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Many scholars and observers who watched the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) dispensing punishment for perpetrators of atrocity crimes decried what they saw 
as the handing down of lenient sentences for some of the most grave crimes under international 
law. A significant body of literature has challenged the legitimacy of the Tribunal’s exercise of power 
in relation to this aspect of its operations. Yet, far less scrutiny has occurred in relation to another 
aspect of the Tribunal’s operations: the premature termination of these widely perceived lenient 
sentences, whereby perpetrators escape one-third of their punishment.  
 
The majority of the perpetrators convicted of atrocity crimes (54 of the 90 sentenced) were granted 
Unconditional Early Release (UER) by the President of the Tribunal and were thus “free as a bird” 
upon release. In contrast to the widespread national practice in relation to perpetrators of serious 
crimes released early on probation, on parole or on conditional release, perpetrators of atrocity 
crimes were often treated more generously, as they were released unconditionally. They were free 
to return to the crime scene and meet their victims, free to be greeted as heroes by welcoming 
crowds of supporters. These scenarios prima facie were an injustice to victims and potentially had 
societal consequences as perpetrators returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), an ethnically-
divided, post-conflict country and said they would be “happy to do it all again”. 
 
This thesis seeks to understand the causes and consequences of UER. It did so through a legitimacy 
framing – examining the extent to which this practice was perceived as legitimate by various groups 
of stakeholders and determining whether it had an overall impact on the legitimacy of the Tribunal. 
It has done so primarily through a legal empirical analysis of the Tribunal Presidents’ early release 
decisions, and through 69 semi-structured interviews with inside stakeholders from the Tribunal, 
outside stakeholders in BiH, and one other international judge. On this basis, the thesis concludes 
that the Tribunal’s grant of UER lacks both in terms of normative and sociological legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, despite this legitimacy deficit, UER has not delegitimised the Tribunal overall, rather, it 
has left a “blackspot” on its legacy. This thesis explains why.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Why Unconditional Release Matters: Why this Research.  
1.1.1. Perpetrators’ Unconditional Early Release in International Criminal Justice 
Despite being found guilty of the most egregious crimes known to mankind, 54 of the 90 
perpetrators sentenced by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) were 
granted unconditional early release (UER) from imprisonment.1 The majority were released after 
serving two-thirds of the declared sentence, effectively escaping one third of their punishment. The 
UER of perpetrators of large-scale crimes such as “mass killings … systematic detention and rape of 
women … and ethnic cleansing”2 raises profound questions about how the international community3 
treats atrocity crimes, understood by this thesis to involve genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, as a category of crime. The practice prima facie treated these crimes with little 
differentiation to ordinary serious crimes, and, in fact, sometimes more generously, as perpetrators 
were released unconditionally.4 It was not simply early release, but unconditional early release 
(UER).5  
 
1.1.2. Research’s Aims and Objectives 
This thesis sought to understand the paradox of punishing those guilty of the most egregious crimes 
and their unconditional early release: why did UER happen? Interviewing insider stakeholders (those 
involved in, and those close to, the decisions) was required to discover the reasoning behind the 
practice. The thesis also sought to understand if others, in particular those people who justice was 
meant to serve - the population affected by those crimes (outside stakeholders) - had queried the 
practice. Thus, understanding the reasons for, and perceptions of, UER was the research’s overall 
aim, in pursuit of which the following research question was asked: 
 
What was the practice and reasoning for the ICTY’s grant of unconditional early 
release (UER), how do stakeholders perceive its legitimacy and to what extent do 
 
1 As of September 2015. See UNMICT website: https://www.irmct.org/en/about/functions/enforcement-of-sentences 
[accessed 03/12/2019].  
2 UNSCR 827 (1993) 25 May 1993. 
3 L.D.A. Corrias and G. M. Gordon, ‘Judging in the Name of Humanity: International Criminal Tribunals and Representation 
of the Global Public’ (2015) Journal of International Criminal Justice 13(1): 97-112.   
4 Up until January 2019, whereby Ćorić was released after serving two-thirds of his sentence but with conditions 
attached, see Chapter 5, s.5.4.8. The lack of conditions attached to release was a factor emphasised by the ICTY 
Prosecutor but explicitly rejected from being considered by the then President Pocar, see Chapter 5, s. 5.4.1.  
5 Yet, it had relatively little scholarly attention, though some of these scholars had urged more research to be undertaken.  
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these perceptions impact on how these stakeholders perceive the ICTY’s overall 
legitimacy?  
 
To answer this overall research question, the thesis posed the following sub-questions: 
 
1. What was the law and practice of UER at the ICTY? 
 
2. What was the reasoning for UER at the ICTY and subsequently at its Residual 
Mechanism, the Mechanism for the International Criminal Tribunals (MICT)?  
 
3. How do inside stakeholders (judges, lawyers and staff) at the ICTY and the MICT 
perceive the legitimacy of UER?  
 
4. How do outside stakeholders (NGOs and CSOs working with victims of the conflict, 
Victims’ Associations, and judges and lawyers engaged in war crimes cases) in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina perceive the legitimacy of UER? 
 
5. Does UER raise broader legitimacy challenges for the ICTY and other International 
Criminal Tribunals?  
 
Although the ICTY’s practice raised legitimacy concerns this was not the first time perpetrators of 
atrocity crimes benefitted from UER at the international level. The Allied Powers responsible for the 
Nuremburg and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals, 1945-1949, and 1945-1948, and subsequent regional 
war crimes trials had granted clemency to the majority of those convicted.6 This clemency was via 
executive decisions,7 based on political contingencies,8 public pressure,9 and a desire to rid the Allied 
Powers of the label of victors’ justice.10 In contrast, UER at the ICTY was granted through a judge (the 
President), in consultation with other judges who had guidance (albeit limited) on what basis to do 
 
6 Discounting the perpetrators who were executed all others, including those who had been sentenced to death, received 
a form of clemency. Clemency, Parole and Early Release was incrementally practiced by the Allied Powers and the other 
countries which prosecuted war crimes, often with the oversight of the Allied Powers. See: S. Wilson, ‘The Sentence is 
Only Half the Story: From Stern Justice to Clemency for Japanese War Criminals, 1945-1958’ (2015) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 13(4): 745-761 at 747. 
7 S. Wilson, ‘The Sentence is Only Half the Story: From Stern Justice to Clemency for Japanese War Criminals, 1945-1958’ 
745- 761.   
8 K. J. Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 
2011) 331-367.  
9 S. Wilson, ‘The Sentence is Only Half the Story: From Stern Justice to Clemency for Japanese War Criminals, 1945-1958’ 
745- 761.   
10 R.H. Minear, Victors’ Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton University Press, 1971).  
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so. As “judicial independence … is an important part of the legitimacy of courts”,11 one of the key 
tasks of the President and his or her colleagues was to ensure that neither political nor public 
pressure had undue influence on their decisions. The Presidents were to be guided by the 
overarching “interests of justice”,12 a rather vague term, which left them with broad discretion. 
However, Presidents were required to consider four factors in determining whether to grant an early 
release: the perpetrator’s crimes, similarly-situated prisoners, a demonstration of rehabilitation and 
substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor.13 The first part of this thesis explores the extent to 
which the Presidents followed this guidance and on what basis they determined that UER was 
appropriate for perpetrators of atrocity crimes. This question was, in part, answered through the 
examination of the publicly-available early release decisions.  
 
1.1.3. This Research’s Contribution to Knowledge  
This judicial reasoning at this enforcement stage, in contrast to other judicial practices,14 has 
attracted limited academic attention. The scholarship has analysed specific elements of the publicly-
available decisions – such as how the President had considered rehabilitation.15 Another had 
criticised the anomaly involved in granting UER to perpetrators who had already benefitted from a 
reduced sentence as a result of pleading guilty, in effect “double-counting”16 a guilty plea. The first 
part of this thesis contributes to scholarship by examining the decisions holistically and from a 
longitudinal perspective,17 thereby enabling an overall assessment of its normative legitimacy.  
 
As the early release decisions gave less than a full account of the decision-making process, the 
research took the opportunity to obtain first-hand the reasoning applied to granting UER to 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes. It was important to know and understand the causes and reasons 
behind the practice, practically, as it was a practice set to continue (see below). It was also important 
at a conceptual level, to understand how stakeholders considered atrocity crimes and their 
perpetrators. This was achieved through conducting qualitative interviews with those who had direct 
 
11 M. Scheinin, H. Krunke and M. Aksenova, Judges as Guardians of Constitutionalism and Human Rights (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2016) at 5. 
12 ICTY Statute, Article 28 – “The President of the International Tribunal, in consultation with the judges, shall decide the 
matter on the basis of the interests of justice and the general principles of law”. 
13 Rules and Procedure of Evidence; Rule 125 General Standards for Granting Pardon or Commutation. 
14 Such as sentencing, the consideration of guilty pleas and joint criminal enterprise.  
15 J.M. Kelder, B. Holá and J. van Wijk, ‘Rehabilitation and Early Release of Perpetrators of International Crimes: A Case 
Study of the ICTY and ICTR’ (2014) International Criminal Law Review 14(6): 1177-1203. 
16 J. Choi, ‘Early Release in International Criminal Law’ (2014) The Yale Law Journal 123: 1783-1784. 
17 See Chapter 2, s.2.3.1. 
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knowledge of the decision-making process (inside stakeholders). This is an original contribution to 
the field of international criminal justice scholarship.18  
 
1.1.4. Perpetrators’ UER and the ICTY’s Stakeholders 
As the law fundamentally plays a role in society,19 including the enforcement of criminal law, an 
examination of the written judicial reasoning and inside stakeholders’ perceptions of UER would only 
tell half of the story. As asserted by Garland, “punishment may be a legal institution … but it is 
necessarily grounded in wider patterns of knowing … and it depends upon these social roots and 
supports for its continuing legitimacy and operation”.20 Garland’s statement refers to sociological 
legitimacy, that is, a “belief in an institution’s right to rule”.21 Such legitimacy is highly dependent on 
the acts of those who administer punishment, and on occasion conclude it prematurely.  
 
Indeed, the ICTY itself, through its judges and staff, asserted that society in the region mattered to 
them in their dispensation of justice: “it will be essential for the ordinary citizens of the region of the 
former Yugoslavia to be satisfied that justice has been achieved”.22 One important perspective which 
this thesis explores, therefore, is the extent to which relevant stakeholders in BiH perceived UER as 
having an impact on justice being achieved. This researcher believes that victims, as persons who 
have suffered directly as a result of the crime, are special stakeholders whose beliefs in justice 
matter.  
 
There is a wealth of scholarship which has examined the ICTY’s engagement with its stakeholders in 
the region (including BiH) and assessed its sociological legitimacy.23 Of most relevance for this thesis 
are assessments of how the ICTY communicated its exercise of power, for example, indictments, 
trials and sentencing, to its stakeholders. As articulated by Kress and Sluiter, the enforcement of 
international criminal justice should form part of its legitimacy assessment.24 This thesis expands this 
field of scholarship as it explores particular stakeholders’ perceptions of the premature termination 
 
18 This element of the thesis is the belief in its legitimacy from one set of stakeholders – the insiders at the Tribunal. 
19 A. Barak, ‘On Judging’ in M. Scheinin, H. Krunke and M. Aksenova (eds.) Judges as Guardians of Constitutionalism and 
Human Rights (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) at 47. 
20 D. Garland, Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory (Clarendon Press, 1999) at 21.  
21 A. Buchanan and R. O. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’ in L. H. Meyer (ed.) Legitimacy, 
Justice and Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009). See Chapter 3, s.3.3.  
22 ICTY Annual Report, 2000, para. 195.  
23 See Chapter 4, s.4.3. 
24 C. Kress and G. Sluiter, ‘Enforcement: Preliminary Remarks’ in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D. Jones (eds.) The Rome 
Statute of International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2002) 1751–1756 at 1753, cited in B. 
Holá and J. van Wijk ‘Life after Conviction at International Criminal Tribunals An Empirical Overview’ (2014) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 12(1): 109-132 at 110. 
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of punishment. It thus contributes to the gap in scholarly assessments of international criminal 
justice’s legitimacy: enforcement’s early ending.  
 
1.1.5. Significance of this Research  
This research was not simply retrospective; it has a practical purpose. The ICTY’s grant of UER is not 
a unique phenomenon; rather, it set the precedent for UER at two-thirds at its sister Tribunal, the 
ICTR.25 Furthermore, the permanent International Criminal Court has a similar practice whereby 
perpetrators’ sentences are reduced;26 they too are free to leave prison with no conditions attached. 
Therefore, UER is a live issue. Although this thesis is an in-depth case study of one International 
Criminal Tribunal (ICT), the ICTY and one of the societies UER had an effect on, BiH, it has highlighted 
legitimacy deficits of relevance to any future ICTs, for example: the sociological legitimacy deficits 
caused by lack of communication and transparency, the normative legitimacy deficit arising from the 
practice of broad discretion held by one individual coupled with a lack of clear guidelines. Identifying 
these legitimacy deficits, the thesis makes recommendations: fundamentally the application of clear 
and consistent reasoning for early release from imprisonment and better communication of that 
reasoning to the people whose lives the practice affects.  
 
1.2. Terminology  
The thesis refers to “perpetrators” of atrocity crimes rather than “convicted persons” or “prisoners”, 
which were terms often used by stakeholders at The Hague and the judges in BiH. This is a conscious 
decision to emphasise their distinct nature;27 they have perpetrated the most egregious crimes, 
which “in contrast to all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems”.28 This 
distinction is also emphasised by the use of the term “atrocity crimes” rather than “international 
crimes”. Other international crimes exist, such as piracy and terrorism. “Atrocity crimes” is used to 
 
25 Although the ICTR had granted an UER for one perpetrator in 2011 (Bagaragaza) it had granted UER at three-quarters 
of the sentence rather than two-thirds. The ICTR, like the ICTY, was established by the UNSC under Chapter VII. When the 
majority of those indicted by the respective Tribunals had been convicted in the first instance, the UNSC used its powers 
to close the ICTR and bring the enforcement of its sentences under an umbrella Residual Mechanism to administer the 
enforcement of final sentences and any retrials. This gave rise to the President of the Residual Mechanism determining 
that those convicted by the ICTR would benefit from the criminal law principle of lex mitor in reading the “similarly-
situated prisoners” guidance, and determined that perpetrators convicted by the ICTR were to be considered as similarly-
situated to ICTY perpetrators. Thus, ICTR perpetrators now were eligible for UER at two-thirds rather than three-quarters; 
see: Bisengimana, Early Release Decision, 11 December 2012, para. 17. 
26 ICC Rule and Procedure of Evidence, Rules 224 and 225: Review concerning reduction of sentence under Article 110, 
although these rules provide much clearer guidelines for the Judges to consider.  
27 A. Smeulers, M. Weerdesteijn and B. Holá, Perpetrators of International Crimes: Theories, Methods, and Evidence 
(Oxford University Press, 2019) at 5.  
28 H. Arendt, ‘Letter to Karl Jaspers of 17 August 1946’, in Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers, Correspondence, 1926-1969 
cited in M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Crime and Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 156-157. 
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reiterate their magnitude and distinct characteristic:29 mass victimisation, mass participation or 
complicity, and their motive – often based on hatred of another.  
 
“Victims” are also described as such rather than “survivors”, based on the legal framing. Although 
the living victim is also a survivor they are under the law, victims of a crime. They testify as victim-
witnesses, which is how they are referenced under the Statute. Further, in addition to The Hague, 
“victims” was overwhelmingly how victims were described in BiH.  
 
The ICTY and its Residual Mechanism are frequently referred to as The Tribunal as the majority of 
interviewees in BiH referred to the ICTY as “The Hague Tribunal”. Many of the stakeholders in BiH 
were unaware that the Residual Mechanism dealt with perpetrators’ applications for early release.  
 
1.3. Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 outlines the methods used and why they were chosen to answer this research question. 
Chapter 3 explains why the legitimacy frame was used to explore the Tribunal’s UER. The legitimacy 
frame was chosen as it enabled a holistic understanding of UER: the application of the law itself and 
the impact of the practice upon society. The chapter further clarifies the stakeholders for whom this 
perception of legitimacy of UER mattered. Chapter 4 outlines the relevant areas of international 
criminal justice scholarship which have explored the ICTY’s exercise of power, given that the 
Presidents’ grant of UER is another exercise of power. Two specific areas are examined. First, the 
scholarship which has scrutinised ICTY’s judicial practices, the normative legitimacy of the Tribunal’s 
exercise of power. As UER does not happen in isolation, people in the region view UER and often 
experience it directly as perpetrators return to the region; consequently, the second area of 
scholarship, the Tribunal’s sociological legitimacy, is examined through scholarship which has 
explored stakeholders’ perceptions of the Tribunal in the region and asked why these perceptions 
were held. Chapter 4 begins however by addressing the specific nature of the ICTY, namely as an ICT 
physically and culturally removed from one of its core stakeholders, the society which experienced 
the crimes adjudicated. It is important to do so as these characteristics are shared by other ICTs and 
the ICC, which may grant early release to perpetrators of atrocity crimes.  
 
 
29 D. Scheffer, ‘Genocide and Atrocity Crimes’ (2006) Genocide Studies and Prevention 1(3): 229-250; D. Scheffer “The 
Merits of Unifying Terms: 'Atrocity Crimes' and 'Atrocity Law' (2007) Genocide Studies and Prevention 2(1): 91-96; and see 
UN ‘Framework for Analysis of Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention’ 2014, noting that “Atrocity crimes take place on a 
large scale, and are not spontaneous or isolated events; they are processes, with histories, precursors and triggering 
factors which, combined, enable their commission” at 14.  
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Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 detail the findings of the research, the analysis of the empirical legal research 
and the semi-structured interviews. Chapter 5 discusses the normative legitimacy deficits of UER and 
outlines how the practice evolved. Through an analysis of the law and the early release decisions, 
the chapter demonstrates how UER was foreseen as an exception but became the standard. This 
was primarily due to the Presidents adopting a stare decisis30 approach, coupled with the Presidents’ 
reading of the law and other documents in favour of the perpetrator. This included how the 
Presidents considered evidence of perpetrators’ demonstration of rehabilitation. As argued above, 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes have committed crimes of a particularly grievous nature which were 
part of societal atrocities. As perpetrators were often due to return to the society concerned, the 
Presidents’ assessment of perpetrators’ rehabilitation was key.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on this particular legitimacy deficit of UER, the Presidents’ assessment of 
perpetrators’ demonstration of rehabilitation. The legitimacy deficit was attributed to a perceived 
inappropriate determination of what rehabilitation for perpetrators of atrocity crimes entails. 
Fundamentally, the legitimacy deficit was based on the unique nature of atrocity crimes: their 
motivation, their perpetrators, and the context of return. Thus, the chapter does not engage with 
the general challenges of determining rehabilitation for perpetrators of ordinary crimes, whatever 
their gravity, as their nature and circumstances of return are so different. This unique nature of 
atrocity crimes gives rise to a distinct purpose of punishment - that is, moral condemnation, which is 
affected when this punishment is terminated early. This purpose of punishment and the impact of 
UER on that purpose is detailed in Chapter 7. This chapter also discusses how UER had repercussions 
in BiH as the President appears to have neglected the purpose of punishment as he granted UER. 
Chapter 8 discusses the impact of UER on a key stakeholder in the international criminal justice 
system, the victims. It begins by reiterating that victims are a key stakeholder and identifies, through 
the thesis’ qualitative interviews in The Hague, why they were overlooked at this stage. The chapter 
identifies what can be done for victims, countering the widespread sense that victims will never be 
satisfied with the outcome of criminal justice.  
 
Chapter 8 continues to answer the broader question of whether UER had an impact on BiH’s 
stakeholders’ overall perception of the ICTY’s legitimacy, and in doing so it highlights the context in 
BiH. This context goes some way to explain why UER, although widely perceived as an illegitimate 
practice, did not, for the vast majority of stakeholders undermine the overall legitimacy of the 
Tribunal. Chapter 9 sets out this research’s contribution to scholarship. It also recognises the thesis’ 
 
30 The judicial practice of following precedent.   
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limitations, the different approaches that could have been taken, and identifies future areas of 
research. It concludes by summarising the most important findings of relevance to international 
criminal justice more broadly.  
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodology adopted in this thesis. It starts by setting out the 
researcher’s positionality, which explains the thesis’ aim and objectives (s.2.2). The chapter outlines 
and explains how and why a qualitative socio-legal methodology was adopted to achieve these aims 
and objectives (s.2.3). The ethical issues associated with the fieldwork, the specific challenges which 
arose during the research period and how these challenges were dealt with, are highlighted, and 
reflected upon (s.2.4). The Chapter recognises the limitations of the study and highlights its 
strengths (s.2.5). 
 
2.2. Why this Research: Researcher’s Positionality  
The researcher’s position is that law and institutions of law do not operate in a vacuum1 and that the 
law should serve the society which it affects.2 An examination of the law, therefore, should be 
undertaken in its societal context.3 As other scholars have advised, a point with which this thesis 
agrees, legal researchers should not “ignore social and political reality”4 around the law. Therefore, 
in addition to understanding the law and practice of UER itself, the thesis sought to understand the 
extent to which social reality in particular can impact on how relevant stakeholders perceive the 
legitimacy of the law’s operationalisation (s.2.3.3). Further, a holistic approach, an understanding of 
the society within which it operates, is required as international criminal law (ICL) does not have, or 
has limited, coercive power in order to operate;5 its operation to an extent, therefore, depends on 
sociological legitimacy – that is, the “belief in the institution’s right to rule” and its ongoing right to 
rule.6 Sociological legitimacy relates to the beliefs held by its multiple stakeholders (Chapter 3, s.3.6), 
those who shape the law and those whose lives are affected by its operations and decisions. With 
these overarching values the thesis sought to understand how the practice of UER happened (how it 
was operationalised), how stakeholders perceived this practice and the impact the practice had on 
their overall perceptions of the institution, the ICTY.  
 
1 M. Aksenova, E. van Sliedrget and S. Parmentier, Breaking the Cycle of Mass Atrocities: Criminological and Socio-Legal 
Approaches in International Criminal Law, (Hart, 2019) at 24. 
2 A. Barak, ‘On Judging’ – ‘the law, as a normative system, has a role in society. It is intended to ensure functional social 
life. It contains order and security alongside justice and morals” in M. Scheinin, H. Krunke and M. Aksenova (eds.) Judges 
as Guardians of Constitutionalism and Human Rights (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) at 47.  
3 D. Feenan (ed.) Exploring the ‘Socio’ of Socio-Legal Studies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) at 6.   
4 M. Aksenova, E. van Sliedrget and S. Parmentier, Breaking the Cycle of Mass Atrocities: Criminological and Socio-Legal 
Approaches in International Criminal Law, (Hart, 2019) at 24. 
5 M. Aksenova, E. van Sliedrget and S. Parmentier, Breaking the Cycle of Mass Atrocities: Criminological and Socio-Legal 
Approaches in International Criminal Law, (Hart, 2019) at 24.  
6 A. Buchanan and R. O. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’ in L. H. Meyer (ed.) Legitimacy, 




A legitimacy frame was used, outlined in Chapter 3, broadly drawing on Beetham’s framework: “for 
power to be fully legitimate … three conditions are required: its conformity to established rules; the 
justifiability of these rules by reference to shared beliefs; and the express consent of the 
subordinate”.7 Within Beetham’s framing other understandings of legitimacy were analysed, used 
and applied. Nevertheless, Beetham’s broad framework allowed the practice of UER to be studied in 
context, as it captured the two elements of normative legitimacy (legality – rules and a moral core - 
beliefs) and the sociological legitimacy (consent) understood here as “acceptance”8 under Beetham’s 
2013 clarification of his 1991 framework. Obtaining an understanding of the concepts of legitimacy 
allowed the qualitative research to enhance these understandings in relation to UER. As noted by 
Geertz, “although one starts at thick description ... from a state of general bewilderment [one does] 
not start (or ought not) intellectually empty-handed”.9 
 
Additionally, a legitimacy frame was used as it allowed this research to contribute to the existing 
scholarship on international criminal justice, and specifically the ICTY. As noted by Aksenova, “there 
is ongoing critical discussion in scholarly and professional circles of the legitimacy of international 
courts and international justice”.10 Therefore, a literature review was undertaken to study these 
critiques primarily concerning, although not limited to, the ICTY’s exercise of power (Chapter 4). This 
frame was logical also because UER was and is an exercise of the ICTY’s power. It is also recognised 
here that the study of international criminal law (and justice) is not “merely a field of study” but 
often “advocacy for international criminal law”.11 As a consequence, a large body of this literature 
often positions itself in a legitimacy frame, critiquing practice and proposing recommendations 
based on these critiques – which this thesis does (Chapter 5, s.5.5, Chapter 6, s.6.7, Chapter 8, s.8.6). 
Therefore, this thesis contributes to this advocacy. Based on the research findings, the thesis 
advocates for reform to the UER practice in order to be perceived as legitimate (as possible) by its 
stakeholders. Other areas of literature reviewed included the purposes of punishment (outlined in 
Chapter 7), given that UER was a premature termination of this. Chapter 7 details how one specific 
purpose was perceived as fitting for atrocity crimes and subsequently negated at UER. Additionally, 
 
7 D. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Macmillan, 2nd edition, 2013). 
8 See D. Beetham ‘Revisiting Legitimacy, Twenty Years On’ in Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An International 
Exploration, in J. Tankebe and A. Liebling (eds.) Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An International Exploration (Oxford 
University Press, 2013) at 20.  
9 C. Geertz, ‘Thick Descriptions: Towards an Interpretative Theory of Culture’ in C. Geertz (ed.) The Interpretation of 
Cultures: Selected Essays (Fontana Press, 1993) at 27.  
10 M. Aksenova, E. van Sliedrget and S. Parmentier, Breaking the Cycle of Mass Atrocities: Criminological and Socio-Legal 
Approaches in International Criminal Law, (Hart, 2019), 23 citing an example of M. Scheinin, H Krunke and M Aksenova 
(eds.) Judges and Guardians of Constitutionalism and Human Rights (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016).  
11 S.M.H Nouwen, ‘As you Set out for Ithaka’: Practical, Epistemological, Ethical, and Existential Questions about Socio-
Legal Empirical Research in Conflict’ (2014) Leiden Journal of International Law 27(1): 227-260 at 229.  
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literature on rehabilitation and the notion of remorse was undertaken as the ICTY’s Rules and 
Procedure of Evidence (RPE) obliged the President to consider the perpetrator’s demonstration of 
rehabilitation in determining a grant of release. This review incorporated stakeholders’ perceptions 
of this factor as well as the Presidents’ consideration of rehabilitation, Chapter 6.12 
 
2.3. Methods Used: Why and How  
To achieve the objectives of this thesis, as the researcher wished to understand the law’s 
implementation within its social reality,13 a socio-legal approach was adopted. It undertook what 
Kagan labelled three socio-legal “research agendas”. 14 That is, the research examined: first, what 
factors shaped the law and their design; second, the legal process and how the decisions were 
made; and third, the effects of the legal processes.15  
 
In relation to understanding the practice of UER, 16 desk-based research was undertaken. This 
entailed the first two of Kagan’s research agendas of what shaped the law on UER, the legal process 
and how the UER decisions were made. It consisted of an analysis of two sets of 
documents: doctrinal analysis of the Statute, the Rules and Procedure of Evidence and the Travaux 
Préparatoires, and empirical legal research of the process of UER and how the early release decisions 
were made. Finally, in relation to the effects of UER and identifying and understanding perceptions 
of it, 17 corresponding to Kagan’s third research agenda, the thesis undertook a qualitative approach 
involving primarily semi-structured interviews.18 
 
2.3.1. Document Analysis  
Legality is a core criterion of legitimacy,19 thus doctrinal analysis of the black letter law on early 
release was first examined: the Statute, its Rules and Procedure of Evidence (RPE), and Practice 
Direction. The research further examined the law’s intention by examining the Travaux 
Préparatoires. Second, the law in practice was examined, that is, the application of these RPE 
through the analysis of the early release decisions. This document analysis is empirical as its analysis 
 
12 ICTY Rules and Procedure of Evidence, Rule 125. 
13 D. Cowen, S. Halliday and C. Hunter, ‘Adjudicating the Implementation of Homelesses Law: The Promise of Socio-Legal 
Studies’ (2006) Housing Studies 21:3, 381-400, at 383.  
14 R. A. Kagan, ‘What Socio-Legal Scholars Should do When There is Too Much Law to Study’ (1995) Journal of Law and 
Society 22(1) at 143-144. 
15 R. A. Kagan, ‘What Socio-Legal Scholars Should do When There is Too Much Law to Study’ at 143. 
16 Sub- Research Questions 1 and 2. 
17 Sub Research Questions 3 and 4.  
18 R.A. Kagan, ‘What Socio-Legal Scholars Should do When There is Too Much Law to Study’ (1995) Journal of Law and 
Society 22(1) at 144.  
19 Beetham’s first factors, exercise of power according to rules.  
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focuses on the stated reasons for UER. The ICTY’s RPE obliged the President to consider four factors 
in their determination as to whether to grant a pardon or commutation of sentence to a 
perpetrator: the gravity of [the prisoner’s] crime, any substantial cooperation with the prosecutor, 
similarly-situated prisoners, and evidence of demonstration of rehabilitation.20 The Statute guided 
the President to decide this on the basis of the “interests of justice” and “general principles of 
law”.21  
 
The thesis examines early release decisions including decisions that deny early release. The decisions 
were collated and systematically analysed in an Excel spreadsheet. This provided a text analysis22 of 
decisions. This database answered the second sub-question of the thesis: What is the legal reasoning 
for the grant of unconditional early release at the ICTY, and, subsequently, the MICT? Systematically 
recording these details, the database provides an empirical record as to which factors were 
considered in most detail, the scope of matters considered as evidence of particular factors (such as 
the perpetrator’s “substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor” and “evidence of their 
demonstration of rehabilitation”).23 These factors were examined in the interviews, obtaining 
stakeholders’ perceptions of these reasons (s.2.4.1).  
 
Trial judgments, and, where applicable, the Appeal Chamber judgments, of those granted UER were 
examined and relevant details recorded in the database. The analysis examined, inter alia, Choi’s 
assertions (see Chapter 5, s.5.4.3) that Tribunal Presidents had erred in “double-counting”24 factors 
such as a guilty plea at the sentencing stage and again at early release. Additionally, some judgments 
set out the purposes of sentencing which were analysed against the early release decision to 
examine the extent to which the stated purposes of sentencing were realised or not as the President 
granted early release. Other details were recorded to garner both the specificities of the perpetrator 
and the bigger picture, the context and the practicalities of early release. These included: the 
typology of the perpetrators;25 the crimes charged with and convicted of;26 plea agreements;27 initial 
sentences and appeals; the length of the incarceration; evidence provided by the enforcement 
state;28 the views of other judges consulted in the decision-making process (where stated); whether 
 
20 Rules and Procedure of Evidence, Rule 125.  
21 ICTY Statute, Article 28.  
22 N. Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research (Routledge, 2003). 
23 ICTY Rules and Procedure of Evidence, Rule 125.   
24 J. Choi, ‘Early Release in International Criminal Law’ (2014) The Yale Law Journal 123: 1783-1784 at 1784.  
25 Typology: direct or indirect perpetrator, military/civilian or political; low, mid or high-level perpetrators. 
26 Categories of Genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes; specific crimes such as murder, rape or torture.  
27 Plea agreements including whether charges were dropped and whether any obligations were placed upon the 
perpetrator.  
28 Such as a psychologist report, prison report on behaviour and prison or state recommendations on release. 
13 
 
the decisions were made public and the timing of this; the statutory factors considered, other 
perpetrator-related factors,29 any stated legal principles; other considerations30 and the 
circumstances surrounding the crime.31  
 
The database also provided a record of how these decisions evolved over time. For example, the 
more time progressed, the more detailed the decisions became. This longitudinal record indicated 
how the procedure of early release evolved, a unique contribution to scholars’ assessment of the 
practice, focused primarily on the Presidents’ consideration of perpetrators’ rehabilitation.32  
 
The database details the law in action: both its practice and reasoning.33 The database, recording not 
only numerically, but verbatim, captured the principles that the Presidents had applied in their 
reasoning to grant or deny early release. The most detailed factor was that of the perpetrator’s 
demonstration of rehabilitation, and, therefore, the reasoning applied to this factor was examined in 
detail. The bases of the Presidents’ determinations were set out in the database. The Presidents’ 
reasoning (when stated) included a perpetrator’s: surrender to the Tribunal; guilty plea; activities 
undertaken in prison; reflections on their crimes; attitude to staff; attitude towards other prisoners; 
prospects of resettlement; job prospects upon release; age; health; and family ties.34 As many of 
these reasons are “value judgements”35 made by the President, they beg the question of whether 
these bases are actually considered as rehabilitation by other stakeholders. Therefore, the question 
on what constitutes sound bases for a demonstration of rehabilitation was part of the interview 
template, to examine the extent to which stakeholders may identify with the Presidents’ bases of 
rehabilitation. Chapter 6 discusses these findings and debates around this area of the Presidents’ 
decision-making. 
 
Additionally, the database identified the dominant practice that had, at least on the black letter of 
Presidential decisions, been applied, namely, that the “similarly-situated prisoners” had been 
determinative to grant perpetrators’ UER, noted by Choi, Merrylees and Holá et al. As the research 
 
29 Perpetrator related -such as age, ill-health, family-ties. 
30 Considerations such as victims, the community upon return.  
31 The extent to which the crimes were committed as part of a wider-strategy, ethnicity etc.  
32 See Chapter 4, s.4.5, J. Choi, B. Holá et al, A. Merrylees.  
33 See similar approaches: Swisspeace and Oxford Transitional Justice Research, Transitional Justice Methods Manual: An 
Exchange on Researching and Assessing Transitional Justice (Swisspeace, 2013) noting that database can provide an 
“analysis of the principles underpinning the law … examining whether these principles can be morally justified and if they 
are realised in the application of the law” at 25.   
34 See Chapter 6, s.6.6.   
35 See Chapter 3, s. 3.5: T. Treves, ‘Aspects of Legitimacy of Decisions of International Courts and Tribunals’ in R. Wolfrum 
and V. Roben (eds.) Legitimacy in International Law (Springer, 2008) at 170. 
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question sought to understand perceptions of legitimacy, how this factor should be considered was 
raised in the interview template.  
2.3.2. Analysis of the Tribunal’s Non-Legal Materials  
Other documents of the ICTY were also examined. This examination enabled the contextualisation of 
these decisions, of how the ICTY communicated its early release decisions (or not). These documents 
included: the Tribunal’s Annual Reports (ARs); speeches by the President and the Prosecutor to the 
UNSC in submitting the ARs; speeches made in the region and at international conferences by ICTY 
judges, prosecutors and staff, and articles they had published in special editions of academic 
journals;36 press releases issued by the Tribunal, and records of Questions and Answers at 
conferences organised by the Tribunal.37 These documents “represent[ed] a specific version of 
realities”,38 that is, how the ICTY represented itself and its purposes to its stakeholders. Analysis of 
these documents informed the semi-structured interviews, as interviewees were often asked, as 
follow-ups to the interview questions, about the Tribunal’s general outreach and specific instances 
of notable practices.39 Examining these documents indicated a prima facie lack of priority that the 
Tribunal afforded to communicate the decisions. The researcher also kept abreast of the current 
communication by the Tribunal. Regular checks of the Court Records on any Presidents’ decisions on 
early release were undertaken, which were not widely communicated but, nevertheless, publicly 
available. This matter was raised with stakeholders in The Hague – was there a reason as to why 
these decisions were not communicated consistently to the region?  
 
Alongside these accounts, the Tribunal’s bilateral agreements with enforcement states (where the 
perpetrators served their sentences) were examined; what specific terms had been agreed between 
the Tribunal and enforcement states as to how they would detain perpetrators of atrocity crimes in 
their domestic prisons, and under what circumstances they would not detain them. Additionally, the 
penal laws and policies relating to prisoner release of these countries were examined, via the EU 
portal.40 This review checked details such as: whether the country had specific penal law and 
sentencing for atrocity crimes; maximum and minimum sentences available for serious crimes; 
 
36 See: Special Issue: ‘The ICTY Ten Years On’ (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 2(2), with the majority of 
contributions written by staff and judges at the ICTY.   
37 See ICTY website: ‘From 2010 onwards, with attention paid to the legacy of the ICTY steadily rising, a series of 
conferences were convened to stimulate stakeholder discussions on the Tribunal’s impact in the former Yugoslavia and 
on the global scene … The events took place in The Hague in 2010 and 2011, in Zagreb in 2012, and in Sarajevo in 2012 
and 2013’. See: https://www.icty.org/en/features/legacy-conferences [accessed 29/01/2020].  
38 U. Flick, An Introduction to Qualitative Research (Sage, 6th edition, 2018) at 357.  
39 For example the ICTY 2000 Annual Report noted the reasons why Outreach Offices were established in the region, and 
some interviewees were asked about this when particular positions were taken, such as that the ICTY’s sole purpose was 
to prosecute and trial perpetrators.  
40 See: https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_member_state_law-6-en.do [accessed 02/12/2019]. 
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whether life sentences were available; minimum and maximum incarceration time for specific 
crimes; policies on prisoner release (usually parole or release on probation), rehabilitation 
programmes and requirements for prisoners to be considered for release, and any policies that 
existed relating to victims’ right to information and protection at the release stage. This review 
allowed the UER to be put in the context of perpetrators’ setting – as it was the national law of the 
enforcement state which was the trigger for the President to consider a perpetrator’s release – 
under the Statute.41 The agreements did not state whether enforcement states had particular penal 
law relating to perpetrators of atrocity crimes or any specific measures relating to typologies of 
perpetrators which could be drawn upon. It was important to determine whether this had been the 
case as it may have influenced the Presidents’ decision-making process, given the paucity of 
precedent they had to draw upon as the first international criminal tribunal with a provision 
explicitly enabling a perpetrator not to serve their full sentence.42  
 
2.3.3. Understanding the Social Context of UER in BiH  
As the second set of sub-questions (3, 4 and 5) of the overall research question examines the 
perceptions of legitimacy of the practice, it was important to put these perceptions in their context. 
As a socio-legal study it seeks to understand a practice in its social-setting;43 it was, thus, important 
for this research to obtain an understanding of the social context itself.44 Therefore, news coverage 
examining national responses of UER was assessed and monitored over the course of the PhD.45 The 
examination was limited to sources tailored for the non-local audience. This assessment of the 
coverage indicated that relatively little attention had been paid and that reporting was rather 
matter-of-fact.46 The routine nature of media and international legal coverage suggested that there 
was a lack of interest, at least in the international sphere. The extent to which this was the case in 
the regional sphere was not known, and the question was therefore added to the research 
instrument. After the fieldwork, Bosnian media coverage of, and political reactions to, early release 
 
41 Article 28 of the ICTY Statute provides that “pursuant to the applicable law of the State in which the convicted person is 
imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or commutation of sentence, the State concerned shall notify the 
International Tribunal accordingly”. 
42 Article 28 of the Statute.  
43 N. Golafshani ‘Understanding Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research’ (2005) The Qualitative Report 8(4) citing 
M. Patton, Qualitative evaluation and research methods (Sage, 3rd edition, 2002) at 14. 
44 N. Wamai, ‘Frist Contact with the Field: Experiences of an Early Career Researcher in the Context of National and 
International Politics in Kenya’ (2014) Journal of Human Rights Practice 6(2): 213.  
45 Primarily through BIRN. Daily news reports were received from BIRN and weekly news reports from Free Radio Europe 
(Free Radio Europe was a round-up of other news sources, such as Al Jazeera, the BBC and regional news stations). Blog-
posts such as the International Crimes Database and Opinio Juris were also examined. 
46 For journalist-NGO interviewee comment on how she “had to” report. Interview, NGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 27/10/2017. Early 
Release decision usually reports factually the name of the perpetrators being released at two-thirds of their sentence.  
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were examined by a local consultant.47 Although it was retrospective, this locally-sourced data 
provided an added layer of rigour to the overall research, obtaining the views of not only Western 
and Western-sponsored media and international organisations but indicated how the national and 
local communities popularly viewed UER. Additionally, in December 2018, a special edition of the 
International Criminal Justice Review (ICJR) was published. The articles focused on the homecomings 
of those trialled before the ICTY.48 These articles primarily analysed the personality of the 
perpetrators, the high level of denialism and the role of the media and political parties in organising 
their welcoming receptions. The consultant’s review and the academic analysis of the homecomings 
received by those returning from The Hague (ICJR special edition) confirmed the interview data, and 
the literature asserting that perceptions of the Tribunal in BiH are significantly influenced by 
political-ethnic elites. 
 
The routine monitoring of the Balkans Transitional Justice news and other NGOs and IGOs reports49 
allowed the researcher, to the greatest extent possible, to be up-to-date with the pertinent legacies 
of atrocity crimes in the region. These included issues related to war crimes prosecution, and ethnic 
and post-conflict matters, which provided a deeper understanding of the bigger picture, in which 
early release occurred. This material was not a major source of information; rather the ongoing 
review enabled a broader understanding of the post-conflict society of BiH, which forms the context 
in which early release occurs and stakeholders’ perceptions are affected.  
 
2.4. Fieldwork and Interviews  
A total of 69 semi-structured interviews were conducted: 17 interviews with stakeholders in The 
Hague50 and 51 with stakeholders in BiH in 2017.51 In 2018, a further two interviews were 
conducted. One Tribunal judge was interviewed in Paris, September 2018, and one judge serving at 
an International Criminal Tribunal was interviewed in Northern Ireland in November 2018. The 
 
47 Money from the university was obtained after the fieldwork was conducted but the consultant tracked media coverage 
from the time of the 54 early releases.  
48 ‘Special Issue: ICTY Celebrities: War Criminals Coming Home’ (2018) International Criminal Justice Review: 28(4). 
49 For example, reports from NGOs such as TRIAL International, Amnesty International, International Crisis Group, Helsinki 
Watch were researched and monitored for the same purposes. Other sources were researched such as the EU’s Office of 
the High Representative; the OSCE, the UNDP, UN Treaty Body Monitoring Mechanisms and the International Review of 
the Red Cross’ National Humanitarian Biannual Update on National Legislation and Caselaw.  
50 In January – February 2017 two weeks were spent in The Hague, 17 interviews were conducted. One interview was 
conducted with an UNMICT judge in September 2018.  
51 See Annex II for the full list of interviews. One of these BiH interviews were conducted over skype in January 2018, but 
listed here for ease of reference.  
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thesis’ methodology took an “actor-orientated”52 approach, which calls for socio-legal research to be 
undertaken in a manner which recognises the agency of those people whose lives are affected by 
outside forces.53 Thus, semi-structured interviews were conducted and as far as possible, 
interviewees’ words are cited verbatim. The actor-orientated approach further calls for “evaluation 
of legal principles in terms of their concrete effects in a social setting, rather than in terms of the 
conceptual coherence of abstract principles.”54 This was implemented by familiarisation with the 
context of BiH, for interviewees to choose the location of the interview. This approach also draws 
upon the principles of critical victimology55 which also seeks “to capture … the lived realities of 
human beings”56 and, therefore, “examine the wider social context” of victims.57 Thus, a large part of 
the findings chapters discusses the context within which these perceptions of UER’s legitimacy is 
formulated. The approach taken by critical victimology further seeks to understand not only the 
wider social context but its origins, “the processes … which remain hidden”.58 For the purposes of 
this thesis this meant finding and listening to the voices of those with first-hand knowledge of UER, 
stakeholders in The Hague.  
 
Following this, the thesis sought to understand both perspectives, those with first-hand knowledge 
of the abstract principles which informed UER (the stakeholders in The Hague) and those whose lives 
they may impact, such as stakeholders in post-conflict BiH. It also recognised that the two sets of 
stakeholders, insiders (The Hague interviewees) and outsiders (interviewees in BiH), are not 
homogeneous, therefore, multiple stakeholders within those groups were identified for a multi-level 
approach (seniority and a range of professions). Obtaining a range of stakeholders’ perceptions as to 
the legitimacy of the practice of and reasoning for UER offered the possibility of illuminating 
 
52 N. Long, ‘From Paradigm Lost to Paradigm Regained? The case for an Actor-orientated Sociology of Development’ 
(1990) European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 49 and more recently, C. Nyamu-Musembi, ‘Towards an 
actor-orientated perspective on human rights’ IDS Working Paper 169 (Institute for Development Studies, 2002).  
53 N. Long, ‘From Paradigm Lost to Paradigm Regained? The case for an Actor-orientated Sociology of Development’ 
(1990) European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies r 49: 6.  
54 C. Nyamu-Musembi, ‘Towards an actor-orientated perspective on human rights’ IDS Working Paper 169 (Institute for 
Development Studies, 2002) at 2 referencing J. Singer, ‘Property and coercion in federal Indian Law: the conflict between 
critical and complacent pragmatism’; M. Rabin, ‘The pragmatist and the feminist’; M. Matsuda, ‘Pragmatism modified and 
the false consciousness problem’; M. Minow and now E. Spelman, ‘In context’ – all in Southern California Law Review 
(1990).  
55 D. Rothe and D. Kauzlarich, Towards a Victimology of State Crime (Routledge, 2014); L. Wolhuter, N. Olley and D. 
Denham, Victimology, Victimisation and Victims’ Rights, (Routledge-Cavendish, 2009); D. Kauzlarich, R.A. Matthews and 
W.J. Millers ‘Toward a Victimology of State Crime’ Critical Criminology (2001) 10: 173; M. Maguire and J. Pointing (eds.) 
Victims of Crime, A New Deal? (Open University Press, 1988) and I. Mawby and S. Walklate (eds.) Critical Victimology: 
International Perspectives (Sage, 1998).   
56 I. Mawby and S. Walklate (eds.) Critical Victimology: International Perspectives (Sage, 1998) at 19. 
57 I. Mawby and S. Walklate (eds.) Critical Victimology: International Perspectives (Sage, 1998) at 21.  
58 I. Mawby and S. Walklate (eds.) Critical Victimology: International Perspectives (Sage, 1998) at 19. 
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commonalities (shared beliefs)59 as to what these stakeholders perceived as illegitimate or 
legitimate practices and/or the stated reasons for UER – the final sub-research question.  
 
To gain an understanding of stakeholders’ perceptions of UER, and in the case of BiH the extent to 
which this had had an impact on their overall perception of the Tribunal’s legitimacy, a semi-
structured interview model was adopted. This meant that interviewees were able to outline their 
perceptions in their own words, and on their own terms.60 Further, in the case of BiH participants 
were provided with information61 regarding the stated reasons for early release, which had not been 
known to many of them. Semi-structured interviews are fluid and flexible.62 Open-ended questions 
allowed the research to give voice to interviewees and allow new insights to emerge, which would 
not be available with pre-defined answers listed in a survey.63 Additionally, “specific follow-up 
questions emerge as the interview unfolds”64 which allowed the researcher to tease out further 
reasoning and to enable views to be clarified, thus providing a deeper understanding of 
interviewees’ opinions. Finally, although the thesis provides an analysis of the interviews, 
stakeholders’ views are seen directly, quoted largely in their own words, in order to give voice to 
them.65  
2.4.1. Interviews with Stakeholders in The Hague  
In The Hague, 17 interviews were conducted,66 across all three organs of the Tribunal: the Chambers, 
The Registry and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).67 This range of stakeholders is representative of 
those who are agents of the system, from the decision-makers to those who administer and 
represent the system.68 Of the Chambers seven judges were interviewed and two staff of the 
President’s Office. One senior staff member of the OTP was interviewed.69 Six staff from the Registry 
 
59 Beetham’s second required element of a legitimate exercise of power – that the power holder and the subordinate 
have shared beliefs as to the justifiability of the rules.  
60 Surveys can obtain a wide scope of opinions, these are pre-defined and therefore are subjective themselves. 
61 Nouwen has noted the value of semi-structured interviews whereby the “researcher engages in a dialogue and also 
answers the interviewees’ questions ... in an attempt to avoid purely extractive research” see S.M.H Nouwen ‘As you Set 
out for Ithaka’: Practical, Epistemological, Ethical, and Existential Questions about Socio-Legal Empirical Research in 
Conflict’ at 246.  
62 T. May, Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process (Open University Press, 2012) 132-136; N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln 
(eds.) The SAGE Handbook (Sage, 5th edition, 2018) at 3.  
63 A. Bryson and S. McConville, The Routledge Guide to Interviewing: Oral History, Social Enquiry and Investigation, 
(Routledge, 2014) at 12.  
64 K. Punch, Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches (Sage, 3rd edition, 2014) at 145. 
65 J. Popay, J. Rogers and G Williams, ‘Rationale and standards for systematic review of qualitative literature in health 
services research’ (1998) Qualitative Health Research (8) 345 cited in E. Fossey, C. Harvey, F. McDermott and L. Davidson, 
‘Understanding and evaluating qualitative research’ Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 36 (2002) at 723.  
66 One interview with a Tribunal judge was held in September 2018, in Paris. 
67 See: https://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/organisational-chart  
68 D. Beetham, ‘Revisiting Legitimacy, Twenty Years On’ in J. Tankebe and A. Liebling (eds.) Legitimacy and Criminal 
Justice: An International Exploration (Oxford University Press, 2013) at 24.  
69 The Chief Prosecutor and his Principal Legal Counsel and Deputy to the Prosecutor were formally invited for an 
interviewee. The OPT responded and one senior staff member met in place of the Chief and Deputy Prosecutor. In 
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were interviewed: one senior member of the Court Support Services, one junior, staff of the Witness 
and Protection Unit, Legal Aid and Defence Matters, Public Information and Outreach.70 An interview 
with a defence lawyer was also conducted at the Tribunal. Gaining access to interviewees who were 
working in The Hague was an arduous task. “Purposeful sampling”71 was undertaken to identify 
interviewees for their knowledge, to obtain a balance of opinions from differing levels of seniority, 
and different practice areas (lawyers, journalists, public relations, psychologists for example).72 
Names were obtained through public documentation.73 Formal letters of invitation were sent out 
two months in advance, but positive responses came after considerable email correspondence and 
numerous phone calls to the Tribunal’s administrative staff. When one judge was thanked for 
agreeing to be interviewed, he laughed and said that “persistence”74 had paid off. Snowballing75 also 
occurred while at The Hague since three interviews were obtained due to senior staff members 
requesting their staff or colleagues to be interviewed.76  
 
The researcher had held “elite interviews”,77 with senior professionals, in previous research, and in 
the context of contested issues (see s.2.5). All initial questions were open-ended.78 Probing into 
these specific challenges came later in the interviews, by which time a good rapport had usually 
developed. 
 
Interviews with eight staff members of the Tribunal were held and their overall views obtained. 
These staff members are insiders,79 described by Takemura as “constituent members”.80 To obtain a 
balance, as far as possible, defence attorneys (relative outsiders) were invited for interviews and one 
interview was held. They were physically working at the Tribunal but representing the accused (and 
 
contrast to snowballing at the Registry and President’s Office, no further interviews were obtained with other 
prosecutorial staff.  
70 Additionally, an informal meeting was held with a former Prosecutor. See Annex II for full list of interviewees. 
71 M.Q. Patton, ‘Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods’ (Sage, 3rd edition, 2002) at 40. 
72 M.Q. Patton, ‘Qualitative Research’ 3 Encyclopaedia of Statistics in Behavioural Science (Wiley-Blackwell, 2005). 
73 Judgments identified the relevant judges, prosecutor and defence lawyers, conference proceedings identified staff, 
from the President’s Office, the Registry and Outreach; Press Releases identified the relevant staff from the Media and 
Public Relations team 
74 Interview, Judge, The Hague, afternoon 30/01/2017.  
75 A. Bryson and S. McConville, The Routledge Guide to Interviewing: Oral History, Social Enquiry and Investigation 
(Routledge, 2014) at 40.  
76 At the Registry and the President’s Office.  
77 A. Bryson and S. McConville, The Routledge Guide to Interviewing: Oral History, Social Enquiry and Investigation 
(Routledge, 2014).  
78 See Annex III – follow-up questions included the extent to which they believe in the legitimacy of the practice, if not, 
why not and if yes, why so? As active participants in the decision-making process, could they justify the UER decisions, to 
themselves and their audiences? 
79 Alongside the categorization of “constituents” the word “regime insiders” can be used, see J. Weiler, ‘The Rule of 
Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute-Settlements’ 
(2001) Journal of World Trade 35: 193.  
80 H. Takemura, ‘Reconsidering the Meaning and Actuality of the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court’ 
(2012) Amsterdam Law Forum 41 Spring Issue, at 6. 
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later the perpetrator) and their best interests. One defence attorney agreed to be interviewed, and 
his perceptions of UER were obtained; his opinions on the practice and reasoning.  
 
The majority of interviewees, especially judges and lawyers, were forthcoming in information 
sharing and their opinions, and many had strong views on UER. It was noteworthy that although all 
interviewees, at the outset of the interview, were informed that anonymity was available, less senior 
staff were often reluctant to express their views in contrast to senior staff members who were 
outspoken.81 Two Tribunal judges who were most critical of the UER had opted for anonymity at the 
outset of the interview. Although other judges were happy for their names to be used, it was 
decided to place blanket anonymity across all judges to ensure anonymity for these two particular 
judges. One judge was an exception to the overall outspokenness. He began introductions by stating 
that questions on specific cases should not be asked as it had been “some time”82 since the rulings. 
Most interviewees had the interview transcript or typed notes returned to them83 with the option to 
clarify, which a few did.  
 
2.4.2. Interviews with Stakeholders in BiH  
Over the course of three months, 51 interviews were conducted with stakeholders in BiH,84 a total of 
57 individuals in all.85 The range of stakeholders interviewed were: 10 judges (all but one were 
deciding war crimes case); 10 prosecutors (one of whom was also a member of a Parole Board) and 
four defence lawyers working on war crimes cases; 20 NGOs, CSOs (Civil Society Organisations), and 
Victims Associations (VAs) working on victim and conflict related matters; 5 staff from IGOs86 and 5 
independent experts.87 Having this range of stakeholders provided perspectives of individuals from 
diverse backgrounds: those who worked in professional roles, judges and lawyers who are meant, in 
theory, to apply objectivity over emotions throughout their work; those from outside of BiH but with 
 
81 Of the Registry, three interviewees were held; one senior staff member was very forthcoming with details of the 
practice and his views, in contrast to less senior staff who were reluctant to voice their opinions; similarly this was the 
case for two staff members at the President’s Office – the senior staff member was forthcoming in contrast to the less 
senior and the same pattern was reflected in the Communications team.  
82 Interview, Former Judge of the ICTY, 25/01/2017.  
83 All interviewees were offered a return of their transcripts or notes, two who had requested anonymity did not wish to 
have the notes or the transcript returned.  
84 51 interviews were conducted in BiH, and one interview was conducted with an interviewee in BiH, over skype in 
January 2018.  
85 For a full list of interviewees, see Annex II.  
86 Two staff members met separately from the EU; and senior staff from the COE and one senior staff member from the 
UNDP.  
87 One interview was a senior staff member at an independent state institution, with extensive experience of working in 
IGOs, another was a lawyer who had worked in the national legal profession with the ICTY rule 11bis cases, another from 
an NGO and now working with an IGO, another IGO staff member was interviewed but in a personal capacity, and finally 
an interpreter who had worked with the ICTY in a number of the Srebrenica cases. One NGO representative was too busy 
to meet during the fieldwork and a skype interview was held on return to Belfast. 
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years of experience working inside BiH (4 of the 5 IGO interviewees); those who, although they may 
be more inclined to victims’ interests, but may be open to a perpetrators’ human rights to 
rehabilitation as NGOs predominantly working on human rights law; and VAs with direct experience 
of perpetrators returning to the community within which they reside. Further, the interviews were 
spread throughout the country; in the Federation (predominately Bosniak and Croat population), the 
Republika Srpska (RS) (predominately Serb) and the Brčko district (mixed).88 The geographical spread 
of interviews across BiH was also valuable as interviewees testified to the specificities of the 
different typologies of perpetrators returning, and their reception by the different communities 
within the locality. For example, interviewees in Brčko and Prijedor (RS) spoke of returning low-level 
perpetrators living in close proximity to them.89 These interviewees spoke directly to opinions made 
by interviewees in Sarajevo and larger towns (Zenica) who believed that direct victims in these areas 
were deeply affected by perpetrators’ return and their ongoing presence.  
  
A research assistant was recruited to organise and interpret the interviews conducted in Bosnian, 
and logistics of travel through the Federation, the Republika Srpska and the Brčko District. All BiH 
correspondence (arranging and following up interviews) used the language from Bosnian/Croat/Serb 
versions of the ICTY website.90 All correspondence was sent in English and Bosnian so the two could 
be checked against each other, and the original language acknowledged. Prior to interviews, 
interpretation by the research assistant was prepared by going through the translation of the 
interview questions and foreseen follow-up questions together. As semi-structured interviews are 
fluid, the interviews were conducted “with, rather than through, [the] interpreter”.91 Therefore, the 
interpreter was given an “induction to the research”:92 the research’s aims and objectives, the 
doctrinal analysis and its findings and concepts such as the purposes of punishment, rehabilitation 
and remorse.  
 
 
88 For a comprehensive outline of the insitutionalisation of ethnic demography see: of the country of BiH: C. Grewe and 
M. Riegner, ‘Internationalized Constitutionalism in Ethnically Divided Societies: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo 
Compared’ in A. von Bogandy and R. Wolfrum (eds.) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2011) at 15.  
89 This included one Prosecutor in Banja Luka who raised the case of Mrđa, released early by the ICTY and who was at 
that time under investigation for another massacre he participated in, had been further investigated for witness 
intimidation and later he was prosecuted and sentenced.  
90 Obtaining the Bosnian versions of the Statute, the Rules and Procedure of Evidence, the Practice Direction the relevant 
caselaw both for language and clarity of the details of the process.  
91 R. Edwards, ‘A Critical examination of the use of interpreters in the qualitative research process’ (January 1998) Journal 
of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24(1) 197-208 at 197.  
92 R. Edwards, ‘A Critical examination of the use of interpreters in the qualitative research process’ (January 1998) Journal 
of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24(1): 197-208 at 200.  
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With the exception of the War Crimes Chambers judges,93 all interviewees were asked if they wished 
to be recorded or would rather notes were taken. Of the 51 BiH interviews, 24 were conducted in 
Bosnian with the interpreter, and most were audio-recorded. All recorded interviews were 
transcribed, and when interviews were not recorded, notes were taken and typed up. Interviewees 
were asked if they wished to receive a copy. Transcripts were returned for those who did request a 
copy.  
 
Three interviews had multiple participants.94 Invitations were sent to individuals and in some 
instances they invited colleagues.95 Interviews with multiple participants and an interpreter posed 
specific challenges. In the first such interview, the judges interrupted each other and gave little 
space for interpretation. In the following interviews, when necessary, an active approach was taken, 
when they spoke over each other or interrupted, the interviewees were asked to pause to allow for 
interpretation. With the exception of judges, the majority of interviewees were interested in the 
research, wanted to know more about the process and reasoning for UER, and wanted to voice their 
opinions. Judges who often initially expressed little interest became more engaged when the matter 
of perpetrators’ rehabilitation and return were raised.  
 
This thesis does not claim that the interview data is fully representative of stakeholders’ groups 
(judges, lawyers, NGOs, victims etc). The fact that this element of the thesis (the sociological 
legitimacy of UER) is qualitative, and further that the interviewees were of selective groups, means 
that they do not provide a full answer to the question of the perceived legitimacy of the practice. 
However, the interview analysis captures a snapshot of UER’s perceived legitimacy at a time and 
place with a select group of stakeholders, and discusses patterns of shared perceptions and, through 
analysis of the interviews how these align with existing concepts of legitimacy96 and context, and a 
proposed understanding of why these perceptions were held. It provides a rich and deep 
understanding of their perceptions.  
 
The nature of the semi-structured interviews, in part, a conversation between the researcher and 
the interviewee, meant that the researcher was able to provide information on the details of early 
 
93 The two interviews with four judges of the Bosnian State Court War Crimes Chambers were not recorded as the 
recorder was not allowed to be brought into the Chambers. 
94 Often reflecting the ethnic make-up, a Serb and a Bosniak were the two State Court judges interviewed on the first day, 
the second two were both Serb as Aldijana pointed out after the interview. An interview with an NGO had an interpreter; 
also one of the staff members spoke fluent English.  
95 In the case of judges and prosecutors, where names were not provided by the court staff, open invitations were sent to 
the judges via the court administrative staff. 
96 Notably the standards of legitimacy, set out in Chapter 3, s.3.5.  
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release and Tribunal stakeholders’ perceptions of the practice, which were unknown to the 
interviewee. This sharing of information adds to the ethical dimension of research (detailed s.2.5). 
Many of the interviewees were, although frequently frustrated with UER, glad to have received 
some answers as to why the practice happened and the knowledge that many in The Hague also had 
misgivings about the practice. Further, sharing this information was positive for the value of the 
research overall. Firstly, it provided the research with a more nuanced understanding of “legitimacy” 
elements, as the interviewee could voice their perceptions of not only the legitimacy of outcome 
(the actual early release),97 but its legitimacy of exercise – that is, the operationalisation and its 
reasoning. Secondly, as a result of this, more in-depth understanding allowed the researcher to 
propose98 ways in which practice of early release, where it occurs in other International Criminal 
Tribunals (ICTs), and even the UNMICT, could be operationalised so as to, as far as possible, obtain 
some legitimacy.   
 
In advance, and again before commencing the interview, all interviewees were offered a subject 
information sheet and consent form to sign or to give oral confirmation that they agreed to be 
interviewed.99 Many had not read the information sheet in advance, and a brief introduction was 
made, 100 ensuring participants gave voluntary informed consent.101 All interviews began with a short 
introduction by the researcher, and all interviewees were asked to speak about their own or their 
organisation’s background - if they wished.102 This was a sign of respect that it was their voices as 
individuals that were being sought, actively listened to and reported on. It was their unique opinions 
and contribution to knowledge. They were research participants not subjects. This approach was 
taken and is captured best by Kelman, who urged that the model of elite interviewing be applied to 
all interviewees. Practically, this translates into orientating an interviewee to reflect that “the 
interview[er] is concerned with [the interviewee’s] personal opinions, beliefs, and experiences – 
matters on which he clearly has unique information to contribute”.103  
 
 
97 Researchers have already reported (noted in Chapter 4) the frustration of the Tribunal’s UER.  
98 Detailed in the findings Chapters 6, 7 and 8, 
99 B. Browne and L. Moffet, ‘Finding Your Feet in the Field: Critical Reflections of Early Career Researchers on Field 
Research in Transitional Societies’ (2014) Journal of Human Rights Practice 6(2): 223–237 at 228. 
100 A. Bryson and S. McConville, The Routledge Guide to Interviewing: Oral History, Social Enquiry and Investigation, 
(Routledge, 2014) at 57. They were informed what the research was about (and what it was not about), its aims, and how 
the information and views they shared would be used. They were told they could terminate the interview at any time, 
and could have anonymity.  Interviews were either audio recorded or notes were made 
101 H.C. Kelman, ‘The Rights of the Subject in Social Research: An Analysis in Terms of Relative Power and Legitimacy’ 
(1972) American Psychologist 27(11): 989-1016 at 1001.  
102 In The Hague this was often asked in terms of their professional backgrounds; the same for judges and lawyers and 
international NGOs in BiH, and for VAs an introduction of their work.  
103 H.C. Kelman, ‘The Rights of the Subject in Social Research: An Analysis in Terms of Relative Power and Legitimacy’ 
(1972) American Psychologist 27(11): 989-1016 at 1004.  
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While the research successfully secured these 51 interviews, there was also evidence of research 
fatigue in BiH that meant not all people contacted agreed to be involved. Twenty-five years after the 
war most NGOs had been interviewed numerous times by Western researchers. The sense of fatigue 
and frustration was eloquently noted by one NGO Director, as she declined an interview. She stated 
that her NGO was not looking back anymore, only looking forward. In addition to providing an 
example of research fatigue, this example is noted as it is believed that it demonstrates the value of 
sending out the information sheet in advance (for voluntary informed consent). Individuals are 
provided with the opportunity to make informed decisions as to whether or not to participate, and 
the practice ensures that the principle of “do no harm” was being applied. 104 
2.4.3. Analysis of Fieldwork Data  
In both The Hague and BiH a journal was kept. It recorded the environment in which research 
occurred, not only in the course of the interviews but in the wider context of the Tribunal and the 
various cities, towns and villages in BiH. During trips to areas with the interpreter, the research 
journal consisted of joint reflections, such as the body language of the interviewee and so on. The 
practice of the journal and recording notes meant that the interpretative process of data analysis 
began actively during the course of the fieldwork itself.105  
 
The method employed for analysing the interview data drew upon Braun and Clarke’s method of 
thematic analysis. The thematic analysis method echoed the methodology of analysing qualitative 
research: “analysis … is sorting out the structures of significance”.106 These structures of significance 
are themes. The computer software NVivo was the relevant tool for undertaking this method 
rigorously. NVivo provided a means to read through transcribed interviews and code by identified 
themes, add new themes and cross-reference them. Before using NVivo, the thematic analysis of the 
data was commenced in the fieldwork period itself, as audio-recordings of the interviews were 
transcribed by the researcher as soon as possible after the interview. Possible themes (identified 
through dominant phrases used or issues raised by interviewees) were noted in the researcher’s 
journal – the data that “emerged as important and of interest from the text”.107 One month after the 
fieldwork, all transcriptions (including the Bosnian-English interviews) were uploaded into NVivo for 
 
104 G. Burgess (ed.) Field Research: A Source Book and Field Manual (Allen and Unwin, 1982). 
105 E. Fossey, C. Harvey, F. McDermott and L. Davidson, ‘Understanding and evaluating qualitative research’ (2002) 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 36: 717-732 at 729. 
106 C. Geertz, ‘Thick Descriptions: Towards an Interpretative Theory of Culture’ in C. Geertz (ed.) The Interpretation of 
Cultures: Selected Essays (Fontana Press, 1993) at 9.  
107 I. Seidman, Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social Sciences, 
(Teacher’s College Press, Columbia University, 3rd edition, 2013) at 119. Braun and Clarke describe this in their method as 
‘familiarizing yourself with the data” whereby they recommend that during transcribing, reading and re-reading, initial 
ideas are noted down at 87, V. Braun and V. Clarke, ‘Using thematic analysis in psychology’ (2006) Qualitative Research in 
Psychology 3: 77-101.  
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systematic analysis of the overall interview data, which were clarified, merged and drilled down into 
dominant themes and sub-themes, and their relationships.  
 
Utilising NVivo108 enabled the disaggregation of the interview data so it became organised and 
viewable under research themes.109 The initial set of nodes in NVivo denoted the broad themes 
already identified from the literature review, and the relevant jurisprudence of the Tribunal (the 
early release decisions and the related sentencing judgments). Two of these are the basis for the 
findings chapters on victims’ sense of (in)justice and the perceptions of the applicability of 
rehabilitation, and what it entails or – indeed- does not entail, for the perpetrators of atrocity crimes 
(Chapter 6). New themes emerged in the course of the analysis, primarily through word frequency, 
which connected to the literature on the purposes of punishment for atrocity crimes and the impact 
of UER on this purpose. The theme of “expressivism”110 as moral condemnation was identified from 
the prevalence of the word “message”, and phrases around communicating denunciation. This 
finding is detailed in Chapter 7.   
 
2.5. Reflexivity and the Ethics of Conducting Interviews in a Post-Conflict Society  
Reflexivity is discussed as the researcher approached the study with the view that complete 
neutrality in socio-legal research is not genuinely possible, that there is “no truly objective way of 
seeing”.111 As asserted by others, “the researcher … cannot escape the fact that the researcher is 
part of the studied world and that her orientations will be shaped by socio-historical locations of the 
researcher, including the values and interests that these locations confer upon the researcher”.112 
Recognising this subjectivity from the outset meant that this framing was continually addressed and 
accounted for; it also allows the reader to read the work in light of this. Further, it meant that the 
researcher has experience in living, working, and interviewing in conflict-affected, ethnically divided 
 
108 In addition to ‘nodes’ (themes), sub-nodes (sub-themes) been attributed to data NVivo software enables data to be 
assigned multiple nodes which meant that relationships between the themes, and sub-themes were more visible to the 
researcher. This was particularly valuable as running these ‘queries’ in NVivo indicated the specific elements of 
legitimacy: both the normative legitimacy and the legitimacy of exercise that are challenged by the decision-making 
process, discussed in chapter 4; and the elements of purposive legitimacy pertinent to both the impact of UER on the 
moral condemnation of atrocity crimes, and victims’ sense of (in)justice.  
109 For example, areas of contestation, around the legitimacy of exercise, legitimacy of?? NVivo aided the management 
and analysis of the data, as the researcher coded representative quotes of the most dominant issues (themes) identified 
by the interviewees. The “prevalence of these themes”109 in the data signified the repercussions that UER had on these 
attributes of international criminal justice.  
110 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment ad International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 173-179; R. D.  Sloane, 
‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of 
International Criminal Law’ (2007) Stanford Journal of International Law 43: 39-94.  
111 J. Kincheloe, ‘Fiction Formulas: Critical Constructivism and the Representation of Reality’ in W.G. Tierney and Y.S 
Lincoln (eds.) Representation and the Text: Re-Framing the Narrative Voice’ (State University of New York, 1997) at 57.  
112 S.M.H Nouwen, ‘As you Set out for Ithaka’: Practical, Epistemological, Ethical, and Existential Questions about Socio-
Legal Empirical Research in Conflict’ referencing M. Hammersley and P. Atkinson, ‘Principles in Practice’ (1995) 
Ethnography 5: although Nouwen noted that Hammersley and Atkinson refer to reflexivity as ‘reflexity’ at 234.  
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countries, including interviewing and meeting victims, and perpetrators of conflict.113 However, 
these experiences of research to date have been as a partial-insider (as a resident in the country, in 
the North of Ireland, and in Sri Lanka, having one parent from Sri Lanka). In BiH, however, there was 
an immediate distance from all interviewees; travelling in from the outside and yet also as a woman 
of colour. For some of the interviewees, primarily outside of Sarajevo, the fact that the researcher 
was evidently a member of an ethnic minority was a point of interest (as interviewees asked the 
researcher’s nationality or origin) and, possibly, though not confirmed, had a commonality with a 
number of the interviewees who were the minority group in the RS and Brčko. One interviewee, a 
Victims’ Association (VA), in the RS, on hearing the UK accent, asked the researcher her country of 
origin. When it was noted that she had mixed heritage and was coming from Belfast, in the North of 
Ireland, this appeared to ameliorate an initial sense of hostility. He noted that the UK was a member 
of NATO and thus responsible for the bombing of late August 1995, which he experienced, whereas 
Ireland and Sri Lanka were not Member States of NATO as far as he knew.  
 
For the researcher, with a human rights background, a sense of guilt sometimes arose in meetings 
with VAs, when they recalled the crimes committed against them. The researcher could not assist 
them in any way; the policy of UER did not appear likely to change. Although this was acknowledged 
at the outset, and they had agreed to meet on the two occasions (below) when palpable harms were 
raised, there was, and is, a deep regret at bringing the interviewees’ personal harms to the fore in an 
attempt to obtain their perceptions of UER. When questioned about the details of the decisions and 
decision-making process, most expressed anger or at least disappointment, but almost all 
commented that were glad to have their opinions of this documented and shared with staff at The 
Hague Tribunal.  
 
Most of the Bosnian interviewees described themselves either as victims of the war or as being 
fortunate not to have experienced direct loss during the war. With the exception of judges and 
prosecutors, many interviewees noted their ethnic background, especially the VAs, and on one 
occasion specifically to emphasise that their VA had members from all three ethnicities - Bosniak, 
Croat and Serb. All VAs interviewed had experienced either direct harm or murder of a family 
 
113 Research has been conducted in Northern Ireland relating to the Bill of Rights, in which political elites, community 
groups were interviewed. One political leader had been a paramilitary convicted of murder. Interviews on Domestic 
Violence in Minority Community population were also untaken, not with victims themselves but with NGOs and state 
bodies. Additionally, the researcher belongs a voluntary group which visits and monitors a short-term immigration 
detention facility where she has met with people who have experienced trauma, who in fact should not be held in these 
detention units.  
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member or members, had been a camp detainee, or had been the survivor of rape.114 Attempting to 
prevent re-traumatization, no interviewees were asked about their experiences during the war,115 
but many from VAs raised the harms they experienced, which were often ongoing.116 This possibility 
was recognised in the ethics application, that as perpetrators were being discussed, recollection of 
past trauma may arise.117 Listening respectfully and offering empathy was the best that could be 
done.118 As the direct victims interviewed were active members of VA, they had knowledge of 
counselling options, if available.  
 
Two interviewees, both direct victims, broke down during the interview, one recalling the murder of 
her child, the other, speaking in the third person, had experienced direct harm. Both interviews were 
paused. Both women, however, wished to finish the interview. Although the interview was 
recommenced in each case, not all the questions were asked, as they had already, in a sense, 
answered them, and it would have been insensitive to pose the question of what factors could 
justify the practice of early release after the comments which had arisen organically in the 
interview.119 These two women were both members of CSOs who had been recommended by the 
Director of the Women’s Organisation and their organisations are members of umbrella advocacy 
groups. These two interviews are highlighted for three reasons. Firstly, as a simple act of honesty 
and transparency,120 a recognition that despite all appropriate measures having been taken, that 
there was a risk of, at least during the course of these two interviews, opening up wounds.121 
Secondly, their lived experience is important to acknowledge, as one of the interviewees requested 
that the thesis noted her belief in the ICTY’s legitimacy. She requested that the researcher “please 
tell the ICTY that they have lost all legitimacy”.122 This sharply contrasted to others, and it is 
 
114 My application to Ulster University’s Ethics Board noted that I would be talking to representatives of victims’ 
Associations. Although no direct approaches were made to victims per se, the application acknowledged that some of 
these representatives would likely be direct victims.  
115 J. Goodhand, ‘Research in Conflict Zones: Ethics and Accountability’ (2000) Forced Migration Review 8 at 13. 
116 This was notably the case for two victims’ who both noted that family members’ remains, who had been killed in the 
war, were still missing.  
117 C. Nordstrom and R. Robens (eds.) Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival (University of 
California, 1995), 105-129; V. Das (ed.) Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia (Oxford 
University Press, 1995) 345-398; and D. Laub, Crisis of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History (Routledge, 
1992).  
118 A. Bryson and S. McConville, The Routledge Guide to Interviewing: Oral History, Social Enquiry and Investigation 
(Routledge, 2014) 165-166.  
119 One interviewee had said that only the death penalty was an appropriate punishment and went onto describe the 
murder of her child (14/11/2017) and another interviewee (04/12/2017), when asked about a sound reason for early 
release responded “how can a victim even think about this?”  
120 These incidents are not recorded as performance of what R. Merister has called “feel[ing] good about feeling bad”, 
After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights (2011) 73 cited in S.M.H Nouwen, ‘As you Set out for Ithaka’: Practical, 
Epistemological, Ethical, and Existential Questions about Socio-Legal Empirical Research in Conflict’ at 237. 
121 P. Bell, ‘Ethics of Psychiatric Research in Conflict Areas’ in M. Smyth and G. Robinson, Researching Violently Divided 
Societies (Pluto Press, 2001) 185-187. 
122 Interview, VA, BiH, 14/11/2017. 
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suggested that the reason for this is due to their lived reality, including the absence of contact they 
had had with the ICTY.123 Thirdly, the thesis wishes to highlight that, despite the harm that continues 
to be experienced, these two interviewees are both active participants in Victim Support groups, one 
actively advocating for reparations, and the other part of a group providing counselling and ongoing 
psychological support for survivors of wartime rape. Their desire to meet and share their stories are 
testimony not to their victimhood but to their strength of character.  
 
As noted at the outset, nothing tangible was provided to those who participated in the research. In 
the information sheet, and at the beginning of the interviews in BiH, it was noted that the practice of 
UER was unlikely to change (based on the majority of opinions in The Hague). The idea, at a 
minimum, of having their opinions recorded and acknowledged was important. Therefore, an 
executive summary will be written, and emailed to all research participants. This will allow the 
researcher to communicate the findings and provide recognition to the participants’ voices and 
opinions and evidence that these opinions had been sent to the judges at The Hague.  
 
 
2.6. The Strengths and Limitations of this Research  
The major strengths of this research are that the thesis provides valuable insights into an under-
researched but important element124 of international criminal justice. The findings, through 
identifying the major legitimacy deficits of the practice, have thereby identified means by which the 
practice can be altered in order to ameliorate the deficits. Additionally, by taking the actor-
orientated approach, interviewing insiders of the Tribunal which granted UER and interviewing 
outsiders affected by the practice - stakeholders in BiH, the interview data has found important 
commonalities (shared beliefs) as to what can, where applicable,125 justify early release from 
imprisonment for perpetrators of atrocity crimes. Although it is recognised that these shared beliefs 
are not universal, they provide lessons which can be learned by all institutions (international and 
national) which pursue criminal justice to address atrocity crimes, which could strengthen its 
legitimacy in the eyes of the community which it is meant to serve.126 The limitations of this research 
 
123 This contrasted with the other three victims interviewed who had direct, sometimes ongoing engagement with the 
ICTY.  
124 In doing so it uncovered a ‘negative’ finding that, in fact, for the majority of interviewees the enforcement of sentence 
was not such an important element of international criminal justice: that some justice was done was better than no 
justice. 
125 For example, substantial cooperation with the prosecutor may not be available to the perpetrator.  
126 A. Barak, ‘On Judging’ – ‘the law, as a normative system, has a role in society. It is intended to ensure functional social 
life. It contains order and security alongside justice and morals” in M. Scheinin, H. Krunke and M. Aksenova (eds.) Judges 
as Guardians of Constitutionalism and Human Rights (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) at 47.  
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are that, as a largely qualitative study, it cannot be said to be representative of stakeholders’ groups. 
Only one former ICTY President was interviewed and that one was reluctant to provide any 
perceptions as such. As the interviews were voluntary and many invited to be interviewed did not 
respond, this suggests that those interviewed had some interest in the topic and desire to share this 
opinion. These findings do not claim to be representative of the population of BiH, which may have 
been asserted if a random sampling survey had been conducted. Further, given that a significant 
number of interviewees, when probed, indicated that they were, in large part, dissatisfied with UER, 
it may be the case that those people who did not respond to the request for interview did so 
because they were satisfied (or at least not dissatisfied) in relation to the practice. This attitude, of 
no dissatisfaction with UER, was indeed the immediate reaction of some judges. Yet, as the 
interviews unfolded, and more thought given to the operationalisation of and reasoning for the 
practice a more nuanced attitude was taken.  
 
As a single case study, the thesis’ findings are not generalizable to other ICTs which make UERs. 
However, it provides an original contribution to the analysis of the sociological legitimacy of UER127 
through a range of stakeholders’ opinions. In doing so, it has identified commonalities between 
these stakeholders, which may be applicable to other ICTs.   
 
It is acknowledged here that other factors are bound to inform perceptions of the legitimacy of the 
practice of UER and the overall legitimacy of the Tribunal itself, as indicated by scholars 
elsewhere.128 The reality that other factors inform perceptions is recognised throughout this thesis. 
However, by acknowledging and discussing that these other factors may have shaped stakeholders’ 
perceptions, there is a level of “transferability”.129 Similarities remain in spite of the differences, as 
other ICTs hold jurisdiction over perpetrators who commit atrocity crimes and return to the region. 
By highlighting that the research produces “context-dependent knowledge” it offers a “true 
understanding ... in another form … in terms of its … applicability”.130 The thesis has recognised and 
examined these circumstances existing in BiH. These are subtle particularities that other post-
 
127 It was, as far as the researcher could see, a phenomenon about which 3 academic articles had been published, none of 
which had undertaken the gathering of perceptions. 
128 E. Stover, The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005) 
106-107, noting that perceptions of the Tribunal’s treatment differed after controversial acquittals; 11 witnesses who had 
noted in a first round of interviews that their experience of testifying at the Hague Tribunal, was later reversed by ten of 
the 11 (after a controversial acquittal) at 106-107; and S. Ford, ‘A Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of 
International Criminal Courts: Implications for the Success of Transitional Justice Mechanisms’ (2012) Vanderbilt Journal 
of Transnational Law 45: 405-476 at 439. 
129 C. Delmar, ‘Generalisability’ as recognition: Reflections on a foundational problem in qualitative research’ (2010) 
Qualitative Studies (1): 115-128. 
130 L. Carminati, ‘Generalizability in Qualitative Research: A Tale of Two Traditions’ (2018) Qualitative Health Research 
28(13): 2094–2101.  
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conflict societies may or may not share. These specific circumstances now highlighted, enable other 
researchers’ and ICTs practising early release to be alert to them.131  
 
Further, over the course of the research, UER was amended, and the Residual Mechanism 
introduced conditional release – therefore, as the findings will discuss, the most significant 
legitimacy deficit of the practice, its unconditional nature, has now been remedied. However, this 
amendment, the researcher believes, indicates that the practice was acknowledged as having a 
legitimacy deficit and that institutions of power (The Tribunal) do wish to be perceived as legitimate, 
and will create strategies to maintain legitimacy, which is a positive for International Criminal 
Justice. 
 
2.7. Conclusion  
The thesis’ research question, “what was the practice of, and reasoning for, the ICTY’s grant of UER, 
how do stakeholders perceive its legitimacy and to what extent do these perceptions impact on 
these stakeholders’ overall perceptions of the ICTY’s legitimacy?” required multiple legal methods: 
doctrinal analysis, empirical legal analysis of early release decisions and a qualitative, socio-legal 
method of inquiry for stakeholders’ perceptions to be understood. The chapter has outlined how 
and why these methods were adopted to answer this research question. In recognising the position 
of an “involved outsider”132 the research endeavoured to minimise bias by engaging with a range of 
stakeholders, conducting semi-structured interviews and allowing, as far as possible, for 
interviewees’ authentic voices to be represented. In order to understand perceptions of the 
legitimacy of the practice, it first had to have an understanding of the concept of legitimacy itself. 
This thesis’ understanding of legitimacy is set out in the following chapter. 
 
131 D. Lincoln and E. Guba, Naturalistic Inquiry, (Sage, 1985) have argued that “it is ... not the naturalist’s task to provide 
an index of transferability; it is his or her responsibility to provide the data base that makes transferability judgments 
possible on the part of potential appliers” at 316.  
132 T. Hermann, ‘The Impermeable Identity Wall: The Study of Violent Conflicts by “Insiders” and “Outsiders”’ in M. Smyth 
and G. Robinson (eds.) Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues (United Nations 





Chapter 3: The Legitimacy Framework 
3.1. Introduction  
There is a range of concepts used to analyse institutions of power and their exercise of power (such 
as efficiency, fairness, rightness). This chapter focuses on the concept of legitimacy, as detailed 
below, on the basis of the argument that it is the most appropriate for exploring Unconditional Early 
Release (UER) of convicted perpetrators, and the extent to which UER has had an effect on how key 
stakeholders perceive the ICTY overall. Although the thrust of the chapter is analytical and 
conceptual, frequent references to the ICTY are noted to explain why this framing was an 
appropriate means by which to understand UER. The following chapter builds upon this framing as it 
discusses directly the assessment of the ICTY’s legitimacy in the scholarship.  
 
Legitimacy in international law is often understood to broadly relate to the “justification of 
authority”1 and its exercise of power. This thesis uses the legitimacy frame for three reasons. Firstly, 
institutions are widely presumed to require legitimacy in order to exercise power.2 Secondly, 
institutions exercising power, generally, wish to be perceived as legitimate.3 Thirdly, scholars have 
used this frame, albeit without necessarily using the word “legitimacy”, in examining the Tribunal’s 
exercise of power.4 In undertaking an examination of the legitimacy of UER and how relevant 
stakeholders perceived this, the thesis explores two dimensions of legitimacy – normative legitimacy 
and sociological legitimacy - which the thesis asserts are intertwined to such an extent that they 
cannot be fully isolated from one another (s.3.3). The notion of justification for authority recognises 
the capacity for two dimensions of legitimacy or approaches to assessing legitimacy.5  
 
Normative legitimacy is the first dimension of legitimacy and has two analytical elements (s.3.2) – a 
strict legal element and a moral element – although these elements are rarely named explicitly as 
 
1 R. Wolfrum and V. Roben (eds.) Legitimacy in International Law (Springer, 2008) at 6. 
2 M.C. Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’ (1995) The Academy of Management 
Review 20(3): 571-610 at 574.  
3 R. Barker, Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations of Rulers and Subjects (Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 18.  
4 S. Ford, ‘Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts: Implications for the 
Success of Transitional Justice Mechanisms (2012) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 45(2) who notes that “there is 
a large body of literature arguing that positive perceived legitimacy is an important factor not only in the success of 
international criminal courts, but also in the success of all transitional justice mechanisms” at 408. This is the literature 
that is outlined in Chapter 4.  
5 D. Bodansky, ‘The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law’ in R. Wolfrum and V. Roben (eds.) Legitimacy in 
International Law, at 313, who argued that “we can consider legitimacy from two perspectives … one way to study 
legitimacy is from the prospect of philosophy – to think of legitimacy in normative terms. Here the issue is: what gives 
some institutions the right to rule?”  and also A. Nollkaemper, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law in The Case Law of the 
ICTY’ in T.A.J.A. Vandamme and J. Reestman (eds.) Ambiguity in the Rule of Law: the Interface between National and 





such.6 For scholars who analyse institutions’ normative legitimacy, an institution is legitimate to the 
extent that it satisfies certain conditions.7 These conditions are itemised by scholars. The conditions 
(described in this chapter as standards) are: procedural (in strict compliance with rules)8 for scholars 
who focus on the positivist-legal aspect of law; and “moral” or a “sense of justice” for scholars who 
focus on the morals underlying the law.9 These standards are considered by such scholars as 
objective, derived either through adherence to agreed rules or procedures or, where rules are not 
yet in place, agreed basic norms – morals underlying the law. These basic norms are often 
conceptualised as norms that are “genuinely … moral[ly] right”.10 In terms of international law, and 
for international criminal law, these are peremptory norms such as the prohibition of torture and 
slavery.11 What specific morals are, however, is not an area of universal agreement,12 and scholarly 
understandings of what is morally right may not be shared by ordinary citizens.13 Normative 
legitimacy in this thesis refers to, unless explicitly noted otherwise,14 the dual normative – the legal 
and the moral elements, not always distinguishable.15  
 
To be clear from the outset: this thesis is not an assessment of UER’s moral legitimacy. In exploring 
UER’s sociological legitimacy, it does, however, explore people’s beliefs.16 These beliefs are often 
based on people’s sense of rightness, a moral core, whether explicated or not. Morals, therefore, do 
play a role.  
 
 
6 With the exception of M. Drumbl and R. Henham who discuss the moral legitimacy of plea bargaining – see Chapter 4, 
s.4.4.1.  
7 L.H. Meyer and P. Sanklecha, in L. H. Meyer (ed.) Legitimacy, Justice and Public International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) at 2.  
8 V. Popovski and N. Turner, ‘Legality and Legitimacy in International Order’ (2008) United Nations University Policy Brief 
5, at 4. 
9 H. Taekmura citing R. Miillerson, 'Aspects of Legitimacy of Decisions of International Courts and Tribunals: Comments' 
in: R. Wolfrum and V. Roben (eds.) Legitimacy in International Law (Heidelberg: Springer 2008) at 191.  
10 A.I Applbaum, ‘Legitimacy in a Bastard Kingdom’, John F. Kennedy School of Government Center for Public Leadership 
Working Papers (Spring 2004): 73-94 at 76.  
11 S. Ratner, ‘Ethics and international law: integrating the global justice project(s)’ (2013) International Theory 5(1): 1–34 
at 4 cited N. Clark, ‘International Criminal Courts and Normative Legitimacy: An Achievable Goal?’ (2015) International 
Criminal Law Review 25(4): 763-783 at 778.  
12 It is further noted that the literature reviewed in this thesis is largely Western-dominated (US, European scholars) or 
academics and observers working within the western legal system, For example, there are no articles from Asian or 
African journals, and from the 69 interviewed, only three interviewees were from Africa and Asia. The ICTY was an 
institution exercising power over atrocity crimes committed in mainland Europe.  
13 This is especially so in times of war, as Chapter 7 in particular demonstrates.   
14 Sometimes, notably in Chapter 5 on the practice of UER, the thesis denotes that an analysis of the normative dimension 
is referring to the legalist aspect.  
15 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1994) at 269 cited J.N. Clark, ‘International 
Criminal Courts and Normative Legitimacy: An Achievable Goal?’ (2015) International Criminal Law Review 25(4): 763-783 
at 778. 
16 A. Buchanan and R. O. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’, in L. H. Meyer (ed.) Legitimacy, 
Justice and Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009). To be noted later - “sociological sense … when it 





Sociological legitimacy is the second dimension of legitimacy, or the approach to understanding 
legitimacy. For scholars examining this dimension of legitimacy, an institution is legitimate to the 
extent that it is believed to be so by those over whom it claims authority. Legitimacy is not solely 
about an institution meeting predetermined conditions, but also relates to “the fact that … the 
particular claim to legitimacy is to a significant degree … treated as ‘valid’”17 by those over which it 
claims authority. This is a subjective test of legitimacy; it is a layperson’s belief, rather than based on 
conditions set by scholars.  
 
The thesis explores the normative (legal) legitimacy of the Tribunal’s practice through an analysis of 
the early release decisions, examining the practice against the rules and procedures (Chapter 5). It 
then explores its sociological legitimacy through a focus on a range of stakeholders’ perceptions and 
discusses the practice’s repercussions (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). These stakeholders are insiders at the 
Tribunal and specific members of the society it has an effect on,18 post-conflict BiH.  
 
This chapter now turns to explain its interpretation of normative legitimacy. This encompasses both 
a strict legalist element and an underlying moral element. It argues that, although legality is key to 
normative legitimacy, it is not its only element, as law has at its foundations a moral core (s.3.2). It 
discusses the complementary nature of the normative and sociological approaches to assessing 
legitimacy of institutions, which is the approach taken by this thesis (s.3.3). The chapter then sets 
out the most relevant categories of legitimacy within which institutions can be viewed as legitimate 
(s.3.4). It then identifies the standards by which these institutions’ legitimacy can be assessed, and, 
simultaneously, examines proposals for how institutions can obtain and maintain legitimacy (s. 3.5). 
Finally, the chapter identifies the stakeholders whose views about legitimacy are the focus of the 
thesis, it answers the question - legitimate or justifiable according to whom? (s.3.6). Broadly, this 
encompasses insiders (those at the Tribunal) and outside stakeholders (those affected by the 
Tribunal’s exercise of power).  
 
3.2. The Two Elements of Normative Legitimacy  
Legal scholarship has, until the turn of the 21st century, predominantly understood legitimacy of 
international law and institutions through a normative lens (a dimension of legitimacy), and asserted 
 
17 M. Weber, Economy and Society: an outline of interpretive sociology, (eds.) Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich 
(University of California Press, re-issue, 1978) at 214. 





this normative approach was an objective test.19 The strict legalist positioning provided a “yes” or 
“no” response. This tick-box assessment of legitimacy was the extent to which international law and 
institutions were established by correct procedure, and their on-going power exercised in 
accordance with correct procedure.20 However, this thesis understands normative legitimacy as 
more than legality. As stated by Popovski and Turner: “Legality is a distinct, immediate, black and 
white decision … legitimacy is [a] flexible category”.21 Normative legitimacy encompasses, or this 
thesis argues are at its core, moral principles, or “moral evaluations”22 which then become enshrined 
in the black letter law. Evaluations, unlike “legal facts”,23 are subjective, and are shaped by those 
making the evaluation. Nevertheless, legality is one feature of normative legitimacy and must be 
explored in an examination of a legal institution’s legitimacy of power.24 Within the legal field, one of 
the approaches to international law recognises the moral core. Popovski and Turner described two 
major schools of legal thought as the “positivist” and “functionalist” schools. For the positivists, 
international law is regarded as “a firm set of rules to be followed without exception (conceptually 
deriving from domestic law)”, in contrast to the functionalist school who regard “international law as 
a gradual process of decisions, shaping itself authoritatively through the organs of the United 
Nations and international treaties”.25 Functionalist lawyers26 assert that law “exists in a social 
context”27 and, consequently, morality and ethics play a role.28  
 
 
19  D. Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law’ 
(1999) American Journal of International Law 93 ‘justified in an objective sense’ at 601. 
20 T. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford University Press, 1995) at 7-8.  
21 V. Popovski and N. Turner, ‘Legality and Legitimacy in International Order’ (2008) United Nations University Policy Brief 
5(1); W. Sandholtz, ‘Creating Authority by Council: The international criminal tribunals’ in in B. Cronin and I. Hurd (eds.) 
The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority, (Routledge, 2008) at 136 – “Actors may be constantly 
negotiating or contesting the boundaries of legitimate institutional action, but their evaluation at any given moment 
reveals the location of informal social norms regarding the legitimate process” and it requires consent efforts to maintain 
it”; also Y. Shany, Stronger Together? Legitimacy and Effectiveness of International Courts as Mutually Reinforcing or 
Undermining Notions’ (2015) Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Studies Research Papers Series, No. 15: 17157. 
22 A. Buchanan, ‘Legitimacy of international law’ in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds.) The Philosophy of International Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2010) at 80. This argument is articulated in the negative by Besson who noted that “legitimacy 
of law amounts to its ability to provide peremptory or exclusionary reasons for actions”. These reasons may be more than 
legal reasoning. 
23 A. Buchanan, ‘Legitimacy of international law’ in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas, The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2010) at 80.  
24 For the purposes of this thesis, the legality of UER (Chapter 5 on the legal procedure of UER). 
25 V. Popovski and N. Turner, ‘Legality and Legitimacy in International Order’ (2008) United Nations University Policy Brief 
5 at 4. 
26 V. Popovski, ‘Legality and Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals’, in R. Falk, M. Juergensmeyer and V. Popovski 
(eds.) Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs (2012) Oxford University Press, citing M.S. McDougal and W.M. Reisman, 
‘The Changing Structure of International law’ (1965) Columbia Law Review 65 at 388.  
27 V. Popovski, ‘Legality and Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals’ in R. Falk, M. Juergensmeyer and V. Popovski 
(eds.) Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs (2012) Oxford University Press, at 388.  
28 V. Popovski and N. Turner, have argued that “functionalist lawyers have according to Popovski and Turner, made 
international law ‘uncertain’ and has “loosen[ed] the constraints of legalist[s], and involve[ed] humanitarian and moral 





Many legal observers29 begin with the positivist approach, in particular Franck, whose “Legitimacy of 
Power Amongst Nations”30 began the wider debate on the legitimacy of international law, as 
international law was becoming more influential.31 Franck posed, and answered, the question - why 
should states obey international law when the institutions which formulated the law were not 
accountable? Franck limited his assessments to the perspective of states and not others who are 
affected by international law and their decision-making. Nevertheless, he recognised the importance 
of sociological legitimacy, as he asserted that international law should have a “pull to compliance”.32 
He described this “pull to compliance” as the “governed [being] convinced that it is right and proper 
to obey [authority] and abide by their decisions”.33 However, he declined to consider the compliance 
pull of international law beyond that of states’ beliefs in “justification of authority” of international 
law and rules. He maintained that individuals within these states would simply be too diverse34 to 
have a true assessment of their beliefs. Franck’s theory has been critiqued for a lack of distinction 
between normative and sociological dimensions,35 and for his equation of the word legitimacy with 
multiple concepts, inter alia procedural fairness, utilitarianism, a desire for order.36 His theory of 
legitimacy is less relevant for this thesis, as his focus is on state compliance and does not take into 
account those whom international law affects.37  
 
3.3. Normative and Sociological Dimensions of, and Approaches to, Legitimacy and their 
Intertwined Nature  
The intertwined nature of normative and sociological legitimacy are best articulated by Buchanan 
and Keohane as they demarcate the difference: “an institution is legitimate in the normative sense 
[if it can be said] to assert that it has the right to rule” and in the “sociological sense … when it is 
 
29 H. Takemura, ‘Reconsidering the Meaning and Actuality of the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court’ (2012) 
Amsterdam Law Forum Spring Issue 41: 7.  
30 T. Franck, Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press, 1990).  
31 D. Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law’ 
(1999) American Journal of International Law, 93: 637; S. Besson ‘Institutionalising Global Democracy’ in L. H. Meyer (ed.) 
Legitimacy, Justice and Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 61. 
32 T. Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ (1988) American Journal of International Law, 725.  
33 T. Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ (1988) American Journal of International Law, 725.  
34 T. Franck, Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press, 1990) – ‘An aggregate concept of justice and 
injustice thus distorts reality”, at 208-209. 
35 A. Buchanan and R. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’ in L. H. Meyer (ed.) Legitimacy, Justice 
and Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 29. 
36 D. Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law’ 
(1999) American Journal of International Law 93 noted that “the ‘term’ legitimacy’ has been used in often … nebulous 
ways’ and references Franck’s 1995 article which four equations of legitimacy as ‘procedural fairness’, utilitarianism, a 
desire for order, and right process’ at 600. 
37 N. Grossman, ‘The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts’ (2013) Temple Law Review  86: 70; and H. Takemura, 
‘Reconsidering the Meaning and Actuality of the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court’ (2012) Amsterdam Law 





widely believed to have the right to rule”.38 For the purposes of this thesis, this right to rule can be 
read (noted s.3.1) as a “justification for authority” and an ongoing assessment of the justification or 
justifications for authority. This includes how rules are made and put into practice - that is how 
authority is exercised. At the practical level of scholarship, these approaches often take place in 
isolation. Some literature takes a legalist and moral philosophical approach, and examines 
institutions’ normative legitimacy, and others adopt a socio-legal (sometimes referenced as 
empirical) approach to legitimacy often by asking stakeholders if they believe the institution has the 
right to rule. In terms of analysis, this means sociological legitimacy is the popular perspective of an 
institution’s normative legitimacy (reiterated s.3.5.8). This has been put graphically by Tasioulas, 
who argued that the “empirical sense of legitimacy … is best understood as parasitic on the 
normative sense”.39 However, many legal scholars frequently theorise on an institution’s normative 
legitimacy, and leave the task of assessing beliefs of legitimacy (sociological legitimacy) to social 
scientists. Other legal scholars have begun to recognise this and have noted that “both approaches 
have a certain normative component”.40 Some legal scholars have gone further in relation to 
international criminal justice, and have asserted that these two approaches to exploring legitimacy 
should be taken in tandem, rather than in isolation.41 Examining the sociological popular perspective 
of an institution’s normative (legal and moral) legitimacy could enable scholars to appropriately 
analyse how international criminal justice can be perceived as just, and, consequently, achieve and 
maintain legitimacy, not only from their own perspective, but from the perspective of the population 
whose lives are affected, a key stakeholder42 (discussed s.3.6). Legitimacy is also important, since 
institutions of international law, despite having some coercive powers - for example to issue arrest 
warrants, have no independent means of exercising coercion over populations, and do not claim to 
do so, but they nevertheless seek compliance in the form of respect, as noted by Buchanan.43 The 
element of respect (perceived legitimacy) of authority and its ongoing exercise of power is the 
approach taken by this thesis; the ICTY did not have independent coercive force over the people of 
 
38 A. Buchanan and R. O. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’ in L. H. Meyer (ed.) Legitimacy, 
Justice and Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 29. Emphasis in original.  
39 J. Tasioulas, ‘Parochialism and the Legitimacy of International Law’ in M.N.S Sellers (ed.) Parochialism, Cosmopolitanism 
and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 17. 
40 Y. Shany, ‘Stronger Together? Legitimacy and Effectiveness of International Courts as Mutually Reinforcing or 
Undermining Notions’ (2015) Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Studies Research papers Series, No. 15-17 at 2.  
41 S. Vasiliev, ‘Between International Criminal Justice and Injustice: Theorising Legitimacy’ in N. Hayashi and C. M. BaillIiet 
(eds.) The Legitimacy of International Criminal Trials, (Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 24. Hereinafter – S. Vasiliev, 
‘Theorising Legitimacy’.  
42 S. Marks, ‘Democracy and international governance’ in J. Coicaud and V. Heiskanen (eds.) Legitimacy of international 
organizations, (United Nations University Press, 2001) at 58.   
43 A. Buchanan, ‘Legitimacy of international law’ in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds.) The Philosophy of international law 





BiH, but it did seek to have its judgments accepted and respected.44 This thesis takes the position 
that for an institution to have legitimacy, its “popular acceptance [is] an important … element of [its] 
normative justification”.45 Popular here denotes the external stakeholders – the general populace 
(often the layperson). 
 
Political scientist Beetham recognised the complementary nature of the normative and sociological 
approaches to assessing legitimacy. He asserted that “for power to be fully legitimate … three 
conditions are required: its conformity to established rules; the justifiability of these rules by 
reference to shared beliefs; and the express consent of the subordinate”.46 The first two conditions 
are the two elements of normative legitimacy, as understood by this thesis – the strict legal element 
(“conformity” - correct application of rules and procedure) and the moral core of the law (“shared 
beliefs”). Beetham argued that these three conditions cannot be viewed in isolation and asserted 
that “all three components contribute to legitimacy.”47 He then proposed a framework through 
which to explore both the normative and sociological dimensions of legitimacy. This approach has 
frequently been adopted and further theorised by criminologists48 and scholarship in the criminal 
justice field, including victimology,49 rather than international law and international criminal justice. 
Palmer, however, adopted Beetham’s model as a tool to “help explain the social data”50 relative to 
the ICTY’s sister tribunal, the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and its relationship with the 
national criminal courts and the gacaca courts in Rwanda. Palmer used Beetham’s model to explore 
how the three courts perceived their own legitimacy and that of the others. Beetham’s three 
dimensions (“conditions”) of legitimacy were neatly categorised by McEvoy as the legal, the moral 
and the sociological dimensions of legitimate exercise of power.51 Beetham revisited his legitimacy 
framework and labelled his three conditions along much the same lines, affirming that “power is 
acknowledged as legitimate to the extent that: it [has] legality, [holds] normative justifiability and 
 
44 See Chapter 4, s.4.3. 
45 D. Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A coming challenge for International Environmental Law’ 
(1999) American Journal of International Law at 600. Bodansky noted that “liberal theories” take this approach, 
referncing W. Achterberg ‘Green Politics: The State and Democracy’ in A. Dobson and P. Lucardie (eds.) The Politics of 
Nature: Explorations in Green Political Theory (Routledge, 1995).  
46 D. Beetham ‘Revisiting Legitimacy, Twenty Years On’ in Tankebe and A. Liebling (eds.) Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: 
An International Exploration, in J. Tankebe and A. Liebling (eds.) Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An International 
Exploration, (Oxford University Press, 2013) at 19.  
47 D. Beetham ‘Revisiting Legitimacy, Twenty Years On’ in J. Tankebe and A. Liebling (eds.) Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: 
An International Exploration, (Oxford University Press, 2013) at 20.  
48 A. Bottoms and J. Tankebe, ‘Criminology: Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal 
Justice’ (2012) The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 102(1): 119-170. 
49 M. Laxminarayn, ‘Enhancing trust in the legal system through victims’ rights mechanism’ (2015) International Review of 
Victimology 21(3): 273-286 at 275. 
50 N. Palmer, Courts in Conflict Oxford, (Oxford University Press, 2015) at 163.  
51 K. McEvoy, ‘A Commentary on Locality and Legitimacy’ in N. Palmer, P. Clark and D.Granville (eds.) Oxford Transitional 
Justice Research Critical Perspectives in Transitional Justice (Intersentia, 2012) cited in N. Palmer, Courts in Conflict 





[has] legitimation”. He modelled this as a “heuristic tool to guide analysis of any particular structure 
… of [a] legitimate power”.52 Beetham, as a political scientist, proposed this framework for assessing 
states’ legitimacy. States have actual subordinates, unlike the ICTY. Thus, his framework required 
adjustment for the purposes of studying the legitimacy of the ICTY and UER, given that the ICTY had 
no “subordinates” who could freely “express consent”. Therefore, the phrase “consent”, used in his 
1991 book, is to be read in line with his 2013 article, which changed “consent” to “actions by 
relevant subordinates which confirm their acceptance or recognition of it [the rules and power of 
the state]”.53 This “acceptance”, as McEvoy rightly noted, is the sociological approach to any 
dimension of legitimacy, which is the extent to which the institution is “believed to have the right to 
rule”,54 namely, that it is perceived as legitimate. 
 
Institutions exercising power generally seek, if not normative legitimacy, at least sociological 
legitimacy in order to, inter alia, work effectively,55 maintain power56 and exercise control.57 In the 
case of institutions bringing to justice those found guilty of violations of international humanitarian 
law, this self-interest could have been their success in advancing the no impunity and accountability 
norms.58 That is, no one is immune from prosecution (indicted) and thus can be held accountable 
(trialled and where found guilty sentenced to imprisonment). This self-interest of advancing the 
 
52 D. Beetham ‘Revisiting Legitimacy, Twenty Years On’ in Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An International Exploration, in 
J. Tankebe and A. Liebling (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2013) at 20.  
53 D. Beetham ‘Revisiting Legitimacy, Twenty Years On’ in Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An International Exploration, in 
J. Tankebe and A. Liebling (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2013) at 20.  
54 A. Buchanan and R. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of global governance institutions’ L. H. Meyer (ed.) Legitimacy, Justice 
and Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 29. 
55 Y. Shany, ‘Stronger Together? Legitimacy and Effectiveness of International Courts as Mutually Reinforcing or 
Undermining Notions’ who argued that there is a close relationship between the two - an “effective court is more 
legitimate than an ineffective court”; T. Tyler, who argued that the better inter-personal treatment by officials and 
minority groups would enhance the perceived legitimacy of institutions by groups over whom it sought to influence, T. 
Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Yale University Press, 1990). 
56 S. Vasiliev, ‘Not only do they have to stay in good grace with the actors delegating them power, but they must also 
keep their legitimacy from drying up by continually winning support for themselves from those over whom that power is 
exercised”, 5.  
57 H.J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Alfred A. Knopf, 6th edition, 1985) at 34. 
58 See J. Subotić, ‘The Transformation of International Transitional Justice Advocacy’ (2012) International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 6(1): 106–125; L. Vinjamuri and A.P. Boesenecker, Accountability and Peace Agreements: Mapping 
Trends from 1980 to 2006 (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2007); C. Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace 
Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria (Oxford University Press, 2008); and Y. Shany, Stronger Together? Legitimacy and 
Effectiveness of International Courts as Mutually Reinforcing or Undermining Notions’ (2015) Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem Legal Studies Research papers Series, No. 15-17 at 12 – ‘ICTs strive to apply universally accepted legal 
standards” and cited the preamble of the Rome Statute, “affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished … Determined to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of these crimes … Resolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice”. 
This has also been noted by others in relation to the International Criminal Court, see T. Obel Hansen, ‘The International 
Criminal Court and the Legitimacy of Exercise’ in P. Andersen, C. Eriksen and B. Viskum (eds.) Law and Legitimacy (Djøf 





“norm projection”59 has been articulated by ICTY President Meron (2003-2005 and 2011-2015), as he 
asserted that “the ICTY's jurisprudence … establishes an important foundation upon which other 
criminal tribunals, both international and national … can build as they join in the common mission of 
bringing the long era of impunity for mass atrocities to an end”.60 His language of the Tribunal’s 
jurisprudence being built up and others joining in the common mission speaks to language of norms 
(common mission) and projection of these norms (the Tribunal set the base line for others to 
further). Therefore, this quotation indicates that some leading judges, such as President Meron at 
the ICTY, perceived the Tribunal and determined its success as advancing the norm of no impunity 
and accountability. Discussed below (s.3.4.2), this understanding of the Tribunal was shared, and 
sometimes justified on this basis of advancing the no impunity and accountability norms.61  
 
The question of the legitimacy of UER and the perceptions of that normative legitimacy (its 
sociological legitimacy) leads to the following: by whom and by what standard is the practice 
justified? These questions direct observers to identify the “who” – the audiences, who include 
stakeholders, - and explore the relevant standards by which they assess the institution’s legitimacy. 
Therefore, the following section outlines the main categories of legitimacy – state consent, 
purposive, and exercise/performance; the second two (purposive legitimacy and legitimacy of 
exercise/performance legitimacy) are categories upon which sociological legitimacy is largely 
determined (s.3.4). Categories are units of assessment of legitimacy and perceptions can assess 
legitimacy on one or all of these categories. The chapter then turns to the standards upon which 
sociological legitimacy is assessed and achieved - or not (s.3.5). The final section (s.3.6), then sets out 
the stakeholders which this thesis took as those who had the right to determine if the legitimacy of 
UER ought to be justified.  
 
3.4. Categories of Legitimacy  
The first category of legitimacy, state consent legitimacy, outlined below, takes a legal positivist 
approach. It verifies legitimacy based on an institution’s adherence to black letter law. It does not 
consider an institution’s sociological dimension of legitimacy. The further categories to be 
considered here, purposive legitimacy and legitimacy of exercise (sometimes called ‘procedural 
 
59 D. Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law’ in S. Besson 
and J. Tasioulas (eds.) The Philosophy of International Law, (Oxford University Press, 2010) at 579.  
60 T. Meron, ‘Procedural Evolution in the ICTY’ (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 2: 520-525, at 520 – 
emphasis added.  
61 For example, the Tribunal’s website, under the Tribunal’s establishment. The section concludes by noting that “This 
date marked the beginning of the end of impunity for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia”. See: 





legitimacy’ or ‘performance legitimacy’) and, to an extent, outcome legitimacy, implicitly recognise 
the sociological dimension of legitimacy. Thus these categories open up the opportunity to assess 
legitimacy from the sociological perspective. Therefore, the categories of purposive and 
procedural/performance legitimacy are the categories that the thesis analyses in depth in the 
context of the Tribunal’s practice of and impact of UER.  
 
3.4.1. State Consent Legitimacy 
A traditional normative approach to assess the legitimacy of international law would be to examine, 
either through practice or declaration, whether or not the state had consented to the law. Under 
this category “so long as states consent to it, authority is justified”,62 and therefore legitimacy is 
achieved. This category of state consent can be applied beyond the creation of the law to its 
practice. The category of state consent to assess the legitimacy of international law has been 
criticised as outdated.63 Practically, it does not ask the question of why international law or an 
institution adjudicating international law is accepted. This narrow approach is questioned, as there 
may be other reasons for consent; the approach does not recognise the social context.64 
Additionally, it does not look beyond the state, namely to its citizens who are affected by their 
state’s consent to the law.65 This top-down approach is critiqued due to its undemocratic nature, i.e. 
the assumption that the state has the right to accept international law without regard to its 
citizens.66 This top-down approach is not the approach of this thesis, which is socio-legal,67 but 
nevertheless requires recognition, as it remains a legalist approach to determining legitimacy of 
international law.  
 
3.4.2. Purposive Legitimacy  
Purposive legitimacy can be examined outside the boundaries of the strict legalist approach. It has 
been defined as “the consistency between, on the one hand, the aims and values underlying the 
rule, the process, or the institution, and on the other hand, those shared by the relevant society, 
 
62 N. Grossman, ‘The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts’ (2013) Temple Law Review 86: at 65.  
63 S. Besson, ‘Institutionalising Global Demoi-cracy’ in L.H. Meyer (ed.) Legitimacy, Justice and Public International Law, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 63.  
64 M. Weber, ‘Economy and Society: an outline of interpretive sociology’, in (eds.) Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (1978) 
at 219, cited in A. Bottoms and J. Tankebe, ‘Criminology: Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in 
Criminal Justice’ (2012) The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 102(1): 119-170 at 148.  
65 A. Buchanan and R.O. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’ in R. Wolfrum and V. Roben (eds.) 
Legitimacy in International Law (Springer, 2008) at 29, and A. Buchannan, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’ in S. 
Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds.) The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) at 90. 
66 Democratic approach as advocated by S. Besson, ‘Institutionalising Global Demoi-cracy’ in L.H. Meyer (ed.) Legitimacy, 
Justice and Public International Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 66. 





constituency and its subjects.”68 In the case of the ICTY, Sandholtz concluded that, as an 
International Criminal Tribunal (ICT), it was considered as holding a “high degree of … ‘purposive 
legitimacy’”. Sandholtz based his assertion on the Tribunal’s primary purpose, to prosecute persons 
accused of major war crimes and crimes against humanity, a purpose, which fitted “firmly within a 
well-established constellation of values and norms”.69 He took a legal positivist approach as he 
referred to the wide acceptance of international human rights law, the underpinning notion of 
“fundamental dignity and worth of the human person”, the prohibition against torture, inhumane 
and degrading treatment, and the wide recognition of international humanitarian law as accepted by 
the majority of states belonging to the UN. Sandholtz concluded that “key rules defining war crimes 
... are by now seen as applying universally, as customary international law”.70  
 
Cassese emphasised another category of legitimacy, “universal values legitimacy”, which replicated 
the characteristics of Sandholtz’s purposive legitimacy of international criminal tribunals. He 
distinguished “universal values legitimacy” from purposive legitimacy, as he argued that these 
universal values of “peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens)” may not be held by an 
institution’s constituents (in this case the FRY), but are nevertheless “based on the values common 
to the whole community within which the institution lives and operates”.71 Although a legally 
peremptory norm of the duty to prohibit atrocity crimes, including genocide and crimes against 
humanity, exists, the norm denouncing such atrocities, may not exist when some stakeholders do 
not see these crimes as crimes. As noted by Drumbl, at times of mass atrocity, which requires mass 
participation, atrocity crimes are not necessarily considered deviant72 – effectively the norm does 
not exist in times of war, and not necessarily after the war has concluded (as set out in Chapter 7). In 
the case of convicted perpetrators returning home, Drumbl provides the example of Nazi war-time 
perpetrators who noted that “many extraordinary international criminals, who engaged in acts of 
unfathomable barbarity, are able to conform easily and live unobtrusively for the remainder of their 
lives as normal citizens”.73 
 
 
68 S. Vasiliev, ‘Theorizing Legitimacy’ at 19. 
69 Emphasis added 
70 W. Sandholtz, ‘Creating Authority by Council: The international criminal tribunals’ in B. Cronin and I. Hurd (eds.) The UN 
Security Council and the Politics of International Authority (Routledge, 2008) at 134.  
71 A. Cassese, ‘The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals and the Current Prospects of International Criminal 
Justice’ (2012) Leiden Journal of International Law 25: 491-501 at 492. 
72 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Crime and Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 2007) - “Although widespread acts of 
extraordinary international criminality transgress jus cogens norms, they often support a social norm that is much closer 
to home … as atrocity becomes more widescale in nature, and more popular, it becomes more difficult to construct 
participation therein as deviant” at 8.   





In addition to the query raised by Drumbl that the purposive legitimacy of International Criminal Law 
may not be held by the relevant constituency an ICT has jurisdiction over, some legal scholars have 
disputed the simple transposition of punishment for crimes of this nature and called for non-punitive 
mechanisms to deal with atrocity crimes.74 
 
Additionally, scholars have noted that purposive legitimacy is too loose a concept - that too many 
aims and purposes75 have been ascribed to ICTs due to the multiplicity of stakeholders, who 
themselves have “different understandings of what the aims and purposes of ICTs are and what they 
should be”.76 As the following Chapter discusses, ICTs not only became mechanisms for determining 
guilt and dispensing punishment, but also as contributing to a “restoration of peace”,77 but further 
to “reconciliation”78 and to “writing history”.79 Further, these aims and purposes can also change 
over time in the views of these different stakeholders.80 This multiplicity of understandings and 
priorities created tensions between stakeholders in relation to the enforcement of punishment 
(including its early termination). This tension has been elaborated by de Guzman, writing more 
broadly in terms of international criminal justice and prosecutorial strategy of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). She has noted that there are different stakeholders, who may hold different 
“visions” (views) on the purposive legitimacy of an international institution, which will affect how 
they perceive the institution’s legitimacy of exercise. In making this argument, she demonstrates the 
interconnectedness between the normative dimension of legitimacy, the stated aims and value 
underlying an international institution, and its sociological dimension, noting that “the degree of 
sociological legitimacy the ICC enjoys ... depends on whether one subscribes to a primarily global or 
 
74 R. Sloane, ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the 
Potential of International Criminal Law’ (2007) Stanford Journal of International Law 43: 39 – 94. 
75 From bringing justice to perpetrators, restoring and maintaining peace – as set out in the UNSC establishing the ICTY; to 
brining justice to victims; establishing the truth; reconciliation – which were stated purposes that the ICTY asserted 
through its rhetoric with stakeholders, and its judgments.  
76 S. Aambolangvan and T. Squatrito, ‘Conceptualising and Measuring the Legitimacy of ICTs’ in N. Hayashi and C. M. 
BaillIiet (eds.) The Legitimacy of International Criminal Trials (Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 45.  
77 UNSCR 808, 22 February 1993.  
78 J.N. Clark, ‘Plea Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation’ (2009) The European Journal of International 
Law 20(2): 415-436; J.N. Clark, International Trials and Reconciliation: Assessing the Impact of the International Criminal 
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Societal Peace in Bosnia’ (2005) Journal of Peace Research, 42(3): 271–289 and J. Meernik and J.R. Guerrero, ‘Can 
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(2014) Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 14(3): 383-340. 
79 R.A. Wilson, Writing History in International Criminal Trials (Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
80 This multiplicity of stakeholders with varying perceptions of the purposes of an institution (the ICTY specifically) was 
confirmed in the thesis’ findings; there existed multiple understandings of the purposes for the punishment of these 
crimes. For example, (detailed in Chapter 4, s.4.3) for some stakeholders punishment was for the purposes of 
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local vision of the Court’s work”.81 Her comment recognises that different stakeholders have 
different visions – there is a global or a local vision – the visions, whatever they are, are not the 
same. The different visions imply different priorities in terms of the most important audiences for 
legitimacy audiences.82 Her comment which is of relevance to all international criminal tribunals, 
calls for the ICC – removed physically from the country, or adjudicated by non-nationals - to be 
attentive to these local audiences as they conduct their work, in order to achieve sociological 
legitimacy. De Guzman, in calling for attention to be accorded to the differing priorities, implicitly 
recognised that legitimacy is not a permanent characteristic.83 Institutions may have initial purposive 
legitimacy, but performance legitimacy is required for its perceived legitimacy to continue,84 as 
discussed below.  
 
3.4.3. Legitimacy of Exercise/Process Legitimacy/Performance Legitimacy 
These three terms85 referring to the same category (an understanding of what legitimacy is about, 
and, consequently, a means of assessing it) indicate the two approaches taken to assess the 
legitimacy of an institution based on their actions: the normative (legitimacy of exercise/process 
legitimacy) and the sociological (performance legitimacy). As UER is a legal act, conducted by a 
judge, an examination of its normative legitimacy, that is, its legality is key. Yet, this is only one 
dimension of legitimacy. Legitimacy encompasses more than adhering to the black letter of the law: 
were the UERs perceived to be legitimate? As noted in Chapter 1, the legitimacy of exercise is central 
 
81 M.M. de Guzman, ‘The Global-Local Dilemma and the ICC's Legitimacy’ in G. Ulfstein N. Grossman, H.G. Cohen, and A. 
Follesdal (eds.) Legitimacy and International Courts (Studies on International Courts and Tribunals) (Cambridge University 
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Press, 2018) at 62-82.  
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5, “Legitimacy is a flexible category; it can be gained and it can be lost. It evolves over time and its maintenance requires 
constant effort” at 4.  
84 W. Sandholtz, Creating Authority by Council: The international criminal tribunals’ in in B. Cronin and I. Hurd (eds.) The 
UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority, (Routledge, 2008) at 140; Y. Shany, Stronger Together? 
Legitimacy and Effectiveness of International Courts as Mutually Reinforcing or Undermining Notions’ (2015) Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem Legal Studies Research papers Series, No. 15-17 at 142; and J. d’Aspremont and E. de Brabandere, 
‘The Complementary Faces of Legitimacy in International Law: The Legitimacy of Origin and the Legitimacy of Exercise’ 
(2011) Fordham International Law Journal 34. Performance legitimacy is called ‘procedural legitimacy’ by W. Sandholtz, 
and ‘process legitimacy’ by Y. Shany. 
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J. d’Aspremont and E. de Brabandere, ‘The Complementary Faces of Legitimacy in International Law: The Legitimacy of 
Origin and the Legitimacy of Exercise’  (2011) Fordham International Law Journal 34 called ‘procedural legitimacy’ by 
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to this thesis. The focus needs to be simultaneously on normative (the rules and the good 
procedures in practice) and sociological (stakeholders’ perspectives of the practice) legitimacy.  
  
Some legal scholars assess the “legitimacy of exercise” or “process legitimacy” from legal standards, 
examining institutions’ “procedural fairness”86 and/or the “right process”87 of decision-making 
only.88 These scholars, such as Luban, have argued that, for ICTs, their legitimacy can be obtained 
based on “the quality of justice they deliver … the manifested fairness of their procedures and 
punishments.”89 These qualities are based on what he termed “natural justice”, which are focused 
on the fair trial rights of the accused, and, when found guilty, their humane punishment.90 This 
focus, however, overlooks the initial first step in ICL, that is, prosecuting those accused of violating 
ICL. Unlike domestic criminal law, ICL and ICTs adjudicate crimes of a mass scale, and at a very 
practical level, therefore, ICTs cannot prosecute everybody. In relation to this, there are no existing 
legal rules that are readily applicable, deemed correct and objective. In relation to the ICC’s selection 
decisions, Obel Hansen noted “the reality remains that the Rome Statute does not set forth clear 
criteria concerning where and when the ICC should intervene”.91 Secondly, scholarship examining 
the procedural fairness of these ICTs overlook instances where international law and its rules give 
broad discretion to its deciders (judges and prosecutors) to apply it. Thirdly, this scholarship ignores 
the sociological dimension of legitimacy (s.3.6.).  
 
Scholars of ICL who recognise this lack of pre-existing, well-defined and objectively applied criteria 
are divided as to how to resolve this dilemma. Some have argued that the legitimacy of exercise 
should be based on “legal criteria” and where there is none, then “either the Prosecutor must 
develop ex ante guidelines or the Court’s judges must direct or guide the Prosecutor through their 
interpretation of the Rome Statute”.92 This argument may answer the second problem Obel Hansen 
further noted, that is, the broad discretion provided to International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutors 
to open an investigation. They are guided to take into account the “interest of victims” and the 
 
86 N. Grossman, ‘The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts’ (2013) Temple Law Review 86: 65 
87 T. Franck, ‘The Power of Legitimacy and Legitimacy of Power: International Law in the Age of Disequilibrium’ (2006) 
American Journal of International Law 100: at 91 cited R. Wolfrum and V. Roben, Legitimacy in International Law 
(Springer, 2008) at 6.  
88 This is indeed the approach undertaken in this thesis’ analysis of the ICTY’s President’s decisions on early release. See 
Chapter 5. 
89 D. Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law’ at 579. 
90 D. Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law’’ at 579. 
91 T. Obel Hansen, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Legitimacy of Exercise’ in P. Andersen, C. Eriksen and B. 
Viskum (eds.) Law and Legitimacy (Djøf Forlag, 2015) at 8. 
92 A. Greenawalt, ‘Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court’ (2007) 





“gravity of the crimes”93 coupled with the fact that the ICC’s Rules and Procedure of Evidence (RPE) 
do not define the concept of gravity. This vagueness was also noted by Danner who additionally 
referenced the later guidance the Prosecutor is given to open a case, that being the “interests of 
justice,” as a “nebulous” concept. 94 This problem is mirrored in UER and the ICTY’s Presidents’ wide 
power to grant a pardon or commutation of sentence based on the “interests of justice and general 
principles of law.”95 As discussed in Chapter 4, the legal procedures (procedural fairness standard, 
s.4.4 and s.4.5) was widely assessed by legal scholars in relation to the Tribunal’s legitimacy of 
exercise.96 This thesis contributes to this field by expanding this analysis into the post-trial stage, as it 
analyses the Tribunal’s Presidents’ written decisions and decision-making process of UER (Chapter 
5). 
 
This judicial discretion can be a point of contestation which lies beyond the strict positivist approach. 
Normatively (the moral element), international law generally seeks to advance, for example, treaty 
goals, including human rights protection.97 It imposes positive obligations on states, in addition to 
limiting states’ power. International Criminal Law is a clear example, notably the Rome Statute, in 
which the Treaty clearly stipulates that it aims to end impunity.98 Some have argued that 
international judicial discretion for adjudicating atrocity crimes has led to a judicial over-reach. One 
commentator has critiqued ICTs for what has been deemed a judicial teleological interpretation of 
crimes. Robinson has critiqued ICT judges in applying a “liberal criminal-law theory [to] provide an 
adequate tool for analysis”99 which, he argued, broadens criminal liability to the extent that it 
infringes on individual rights. He argued that judges should have recognised the “un-controversially 
generic [principle] that human beings have intrinsic worth, and thus that we cannot use them as 
mere objects for a lesson to deter others or to convey a socially valuable message”.100  
 
In contrast to the legitimacy of exercise being contested by legal scholars from a purely normative 
frame (the morality of judicial decision-making according to their own moral reasoning, for 
Robinson, that being the moral rightness of the adhering to the rights of the accused), there are 
 
93 T. Obel Hansen, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Legitimacy of Exercise’ at 8. 
94 A.M. Danner, ‘Enhancing the legitimacy and accountability of prosecutorial discretion at the international criminal 
court’ (2003) American Journal of International Law 97(3): 510-552 at 543. 
95 ICTY Statute, Article 28. 
96 See Chapter 4. 
97 D. Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law’ at 582. 
98 ICC Preamble, referenced by T. Obel Hansen, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Legitimacy of Exercise’ in P. 
Andersen, C. Eriksen and B. Viskum (eds.) Law and Legitimacy (Djøf Forlag, 2015). 
99 T. Obel Hansen, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Legitimacy of Exercise’ at 17.  
100 D. Robinson, ‘A Cosmopolitan Liberal Account of International Criminal Law’ (2013) Leiden Journal of International Law 





those who challenge the normative legitimacy of judicial discretion, as they argue that taking a 
positivist legal approach may conflict with sociological legitimacy. These scholars recognise the 
sociological value of legitimacy. They value the perspectives of outside, non-legal stakeholders, and 
argue that their interests should be considered in order to maintain legitimacy. De Guzman 
articulated this point in terms of the ICC, when she argued that “the ICC’s normative and sociological 
legitimacy derives, at least in part, from the procedures it employs, but any assessment of this 
“input”101 [legitimacy of exercise] must take account of the ends to which the Court employs those 
proceedings”, which, in the case of the ICC, is, one could argue, “to advance the local justice agendas 
of communities most affected by the crimes”.102 Thus, the examination of legitimacy of exercise is 
only one aspect of normative legitimacy which in turn has to be recognised by the institution’s 
stakeholders.  
 
This sociological approach and its requirement in any assessment of an institution’s legitimacy is 
emphasised by those who utilise the term “performance legitimacy”. The word performance implies 
that the institution’s action has a watchful “audience”.103 The institution is being observed, it is 
aware of this external audience, and it conducts itself with this audience in mind. In relation to ICTs, 
the ICTY’s first President Cassese noted this sociological approach in general terms. In his definition 
of performance legitimacy, he noted that this category could be appraised.104 He defined 
performance legitimacy as “answerability to a founding authority; the transparency of its decision-
making, its appointment of organs of the institution … and its accountability to the institution’s 
constituency”.105 An institution’s answerability, that is to say its appointment process and 
accountability are legal aspects of this category of legitimacy; both are important and will be 
assessed. So too, however, are the notions of two audiences that Cassese implicitly identifies – the 
institution’s founding authority and its “constituency”. Cassese does not directly elucidate who 
makes up these audiences, one being constituents. This thesis refers to a number of the ICTY’s 
constituents as stakeholders, identified and discussed in s.3.6. The performance legitimacy of the 
 
101 M.M. de Guzman, ‘The Global-Local Dilemma and the ICC's Legitimacy’ who noted “This process-based legitimacy is 
sometimes called “input legitimacy”’, citing Fritz W. Scrapft ‘Legitimacy and the Multi-Actor Polity’ in M. Egeberg and P. 
Lægreid, Organizing Political Institutions: Essays for Johan P (Scandinavian University Press, 1999) at 8. 
102 M.M. de Guzman, ‘The Global-Local Dilemma and the ICC's Legitimacy’ in G. Ulfstein, N. Grossman , H.G. Cohen, A. 
Follesdal (eds.) Legitimacy and International Courts (Studies on International Courts and Tribunals) (Cambridge University 
Press, 2018).  
103 K. McEvoy and A. Schwartz, ‘Judging and Conflict: Audience, Performance and the Judicial Past’ in A.M McAlinden and 
C. Dwyer (eds.) Criminal Justice in Transition: The Northern Ireland Context (Bloomsbury, 2015) 157-184, see section 
‘Audience and Performance’ 160-173. 
104 A. Cassese, ‘The Legitimacy of ICTs and the Current Prospects of International Criminal Justice’ at 493.  





Tribunal and UER is crucial, and the extent to which these audiences appraise the legitimacy of the 
exercise of the early release practice. 
 
3.4.4. Outcome Legitimacy 
The measure by which “outcome legitimacy”106 is determined is the extent to which the institution 
has fulfilled its mandate, i.e. its goal attainment.107 Thus, outcome legitimacy is directly linked to the 
institution’s purposive legitimacy.108 In the case of the ICTY, UNSC Resolution 827 set out one 
primary goal. It stated that the Tribunal’s “sole purpose”109 would be to “bring to justice those 
responsible for grave violations of international humanitarian law”.110 Yet, the Resolution also noted 
that the Tribunal would assist in “restoring and maintaining peace in the region”.111 Additionally, the 
ICTY itself (via its rhetoric and judgments) added new objectives beyond its initial mandate given to 
it by the UNSC, such as reconciliation and giving voice to victims.112 Where it has added new 
objectives, its audiences (including stakeholders in the region and academics) heard them, and did 
not forget them. Thus, these additional goals were another basis by which the ICTY’s legitimacy 
would be assessed.113 
 
Outcome legitimacy may be the most difficult to achieve. An institution usually has goals but there 
are often external factors, over which the institution lacks control. For example, where an institution 
lacks the capacity to enforce its power, such as ICTs with no police force, it depends on states to 
arrest those it indicts. Where states refuse to do so, it has failed in their goal of bringing those 
responsible to justice. Further, there are matters that affect outcomes that are beyond the 
institution’s control; for example, the death of an indicted person – similarly, the goal of bringing 
them to justice has failed. In relation to this lack of control of outcomes, some scholars have 
 
106 S. Vasiliev, citing Franck, 18. – ICTY – realising their indictments, it did try all 161 – other than those who died; the 
judgments – Gotovina etc; but it also widens its outcome by introducing notions of victims’ justice and reconciliation etc – 
from subjective criteria to be judged against to totally subjective criteria   
107 ICTY achieved its tangible aims – brought all 161 indictments to prosecution.  
108 This thesis discusses the category of purposive legitimacy more than outcome legitimacy as the Tribunal has met its 
goal of bringing to justice those it indicted. New more intangible purposes, sometimes reported as goals, were added, 
such as giving voice to victims and reconciliation; these are less tangible and are thus discussed in relation to purposive 
legitimacy, the stated purposes rather than specific measureable goals.  
109 UNSCR 827, UN Doc S/RES/827 (1993), adopted 25 May 1993, para. 2. 
110 UNSCR 827, UN Doc S/RES/827 (1993), adopted 25 May 1993, acting under Chapter VII, para. 2.  
111 UNSCR 827, UN Doc S/RES/827 (1993), adopted 25 May 1993, opening declaration.  
112 Detailed in Chapter 4, s.4.3. 
113 In the case of the ICTY, under UNSC 827, it was noted that it was the Tribunal was established “for the sole purpose of 
prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law”. It aimed to bring about the 
restoration and maintenance of peace. However, its judgments, and judicial statements, at least at the beginning of the 
Tribunal’s lifetime, articulated that it believed its judgments would further lead to reconciliation. Prosecutor v. Erdemović, 
Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis, 5 March 1998, para.21; and Dragan Nikolić, Trail Chamber Sentencing Judgment, 18 December 





advocated for a holistic approach and argued that an institution’s practice is more important than its 
specific outcomes. Bodansky articulated this critique and asserted that legitimacy should be 
conceived of as an ongoing judgment. He argued: “what requires justification is the rule or decision’s 
authority, not its particular content. A person might think the law or decision is misguided ... or even 
unjust, but still accept it as legitimate”.114 Bodansky’s focus is on the bigger picture, of the overall 
perception of legitimacy which is pertinent for UER by the Tribunal. The practice may immediately 
be perceived to be unjust but, according to the theories of standards of legitimacy (presented 
below), these unjust decisions (outcomes) may not undermine legitimacy if the procedures by which 
they are taken are perceived as legitimate. That is, there are a number of standards by which 
legitimacy can be measured and, consequently, be obtained and maintained. The majority of these 
fall within legitimacy of exercise or performance legitimacy.  
 
3.5. Standards to Obtain, Maintain and Assess Legitimacy  
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the majority of institutions exercising power, including 
international criminal tribunals, generally wish to be legitimate for themselves and to be perceived 
as legitimate by others.115 In line with others, this thesis asserts that, to hold sociological legitimacy, 
a core sense of normative legitimacy is required. This section examines the standards116 and 
criteria117 proposed by scholars that can serve as “justifications of authority”; 118 that is, what 
promotes and sustains legitimacy.119 Sociological legitimacy’s reliance on normative legitimacy is 
supported by the “strategic and institutional approaches” to “managing legitimacy” set out by 
Suchman who comprehensively recommends how institutions can obtain, maintain and regain 
legitimacy.120 These strategic approaches were echoed years later by scholars121 advocating 
standards which, in their view, could “justify authority”; that is, how international law and 
international institutions could achieve and maintain legitimacy.  
 
114 D. Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law’ 
(1999) American Journal of International Law 93 at 602. 
115 M.C. Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’ (1995) The Academy of Management 
Review 20(3): 571-610 at 594. 
116 A. Buchanan and R. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of global governance institutions’ in L. H. Meyer (ed.) Legitimacy, Justice 
and Public International Law, section entitled ‘’Competing Standards of Legitimacy’ 35-40. 
117 A. Buchanan and R. Keohane ‘The Legitimacy of global governance institutions’ in L. H. Meyer (ed.) Legitimacy, Justice 
and Public International Law – sub-heading ‘criteria’ then referring to them as ‘attributes’ at 42.  
118 D. Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law’  
(1999) American Journal of International Law 93 at 601 cited in H. Takemura, ‘Reconsidering the Meaning and Actuality of 
the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court’  (2012) Amsterdam Law Forum Spring Issue 41: 6.  
119 M.C. Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’ (1995) The Academy of Management 
Review 20(3): 571-610 see 597-599.  
120 M.C. Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’ (1995) The Academy of Management 
Review 20(3): 571-610.  






This thesis has identified seven relevant standards by which to assess legitimacy.122 The first two, 
institutional integrity and procedural fairness, are often said to be objectively assessed. However, 
outlining standards on which institutions’ legitimacy is assessed necessarily encompasses the act of 
assessing, which is ultimately subjective. As asserted by Treves, any “judgment of legitimate or 
‘illegitimate’ is directly based on value judgments … legitimacy is more often than not a claim that 
certain generally shared values should prevail over others in a specific case”.123 For the positivist 
legalist, these shared values are found in the black letter law, or the written mandate or stated 
purposes of a particular institution. This is highlighted both in the literature and in this thesis’ 
findings. 
 
3.5.1. Institutional Integrity 
The standard of institutional integrity indicates the link between the categories of purposive 
legitimacy and outcome legitimacy. It falls into both categories of, first - legitimacy of exercise 
(called performance legitimacy) and second outcome legitimacy. For the legitimacy of exercise or 
performance legitimacy, integrity can be scrutinised in relation to an institution’s ongoing 
performance. Do its practices align with the purported goals of the institution? This connection is 
articulated best in the negative by Buchanan and Keohane who caution that “if an institution 
exhibits a pattern of egregious disparity between its actual performance, on the one hand, and its 
self-proclaimed procedures or major goals, on the other, its legitimacy is seriously called into 
question”.124 In this sense, the standard can be assessed through both the normative and the 
sociological approach to legitimacy. In the second instance, institutional integrity is the extent to 
which the proclaimed goals or purposes of the institution have been met in the eyes of its 
stakeholders. As a black and white standard (the direct connection between stated purpose and 
outcome) institutional integrity is particularly relevant for ICTY’s UER. UER prematurely terminated 
the original sentence the Tribunal meted out. In its judgments, retribution and general deterrence 
were the primary purposes of sentencing proclaimed by the judges.125 UER, prima facie has the 
potential to lead to the questioning of the Tribunal’s institutional integrity. Retribution is terminated 
 
122 Institutional Integrity, Procedural Fairness, Procedural Justice, Transparency, Legitimation through Justification, 
Legitimation through Participation and Acts of Persuasion.  
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prematurely, and for deterrence, potential perpetrators are sent the message that, if found guilty of 
atrocity crimes, the sentence promulgated will, more than likely, not be the lived reality.  
3.5.2. Procedural Fairness 
This broad standard comes under the category of legitimacy of exercise and is a standard by which 
scholars examining legitimacy from a normative approach assess an institution’s legitimacy. 126 The 
components of the standard derive from administrative law as they are “concerned with the process 
of decision making”.127 Such process can be based on objective criteria or components. Procedural 
fairness has three key components – in terms of administrative law they are termed as principles of 
“openness, fairness, and impartiality: openness requires publicity for the proceedings and 
knowledge of the essential reasoning underlying the decision; fairness requires the adoption of clear 
procedures; while impartiality requires freedom from the influence, real or apparent”.128 The first 
“openness” is transparency (discussed s.3.5.4). The second two standards relate to the decision-
maker – their fairness (adhering to clear procedures) and independence (impartiality). These three 
components in turn lead to an overall quality, that of the final decision. In the normative sense, 
these can be grounded in taking a positive law approach,129 that is, that the decisions are reached, 
fairly and impartially, whilst being transparent.  
 
The second and third components of fairness and independence of the decision-maker are 
particularly relevant in the case of the ICTY and UER. International judges were chosen, under the 
Tribunal’s founding legal doctrine, presumed to be unbiased (not from the region) and highly-
esteemed professionals; thus their decisions would be perceived as fair and “authoritative”.130 Strict 
legalistic scholars argue that normative legitimacy of procedural fairness has the capacity to counter 
negative perceptions: “By meeting all the relevant requirements of due process and fair 
administration of justice, ICTs may to some extent address critiques in view of deficient bases for 
their establishment, lack of consent and intermittent approval by constituencies”.131 This objective 
standard of procedural fairness, then, is of relevance to the legitimacy of UER and called for an 
analysis of the decisions and the process of decision-making. The thesis asked to what extent was 
 
126 Others too can examine the process. Many of these elements thus link to procedural fairness’ sociological standard – 
procedural justice, discussed in s.3.5.7 
127 M. Adler, ‘A Socio-Legal Approach to Administrative Justice’ (2003) Law and Policy 25(4): 323-352 at 324. 
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the UER practice procedurally fair? Under which rules was the practice administered, and to what 
extent did the President who decided on early release act in accordance with these rules?  
 
Finally, these two components (independence and fairness) relate to the overall quality of the 
decision. Some legal scholars have emphasised the value of procedural fairness and asserted that 
that “procedural requirements for legitimate authority … will help produce good outcomes”.132 Did 
the process result in a fair decision? The decision may not necessarily be desirable, but it must be 
fair.133 Assessing the procedural fairness depends in large part on the extent to which it is 
transparent – only if the decision is reasoned and accessible can stakeholders view the fairness of 
the decision (transparency, s.3.5.4). 
 
3.5.3. Procedural Justice  
The standard of procedural fairness can be assessed from the perspective of the layperson as well as 
the academic. Procedural fairness is an objective standard, which can be assessed on the letter of 
the law and practice. Procedural justice is a subjective standard, whereby people assess the lived 
reality of the law; the layperson’s perceptions of the decision-maker and the quality of their 
decisions. Although the view of the layperson, it is generally the view of those directly engaged with 
the institutions. For example, the standard of the quality of the decision-making based on the 
stakeholders’ perceptions as to whether they were treated fairly in the process, allowed to have 
their voices heard – is subjective. It is how they feel they are treated - people can be treated in a 
respectful way but not necessarily feel respected. Concerning the standard of the quality of the 
treatment, the layman could assess the extent to which they perceived that they have been treated 
in a dignified manner. Scholars134 have empirically tested the significance of the standards of 
procedural fairness, such as clear procedures and impartiality in decision-making.135  
Tyler and colleagues, based on multiple empirical studies, proposed that those engaged with the law 
perceive its legitimacy not by its outcomes but by its procedures.136 What was important, they 
asserted, was performance legitimacy rather than outcome legitimacy. There are two key elements 
 
132 D. Bodansky, ‘The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law’ in R. Wolfrum and V. Roben (eds.) Legitimacy in 
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of Tyler’s procedural justice concept - quality of treatment and quality of decision-making.137 The 
second element was the quality of decision-making, primarily being that the decision-maker is 
perceived as independent and fair. This element of Procedural Justice denotes two components of 
the standard of Procedural Fairness (s.3.5.2).  
Tyler’s examination of studies validated legal scholars’ assertions that procedure does matter. The 
subjective nature of Procedural Justice (contra Procedural Fairness, s.3.5.2) is highlighted by Tyler’s 
findings that the more participants in the criminal justice system were treated with respect by 
officials within the criminal justice system,138 the more institutions’ legitimacy was enhanced, 
independent of negative outcomes in cases.139 Tyler’s concept of procedural justice has been tested 
and validated by others, legal scholars and victimologists,140 who have argued that victims should be 
treated in a dignified manner through and after the process. Tyler has also referenced the other 
standards of legitimacy - transparency (s.3.5.4) and legitimation through justification (s.3.5.5) in his 
general conclusions whereby he asserted that “authorities benefit from openness and explanation, 
because it provides them an opportunity to evidence that their decision making is neutral”.141 
The link between the standard of being treated with respect in procedural justice and shared beliefs 
(see Acts of Persuasion and M. Walzer, s.3.5.7) to achieve and maintain legitimacy has been made by 
Bottoms and Tankebe. They have asserted that there exist “in all social contexts … strong shared 
values about the importance of justice … especially procedural justice, in the actions of law 
enforcement officials”. Good “quality of interpersonal treatment” requires the decision-maker to 
treat subjects in a respectful manner.142 Again, this standard of legitimacy echoes that of basic 
principles of human rights law, that all persons should be “treated with dignity and respect”,143 a 
principle that can be extended beyond the trial process to that of the early release practice.144 Not 
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only have they been the victims of the crime committed by the perpetrator, but the perpetrator can, 
and often does, return to locations where the victims reside.145 
3.5.4. Transparency  
The standard of transparency immediately connects to the category of performance legitimacy.146 
Transparency is a basic principle under administrative law. In common law jurisdictions, 
administrative law is understood as an area of law “concerned with the legal control of the exercise 
of public functions”.147 Outside of the law, extending to any institution’s functioning, it can be 
thought of more broadly as maintaining good governance.148 Procedural fairness standards can 
therefore be applied to the exercise of power beyond the state, to international institutions, 
including international courts149 and international criminal tribunals. It is a basic component of any 
institution exercising authority. It has been argued by some that “procedural fairness … is one aspect 
of legitimacy over which ICTs arguably possess the highest degree of control”.150 Where institutions 
are removed from those whose lives they affect, procedural fairness could be practised, minimally, 
through transparency. As Bodansky has asserted “the greater the distance between the ruler [the 
decision-maker] and the governed, the greater the legitimacy concerns”.151 Thus transparency may 
ameliorate that concern. In terms of applying this concept to the ICTY and UER, discussed in Chapter 
5, transparency was, indeed, a principle of the Tribunal, which itself explicitly linked transparency to 
the successful maintenance of its legitimacy to its stakeholders: “transparency of the judicial process 
[which] shall enhance the public confidence in the Tribunal”.152  
 
Some commentators have expressed caution over transparency, noting that it may enhance 
legitimacy where decisions are made through good procedure but may damage an institution’s 
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legitimacy when decisions lack coherence.153 Nevertheless, it is then recognised that this potential 
can lead to fairer and better decision-making.154 This has been recognised in early work exploring the 
legitimacy of international law and the institutions creating and administering it, and reference was 
made by Bodansky to the American Administrative Procedures Act. This national legislation required 
administrative agencies to provide the public, inter alia, with notice, as it seeks to establish new 
rules.155 By being open, it enables the public to have verifiable grounds to both understand the law 
and critique it. This argument has being applied to international criminal law and the assertion that 
prosecutors should develop ex ante guidelines to prosecute cases before the International Criminal 
Court, which “provide a transparent mechanism through which the Prosecutor can explain and 
justify his actions”.156 Thus, transparency can lead to another standard of legitimacy, “legitimation 
through justification” (see s.3.5.5).  
 
Transparency can, therefore, keep institutions in check. Firstly, at a sceptical level, it is argued that 
“publicity is a deterrent against malversation and misconduct by both judges … the basic mechanism 
of ensuring judicial accountability”.157 A more positive reading would propose that where institutions 
are aware of an audience observing them, they will act more mindfully in light of the audience: “The 
administrator is likely to make more reasonable decisions than he or she otherwise might, and is 
more subject to general public surveillance”.158 Some scholars have argued that institutions should 
“adopt a norm of publicity and … their decision-making should be ‘transparent’ and ‘open’”.159  
 
Finally, transparency, it is further proposed, “can serve a legitimating function if it exposes to public 
discourse the decision makers' understanding of the appropriate goals and priorities for the 
institution”.160 Thus, transparency can lead to another standard of legitimacy, ‘legitimation through 
justification’ (s.3.5.5), which can then, in turn, if justification is successful, lead to ‘acts of persuasion’ 
(s.3.5.7). Transparency is a first and minimal step, but it can nevertheless trigger other standards of 
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legitimacy, which require positive acts to be undertaken for the benefit of the institution’s 
audiences.  
 
3.5.5. Legitimation through Justification  
Transparency is a passive characteristic. However, by being transparent, an institution may wish to 
explain their acts. Scholars have, therefore, advocated for these active measures to be undertaken. 
Buchanan and Keohane proposed that “accurate information on how [an] institution works” must be 
available not only to “designated accountability holders” but also to “those who may contest the 
terms of accountability”. 161 This implies the public who may be affected by the decision at large, and 
who may challenge it. Information should be actively disseminated rather than simply available. The 
onus is on the institution to make the decision known, not for the public to discover it. The standard 
of transparency and active outreach has been taken further by scholars who have asserted that “one 
especially important dimension of broad transparency is responsibility for public justification”.162 
Now, institutions should not only be mindful of how they determine the law, but also how they 
explain their decisions to the public, to an outside audience. “Institutional actors must offer public 
justifications of at least the more controversial and consequential institutional policies”.163 This 
normative legitimacy is mirrored in the literature exploring sociological legitimacy. The equivalent to 
“controversial decisions” is echoed by Suchman as “disruptive events”. Suchman, in his work on 
“strategies for legitimacy”, asserted that institutions may be able to “preserve a modicum of 
cognitive legitimacy” if they cannot justify [disruptive events], then at least explain them.164 
Providing either a “public justification”, or, where one is not possible, explaining or reasoning a 
disputed outcome, is a good standard of legitimacy of an institution, which may otherwise be called 
into question. This standard of “public justification” is fitting for the purposes of UER: a practice 
effectively ending punishment early. It is a practice which could be perceived to be at odds with a 
mandate to bring to justice the perpetrators, whereby a declared sentence is stated as fitting with 
that punishment. At a minimum the decision to end that punishment early called for either a 
justification or an explanation.  
 
161 A. Buchanan and R. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’ in L. H. Meyer (ed.) Legitimacy, 
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justifications” to N. Daniels and J. Sabin, ‘Limits to Health Case: Fair Procedures, Democratic Deliberation, and the 
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3.5.6. Legitimation through Participation  
The above standards are those proposed by scholars generally for pragmatic reasons of maintaining 
legitimacy in an institution’s current and on-going exercise of power. At the more abstract level, 
scholars have proposed standards that are more idealistic. These foundations are, in part, due to the 
fact that international law lacks democratic validation. With no international parliament, 
international law “lacks a legislature”.165 As, however, democracy is, as argued by many, “the 
touchstone of legitimacy”,166 proposals for legitimation through participation reflect the principle of 
the demos - participation by the people. These proposals revolve around “communicative aspects of 
legitimisation”.167 From the legal perspective, the approach to international and non-accountable 
institutions of power, such as the World Bank, which develop rules that affect individuals, legitimacy 
can be achieved and maintained through active communication, i.e. “increased public 
participation”.168 For international courts and tribunals which (especially in the early years of the 
ICTY), through their exercise of power (including developing and amending their RPE and writing 
judgments), effectively create rules and policies that filter down to and affect people in states, the 
communication standard, as a form of public participation, is articulated in a two-stage approach: 
“First, legal persons whose international legal rights and duties are at issue in international court 
proceedings must have the right to present their views. Second, to the extent international courts 
are making law or policy, those potentially affected should have the ability to participate”.169 
International Criminal Law (ICL) has a global audience, in effect, bringing to account those accused of 
crimes against humanity. This means that potentially all human beings, those who may be 
perpetrators or those who are the victims of such crimes, are the audience to which this “no 
impunity” message is to be delivered. This stance is also proposed by scholars, who have argued that 
the ICC Statue is an international treaty, signed by states addresses all citizens, which includes 
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“victims, afflicted populations and perpetrators”.170 As detailed below (s.3.6), ICL has a global 
audience, but not all members of the audience are necessarily stakeholders; academics, for example, 
are one audience, but their lives (rather than their chosen careers) are not directly affected. 
Stakeholders are those who have a stake, they affect or are affected by the institution’s exercise of 
power itself.  
 
The initial stage is representation, and the second is participation. Participation denotes an 
interaction, an active communication. This would be between the law and decision-maker and the 
people affected by these laws and decisions. Theorist Habermas argued that laws and norms 
generally should be formulated not by those in power but by all those affected. This is the “general 
discourse principle” whereby “those norms … can be justified if and only if equal consideration is 
given to the interests of all those who are possibly involved”.171 In a world of 7.5 billion people,172 it 
is difficult to realise this ideal, and Habermas’ work did not provide a solution to how compromise 
may be reached. This has been articulated by others (below, s.3.5.7). 
 
3.5.7. Acts of Persuasion  
Communication and participation requiring “equal consideration” implies that the communication 
should be more than voices sounding past each other. Further, participation will not always provide 
a solution; there are occasions when consideration of one or more participants will overrule others. 
This is specifically an obstacle for international law, where norms held by the institution, the 
decision-makers, may not be “embedded in a defined community”173 and thus not simply accepted.  
 
In these cases, scholars have asserted that, for such an institution, “legitimacy … ultimately depends 
on [their] capacity to persuade observers that the exercise of its power … is consistent with the 
application of rules that are universal in nature”.174 A sense of universality can derive from  
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“the degree to which those norms can be justified through rational argument”.175 Their argument is 
that principles will only become norms when they are justifiable. In relation to ICL, some scholars 
have recognised the importance of persuasion required for international norms. As noted above 
(s.3.5.4 transparency) scholars who have advocated for the ICC’s Prosecutor to develop guidelines 
determining which cases to pursue, have further argued that guidelines may be able to be a means 
of communicating norms, thus going beyond a mere justification for their approach. These 
justifications become acts of persuasion, and, thus, may advance norms. However, scholars note 
that these acts of persuasion are not a one-way communication; communication is a first step. This 
is articulated best by de Guzman: “The [ICC]’s decision makers would announce the norms to which 
they have accorded priority in explaining the grounds for their selection decisions … relevant 
audiences … would then react, providing the decision makers with feedback on their normative 
choices. Decision makers would incorporate such feedback into their future decisions. Through this 
dialogic process, incremental progress would ideally be made toward greater consensus on norms 
and priorities”.176 Thus, de Guzman argued that the standards of legitimation through participation 
and acts of persuasion are upheld at the initial stage of the enforcement of international criminal 
law – case selection for prosecution, and they remain pertinent at the latter stage, including when 
perpetrators are considered for early release from imprisonment.  
 
It has been recognised that the “concept of shared values does … have its considerable 
complexities”.177 This may be the case of UER, as well as more broadly in the case of international 
criminal justice, where international judges are developing rules not necessarily based on values 
held by the community, where those practices have an impact, and further acts of persuasion may 
be required. Tankebe and Bottoms highlighted this challenge, and developed proposals by Walzer.  
 
Walzer argued that every society holds “thick” and “thin” moralities. All societies have specific 
(thick) moralities in how they consider themselves and their morality; “they will aim at what is best 
for themselves, what fits with their history and culture”.178 Nevertheless, Walzer posited that most 
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“communities also possess a way of talking to people abroad, across different cultures, about the 
thinner life [that different groups] have in common” and, crucially, he asserted that that “there are 
the makings of a thin and universalist morality inside every thick and particularist morality”.179 These 
thin moralities encompass “basic prohibitions – of murder, deception, betrayal and gross cruelty – 
that the law specifies”.180 Additionally, they encompass broad notions of “truth and justice”. In terms 
of justice he argued that this morality was universal, “simple enough: an end to arbitrary arrests, 
equal and impartial law enforcement”.181 Based on this thin morality, Bottoms and Tankebe argued 
that these common values should be emphasised by leaders of institutions. Acts of persuasion 
should occur whereby institutions of power seek out commonalities and persuade stakeholders to 
respect their decisions. They recommended that “power-holders in an increasingly globalised world 
… identify and articulate that shared thin morality, and negotiate its acceptance among a number of 
communities who espouse different thick moralities”.182 This standard of legitimacy may be 
applicable in relation to the UER of perpetrators by the ICTY: to communicate their decisions (a first 
step would be transparency) and, further, to appeal to some shared sense of morality that could 
persuade these stakeholders that UER was legitimate.  
 
The notion of commonalities across different groups echoes Beetham’s reference to “shared 
beliefs”. Beetham’s framework for the “legitimation of power” asserted that rules must be justified 
according to these shared beliefs between the decision-maker and its constituents (stakeholders). 
The notion of shared beliefs connects to the argument that rules derive from morals. Thus, morals 
are frequently embedded within the rules. Alongside this, advocates of Procedural Justice (s.3.5.3), 
have highlighted shared values applicable not only to the law but also the procedures within which 
they are manifested. Acts of communication and legitimation are embedded in every aspect of an 
institution’s exercise of power.  
 
3.5.8. Normative Legitimacy as Core to Achieving Sociological Legitimacy  
What the latter standards examined above (transparency, legitimation through justification, 
legitimation through participation and acts of persuasion) have highlighted is the value of 
communication. For a law, a practice, and the institution itself to be perceived as legitimate, it 
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generally needs to communicate that sense of legitimacy. Further, legitimacy is not an all or nothing. 
These standards of legitimacy, just as the categories of legitimacy (purposive, of exercise or 
performance, and of outcome) are not necessarily assessed in isolation. Therefore, where one 
standard is weak, another can bolster an institution’s legitimacy; some, indeed, may be more 
important in a given context. The standards and categories are, just as with the dimensions of 
legitimacy (normative and sociological), deeply intertwined.183 The social context encompasses the 
people who make up that social element, that is, the stakeholders in legitimacy, in the acts of 
communication. In addition to scholars and decision-makers, the decisions affect society and, 
therefore, their belief in the institution’s legitimacy matter. These categories of legitimacy, or as 
Vasiliev terms them “objects of justification,”184 should be assessed, not only by the scholar, but by 
the stakeholders upon whose lives they impact. Outlined further below (s.3.6) are the stakeholders 
relevant to this thesis’ exploration of the legitimacy of practice of UER (Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8).  
 
3.6. The Stakeholders who Perceive Institutions’ Legitimacy  
3.6.1. Identifying Stakeholders  
Identifying the categories by which legitimacy can be assessed raises the question - “whose views 
are the litmus test [for legitimacy]?”185 The word “views” echoes the category of performance 
legitimacy and implies that there is more than one audience. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
audiences whose views are the litmus test are the decision-makers and those engaged in the 
exercise of the institution’s power (insiders), and those directly affected186 by these decisions 
(outsiders). Both these insiders and outsiders are audiences, and are described here as 
stakeholders;187 some scholarship refers to them as constituents.188 UNSC Member States are also 
stakeholders in the ICTY as they are the “founding authority”,189 and although they are not decision-
makers, they hold a certain amount of control over the decision-makers (Chapter 4, s.4.2.1). 
Audiences can include a number of other groups, not directly affected by the decisions, such as 
academics and citizens of other countries. This section sets out the different stakeholders that have 
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been considered as relevant (and accessible)190 in assessing the perceived legitimacy of the practice 
of UER. 
 
First outlined are the relevant stakeholders in the legitimacy discourse more generally. Barker, who 
wrote about states and state leaders (institutions exercising power) asserted that “the most 
important member of the audience is the emperor himself”.191 At the core, those within the 
institution itself are stakeholders, they direct the institution’s practice, and, to convince others of 
their legitimacy, would generally require they perceive themselves as legitimate. Suchman, speaking 
at the broadest level of legitimacy for institutions exercising power, denoted the “immediate 
audience” as “those whose lives are affected by the exercise of power”.192 He explained that these 
“audiences are likely to become constituencies” who “scrutiniz[e] organizational behaviour to 
determine the practical consequences, for them”.193 In relation to international legal institutions, 
there are further audiences, beyond the immediate power-holder and those directly affected by the 
exercise of power. Buchanan and Keohane articulate this and further imply the requirement that an 
assessment of legitimacy should also explore perceptions of legitimacy. They have argued that 
“legitimacy requires not only that institutional agents are justified in carrying out their roles, but … 
that those to whom institutional rules are addressed have … reasons to comply with them, and that 
those within the domain of the institution’s operations have … reasons to support the institution or 
at least to not interfere with its functioning”.194 This assertion speaks to the requirement to 
interrogate the reasons as to why an institution and its actions are supported. This is where the 
complementary nature of legitimacy of a rule and the overall practice is highlighted, i.e. an 
institution can be legitimate to the extent to which it is perceived as such by its stakeholders. This 
reflects Beetham’s assertion (noted s. 3.3) that “power is acknowledged as legitimate to the extent 
that: it [has] legality, [holds] normative justifiability and [has] legitimation”.195 This 
interconnectedness meant that, to understand the sociological legitimacy of UER and any impact this 
had on the Tribunal’s overall legitimacy, required asking the stakeholders their perceptions on the 
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practice.196 The following section outlines why the thesis chose to study these stakeholders’ 
perceptions.  
 
3.6.2. Stakeholders in Criminal Justice Systems 
Generally, a criminal trial, domestic or international, requires the following individuals: an accused197 
and a victim, the two individuals who have “triggered”198 the case; a prosecutor, who has brought 
the case before the court; a defence attorney, who provides assistance to the accused; witnesses 
who testify to either support or counter the prosecution’s case; the trial chamber staff who 
administer procedural matters for the duration of the trial; and judges (or jury) who rule on the case. 
Behind the trial, there are judges’ clerks who provide research and assist in writing judgments; court 
reporters who summarise the details and procedures of the case; staff who provide assistance to 
witnesses, prison or security staff who guard the accused, and the media who follow and report on 
the case, where permitted. For international criminal trials, there are interpreters who enable 
communication between all of these actors. With the exception of the perpetrators, 199 security 
personnel, interpreters, and the media, all of these actors were considered as stakeholders whose 
opinions were sought as to the legitimacy of the practice of UER and its impact on the ICTY overall.  
 
3.6.3. Victims of Crime as Stakeholders  
The thesis’ identification of victims as key stakeholders in assessing the practice of the ICTY’s 
legitimacy stems from the perspective, shared by many others, that international criminal justice 
should “not be perceived and approached as an end itself, but as a means to deliver justice to those 
directly affected”.200  
 
At the domestic level, the concept of victims of crime being key stakeholders in the criminal justice 
system was posited by criminologist Nils Christie. He argued that, as of 1977, in the Western criminal 
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(common law) justice systems, the victim of crime had “lost participation in his own case”.201 The 
crime (which Christie terms “conflict”) which had triggered the case had been stolen by the state (R. 
v. the defendant) which had effectively made the victim the “heavy loser” in the criminal justice 
system.202 Christie argued that, in the trial process, the focus is on the “offender”, those accused of 
crime, not the victim and their harm. This, he argued, “reduced the victim to a nonentity”. Victims 
are represented by a Prosecutor and only speak when called to do so, to testify to crimes, the wrong 
of the perpetrator, not to their harms resulting from those crimes. He concluded that the “criminal 
conflicts have … become other people’s property – primarily the property of lawyers”.203 Christie 
referenced empirical research of victims in the UK justice system which supported his assertion,204 
that “victims had been sorely neglected by the criminal justice system”.205  
 
In response to this widespread belief of victims being side-lined by the criminal justice system, came 
a number of victims’ rights movements, in several jurisdictions and continents, throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. These movements were successful to the extent that there is now widespread 
recognition of victims as stakeholders with rights in domestic criminal justice systems which include 
the right to be consulted in a decision whether or not to prosecute, bail decisions, acceptance of a 
plea, a sentence and a decision on parole.206 These concepts and beliefs that victims are 
stakeholders took legal shape in the form of soft law, the UN Declaration on Victims, 1985 and the 
Council of Europe’s Recommendation on “The Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal 
Law and Procedure” 1985.207 This thesis, to the extent possible, set out to find how far any of these 
rights were considered or put into practice at the ICTY in the process of UER; that is, if the victim-
witnesses had been notified in the UER of a perpetrator, as would have been the case in a number of 
the EU or EEA countries where they served their sentence.208 
 
 
201 N. Christie, ‘Conflicts of Property’ (1977) British Journal of Criminology 17(1).  
202 N. Christie, ‘Conflicts of Property’ (1977) British Journal of Criminology 17(1) at 7. 
203 N. Christie, ‘Conflicts of Property’ (1977) British Journal of Criminology 17(1) at 5. 
204 A. Ashworth, ‘Victim Impact Statements and Sentencing’ (1993) Criminal Law Review, citing J. Shapland, J. Willmore 
and P. Duff, Victims in the Criminal Justice System (Gower Publishing, 1985) at 7.  
205 A. Ashworth, ‘Victim Impact Statements and Sentencing’ (1993) Criminal Law Review 1: 498–509.  
206 A. Ashworth, ‘Victim Impact Statements and Sentencing’ (1993)  Criminal Law Review 1 and see: https://e-
justice.europa.eu/content_rights_of_victims_of_crime_in_criminal_proceedings-171-en.do [accessed 02/12/2019] EU 
portal through which the majority of EU Member States set out their conformity with the Directive 2012/29/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and 
protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA.  
207 Recommendation No. R (85) 11 of the Committee of Ministers to the Member States on the Position of the Victims in 
the Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 28 June 1985 at the 387th 
meeting of the Ministers' Deputies) see: https://www.coe.int/en/web/ccpe/documentation/recommendations 
208 With the exception of Denmark, the countries in which the perpetrator was held and released from provide the 
victims of serious crimes, which would be expected to cover war crimes that their victims can request to be informed of 





Under this legal framework, the assumption is frequently made in the field of international human 
rights, transitional justice and victimological scholarship that victims are key stakeholders, and their 
perceptions of legitimacy matter in the overall legitimacy assessment of international criminal 
justice. The broad range of literature assessing, often critically - by both scholars and internal 
stakeholders; the treatment of victims by the ICTY and the perceptions of the ICTY by victims’ 
communities is reviewed in the following chapter,209 testifying to the statement that, “it seems 
evident that one stakeholder group are the victims of the crimes over which the tribunals have 
jurisdiction”.210 Therefore, this thesis sought to question the extent to which ending this retributive 
justice early had had an impact on the victim-communities’ views of the Tribunal. 
 
Before turning to the site of justice, or injustice, let us return to where the criminal justice process 
began, with the stakeholders at the Tribunal itself. 
 
3.6.4. Insiders’ Perspectives of Legitimacy  
As noted above, institutions of power, including the ICTY, wish to be perceived as legitimate, and 
routinely engage in acts of justification for their authority. Before being able to assert that the 
institution is legitimate, it surely must have a sense of its own legitimacy – that is, a belief that it is 
justified in exercising its authority. If an institution does not have a sense of its own legitimacy, how 
can it expect others to respect its decisions? The notion of self-belief being a pre-requisite is 
articulated by Juan Linz who argued that “the legitimacy of a democratic regime rests on the belief in 
the right of those legally elevated to authority to issue certain types of commands [and to] expect 
obedience”.211 This statement also prompts two questions of who are “those legally elevated to this 
position of authority who can issue such commands” and “what commands”? The ICTY, first and 
foremost, was mandated to “bring to justice those responsible” for atrocity crimes; as a criminal 
tribunal, the act of bringing to justice meant a determination of guilt for those responsible. Those 
are the commands that the institutions wish to be perceived as legitimate, their ultimate exercise of 
power. Therefore, it was the judges who were the individuals enshrined with legal authority to 
render the final determination on the guilt of those deemed responsible and to pass sentence. In 
relation to legitimacy, it has been argued that “constructing and maintaining professional and 
personal esteem and a sense of professional legitimacy is a fundamentally social process which 
 
209 Chapter 3, s. 3.3.  
210 M. Heikkila, ‘The Balanced Scorecard of International Criminal Tribunals’ in C. Ryngaert (ed.) The Effectiveness of 
International Criminal Justice (Intersentia, 2009) at 33.  
211 J. Linz, ‘The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Crisis Breakdown and Reequalibrium’ (Johns Hopkins Press, 1978) 





requires validation from others”.212 Consequently, then, judges have to adhere to their own sense of 
legitimacy as they perform to their audiences. In relation to criminal justice and perceptions of self-
legitimacy in the national setting, there is a significant body of literature which has explored judicial 
behaviour in light of the “various audiences judges perform to or for”.213 
 
The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) was another primary performer. They engaged directly with the 
Tribunal’s various stakeholders, especially victims. They have initial and ongoing engagement with 
victims: questioning them for evidence, recording their statements, and choosing which victims 
would come to The Hague to testify. Other staff (such as the Victim and Witness Unit, the staff of the 
Registry, Media and Communication) are also these insiders, described by Takemura as “constituent 
members”.214 Rather than performing, they may actively engage with external audiences, such as the 
media, individuals of international bodies, and the public of the region where the crimes were 
committed. In the context of legitimation, the process by which institutions create and sustain 
legitimacy, Barker asserted that “when rulers legitimate themselves, they give an account of who 
they are, in writing, in images, in more or less ceremonial actions and practices”.215 Tribunal judges 
do this through their written judgments; other internal stakeholders do so through their 
engagement with the Tribunal’s outside stakeholders.  
 
3.6.5. The War-affected Populations as Stakeholders in International Criminal Justice  
At a broad and philosophical level, and implied in part above by the Tribunal itself, the Tribunal 
sought to bring justice to victims and to all other people involved in general, that is, the wider post-
conflict society. This fits into Raz’s understanding of a legitimate authority which serves the society it 
 
212 K. McEvoy and A. Schwartz, ‘Judging and Conflict: Audience, Performance and the Judicial Past’ in A.M. McAlinden and 
C. Dwyer (eds.) Criminal Justice in Transition: The Northern Ireland Context (Oxford University Press, 2015) 158-185, at 
161 referencing C. Johnson, T. Dowd, and C. Ridgeway, ‘Legitimacy as a Social Process’ (2006) Annual Review of Sociology 
32: 53 at 5. 
213 K. McEvoy and A. Schwartz, ‘Judging and Conflict: Audience, Performance and the Judicial Past’ at 161 citing T.J. Miceli 
and M.M. Cogel ‘Reputation and Judicial Decision-Making’ (1994) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 23: 31; 
F. Schauer ‘Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior’ (1999) University of Cincinnati 
Law Review 68: at 615; N. Garoupa and T. Ginsburg ‘Judicial Audiences and Reputation: Perspectives from Comparative 
Law’ (2008) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 47: 451.  
214 H. Takemura, ‘Reconsidering the Meaning and Actuality of the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court’ 41 
Amsterdam Law Forum Spring Issue (2012) 6. In following the logic of internal stakeholders along with Barker’s concept of 
self-legitimation and the audiences to which power-holders prioritise their acts of self-legitimation, the thesis sought the 
opinion of other staff at the ICTY. 
215 R. Barker, Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations of Rulers and Subjects (Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 
35. In practice, at the ICTY, this legitimation was undertaken not only by the judges in their written decisions and public 





governs.216 In the case of the ICTY, it prosecuted perpetrators from the region, for people, the 
victims, in the region; thus, post-conflict society is a key stakeholder in the justice it dispensed. 
Further, atrocity crimes include more than the direct victims before the Tribunal due to 
perpetrators’ mass victimisation, due to the fact that the motivation of the crimes was often based 
on the notion of the other; in short, the atrocity crimes occurred as part of a societal breakdown. As 
will be discussed in the following chapter, the ICTY became a de facto transitional justice mechanism 
which dealt with this societal breakdown. Scholars capture this characteristic as they frequently 
discuss the ICTY within a framing of transitional justice rather than explicitly as international criminal 
justice.217 This understanding requires that “rebuilding rule of law [becomes] a key element of the 
reaction to international crimes”.218 Consequently, effective transitional justice mechanisms are 
those which “successfully reconstruct social norms in opposition to mass violence” and that the 
“local population must perceive such mechanisms as legitimate before it will internalise these norms 
these mechanisms represent”. 219 This statement is pertinent to the practice of early release for 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes and the above (s.3.2) noted query that the practice raised: was it a 
deliberate practice under which the ICTY was developing new norms to forgive perpetrators of 
atrocity crimes, by treating them as ordinary crimes, or in fact, more favourably? Did these norms 
filter down to the ICTY’s successors in the criminal justice process in BiH, the judges and lawyers who 
were working on war crimes cases at the domestic level? To what extent did they believe the 
practice of UER was legitimate, and did the practice impact on their overall perceptions of the 
Tribunal’s legitimacy? To what extent would this practice of UER be repeated in the war crimes cases 
prosecuted in BiH itself?  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has distinguished the two main approaches to legitimacy, its normative (encompassing 
both legal and moral elements) and sociological dimensions, demonstrated how interconnected they 
 
216 J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1988) at 53 and 56 cited S. Aambolangvan and T. Squatrito, 
‘Conceptualising and Measuring The Legitimacy of ICTs’ in N. Hayashi and C. M. BaillIiet (eds.) The Legitimacy of 
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217 D. Luban ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law’ at 574 who 
argued that prosecuting perpetrators of atrocity crimes – “deals with “extraordinary violence, symmetrically perpetrated, 
and typically on a large scale … instead of being normal parts of the daily function of government, international criminal 
trials occur after governments have fallen or been radically altered” therefore TJ, and “therefore trials take on political 
overtones”. Therefore “foundational question about what justifies punishment takes on different configurations in ICL”.   
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are, and underscored why an assessment of an institution’s legitimate exercise of power should 
understand both dimensions. It has also explained why sociological legitimacy is required for 
institutions of power which do not have independent coercive force; their ability to exercise 
authority rests on stakeholders’ acceptance of their legitimacy, via perceptions of the institution’s 
normative legitimacy (both legal and moral elements) based on its performance – its exercise of 
power. Further, for institutions which seek to advance norms (over time), legitimacy is fundamental 
for war-affected societies to internalise these norms.220 The chapter then outlined the relevant 
categories and standards of legitimacy that the thesis examines in its assessment of UER. Just as 
normative and sociological legitimacy are complementary, so too are many of the standards of 
legitimacy. It has clarified why the normative legitimacy assessment of the practice has necessitated 
the examination of its sociological legitimacy by the relevant stakeholders. It has identified the 
stakeholders whose assessments of these categories and standards were obtained and analysed, 
and explained why. 
 
The thesis set out to explore the normative and sociological legitimacy of UER from the viewpoint of 
different stakeholders.221 These findings are analysed in Chapter 5, assessing the normative 
legitimacy of the practice – its legality; then the sociological legitimacy challenges raised by the 
practice’s stated reasoning - Chapter 6. The repercussions of UER on its key stakeholders are set out 
in Chapters 7, moral condemnation negated, and 8, victims’ sense of injustice. In doing so, the study 
contributes to the literature which has explored the ICTY’s normative and its sociological legitimacy; 
that is the exercise of its legal powers and perceptions of the Tribunal by stakeholders in the region, 
to which we will now turn. 
 
 
220 M. Drumbl, “I would welcome a policy whereby international institutions sentenced differently based on incorporation 
of national norms … This policy is particularly desirable when national positive law instruments, or court activity, 
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national sentencing practices is intimately connected to the meaningfulness of sanction” in Atrocity, Punishment and 
International Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 162-163.  











Chapter 4: Assessments of the ICTY’s Legitimacy 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the literature which has assessed the ICTY’s legitimacy: its normative (both 
legal and moral elements) and sociological dimensions. Observers1 have analysed specific categories 
of its legitimacy and appraised its legitimacy on different standards. Thus, in outlining these 
legitimacy assessments specific to the ICTY the chapter builds on the preceding chapter which 
defined the concepts of legitimacy: its dimensions (and approaches by which it is explored), its 
categories and the standards used to assess the legitimacy of institutions of power more broadly.  
 
As a socio-legal thesis, focusing on the law in context2 in addition to the law itself, this chapter 
examines the literature which interrogates the Tribunal’s sociological legitimacy with reference to a 
variety of stakeholders (s.4.3), primarily, the people in the region (s.4.3.2) and particularly in relation 
to victims of the crimes being punished (s.4.3.1). Alongside this, the chapter explores the normative 
(legal and moral) legitimacy dimension of punishment dispensed by the ICTY (s.4.4). Through the 
findings’ chapters (Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8), this thesis argues that UER is a continuation of many of 
these legitimacy challenges and deficits identified in this literature. This chapter also explores the 
significant, albeit more limited, scholarly critiques of the normative legitimacy dimension of the 
Tribunal’s Presidents’ decision-making and early release explicitly (s.4.5). As this thesis complements 
and extends this area of research, it is detailed further in Chapters 5 and 6.3 Finally, this chapter 
notes a small body of literature which has raised disquiet at the return of those convicted by the 
ICTY to the region, and the challenge to ICTY’s sociological legitimacy as they do so. Other literature 
addressing these homecomings is noted in the relevant Chapters (6 and 7) outlining the impact of 
UER on post-conflict BiH 
 
Prior to examining these accounts of the legitimacy of the Tribunal’s exercise of power, it is 
important to acknowledge the specific nature of the Tribunal itself and its establishment (s.4.2). Its 
 
1 The word observers is used as the literature exploring the Tribunal’s legitimacy, published in academic journal is not 
only written by academics, but also by practitioners (judges and prosecutors from the Tribunal itself) and staff members.  
2 See Chapter 2, s.2.2  
3  B. Holá called for the exploration of the impact of UER on reconciliation in BiH, see B. Holá, J. van Wijk, F. Constantini, 
and A. Korhonnen, ‘Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ Reflections on Their Crimes in Early Release Decisions’ (2018) 
International Criminal Justice Review 28(4): 349-371 at 366. Given time and resources the empirical research for this 
thesis was undertaken to capture and analyze a select number of stakeholders’ perceptions of the legitimacy of UER, in 
addition to exploring its normative legitimacy. Further, it would be counter-intuitive to measure UER’s impact on 
reconciliation when reconciliation itself is such a contested concept and much of the scholarship on post-conflict BiH 





genesis and characteristics have, as argued in the literature4 and reflected in this thesis’ findings, 
influenced the operationalisation of the Tribunal’s penal practice and its relationship with its 
stakeholders. Alongside this, the Tribunal’s unique nature (s.4.2) has also played a role in 
determining how the Tribunal is perceived in the region (its overall sociological legitimacy). 
Additionally, by detailing these characteristics of the ICTY, the thesis highlights a number of 
characteristics shared by other International Criminal Tribunals (ICTs) and the permanent 
International Criminal Court (ICC). First, they have multiple, sometimes conflicting, stakeholders, 
with differing priorities and understandings of the Tribunal/Court’s purposive legitimacy.5 Second, 
they are removed from the society over which they have jurisdiction. Third, the nature and gravity of 
the crimes they adjudicate “explode the limits of law”.6 Thus, some findings on the legitimacy 
challenges raised by UER are generalisable. Therefore, other ICTs and the ICC could draw lessons 
from these findings as they consider the grant of early release for perpetrators of atrocity crimes and 
undertake practices assist in maintaining their overall legitimacy through good performance 
legitimacy.7  
  
4.2. The Establishment and Nature of the Tribunal 
4.2.1. The Tribunal’s Multiplicity of Stakeholders and their Perceptions of its Purposive Legitimacy  
The ICTY was established as the war in the FRY was raging.8 As the UN Security Council established 
the Tribunal it set out its determination to “bring an end to [widespread violations of international 
humanitarian law ... including mass killings and … ethnic cleansing] and to take effective measures to 
bring to justice the persons … responsible for them”.9 The ICTY’s core mandates,10 its purposive 
legitimacy,11 in the minds of the UNSC were twofold. First, specific deterrence, as it determined the 
ICTY would assist in ending the killing; second, accountability as it would bring to justice those 
responsible. Member States of the UNSC were key stakeholders of the Tribunal, given they were its 
founders who provided resources, and annually extended its mandate after they scrutinised the 
 
4 K. King and J. Meernik, ‘Assessing the Impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Balancing 
International and Local Interests While Doing Justice’ in B. Swart, A. Zahar and G. Sluiter (eds.) The Legacy of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Oxford University Press, 2011) 7-54. 
5 P.J. Keenan, ‘The Problem of Purpose in International Criminal Law’ (2016) Michigan Journal of International Law 37(3): 
421-474 at 454 
6 H. Arendt cited in M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007) and G. 
Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 2000) noting that H. 
Arendt, in relation to the Nuremberg Trials, argued that sentencing someone for the destruction of thousands of lives is 
“totally inadequate” at 13.  
7 See Chapter 3. 3.4.3, “Performance Legitimacy” is also described as ‘Legitimacy of Exercise’ and “Process Legitimacy”  
8 The ICTY was established by the UN Security Council (UNSC) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on 22 February 1993.  
9 UNSCR 808, 22 February 1993 – emphasis added.  
10 See Chapter 8, s.8.5, which a number of Tribunal judges were keen to emphasis.  





Tribunal’s Annual Reports – which outlined its exercise of power. Other stakeholders of the Tribunal 
were identified by the UN appointed Commission of Inquiry, which documented a number of the 
violations of international humanitarian law, on which the Tribunal adjudicated.12 The Commission’s 
final report noted the “high expectation of justice conveyed by the parties to the conflict, as well as 
by victims, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations, the media and 
world public opinion.”13 The report immediately asserted that “the International Tribunal must be 
given the necessary resources and support to meet these expectations and accomplish its task”.14 
The Commission appeared to caution one group of stakeholders, UNSC Member States (to whom 
the report was presented and who financed the Tribunal), to pay heed to the Tribunal’s other 
stakeholders, which included the victims. Glasius and Colona noted this multiplicity of stakeholders 
who, immediately on the Tribunal’s establishment, had “diverse founding expectations”.15 The 
second group of international stakeholders identified (INGOs, NGOs, the international media, and 
victims) were described by the Commission as having “high expectation[s]”.16 Their conception of 
justice was wider than incapacitation of perpetrators, accountability, and a cessation of hostilities. 
Schrag described these purposes as, amongst others, bringing “a sense of justice to war-torn 
places”.17 For these outside stakeholders (including victims of the conflict), Schrag suggested theirs 
was a broad reading of the wording of the UNSCR which asserted that the Tribunal would 
“contribute to restoration and maintenance of peace”.18 The maintenance of peace could entail a 
long-term mandate. Yet a strict reading of the phrase, “the restoration and maintenance of peace” 
could implicitly make the life of the ad hoc Tribunal time-bound. Technically, after it had tried those 
responsible for the mass violations, and when peace was restored, the Tribunal had achieved its 
purposes. Thus, for one set of stakeholders, on whose finances it depended for its existence and 
operationalisation,19 the Tribunal had a limited timeframe: the Tribunal was established with the 
immediate aim of incapacitating the warring parties and ending the ongoing conflict in FRY.20 Finally, 
the Bassiouni report indirectly identifies an antagonistic set of stakeholders, Serbian public 
 
12 Chairman of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council 780 (1992) to 
Investigate Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia (1993-94).  
13 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), para. 320 
14 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), para. 320 – 
emphasis added - cited in M. Glasius and F. Colona, ‘The Yugoslavia Tribunal: The Moving Targets of a Legal Theatre’ in D. 
Abazović and M. Velikonja (eds.) Post-Yugoslavia: New Cultural and Political Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) at 
12.  
15 M. Glasius and F. Colona, ‘The Yugoslavia Tribunal: The Moving Targets of a Legal Theatre’ in D. Abazović, M. Velikonja 
(eds.) Post-Yugoslavia: New Cultural and Political Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) at 11. Hereinafter, M. Glasius 
and F. Colona, ‘The Yugoslavia Tribunal: The Moving Targets of a Legal Theatre’. 
16 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), para. 320. 
17 M. Schrag, ‘Lessons Learned from ICTY Experience’ (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 2: 427-434, at 428.  
18 UNSCR 808, 22 February 1993 
19 M. Klarin, ‘The Tribunal’s Four Battles’ (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 2(2): 546–55 at 552 
20 R. Kerr, ’Peace through Justice: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2007) Southeast 





opinion.21 This set of stakeholders had been rallied by “regional media bias as well as the early 
framing of the Tribunal in the international media [which had] emphasised the ‘Serb crimes’ being 
prosecuted. Therefore, from the outset, dominant Serbian public opinion [was] against the proposed 
court”.22 Thus, the purposive legitimacy of the Tribunal was conceived of, and its exercise of power 
observed in the light of this conception, differently by its numerous audiences,23 whether it realised 
this or not.  
 
4.2.2. The Tribunal: A Giant with No Arms and No Legs  
In addition to having multiple stakeholders with differing expectations, these stakeholders had 
differing levels of influence, at different times, and for different purposes. One set of stakeholders 
(Members of the UNSC) were directly influential, given the ad hoc nature of the Tribunal. In May 
1993 the Tribunal did not physically exist; money had to be obtained to build it and staff it. Further, 
it was no easy task, as there was a lack of effort by “major western powers to deliver … a working 
budget”.24 A number of scholars have argued that this led the Tribunal to focus its initial “efforts to 
gain legitimacy”25 on the international community26 rather than the region, which led them to 
overlook stakeholders in the region27 (albeit with a view to bringing accused perpetrators in the 
region to justice). This argument, that the Tribunal’s initial efforts to obtain legitimacy were focused 
not on the region but on the more nebulous international community of states, is implicitly 
supported when one looks at its first Annual Report. It dedicates 22 paragraphs outlining the 
“Tribunal and World Public Opinion” in contrast to one and a half paragraphs to the “Public 
 
21 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992). “The 
Commission is shocked by the high level of victimization and the manner in which these crimes were committed, as are 
the populations of all the parties to the conflict. The difference is that each side sees only its own victimization, and not 
what their side has done to others” at para. 317. 
22 M. Glasius and F. Colona, ‘The Yugoslavia Tribunal: The Moving Targets of a Legal Theatre’ in D. Abazović and M. 
Velikonja (eds.) Post-Yugoslavia: New Cultural and Political Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) at 12 referencing D. 
Cotič, “Introduction’ in R. Clark and M. Sann (eds.) The Prosecution of International Crimes (Transaction Publishers, 1996) 
at 10-12. 
23 See Chapter 3.4.3. See specifically, ‘Audience and Performance’, 160-173 in K. McEvoy and A. Schwartz, ‘Judging and 
Conflict: Audience, Performance and the Judicial Past’ in A.M. McAlinden and C. Dwyer (eds.) Criminal Justice in 
Transition: The Northern Ireland Context (Bloomsbury, 2015) 157-184.   
24 M. Glasius and F. Colona, ‘The Yugoslavia Tribunal: The Moving Targets of a Legal Theatre’ at 13.  
25 J. Subotić, ‘Legitimacy, Scope and Conflicting Claims on the ICTY: In the Aftermath of Gotovina, Haradinaj and Perišić’ 
(2014) Journal of Human Rights 13: 170-185, at 179. 
26 M. Klarin, ‘The Tribunal’s Battles’ (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 2(2): 546–558 at 552.  
27 M. Klarin, ‘The Tribunal’s Four Battles’ - “The Tribunal was initially busy with winning over the ‘hearts and minds’ of 
those on whom its survival and functioning depended – such as the UN Budgetary Committee, other donors to NATO, as 
well as those who were in a position to ensure the arrests of the accused and access to witnesses and evidence. Thus, in 
the first few years, the Tribunal had almost totally neglected its ‘constituency’, as Judge Gabrielle Kirk-McDonald once 
described the public in the countries of the former Yugoslavia’ (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 2: 547-558 





Relations” in the region.28 To what extent, this thesis queried, was a focus maintained on the 
international community over that of the region, and did this focus play a role in the practice in UER?  
 
This financial reliance on states continued beyond the lifetime of the Tribunal at the enforcement of 
sentences stage. Upon conviction, the Statute directed that perpetrators’ sentences were enforced 
in states other than the FRY, which required these states’ agreement.29 Thus, prima facie, the 
Tribunal was reliant on these states’ goodwill to enforce their sentences.30 Consequently, its 
perceived legitimacy by these stakeholders was required. An attitude towards the significance of 
these stakeholders’ assessment of their legitimacy was noted by the former Tribunal’s Chief 
Prosecutor Arbour, who asserted that the Tribunal “perceived itself … very much at the mercy of 
state co-operation, very uncertain about its financial future … [and] about the political support in 
world public opinion”.31 Arbour’s assertion raised the question as to whether this self-perception of 
dependency upon enforcement states by inside stakeholders continued when considering UER, as a 
pardon or commutation of sentence (effectively UER) was triggered, under the Statute, on the penal 
law of the enforcement state.32  
 
The positivist legalistic approach to obtaining and maintaining legitimacy, was well articulated by 
Damaška, “lacking coercive [power], their legitimacy hangs almost entirely on the quality of their 
decisions and their procedures.”33 A number of Tribunal judges also held this legalistic approach 
although not all observers shared this attitude on how best the Tribunal could maintain its 
legitimacy (detailed below s. 4.2.3).  
 
 
28 ICTY Annual Report 1995, paras 161-184. These paragraphs reported on the positive coverage from the New York 
Times, Le Monde and newspapers in the Netherlands. This visible pattern, of one stakeholder being briefly referenced 
then immediately overshadowed by another, speaks to the literature, which critiqued the Tribunal’s initial rhetoric, which 
asserted it was bringing justice. The argument is that it was not that the Tribunal deliberately neglected stakeholders in 
the region, but made assumptions as to what it was they wished for (see s.4.3.1). 
29 Bilateral agreements between the ICTY and European States: see: https://www.icty.org/en/documents/member-
states-cooperation [accessed 09/12/2019]  
30 R. Mulgrew, Towards the Development of the International Penal System (Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 23. 
31 M. Klarin, 'The Tribunal's Four Battles' (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 2: 550-551 at 546.  
32 Article 28, ICTY – see Chapter 5, s. 5.2. 
33 M. Damaška, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice’ (2008) Chicago-Kent Law Review 83(1) 329-365 at 329 
noting that “interdisciplinary literature on norm acceptance through persuasion suggests that there is a necessary 
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legitimate authority” at 345 referencing T. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Yale University Press, 1990) and G.R. Miller, 
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4.2.3. The Tribunal Judges Defining their Role  
The Tribunal’s second challenge was that International Criminal Law (ICL) was in its infancy. The 
judges had little established precedent to guide their decision-making, not only on determining guilt 
or innocence, but whether certain criminal law defences, such as duress, were applicable under 
ICL.34 This meant, in effect, they were often developing ICL.35 As noted by the Tribunal’s first 
President, among the problems for international criminal courts, and particularly for the ICTY, was 
that its judges had to “apply, in addition to its Statute, customary international law, which can only 
be ascertained by consulting widely-dispersed international law sources”.36 President Cassese 
implicitly recognised, by use of the word “ascertained” that, unlike national jurisdictions, which, he 
reflected, could “rely on dozens of codes and hundreds of precedents for guidance”,37 Tribunal 
judges were searching for practice, and in doing so developing international customary law into a 
body of ICL. This role is articulated as a matter of pride by some judges themselves. President Meron 
noted that the ICTs (the ICTY and its sister Tribunal the ICTR) had “helped create a whole new 
universe of international criminal justice in which an end to impunity and legal accountability … are 
… increasingly our reality”.38 Similarly, Judge Wald describes the “ICTY’s premier accomplishment … 
[as] … the development of a corpus justis of international humanitarian law”.39 The judges’ self-
perception has led some authors to propose that developing ICL became the main focus of the 
Tribunal.40 For many legal scholars this aspect of the Tribunal’s work is perceived as its major 
contribution to international criminal justice.41 Yet, the success of developing ICL was time 
consuming, and led to re-trials,42 and frequently delayed justice for stakeholders in the region. This 
has been emphasised by observers who have focused their attention on the societal role of law, and 
critiqued the Tribunal judges for not doing so, thereby neglecting stakeholders’ perceptions of them 
 
34 A. Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International 
Humanitarian Law’ (1998) European Journal of International Law 9: 2-17 at 11, citing Erdemović’s defence.   
35 K.I. Kappos and P.W. Hayden ‘Current Developments at the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals’ (2016) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 14: 1261-1295. 
36 A. Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International 
Humanitarian Law’ at 11.  
37 A. Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International 
Humanitarian Law’ at 11. 
38 T. Meron, ‘The Making of International Criminal Justice: The View from the Bench: Selected Speeches (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) at 109.  
39 P. Wald ‘ICTY Judicial Proceedings: An Appraisal from Within’ (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 2(2): 466-
473 at 472. 
40 D. Orentlicher, Shrinking the Space, at 53 cited in J K. King and J. Meernik, ‘Assessing the Impact of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Balancing International and Local Interests While Doing Justice’ in B. Swart, 
A. Zahar and G. Sluiter (eds.) The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 7-54, citing President Pocar at 13.   
41 R. Kerr, ‘Peace through Justice: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2007) Southeast 
European and Black Sea Studies 7(3): 373-385 at 383.  





in the region.43 This critique was harshly noted by an ICTY former spokesperson that “the Tribunal’s 
judges have been and will always be more interested in what international law journals have to say 
about their judgments than the people to whose lasting peace they are supposed to be 
contributing”.44 An exploration of this attitude, of proud developers of ICL, was called for as the 
President and his colleagues developed the penal practice of UER. The second and third sub-
research question addressed this, as they examined how the judges reasoned and perceived UER; to 
what extent was the practice a well-reasoned one and what were their perceptions of the practice? 
 
The self-perception expressed above - judges as legalists tasked with deciding on, and where 
necessary, developing ICL - was made clear by some judges who asserted that they did not perceive 
their role as contributing to peace. This position was captured clearly by Tribunal President Pocar 
(2005– 2009) as he noted that “the ICTY was entrusted with prosecuting and holding trials for the 
main perpetrators … and that’s the only task”.45 What is evident here is how divergent the 
perceptions of the Tribunal’s purposive legitimacy46 were, even among internal stakeholders (the 
judges and staff of the Tribunal). Hodžić perceived the Tribunal’s core purpose as being the second 
half of the Tribunal’s mandate, its contribution to the restoration and maintenance of peace; 
whereas President Pocar perceived its sole purpose as fulfilling the first half of the mandate – 
bringing to justice those responsible for grave crimes.47  
 
The criticism of judges being focused on their role in ascertaining the law, arising from reality that 
ICL was in its infancy, may never have arisen if, from the outset, they had made clear that 
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused was their focus. Yet this was not the case, as some 
of the judges themselves espoused these broader non-legal goals to their work, such as peace in the 
region. Critiques that the Tribunal neglected regional stakeholders are valid because, as s.4.3.1 
outlines, upon reading the initial ICTY judgments (written by judges rather than other organs of the 
Tribunal) they asserted that their judgments would have positive societal benefits, often citing 
reconciliation48 - goals, which are “far removed from the normal concerns of national criminal 
 
43 R. Hodžić’s critique and Dimiitrijević cited in M. Klarin, ‘Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former of 
Yugoslavia’ (2009) Journal of International Criminal Justice 7: 89-96 at 96 and M. Schrag, ‘Lessons Learned from ICTY 
Experience' (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 2:  427-434 at 431. 
44 See: https://balkaninsight.com/2013/03/06/accepting-a-difficult-truth-icty-is-not-our-court/ [15/11/2019] 
45 D. Orentlicher, Shrinking the Space for Denial: The Impact of the ICTY in Serbia (Open Society Institute, 2008) at 53 
referencing Presidents Pocar and Meron cited in K. King and J. Meernik ‘Assessing the Impact’ in B. Swart, A. Zahar and G. 
Sluiter (eds.) The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Oxford University Press, 2011) 
at 13. 
46 See Chapter 3, s.3.4.2.  
47 Wording of the UNSCR 808, 22 February 1993.   
48 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Judgement 29 November 1996, para. 58; Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., 16 November 1998, para. 





justice”.49 This criticism was directly argued by Subotić who asserted that: “the ICTY has in no small 
part brought this unrealistic expectation [of being the “principal instrument of both retributive and 
restorative justice”] onto itself by legitimizing its work to hostile domestic publics as a path to 
reconciliation and creation of a historical transcript”.50  
 
As the practice of UER was a new development in ICL (detailed s.4.5 and Chapter 5), this divergence 
of perceived purposes, the reality of the judges being responsible for developing ICL and practice, 
and the accusation that this was done at the expense of the region, were probed in this thesis’ 
research in relation to UER. To what extent did the judges at the Tribunal focus their attention on 
developing the practice of early release and to what extent did they consider this penal practice as 
being significant for the region? This thesis contributes, through its direct engagement with the 
Tribunal’s internal stakeholders in The Hague (which ascertained their self-perception), to advancing 
knowledge beyond the trial process to that of the enforcement of criminal justice – that is, the 
practice of, and reasons for, the premature ending of the enforcement of justice: UER from 
imprisonment.  
 
4.3. The Tribunal’s Legitimacy of Practice with Key Stakeholders 
The above section (s.4.2.1) outlined the pragmatic challenges caused by the unique ad hoc nature of 
the Tribunal, which scholars have argued influenced how it engaged with its key stakeholders – that 
is, its performance legitimacy. In addition to this practical challenge was the “self-imposed … 
overabundance of … goals” was the fact that they not only were “truly gargantuan”51 but not 
accorded enough priority (s.4.3.2) which led to sociological legitimacy deficits. During the course of 
its lifetime (at least since 1999 when it established Outreach) the ICTY actively sought to be 
perceived as legitimate by its regional stakeholders (the post-war communities of the FRY) as well as 
the UNSC Member States who funded their work.52 It sought to gain and maintain legitimacy as it 
issued Press Releases regarding its work, translated court documents into the local languages, 
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summarised judgments for public consumption, broadcast trials live in the region, opened offices in 
the region, and held legacy conferences.53 Through this active engagement with the public in the 
region, the Tribunal was implying that their perceptions mattered. The ICTY, therefore, had 
established post-conflict society in the FRY as stakeholders in their dispensation of justice by actively 
disseminating and explaining their decisions (legitimation through justification and participation)54 to 
them. This research questioned the extent to which this engagement extended to UER as 
perpetrators returned to post-conflict society; for example, were early release decisions made 
public, explanatory press releases made and were the decisions explained?  
 
4.3.1. Rhetoric and Reality for Victims  
It is worth reiterating here55 why the Tribunal’s engagement (or lack thereof) with victims in 
particular is relevant in an assessment of its legitimacy for the purposes of this thesis, given that the 
mandate of the Tribunal was clearly to “bring to justice”56 perpetrators of atrocity crimes and deter 
others. There are two reasons: the first is purposive and the second functional.57 Scholarship has 
examined the Tribunal’s engagement with them from these two perspectives.  
 
Victims are purposively legitimate stakeholders in the ICTY’s dispensation of criminal justice, 
because the Tribunal itself (organs from the President, the judges, the Prosecutor and Public 
Relations) outwardly signalled that providing justice to victims was one of its objectives. In explaining 
its “establishment” and under its list of “achievements” on the website, it asserted that “by holding 
individuals responsible for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, the Tribunal is bringing 
justice to victims”.58 The rhetoric began at the outset of the Tribunal and was on-going, and it 
requested assistance from the UNSC in order to “complete the mandate given … to combat impunity 
and render justice to the victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity”.59  
 
Scholars have argued that some of the Tribunal’s rhetorical aspirations erred, as they presumed 
these were aspirations shared by a key stakeholder, the victims, and in assuming this convergence 
“silenced them”.60 In addition to the literature, the presumptiveness of some of the Tribunal’s 
 
53 See: https://www.icty.org/en/outreach/home [accessed 04/12/2019]. 
54 See Chapter 3, s.3.5.5 and s.3.5.6.   
55 See Chapter 3, s.3.6.3 for victims as stakeholders in the criminal justice system more broadly.  
56 UNSCR 808, 22 February 1993.  
57 L. Moffet, Justice for Victims Before the International Criminal Court (Routledge, 2014) at 39.  
58 See: http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/achievements [accessed 19 May 2019]. 
59 ICTY Annual Report 2002, para. 321 – emphasis added.  
60 N. Patterson, ‘Silencing Victims in International Courts: Neglecting a Solemn Obligation’ (2003) Georgetown Journal of 





internal stakeholders is implicit in the ICTY’s first Annual Report. It noted that bringing justice to 
perpetrators would “be a means, at least in part, of alleviating [victims’] suffering and anguish”.61 
Prosecutors similarly have justified their strategies in the name of victims. Chief Prosecutor Carla de 
Ponte62 justified her strategy of pursuing direct perpetrators of particularly heinous crimes as well as 
the high-level political and military leaders for the sake of the victims. She asserted to the UNSC that, 
“for the victims and survivors ... it was these people who brought their world to an end … Unless 
these local leaders are brought to justice … the ordinary population will not come to terms with the 
past”.63 Both of these statements further hint that the role of the victims was perceived as passive:64 
justice was being brought to them, and for them, and the Tribunal believed that, in doing so, it 
would alleviate them from their position of powerlessness; their world, according to the Prosecutor, 
had been devastated. The Tribunal pledged itself to fulfil the ambitious mandate that some of its 
state supporters had hoped for, such as the Hungarian Ambassador to the UN. He had declared his 
belief (and that of his country) that a successful criminal tribunal could make it “easier [for] the 
healing of psychological wounds that the conflict has inflicted on the peoples”65 of the former 
Yugoslavia. Fletcher, Stover and Weinstein consider this language, and note that the notion of 
“healing of psychological wounds” is linked to broader societal peace, and assert that, from its 
inception, “the goal of reconciliation became associated with these trials for many supporters”66 of 
the Tribunal. Alongside this the President espoused that the Tribunal would be a “tool to promote 
reconciliation and restore true peace”.67 The same Annual Report implicitly exposed the problematic 
dynamic with this notion of the Tribunal being a tool for promoting reconciliation.68 This was the 
assumption that punishing individual perpetrators would bring satisfaction to victims, and providing 
retributive justice would quell the desire for revenge.69  
 
Victims, functionally, are key stakeholders in the dispensation of justice,70 alongside the purposive 
rhetoric. They were essential to the work of the Tribunal. Victims were required to testify to their 
victimhood (either as direct victims or as eye-witnesses to the crimes) to bring perpetrators to 
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justice. As acknowledged by the Tribunal, “many of the first available witnesses were victims who 
had fled from Bosnia and Herzegovina [who] had been held in detention camps and had been the 
subject of "ethnic cleansing".71 The victims’ role under the Statute was as functional witnesses.72 This 
role became a status entrenched by the judges, as they adopted the Tribunal’s Rules and Procedure 
of Evidence, in which victims generally were referenced in the single phrase of “victims and 
witnesses”.73 In the Statute, the first mention of victims’ role is that the prosecutor has the right to 
question victims in gathering evidence for indictments.74 Article 20 provides that trials “are 
conducted … with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of 
victims and witnesses”. The article provides that the rights of the accused are balanced against the 
“due regard” for victims’ and witnesses’ safety; for example, having their identity protected and 
being allowed to give testimony in camera rather than open court.75 This language emphasises the 
victims’ role as being that of providers of evidence, whose protection was required as a commodity 
of testimony. Their interests are borne in mind, but they are passive, in contrast to the defendants 
who can assert rights. The Statute directs that they are given due regard to their safety.76 This has 
led some, including former ICTY President Jorda, to conclude that the procedures followed by the 
Tribunal “reduce[d] the victim to nothing more than the ‘object-matter’ of international criminal 
proceedings”.77 Jorda and de Hemptine urged the Intentional Criminal Court to allow for a greater, 
different role for victims than just victim-witnesses. They recommended criminal proceedings to be 
split in two, and, for the second part, to provide victims with an opportunity to be heard, under 
“inquisitorial rules and subject to strict control by the judge”, thereby enabling victims to “speak of 
their personal sufferings”.78 If there had been a separate occasion for victims to present victim 
impact statements, this may have enabled the judges to frame their thinking accordingly, and focus 
on the personal loss of the victim, rather than simply listen for whether or not their testimony 
corroborated the prosecution’s case. This has been argued by Tribunal prosecutors as well as 
 
71 See: http://www.icty.org/en/about/office-of-the-prosecutor/history [accessed 23 March 2019]. 
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indictments being amended by the Prosecutor (Rule 73 bis); the other note relating to victims, is in the context of victim-
witnesses providing evidence in written rather than oral testimony.   
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scholars 79 who have asserted that “giving more voice to the victims … can also help the judges to 
better understand the elements of the crimes that they are considering”.80 This thesis questioned 
whether this principle could have similarly been applied when the President and his colleagues 
considered an application for pardon or commutation of sentence? As noted in Chapter 3, s.3.6.3, in 
a number of countries, victims have the right to be informed when their perpetrators are being 
considered for release from imprisonment and to make statements to parole boards as to the 
impact this may have on them.81 The interviews, therefore, asked: did the judges’ perceive the 
victims as having any role to play at this stage, whereby the perpetrator was released back into their 
lives? To what extent did the judges consider victims as they decided on perpetrators’ UER?  
 
The Tribunal’s legitimacy of exercise has been critiqued by observers82 who have argued that its 
exercise of power “reduced [victims] to instrumentalized witnesses”.83 It was not, however, only the 
prosecution who lacked sensitivity, but, at times, judges also. Dembour and Haslam pointed to 
numerous instances in the Krstić transcripts where judges steered witnesses away from recounting 
their feelings towards the details they deemed relevant.84 It was not the place for victims to tell of 
their personal sufferings. This was also supported by Stover’s empirical research, whereby judges 
will “admonish witnesses who stray from the facts, which can frustrate victims who have waited 
years to tell their story”.85 Of more concern in their findings were occasions where judges simply 
failed to hear victims, and consequently made “incongruously optimistic” remarks.86 In one instance, 
the presiding judge thanked a witness who had testified to his father being disappeared, and most 
likely dead, and noted “I hope your father will come back”.87 These remarks, whereby judges 
appeared oblivious to victims, reiterated the importance of probing judges’ actions in determining 
UER; to what extent did they consider victims when they made their decisions?  
 
 
79 M. Damaška, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ at 334. 
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Stover studied victims and their lived experiences of testifying. His empirical study of 87 victim-
witnesses found that 77% of those who testified found the experience of testifying at the Tribunal a 
positive one, not for any sense of catharsis, but primarily due to the “professionalism of staff” with 
whom they engaged.88 This professionalism encompassed practices such as taking them into the 
courtroom prior to testifying, debriefing them, and “most important, contacting them once they had 
returned home”.89 Stover’s findings have being recently supported by Meernik and King, who found 
in their quantitative study that the majority of witnesses (78%) were largely satisfied with their 
experience with the ICTY.90 This finding supports Tyler’s theory of “procedural justice”,91 which 
argues that how an institution of authority treats its participants is the most significant factor in how 
the participants perceive an institution’s overall legitimacy.92 Stover’s finding pointing to the 
significance of the “quality of interpersonal treatment” is reflected also through what the witnesses 
found as negative factors. These included victim-witnesses’ frustration and disappointment at not 
being informed of the reasons for subsequent acquittals. The value of procedural justice was 
implicitly recognised by Jorda and de Hemptine who expressed regret that a victim had no right “to 
be kept informed of the course taken by the proceedings even where they are of personal concern 
to him”.93 These studies highlight the legitimacy challenges the Tribunal faced in relation to 
treatment of victims who had testified before it. Both studies’ authors made recommendations for 
better procedural justice, to enhance the Tribunal’s legitimacy of exercise in relation to the victims 
with whom it directly engaged. Provision of updated information, as a positive in shaping victim 
perceptions of the Tribunal’s legitimacy, is pertinent to UER of perpetrators. As the following chapter 
details, the Practice Direction guiding the President on the practicalities of early release provided the 
possibility of informing those who testified before the Tribunal, including, therefore, victim-
witnesses, of a grant of early release.94 The extent to which victims were informed, and reactions to 
this, were posed in the questions to interviewees, both at the Tribunal and those in BiH.  
 
Empirical studies have researched the broader community of victims (only a handful of victims 
appear before the Tribunal). Clark has critiqued the Tribunal for failure to see justice for victims as 
anything beyond retributive justice, and, therefore, failing to consider measures to assist their 
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interests.95 The Tribunal was, after all, routinely asserting that its “beneficiaries [were] victims of the 
conflict”96 – not only those who testified before them as witnesses. Clark’s assertion supports 
Fletcher, who has similarly asserted that the Tribunal has formulated an “imagined victim which 
supports the logics of international criminal justice, which ... render … invisible the particular 
meanings and desires [of justice] of real victims”.97  
 
Clark’s empirical findings did not “support the Tribunal’s claim that it is delivering justice to 
victims”.98 Clark’s interview data demonstrate that the Tribunal did not have a clear strategy of how 
to actually achieve justice for victims, and she argued that the Tribunal should have recognised the 
limits of legal justice from the outset. Others too have recognised a generalisable failing of 
transitional justice mechanisms to live up to victims’ justice rhetoric. McEvoy and McConnachie have 
argued that it is unfair to raise victims’ expectations through rhetoric, only to fall short through 
practice. They have called for a “greater degree of humility”.99 Their assertion has been that 
numerous transitional justice mechanisms (including ICTs) and their “entrepreneurs” are 
“irresponsible to promise … victims that they will have their voices heard or, even more grandiosely, 
that these processes can … deliver justice … or lead to healing and reconciliation”.100 This was the 
initial rhetoric adopted by the ICTY in early Annual Reports101 and judgments.102 This justice rhetoric 
was proudly expressed at the outset of the Tribunal’s lifetime, though later “toned down”.103 
However, as the findings chapters discuss, once expectations were raised they were, as noted by the 
Commission of Experts Final Report,104 expected to be fulfilled. When they were not it had the 
potential to lead to disappointment. Not only victims but scholars and prosecutors also perceived 
that there was a duty to victims, and perceived the Tribunal’s treatment of them as “neglecting a 
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solemn obligation”.105 Damaška, often drawing on the practice and rhetoric of the ICTY,106 argued 
that international criminal justice simply became too ambitious, proclaiming too many (often 
conflicting) objectives with no established hierarchy among them. He warned of “unfulfilled 
expectations and inconsistencies [as being] harmful to any system of justice, and especially to an 
evolving one, whose legitimacy in the communities affected by international crime is still 
delicate”.107 He recommended, along with others108 the pruning of “unrealistic aspirations”.109 Stover 
urged the Tribunal to adopt a “more realistic view of what trials can accomplish”.110 These practical 
propositions echo McEvoy’s call for international lawyers to demonstrate some legal humility.111 This 
research posed to what extent UER was perceived by victims, and other stakeholders in the region, 
as another unmet expectation (did these stakeholders expect perpetrators’ sentences to be served 
in full) and, if yes, to what extent did this unmet expectation impact on their perception of the 
Tribunal’s legitimacy?  
 
4.3.2. Tribunal’s Relationship with the Regional Stakeholders 
Justice dispensed should serve the community it holds jurisdiction over.112 Frequently, scholars take 
this principle for granted, though some place an emphasis on it: “We must first assume that the 
intention of those that design judicial institutions and those who work within them is to improve 
collectively the lives of those people in whose name they provide justice”.113 This thesis shares the 
overall belief that ICTs should seek to obtain and maintain legitimacy in the region. The law’s 
outcomes have percussions beyond that of the perpetrator convicted or acquitted, as Chapters 7 
 
105 N. Patterson, ‘Silencing Victims in International Courts: Neglecting a Solemn Obligation’ (2003) Georgetown Journal of 
International Affairs 4(1) 95-100.  
106 M. Damaška, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ at 331. 
107 M. Damaška, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ at 365. 
108 C. Stahn, ‘Between ‘Faith’ and ‘Facts’: By What Standards Should We Assess International Criminal Justice?’ (2012) 
Leiden Journal of International Law 25: 251–282 at 257 – “There may be a need for a greater degree of realism (i.e., a 
better factual understanding of international criminal justice) in order to assess its strengths and weaknesses”.  
109 M. Damaška, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ at 365.  
110 E. Stover, The Witnesses, 144 cited in J.N. Clark, ‘Judging the ICTY: Has it achieved its objectives” at 137. This included 
the rhetoric of the Tribunal’s work as contributing to not simply restoration of “peace” but of “reconciliation” – Clark 
noted that this was not an original part of its mandate but pinpoints that the Tribunal began this rhetoric and thus “the 
fact that the Tribunal’s work has been regularly and explicitly associated with reconciliation, means that it is both 
important, and entirely appropriate, to examine whether the ICTY has indeed contributed to inter-ethnic reconciliation in 
the former Yugoslavia” at 39.  
111 K. McEvoy ‘Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice’ (2007) Journal of Law and 
Society 34(4): 411-440, at 411. 
112 As Chapter 3, s. 3.6.5 outlined, see J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1988) at 53 and 56 – cited 
in S. Aambolangvan and T. Squatrito, ‘Conceptualising and Measuring The Legitimacy of ICTs’ in N. Hayashi and C. M. 
BaillIiet (eds.) The Legitimacy of International Criminal Trials (Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 50.   
113 J. Meernik, ‘Justice and Peace? How the International Tribunal Affects Societal Peace in Bosnia’ (2005) Journal of Peace 





and 8 detail. Specifically for the ICTY, Patterson, along with others,114 argued, “the Tribunal cannot 
simply ignore the wider mandate given to them by the UN Security Council” which, unlike other 
criminal courts, included, under the UNSCR establishing it, that the justice it dispensed would 
“contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace”.115 Additionally, just as the Tribunal stated 
that it aimed to bring justice to the victims, it also articulated that it aimed to bring justice to the 
region;116 thus their perceptions of its legitimacy matter and the relevant question is: to what extent 
did they perceive the justice dispensed by the Tribunal, in their name, as legitimate? For the 
purposes of this thesis this includes the premature ending of the justice dispensed; did they perceive 
this practice as legitimate?  
 
The majority of empirical studies which have researched regional perceptions of the Tribunal have 
argued that the Tribunal largely failed to win over the “hearts and minds” of post-conflict society, 
key stakeholders.117 This has been summed up by Subotić as she noted that the “ICTY legal 
proceedings have been staggeringly difficult for the local population to understand and 
internalize.”118 Scholars have attributed this failure to the nature of the Tribunal, its dependence on 
states to provide resources, the infancy of ICL and practice, and its focus on its international 
influential stakeholders (UNSC Members) rather than local ones (outlined above s.4.2) to explain the 
lack of engagement with the region. Glasius and Colona capture this initial oversight as the route of 
ongoing negative consequences as they reflected, “if the international community were not casting 
its expectations of the Tribunal in terms of benefits to the region, the failure of such benefits to 
materialize becomes less surprising”.119  
 
Although some scholars query whether the Tribunal could have combated FRY States’ massive 
propaganda machines (state-sponsored media) intent on distributing malicious rumours and 
fostering negative perceptions,120 many observers argued the Tribunal should and could have done 
more to tackle negative perceptions. Hodžić, critiquing the Tribunal judges for prioritising the 
 
114 M. Klarin, ‘The Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former Yugoslavia’ (2009) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 7: 89-96 at 96 – “The ICTY mandate is not limited to the prosecution and punishment of persons 
responsible for crimes and deterring possible future wrongdoers; it is expected to contribute to a lasting peace, 
democracy, protection of human rights and inter-ethnic reconciliation in the Balkans” at 96. 
115 UNSCR 808 cited in N. Patterson, ‘Silencing Victims in International Courts: Neglecting a Solemn Obligation’ at 96.  
116 Annual Report 1998, “prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
removes such persons from their communities, and, if found guilty, ends their impunity and facilitates the through its 
judicial proceedings reconciliation of those communities. In addition the Tribunal establishes a historical record which 
provides the basis for the long-term reconciliation and reconstruction of the region” para. 201.  
117 M. Klarin, ‘Tribunal’s Four Battles’ (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 2(2): 552. 
118 J. Subotić, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans (Cornell University Press, 2009) at 132. 
119 M. Glasius and F. Colona, ‘The Yugoslavia Tribunal: The Moving Targets of a Legal Theatre’ at 14. 





development of ICL and overlooking its stakeholders (s. 4.2.3), also made a valuable point, that 
speaks to the theory of performance legitimacy;121 “everything the court does is outreach”.122 Others 
have gone further, and critiqued the Tribunal judges for refusing to recognise this broader societal 
role including politics. Klarin,123 like Hodžić, attributed this neglect to a judicial legalist tendency to 
“concentrate on the technical elements of the crimes and the procedure … concerned only with 
claims that some legal rules may be violated in the procedure”.124 This meant they cast aside other 
matters as “political’’, perceived as an area into which judges should not stray.125 This stance, Klarin 
argued, was an error, as the reality was that regional stakeholders viewed all judgments as political 
rather than legal. These perceptions were not limited to judgments but who the Tribunal 
prosecuted. Lawyer Schrag argued that the OTP paid too little attention as to how its “political 
context … [of] prosecutorial strategies” would be viewed in the former Yugoslavia.126 J.N. Clark, 
writing as a socio-legal scholar, argued that politics infuses the Tribunal’s work and called for 
attitudes and practice to change accordingly, “this is the ontological reality which these institutions 
exist in and with which they must engage.”127 These observers and scholars128 have urged the 
Tribunal to do more to “improve its image and get its message across to the region”.129 In turn, the 
Tribunal has provided lessons for other ICTs, that judges be attuned to lay people in developing 
international procedure. Damaška asserted that if ICTs are to achieve their “didactic mission they 
should avoid the perception of cloistered isolation from the intuitions of ordinary people”.130 This 
research’s interviews with judges and other internal stakeholders queried the extent to which these 
scholarly criticisms had been heard: did the judges’ consider the politics of the region in the grant of 
UER? Had any actions been taken to enhance their perceived legitimacy of exercise in the region, in 
particular when it came to UER?  
 
121 K. McEvoy and A. Schwartz ‘Judges, Conflict, and the Past’ (2015) Journal of Law and Society 42(4): 528-555. 
122 R. Hodžić, ‘Accepting a difficult truth: ICTY is not our court’. Balkan Insight, cited in J. Subotić, ‘Legitimacy, Scope and 
Conflicting Claims on the ICTY: In the Aftermath of Gotovina, Haradinaj and Perišić’ (2014) Journal of Human Rights 13: 
170-185, at 178. 
123 R. Hodžić, as Klarin, also has a background in journalism rather than law or academia, see: 
https://harriman.columbia.edu/event/justice-unseen [accessed 14/12/2019]  
124 M. Klarin, ‘The Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former Yugoslavia’ at 96. 
125 K. McEvoy and A. Schwartz ‘Judges, Conflict, and the Past’ (2015) Journal of Law and Society 42(4): 528-555. See 
Chapter 3, s.3.4.3. 
126 M. Schrag, ‘Lessons Learned from ICTY Experience’ (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 2: 427-434. 
127J.N. Clark, ‘International Criminal Courts and Normative Legitimacy: An Achievable Goal?’ (2015) International Criminal 
Law Review 25(4):763-783. Argued that the power of courts is contingent on political actors necessarily means that 
politics infuses their work.  
128 J.N. Clark, ‘The Impact Question: The ICTY and the Restoration and Maintenance of Peace’ in B. Swart, A. Zahar and G. 
Sluiter (eds.) The Legacy of the ICTY (Oxford University Press, 2011) at 76; M. Klarin, ‘The Impact of the ICTY Trials on 
Public Opinion in the Former Yugoslavia’ 90, cited in M. Glasius and F. Colona, ‘The Yugoslavia Tribunal: The Moving 
Targets of a Legal Theatre’. 
129 M. Klarin, ‘Building the ICTY Legacy for Local Communities’ in R. Steinberg (ed.) Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) at 111. 
130 M. Damaška, ‘The Competing Visions of Fairness: The Basic Choice for International Criminal Tribunals’ (2011) North 






Empirical research and surveys131 indicate that the ICTY’s exercise of power, its indictments, 
sentences imposed and judicial findings are viewed from a position of ethnic-political allegiances132 
rather than a legal perspective. Studies have concluded that “Bosnia-Herzegovina is a deeply divided 
society”133 and that “each of the three national communities … the Serbs, the Croats, and Muslims, 
views itself as a victim and not as a perpetrator of aggression and the atrocities against the other 
parties”.134 Ethnic allegiances remain a dominant factor in determining whether sentencing decisions 
are considered too lenient or severe;135 and further, in the Serb dominated Republika Srpska (RS) 
there remains a lack of acknowledgement of the crimes altogether.136 This denial has been blamed 
by a number of scholars on outreach, often seen as “too little too late”.137 The Tribunal’s overall 
“lack of a coherent and effective strategy for outreach”138 when it did engage with the region, has 
compounded this. Yet, behind this broad picture, a more nuanced one emerges as statistics are 
disaggregated. Kutnjak Ivković and Hagan’s study, for example, recognised that, some victims, in 
particular those who have engaged with BiH courts, perceived the Tribunal’s rulings to be fair and 
impartial.139 At the more general level of over legitimacy, Clark’s studies have noted that some 
victims, although critical of the Tribunal’s sentencing and acquittals, were nevertheless “glad” that 
 
131 Belgrade Centre for Human Rights surveys conducted in 2010 and 2012. These surveys, sponsored by the OSCE, 
analyzed by M. Milanović ‘The Impact of the ICTY on the Former Yugoslavia: An Anticipatory Postmortem’ (2016) The 
American Journal of International Law 110: 233-259 at 253. 
132 R. Kerr, ‘Peace through Justice: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ at 376 and J. Subotić 
Expanding the scope of post-conflict justice: Individual, state and societal responsibility for mass atrocity’ (2011) Journal 
of Peace Research 48(2): 157-169 at 166. 
133 F. Beiber, Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance (UNRISD and Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 
at 1. 
134 D. Saxon, ‘Exporting Justice: Perceptions of the ICTY Among the Serbian, Croatian and Muslim Communities in the 
Former Yugoslavia’ (2005) Journal of Human Rights 4: 559-572 at 562 – citing a legal officer at the ICTY, rather than 
Saxon’s own experience.  
135 M. Glasius and F. Colona, ‘The Yugoslavia Tribunal: The Moving Targets of a Legal Theatre’ in D. Abazović, M. Velikonja 
(eds.) Post-Yugoslavia at 18-19 and Clark, Saxon, Klarin ‘Building the Legacy for Local Communities’ in R. Steinberg (ed.) 
Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) at 118 – “The sentences ordered by the ICTY are 
generally views as grossly inadequate”.  
136 M. Milanović, ‘ICTY on the Former Yugoslavia: An Anticipatory Postmortem (2016) The American Journal of 
International Law 110: 233-259 at 244 and see: ‘Bosnian Serb TV Station Fined for False Report on Massacre’ BIRN, 18 
October 2019 – “Radio Television Republika Srpska … aired a report in May this year which contained claims that the 
victims died because a bomb was placed at the Tuzla Gate site by Bosniaks, and that they were not killed by a shell fired 
by Bosnian Serb forces as the courts have established”. See: https://balkaninsight.com/2019/10/18/bosnian-serb-tv-
station-fined-for-false-report-on-massacre/?utm_source=Balkan+Transitional+Justice+Daily+Newsletter+-
+NEW&utm_campaign=5087de2d5b-BTJ_EN&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a1d9e93e97-5087de2d5b-319767961 
[accessed 13/12/2019]  
137 J.N. Clark, ‘Plea Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation’ (2009) The European Journal of International 
Law 20(2): 415-436 at 422 or– “a decade [after its establishment) outreach activities were still found to be woefully 
inadequate” M. Glasius and F. Colona, ‘The Yugoslavia Tribunal: The Moving Targets of a Legal Theatre’ in D. Abazović, M. 
Velikonja (eds.) Post-Yugoslavia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) at 15, citing D. Orentlicher, That Someone Guilty Be Punished: 
The Impact of the ICTY in Bosnia (Open Society Justice Institutive and ICTJ, 2010). 
138 R. Kerr, ‘Peace through Justice: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ at 376. 
139 S. Kutnjak Ivković and J. Hagan,’ Pursuit of justice and the victims of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina: An exploratory 





the ICTY “existed”.140 Orentlicher’s research revealed the opinion that “some justice was done”141 
was better than none, and more recently that “the Tribunal has rendered a measure of justice … 
[which] however flawed, is infinitely preferable to no justice at all”.142 These more nuanced findings 
and discussions demonstrate, as do this thesis’ findings (Chapters 7 and 8), that perceptions of an 
institution’s legitimacy are relevant to perceptions of legitimacy of other institutions and individuals’ 
lived experience of those.143  
 
4.4. The Tribunal’s Penal Practices Under Scrutiny 
The above literature exploring the sociological legitimacy of the Tribunal’s dispensation of justice for 
victims and society as a whole is complemented by literature assessing the Tribunal’s normative 
legitimacy of its exercise of power, through analysis of its practice and judgments.144 As these 
assessments do not occur in a vacuum, sentencing judgments are seen and heard by the Tribunal’s 
multiple audiences, including stakeholders, researchers have also discussed the perceived legitimacy 
of these judicial determinations, noted herein. The following section outlines the literature on the 
most contested areas of judicial penal reasoning in, and practice of, sentencing, repeated in the 
topic of this thesis – perpetrators’ UER from the declared sentence.  
 
4.4.1. Plea-Bargaining  
Initially, the Tribunal categorically rejected plea-bargaining given the gravity of the crimes for which 
the accused were indicted.145 The formal introduction of plea-bargains in 2002146 is an example of 
the Tribunal’s practice being reversed. Plea-bargaining was introduced at the insistence of influential 
stakeholders, particularly America, who wished for more expedient justice of an expensive 
dispensation of justice.147 Plea-bargaining, it was further hoped, would assist in gathering evidence 
 
140 J.N. Clark, International Trials and Reconciliation: Assessing the Impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (Routledge, 2014) at 59.  
141 D. Orentlicher, That Someone Guilty Be Punished: The Impact of the ICTY in Bosnia (Open Society Justice Institutive and 
ICTJ, 2010) at 34. 
142 D. Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY’s Impact in Bosnia and Serbia (Oxford University Press, 2018) at 128. 
143 S. Kutnjak Ivković and J. Hagan, Reclaiming Justice; The ICTY and Local Courts (Oxford University Press, 2011) who 
argued that “Individuals’ views of the ICTY’s legitimacy and fairness are likely affected by environment in which they 
reside” at 81.  
144 R. Henham, ‘Evaluating the Contribution of Sentencing to Social Justice: Some Conceptual Problems’ (2012) 
International Criminal Law Review 12: 361-373.   
145 M. Scharf, ‘Trading Justice for Efficiency: Plea-Bargaining and International Tribunals’ (2004) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 2: 1070-1081 at 1073. 
146 R. Henham and M. Drumbl, ‘Plea Bargaining at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2005) 
Criminal Law Forum 16: 49-87 - ‘Plea bargains’ or ‘charge bargains’ were introduced into the RPE in 2001 through an 
amendment to the ‘pure guilty plea’.  They note that the ‘pure guilty plea’ under Rule 62(VI) and 62 bis were originally 
envisaged by the ICTY and were not foreign to international criminal tribunals, at 51. 





for higher-level, senior military and political figures, to be indicted.148 Many academics have queried 
both the normative (often explicitly its moral core)149 and sociological legitimacy of plea-
bargaining.150 Three specific legitimacy deficits are levied against the practice of plea-bargaining: 
first, its inappropriateness due to the nature and gravity of the crimes; second, the practice’s 
capacity to distort the record, the truth of the crimes; and, third, the injustice done to victims. These 
three legitimacy deficits of plea-bargaining are all reflected in the practice of UER as discussed in 
Chapters 6 (the inappropriateness), 7 (the capacity to distort the truth) and 8 (an injustice to 
victims).  
 
Plea-bargaining first initial legitimacy deficit was articulated by the Tribunal’s first President, 
Cassese, who asserted that the accused’s indictments should not be altered as these were the 
“gravest possible of all crimes [and] no matter how useful their testimony may otherwise be … no 
one should be immune from prosecution”.151 Drumbl and Henham query the “moral legitimacy”152 of 
plea-bargaining. Firstly, they noted the practice being at odds with the Tribunal’s stated purposes of 
punishment, primarily retribution.153 They argued “by punishing people differently based on 
administrative contingencies, the ICTY moves away from punishing people differently based on the 
gravity of the crime or the level of their desert”.154 This moral questioning was also posed by victims 
who could not reconcile the disconnect between the crime admitted to, and the sentence imposed. 
In a victim-witness’s own words, “I felt glad that [Deronjić] admitted his guilt. I do not, however, 
understand how it is possible to give him a lenient term of imprisonment after what he himself 
confessed”.155 As well as the difficulty victims (as well as the first President) had with comprehending 
how the most severe crimes admitted to could result in a lower sentence, their surprise and 
disappointment may have been compounded by the fact that plea bargains were not a practice in 
the FRY,156 and shocked and angered many as it was practiced by the Tribunal.157 Plea bargains, 
 
148 J.A. Cook, ‘Plea Bargaining at The Hague’ (2005) Yale Journal of International Law 30(2): 473-506 at 498.  
149 R. Henham and M. Drumbl, ‘Plea Bargaining at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2005) 
Criminal Law Forum 16: 49-87, who query the “moral legitimacy” of plea-bargaining at 76.   
150 J. Clark, Combs, Scharf.  
151 The US Government had proposed plea-bargaining for the sake of gaining cooperation to elucidate evidence for high-
level figures, cited in M. Scharf, ‘Trading Justice for Efficiency: Plea-Bargaining and International Tribunals’ (2004) Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 2: 1070-1081 at 1073 citing V. Morris and M.P. Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Transnational Publishers, 1995) at 649 and 652. 
152 R. Henham and M. Drumbl, ‘Plea Bargaining at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former at 76.  
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154 R. Henham and M. Drumbl, ‘Plea Bargaining at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ at 56.  
155 J.N. Clark, ‘Judging the ICTY: Has it achieved its objectives?’ (2009) Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 9(1-2): 
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resulting in a lower sentence, were widely perceived as lacking a moral justification for the majority 
of scholars and those in the region, and, consequently, was sociologically illegitimate.158 This 
research saw potential parallels in the practice of plea-bargaining, resulting in a lower sentence, as 
inappropriate given the gravity of the crimes with early release from imprisonment for perpetrators 
of atrocity crimes.  
 
The second legitimacy deficit of plea bargains was that the bargains struck were at odds with some 
Tribunal judges’ rhetoric that guilty pleas contributed to the Tribunal’s production of truth.159 This 
assertion was doubted by a number of the judges themselves, as well as academics.160 Thus, within 
the Tribunal, there existed no “shared beliefs”161 of Rule 62ter162 being justifiable. This was 
particularly true for pleas where charges from the indictment, including genocide,163 and charges for 
specific atrocities were struck off. An “incomplete truth”164 was subsequently recorded. Scharf’s 
argument went further, “dropping charges has the effect of editing out the full factual basis … and 
thus has the potential to distort the historic record generated by the Tribunal”.165 The assertion, by 
some judges, that guilty pleas produced an authoritative record of the crimes166 was dismissed by 
many scholars. Combs critiqued the Tribunal for “conclud[ing] plea agreements without providing 
prosecutors virtually any details about the crimes to which they pled guilty”. She highlighted the 
missed opportunity of Plavšić’s guilty plea. As Plavšić was in a key political position and played a 
“role in the ethnic-cleaning campaign”, her plea had the potential to provide “insights into every 
 
158 J.N. Clark, ‘Plea Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation’ (2009) The European Journal of International 
Law 20(2): 415-436; and S. Kutnjak Ivković and J. Hagan, ‘The Politics of Punishment and the of the Siege of Sarajevo: 
Toward a Conflict Theory of Perceived International (In)Justice’ (2006) Law & Society Review 40(2) found only 6% of their 
interviewees supported plea-bargaining at the Tribunal at 396. The authors conducted ‘two purposive samples were 
collected by the same interviewer, with 299 respondents in 2000 and 473 respondents in 2003’. 
159 Prosecutor v. Mrđa, Case No. IT-02-59-S, Trial Chamber judgement, 31 March 2004 noted “a guilty plea … helps 
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160 Most notably in M. Nikolić, noted in J.N. Clark, ‘The Limits of Retributive Justice’, at 475 – the judges reflected that 
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166 Sentencing judgments of: Todorović, 31 July 2001 at para. 81; P. Banović, 28 October 2003 at para. 68; Češić, 11 March 
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aspect of its planning and implementation”, yet Combs noted that the agreement was a “scant five-
page factual [account] … presents only the briefest sketch of the atrocities”.167 Therefore, the truth 
recorded was minimal and given that charges such as genocide were dropped, could not be 
authoritative.168  
 
Plea-bargains’ third ascribed legitimacy deficit, when charges for specific atrocities were dropped, 
was that this was at odds with the Tribunal’s larger rhetoric of giving voice to and providing justice to 
victims. Some judges had inter alia posed that “victims and witnesses are relieved from the possible 
stress of testifying at trial”.169 This is disputed by many, who argued that “for some victims testifying 
… may have significant cathartic value”.170 Again, this positive sentiment of victims being relieved 
from the stress of testifying was not shared by all judges, who expressed their distaste at the 
practice, and recognised the victims’ interests in the dispensation of criminal justice for the accused. 
Certainly, it angered some victims denied victim status, as the Prosecutor dropped the crimes 
committed against them from the indictment. Whether it was their effective denial of victim status 
or the opportunity to testify, it has angered victims.171  
 
Drumbl and Henham urged the Tribunal “not to overstate the truth-telling and reconciliatory effects 
of plea agreements”.172 The notion that the judges were over-stating the reconciliatory effects was 
highlighted in two empirical studies with victims. These studies found that, in contrast to Tribunal 
judges, victims were deeply suspicious of statements of remorse expressed by those pleading 
guilty.173 As many victims could not accept perpetrators’ remorse, expressed in a guilty plea, which 
resulted in a reduced sentence, the practice generally disturbed victims, making them less likely to 
reconcile.174 This was highlighted by one victim who found it “offensive” when perpetrators who 
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pleaded guilty “get praised by the court for being very cooperative”.175 These studies are of 
relevance to UER as perpetrators’ stated remorse has sometimes been considered at the grant of 
early release,176 and this research posed the question to interviewees: what were their perceptions 
of perpetrators’ remorse and the extent to which it should be considered at this stage?  
 
Scholars recommended that the ICTY’s Outreach Programme engage honestly with victims and 
“provide … much needed explanations” to ameliorate their disappointment.177 This should be noted 
by other ICTs and the ICC, if such practices are to be adopted.178 Clark believed that, “if victims were 
more informed … plea bargains would perhaps be less controversial.179 Her argument is supported 
by other empirical studies which have found that better procedural justice (elements such as 
according respect to participants in an institution’s process) would have a “cushioning effect” on 
negative decisions.180 Outreach could have gone a step further, however; rather than simply 
informing victims Outreach could seek to highlight the practical benefits of plea agreements, 
especially when they provided evidence or assisted in bringing other perpetrators to justice. This 
was noted by Orentlicher’s research in which one interviewee noted that “it would mean a lot ... [if 
it] led to mass graves or the conviction of others who were even more responsible”.181 Therefore, for 
this to be the case, it is important to better formulate plea bargains so as to ensure the perpetrators 
are obliged to cooperate with the Tribunal, and that cooperation leading to further evidence is 
emphasised in outreach efforts. Again, this had parallels with UER. In his consideration of an 
application for early release, the President is required to consider a prisoner’s “substantial 
cooperation to the Prosecutor”.182 Did the President consider perpetrators’ cooperation with the 
Prosecutor, and how?183 Had this consideration been communicated and explained to people in the 
region?184 To what extent did stakeholders in the region believe this was a reasonable justification to 
grant UER?  
 
175 D. Orentlicher, The Someone Guilty Be Punished (Open Society Justice Initiative and ICTJ, 2010) at 63, citing Omarska 
survivor M. Duratović, as he spoke to the author regarding Mrđa’s guilty plea, which resulted in lower sentence, as the 
judges’ perceived his plea as a mitigating factor, due to, inter alia, assisting with providing the truth which could 
‘contribute to promoting reconciliation between the people of BiH’, as cited on the ICTY’s website.  
176 See Chapter 6, s.6.6.  
177 J.N. Clark, ‘Plea Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation’ at 431. 
178 Although the Rome Statute provides no specific place in the Statute nor the RPE for guilty pleas or bargaining it does 
not specifically rule them out: see 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313430885_Plea_bargaining_in_international_criminal_justice_-
_can_the_International_Criminal_Court_afford_to_avoid_trials [accessed 13/12/2019]. 
179 J.N. Clark, ‘Plea Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation’ at 431.  
180 R. Killean ‘Procedural Justice in International Criminal Courts: Assessing Civil Parties’ Perceptions of Justice at the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ (2016) International Criminal Law Review 16: 1-38 at 4.  
181 D. Orentlicher, That Someone Guilty Be Punished at 51.  
182 ICYT Rules and Procedure of Evidence, Rule 125.   
183 See Chapter 5, s.5.4. 






4.4.2. The Judges’ Sentencing Practices  
Many scholars have queried the normative legitimacy of the Tribunal’s sentencing determinations 
on three main grounds: first; perceived leniency,185 second; inconsistency, and third; idiosyncrasy in 
mitigating factors. Most observers argue that the final sentences are frequently therefore not 
commensurate with the gravity of the crime.186 This literature was relevant to UER as the practice 
prima facie appears as another act of idiosyncratic reasoning resulting in leniency toward individuals 
found guilty of atrocity crimes. This critique of eccentricity called for an examination of how it 
happened and the stated reasoning, through analysis of the early release decisions, and the extent 
to which the practice and the reasoning had an impact on the Tribunal’s legitimacy in the eyes of 
stakeholders interviewed.  
 
Just as plea-bargains were generally met with disappointment by victims’ communities,187 so too 
were the “surprisingly low” sentences handed down by the Tribunal.188 Although it is widely 
recognised, in both the scholarship189 and by victims themselves,190 that no punishment could 
“mirror”191 the gravity of the crime, some literature has articulated why, despite this recognition, 
this sense of disappointment remains, and has made proposals as to what can be done, if anything, 
to lessen the sense of disappointment. Hodžić described the sociological significance of sentencing 
“the length of ... the sentence is ... important because the sentence demonstrates recognition of 
victims’ suffering”.192 Hodžić’s assertion is articulated by a torture camp survivor, cited in 
Orentlicher’s empirical study, who described the life-sentence handed down to Stakić (for his role in 
the crimes in Prijedor) as “very important for us symbolically”.193 Thus, the symbolism, denoted in 
the length of the sentence, does matter. This research examined the extent to which UER was 
 
185 There is one scholarly exception, Scalia, who proposes that life sentences are too harsh and potentially violate the 
prohibition of cruel and inhumane treatment. See D. Scalia, ‘Long-Term Sentences in International Criminal Law: Do They 
Meet the Standards Set out by the European Court of Human Rights?’ (2011) Journal of International Criminal Justice 9: 
669-687 
186 There is a smaller body of literature which has defended the Tribunal’s sentencing determinations as consistent S. 
D’Ascoli and M. Basset. 
187 J.N. Clark, ‘Plea Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation’ 415 – 436.  
188 J.D Ohlin, ‘Proportional Sentences at the ICTY’ in B. Swart, A. Zahar and G. Sluiter (eds.) The Legacy of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Oxford University Press, 2011) 322-341 at 324. 
189  M. Harmon and F. Gaynor, ‘Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes’ (2007) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 5: 683-712 at 688; J.D Ohlin, ‘Proportional Sentences at the ICTY’ 322-341. 
190 D. Orentlicher, That Someone Guilty Be Punished: The Impact of the ICTY in Bosnia (Open Society Justice Institutive and 
ICTJ, 2010) at 53. 
191 R. Henham, ‘The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing’ (2003) Journal of International Criminal Justice 
1(1): 64-85. 
192 R. Hodžić, ‘A Long Road Yet to Reconciliation: The Impact of the ICTY on Reconciliation and Victims’ Perspectives of 
Criminal Justice’ in R. Steinberg (ed.) Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY (2011, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden) at 119. 
193 D. Orentlicher, ‘That Someone Guilty Be Punished’ 53 – although Stakić’s life sentence was reduced to a forty-year 





symbolic and what impact this had on the Tribunal’s perceived legitimacy.194 Orentlicher noted that 
despite there being a recognition even amongst victims, and a general assertion that victims of grave 
crimes will always be dissatisfied, she argued this did not mean that the length of the sentence did 
not matter. She noted that “many victims are discriminating in their assessment of the ICTY 
sentences; those who condemned short sentences readily acknowledged their satisfaction when the 
ICTY imposed sentences that seemed commensurate with the defendant’s crimes”.195 Szoke-Burke 
sums up this sentiment of the symbolic to victims, as he accused the ICTY’s sister ad hoc Tribunal’s 
sentencing determinations as “belittling human suffering”.196 This sentiment is reflected in the work 
of Harmon and Gaynor, prosecutors at the ICTY, as they derided Krstić’s 35-year sentence for his role 
in the genocide of 7,000-8,000 men and boys at Srebrenica.197 They calculated the proportionality of 
the sentence using the minimum figure of 7,000 victims and found that “Krstić will spend 1.825 days 
in prison per murder victim. If he is released after serving two-thirds of his sentence, which is the 
consistent practice at the ICTY, he will have served 1.205 days in prison per murder victim”.198 The 
particular framing of days distracts from their valid overall argument, similar to Szoke-Burke as they 
argued that “a day or two in prison for the murder of a human being [is] inconsistent with any 
serious notion of human dignity”.199 This research posed to what extent UER of perpetrators of 
atrocity crimes was another act perceived as disregarding the dignity of victims, a lenient sentence 
effectively reduced at early release.  
 
In relation to the ICTY, Ohlin advocated for symbolic sentences which would have the same of life 
sentences. Acknowledging a formalistic approach, Ohlin proposed symbolic sentences would denote 
not only the gravity but the typology of the perpetrator. He suggested that low-rung-perpetrators’ 
sentences to range from 50 years, mid-range to 100 years and “the most deserving might receive 
sentences in excess of 1,000 years”.200 He noted that given the expectancy of around 53,064 
years,201 these sentences will not be the lived reality but symbolic.202 He urged for the application of 
the principle of “offence-gravity proportionality … even moderate participation in international 
 
194 See Chapters 7 and 8.   
195 D. Orentlicher, ‘That Someone Guilty Be Punished’ at 53 
196 S. Szoke-Burke, ‘Avoiding Belittlement of Human Suffering A Retributivist Critique of ICTR Sentencing Practices’ (2012) 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 10: 561-580. Although Szoke-Burke argued this in relation to the ICTR, J.D. Ohlin, 
although not been so direct has called for symbolic sentences to reflect the gravity of the crimes at the ICTY.  
197 On Appeal, the Appeal Chamber overturned his conviction for genocide and found him guilty of the lesser crime of 
‘aiding and abetting’ genocide’. His 47-year sentence was thus reduced to 35 years.  
198 M. Harmon and F. Gaynor, ‘Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes’ at 692. 
199 M. Harmon and F. Gaynor, ‘Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes’ at 692. 
200 J.D Ohlin, ‘Proportional Sentences at the ICTY’ at 338. 
201 See: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=Healthy_life_years_statistics#Healthy_life_years_at_birth [accessed 13/12/2019].  





crimes … reflect the inherent gravity of the offence [and thus] wield a life sentence”.203 Symbolic 
sentencing would have been a means to address, what has been described by Drumbl as, the 
divergence between the “proclaimed extraordinary nature of atrocity crimes [and the] modality of 
punishment [which has] remain[ed] disappointingly ordinary”.204 Responding to the critique of a lack 
of realism, Ohlin emphasised these sentences “have a symbolic resonance that capture the alleged 
level of culpability in the case”.205 Indeed, symbolic sentences would be more in line with the first 
two purposes for sentencing provided by the ICTY, namely retribution and deterrence.206 Ohlin also 
counters potential human rights concerns of de facto life sentences, (outlined below by Scalia), as he 
noted, like Harmon and Gaynor that symbolic sentences are “simply aggregating a modest prison 
sentence for each death that a particular defendant was responsible for”.207 However, symbolic 
sentencing, based on offence gravity, which does not account for the perpetrator’s individual 
circumstances, does not appear to align with human rights principles, outlined below. As atrocity 
crimes are fundamentally grave human rights violations committed by individuals, it would be 
incongruous not to acknowledge the human rights of the perpetrators. Nevertheless, this thesis 
argues that this principle means that a genuine examination of the perpetrator’s individual 
circumstances must be undertaken when early release is considered, detailed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
One exception is noteworthy in relation to the dominant literature critical of the ICTs sentencing for 
lenient sentences, and effectively responds to Ohlin’s recommendations of effective life sentences. 
Scalia expressed concerns that life sentences handed down by the Tribunal could be, under strict 
reading of the ICTY Statute, incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
and may constitute a “slow death”.208 Irreducible life sentences with no possibility for a proper 
review violate Article 3 as determined by Stafford v. the UK (2002).209 The ECtHR asserted that 
persons “incarcerated without any prospect of release and without the possibility of … review … 
risk[ed] that he could never atone for his offence and … however exceptional his progress towards 
rehabilitation, his punishment would remain fixed”.210 The ECtHR determined that this violated 
human dignity, could constitute inhumane and degrading treatment under Article 3, the most 
 
203 J.D Ohlin, ‘Proportional Sentences at the ICTY’ at 337.  
204 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 6.  
205 J.D. Ohlin, ‘Proportional Sentences at the ICTY’ at 338. 
206 B. Holá, ‘Sentencing of International Crimes at the ICTY and ICTR Consistency of Sentencing Case Law’ (2012) 
Amsterdam Law Forum 4(4): 3-24.  
207 J.D Ohlin, ‘Proportional Sentences at the ICTY’ at 338. 
208 D. Scalia, ‘Long-Term Sentences in International Criminal Law: Do They Meet the Standards Set out by the European 
Court of Human Rights?’ (2011) Journal of International Criminal Justice 9: 669-687.  
209 The Strasbourg Court has reaffirmed this more recently, Hutchinson v. the UK (2015) emphasising that life sentences in 
themselves are not incompatible with Article 3 so long as they are reviewable and reviewed by an independent and 
impartial body. The reasoning set out by the Court echoes the principle of human dignity. 





fundamental of rights protected under the ECHR. This judgment and Scalia’s critique of the Tribunal 
were relevant to the Tribunal’s practice of UER: to what extent was this belief held by judges at the 
Tribunal? Was the grant of UER a means for them to give the perpetrator a second chance? This 
consideration was posed as the early release decisions were analysed and throughout the semi-
structured interviews211 with stakeholders, both insiders at the Tribunal and outsiders in BiH.  
 
Further, Scalia questioned the ICTY’s Statute provision for a pardon or commutation of sentence. 
Scalia argued the President’s discretionary decision, which is non-appealable,212 renders the practice 
“inconsistent with the ECtHR jurisprudence”.213 Although the President’s decision is non-appealable, 
the amended Practice Direction (2009) allows the perpetrator to submit an application for early 
release at any time, and the enforcement state to do so when the perpetrator becomes eligible 
under its national laws. Effectively this means perpetrators serving their life sentences will have their 
sentence reviewed; though the legitimacy challenge Scalia identified - the decision resting with the 
President, at his discretion and the ultimate decider, remained. Scalia’s assertions are correct on the 
black letter of the Statute. Others, however, have demonstrated that the black letter law on the 
grant of a pardon or commutation of sentence is radically different from the practice adopted by the 
Presidents to date.214 (See below s.4.5, Chapter 5 on the Tribunal’s practice and Chapter 6 on the 
Presidents’ considerations of perpetrators’ demonstration of rehabilitation).  
 
In addition to judicial reasoning being challenged, many scholars have noted inconsistencies in 
sentencing lengths as a legitimacy deficit of the Tribunal’s exercise of power. This was not a universal 
assertion, as there is a smaller number of scholars who argued that there were discernible patterns 
in the ICTY sentencing; according to these scholars high-level perpetrators, in particular those who 
were instigators of crimes, received higher sentences, as did perpetrators of direct violence against 
vulnerable victims.215 Generally, however, academics widely share the view that the Tribunal’s 
sentencing was inconsistent216 and this ran counter to the one Trial Chamber determination which 
 
211 As the interviews were semi-structured this question was not always posed, and not to all interviewees. The question 
was primarily posed to judges and lawyers. The notion of a second chance was often asked as a follow-up question to the 
interviewee’s answer.  
212 Under the ECHR a prisoner has the right to have their sentence reviewed, and done so by an independent and 
impartial body of the state, rather than an individual, who is part of the government. 
213 D. Scalia, ‘Long-Term Sentences in International Criminal Law: Do They Meet the Standards Set out by the European 
Court of Human Rights?’ at 675. 
214 J. Choi, A. Merrylees and B. Holá et al.   
215 M. Bassett, ‘Defending International Sentencing: Past Criticism to the Promise of the ICC’ (2009) Human Rights Brief 
16(2); D’Ascoli Sentencing in International Criminal Law: The UN ad hoc Tribunals and Future Perspectives for the ICC 
(Hart Publishing, 2011); and J. Meernik and K. King, ‘The Effectiveness of International Law and the ICTY - Preliminary 
Results of an Empirical Study’ (2001) International Criminal Law Review 1: 343-372.  





recalled that “[o]ne of the fundamental elements in any rational and fair system of criminal justice is 
consistency in punishment”.217 This critique was articulated by Henham who argued that 
“obfuscation and confusion by international sentences in articulating the connections between 
penal justifications and sentences … not only undermines the development of rational sentencing 
principles, it also weakens the legitimacy of international punishment”.218 Many academics called for 
sentencing guidelines, a task that the Tribunal declined to take up. The Tribunal asserted an 
“overriding obligation to individualise a penalty to fit the individual circumstances of the accused 
and the gravity of the crime”.219 Drumbl responded to this judicial assertion convincingly, as he 
argued that a general measure is needed around which judges can individualise: “Although 
individualising the penalty is certainly desirable, the benefits thereof dissipate when there is no 
coherent framework in which to predictably consider the factors to … sentencing”.220 Beresford 
cautioned that an absence of sentencing guidelines could mean “unstructured discretion allow[ing] 
personal preferences of a judge and may permit discrimination, individual idiosyncrasy and other 
irrelevant influence[s]” to affect sentencing practice.221 This forewarning of idiosyncratic reasoning 
was realised at sentencing (discussed below) and, as Chapter 6 details, was repeated throughout 
Presidential decisions on UER as they considered perpetrators’ demonstration of rehabilitation.  
 
A number of idiosyncrasies in judicial reasoning which provided for mitigating circumstances in 
sentencing were detailed by Galbraith. Galbraith discussed judges’ consideration of “good deeds” by 
the perpetrator and their apparent impact on sentencing, although, due to a lack of guidelines, the 
tangible impact remains unknown. Galbraith identified two types of “good deeds” discussed by 
judges, and two ways in which the good deeds were considered, both of which reflect Beresford’s 
caution against inconsistency and idiosyncrasy. The two types of good deeds were: first, assistance 
to direct victims, and, second, assistance to members of the same ethnic group as the victims of the 
crimes being prosecuted.222 The judgments provide no reference as to how these good deeds (as 
mitigating circumstances or evidence of good character) were to be considered at sentencing.  
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These idiosyncrasies demonstrate how subjective judicial determinations were. Galbraith compared 
cases to argue the Tribunal’s apparent subjectivity in determining good deeds. In the case of 
Vuković, found guilty of twice raping a 16-year-old girl, the defendant argued on appeal that the 
judges should have considered in mitigation the aid he had provided to Muslims in general during 
the war. The judges rejected this request, asserting that the “Appellant’s help to other Muslims in 
the conflict does not change the fact that he committed serious crimes against FWS-50. If he is to be 
punished for his acts against FWS-50, it is to these acts that any possible mitigating factors should be 
linked”.223 Galbraith contrasts the approach taken by the judges in Vuković to judges in Simić et al.224 
whereby the judges considered, without elaboration, that Miroslav Tadić’s good deeds throughout 
the war (rather than good deeds directed at specific victims) were relevant to sentencing.225 
Additionally, the judges’ belief that good deeds to other ethnicities constituted evidence of a 
reformable character226 appear to overlook the context of the crime and the criminals, who, as 
Luban noted, were not criminals before the war, they may have been “ordinary, law-abiding citizens, 
good men and good-neighbours, in peacetime”.227 The demonstration of good deeds, rather than 
evidence of a reformable character, was evidence of their general character which had failed them 
during the war. Galbraith’s examples are pertinent to the grant of UER; as Chapter 6, s.6.6 discusses 
there is a number of factors the President considers as evidence of rehabilitation which do not 
appear to take into account the context of atrocity crimes, and their discriminatory based nature.  
 
The dominant feature of the sentencing practice was the lack of consistency228 and clarity. The 
Tribunal did not heed calls for the “objectives of sentencing [to be] clarified and re-evaluated [given 
the nature of the crimes] and “make the sentencing process more transparent”.229 The recognition 
of this shortcoming, the Tribunal’s judicial reasoning lacking transparency and articulation of 
reasoning, is not only a criticism of sentencing but other areas of practice by the judges as they 
wrote their own rules and procedures (s.4.5.1).  
 
4.4.3. Leniency Concerns  
Before turning to enforcement and UER, pertinent concerns were raised that judges were unduly 
lenient in their treatment of those accused of atrocity crimes as they granted provisional release to 
 
223 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, in J. Galbraith, ‘The Good Deeds of International Criminal Defendants’ at 807. 
224 J. Galbraith, ‘The Good Deeds of International Criminal Defendants’ at 808. 
225 J. Galbraith, ‘The Good Deeds of International Criminal Defendants’ at 808. 
226 J. Galbraith, ‘The Good Deeds of International Criminal Defendants’ at 808.  
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and J. Tasioulas (eds.) The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 575.  
228 J.D Ohlin, ‘Proportional Sentences at the ICTY’, 322-341.  





those accused pending and during trial. This criticism echoed the criticism of scholars and 
prosecutors above who were displeased at the Tribunal’s apparent lack of differentiation between 
sentencing atrocity perpetrators and ordinary criminals (s.4.4.2). Judges at the Tribunal as well as 
academics raised these concerns. Given the gravity of the crimes it was alleged that the grant of 
provisional release signalled that the crimes being tried were considered “no more serious than any 
garden-variety domestic crime”.230 ICTY Judge Schomburg was similarly concerned at how the 
Tribunal practice of releasing the accused for court breaks could be interpreted. He noted that this 
“would in practical terms convey the impression, particularly to the people … of the former 
Yugoslavia that accused before the International Tribunal are let out on holidays”.231 This thesis 
questions the extent to which Judge Schomburg’s concerns of perceived leniency232 was repeated 
and caused people in the region to be frustrated as perpetrators were released early and 
unconditionally, which was not a short break from proceedings but an early ending of punishment.  
 
4.5. The Unconditional Early Release of Perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes  
This final section examines the relatively small yet pertinent body of scholarship, which has 
examined the judicial practice beyond sentencing perpetrators (relevant to UER) which this thesis 
complements. This literature has made in-roads into Kress and Sluiter’s recommendation that 
international criminal justice’s enforcement should form part of its overall legitimacy evaluation.233 
Much of this literature has concluded that a number of the legitimacy deficits at sentencing 
continued into the enforcement stage, and this thesis examines the extent to which these deficits 
existed when enforcement of sentences was concluded prematurely at UER. These criticisms 
included a deficiency in clear judicial reasoning (s.4.5.2 and s.4.5.3) and leniency towards 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes. Another criticism, one observer noted, was the President reading 
beyond the strict letter law in a grant of UER.  
 
4.5.1. Judicial Overreach  
In addition to favourable treatment of the accused, commentators have critiqued judges’ treatment 
of perpetrators as they granted unconditional early release. Commentators challenged the 
 
230 C. Davidson ‘No Shortcuts on Human Rights: Bail and the International Criminal Trial’ (2010) American University Law 
Review 60(1): 1-70 at 13.  
231 C. Davidson, ‘No Shortcuts on Human Rights: Bail and the International Criminal Trial’ at 54. 
232 Judge Schomburg’s statement also indicates that this judge was aware that the people in the region were a watchful 
audience, who he believed judges should consider as they exercised their powers over the accused.   
233 C. Kress and G. Sluiter, ‘Enforcement: Preliminary Remarks’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D. 
Jones (eds.) The Rome Statute of International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2002) at 1753 
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legitimacy of judges’ exercise of power. Firstly, observers raised concern regarding judicial 
overreach, that is, judges going beyond their written powers and beyond the original intention of 
the Statute’s drafters. Fittingly, the Tribunal’s third President, Judge Jorda, expressed reservations at 
the power given to the Tribunal judges to “draft their own procedure ... in the sensitive area of 
criminal procedure”234 whilst he had been critiqued for going “beyond a use of these powers that 
can be justified in traditional common law terms”.235 This concern was raised by his Presidential 
decision to grant an UER to a convicted perpetrator held in the UN Detention Unit (UNDU). Under 
the Statute and the RPE, perpetrators’ eligibility for a pardon or commutation of sentence is 
triggered by their eligibility under the law of the enforcement state.236 President Jorda, however, 
considered Kolundžija’s direct application for a pardon, not an enforcement state.237 Symons 
asserted that President Jorda effectively expanded the powers of the Tribunal by considering this 
direct application and further set the precedent for others to do so.238  
 
4.5.2. Judicial Reasoning of UER Questioned  
In addition to judicial overreach, scholars have critiqued the apparent lack in clearly developed 
judicial reasoning provided in the early release determinations. The ICTY’s RPE guide the President, 
who is responsible for the “pardon or commutation of sentence,”239 to consider four factors: gravity 
of the crime, similarly-situated prisoners, substantial cooperation with the prosecutor and a 
demonstration of rehabilitation.240 Scholars examining the Presidents’ practice of UER have largely 
critiqued the determinations for lacking rigour in the consideration of all four of these factors. 
Scholars, in their analysis of the decisions, asserted that the “vast majority of cases”241 indicate 
(correctly up until February 2017) that the ““similarly-situated prisoners’ [factor] has eclipsed the 
other three to become essentially dispositive”.242 Holá describes this two-thirds as the “magic-
threshold”243 – the use of the word “magic” suggests a sense of the President conjuring up a figure, a 
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subjective rather than an objective criterion.244 The notion of the President practising too much 
discretion and doing so arbitrarily is summed up by Choi who asserted that “disregarding the other 
factors and rendering this [similarly-situated prisoners] one dispositive, the President frees herself to 
establish whatever standards she wishes, so long as she applies them consistently between 
prisoners”.245 Ironically, the principle of individualisation of punishment, which was the judicial 
reasoning provided by Tribunal judges for not establishing sentencing guidelines (noted s.4.4.2), 
appears to be reversed when the President considered the early termination of that same sentence. 
This has been noted by Orentlicher: “One striking exception to the ICTY’s general reluctance to 
adhere to the principle of consistency in sentencing [is its] determinations about early release from 
prison [whereby] the ICTY President has often accorded substantial weight to the fact that early 
release has routinely been granted to other defendants”.246 This research’s analysis of the early 
release decisions tested these specific scholarly criticisms and the criticisms were directly raised with 
a number of interviewees in The Hague. 
 
The criticism that early release decisions were subjective rather than objective was implicitly noted 
by Choi as he highlighted Tribunal Presidents’ instances of “double-counting” 247 guilty pleas. Choi 
critiqued the President in re-considering guilty pleas at early release, given that the plea had already 
been considered at sentencing, and generally contributed to a lower sentence.248 The Tribunal’s 
Presidents have considered a guilty plea either as evidence of remorse (thus evidence of 
rehabilitation) or cooperation with the Prosecutor249 under the RPE.250 The consideration of a guilty 
plea undertaken on any consistent basis but rather how the individual President wishes.251 This 
decision echoes the critique of Galbraith (s.4.4.2) in relation to good deeds being considered on 
various bases, and inconsistently, as mitigating circumstances or evidence of good character in 
sentencing. Finally, the following section discusses the judges’ assessments of rehabilitation as 
another aspect of judicial reasoning discussed in the literature. Further, a perpetrator’s 
demonstration of rehabilitation is a factor the President is required to consider as he decides an 
 
244 Although Holá and van Wijk recognise that the 2/3 threshold appears to represent the median figure of when 
prisoners in the European enforcement states are eligible for release on parole or probation, or conditional release. See: 
Holá B and van Wijk J, ‘Life after Conviction at International Criminal Tribunals’ (2014) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 12: 109-132 at 122.  
245 J. Choi, ‘Early Release in International Criminal Law’ at 1797. 
246 D. Orentlicher, That Someone Guilty Be Punished: The Impact of the ICTY in Bosnia (Open Society Justice Institutive and 
ICTJ, 2010) at 56.  
247 J. Choi, ‘Early Release in International Criminal Law’ at 1814. 
248 J. Choi, ‘Early Release in International Criminal Law’ at 1798.  
249 J. Choi, ‘Early Release in International Criminal Law’ at 1784. 
250 Rule 125, two of the four factors the President is required to consider as the perpetrator applies for a pardon or 
commutation of sentence is ‘evidence of their demonstration of rehabilitation’ and ‘substantial cooperation with the 
Prosecutor’.  





early release application, and as Chapter 6 discusses, their assessment of rehabilitation is a 
significant and controversial factor in shaping the legitimacy assessment of the UER practice.   
 
4.5.3. Judicial Assessments of Rehabilitation  
Scholars have also questioned the judicial consideration and explanation of perpetrators’ 
demonstration of rehabilitation: firstly, the apparent benefit of the doubt accorded to evidence of 
rehabilitation, and, secondly, whether this was an appropriate measure for perpetrators of atrocity 
crimes.  
 
Many scholars have expressed disappointment at the apparent benefit of the doubt accorded to 
perpetrators as the Presidents consider the evidence of the perpetrators themselves, their counsel 
or the enforcement state has provided of their rehabilitation.252 Holá and colleagues have 
systematically analysed the decisions. Although they recognise that it is not the responsibility of the 
Tribunal to rehabilitate perpetrators,253 they note their disappointment that the judges have failed 
to assess it systematically.254 They found that submissions on rehabilitation “are often conflicting or 
unsubstantiated”, and critique the President for an apparent lack of follow up.255 They concluded 
that “evaluation of prisoners’ reflections on their crimes and its relevance for assessment of 
rehabilitation by the President seems to be rather matter-of-factly, superficial, and sweeping”.256  
 
The second critique, based on the understanding that atrocity crimes occur in a different context 
and high-and-mid level perpetrators are often of a different nature to ordinary criminals.257 It is 
argued that high and mid-level perpetrators, rather than being generally deviant, constitute a 
“different kind of perpetrator [who] commits crimes in abnormal and extraordinary 
circumstances”.258 However, some low-level perpetrators may be motivated by personal revenge or 
 
252 See Chapter 6. 
253 R. Mulgrew, Towards the Development of the International Penal System (2014, Cambridge University Press) who 
undertook empirical study on perpetrators’ life in prison, has advocated for an international penal system whereby 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes could receive tailored treatment rather than be dispersed throughout Europe.  
254 B. Holá, J. van Wijk, F. Constantini, and A. Korhonnen, ‘Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ Reflections on Their 
Crimes in Early Release Decisions’ at 365. 
255 B. Holá, J. van Wijk, F. Constantini, and A. Korhonnen, ‘Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ Reflections on Their 
Crimes in Early Release Decisions’ at 363. 
256 B. Holá, J. van Wijk, F. Constantini, and A. Korhonnen, ‘Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ Reflections on Their 
Crimes in Early Release Decisions’ at 365. 
257 See Chapter 6, s.6.6. 
258 J.M. Kelder, B. Holá and J. van Wijk, ‘Rehabilitation and Early Release of Perpetrators of International Crimes: A Case 





a violent tendency,259 but the overarching fact remains that these crimes were committed in a 
context. With this context in mind, the Tribunal Presidents’ understanding of good behaviour in 
prison as being an indicator of the extent to which a perpetrator has demonstrated evidence of 
rehabilitation is described by Merrylees as “superficial”.260 He points to Kelder, Holá and van Wijk’s 
example of Obrenović, whom the President considered as demonstrating signs of rehabilitation 
given that he served as a kitchen attendant. They query the suitability of this measure, and highlight 
that the President himself did not provide an explanation. They note: “how Obrenović fulfilling of 
obligations in the kitchen actually assists in rehabilitating this former military officer convicted of 
persecuting hundreds of civilians remains unclear”.261 Holá and colleagues advocated that 
acknowledgment and remorse should be emphasised for rehabilitating atrocity criminals, as the 
crimes are perpetrated based on ethnic-hatred or within this context.262 They have further critiqued 
the Tribunal’s failure to consistently consider “whether or not they deny their past deeds or 
acknowledge the wrongfulness of their actions” 263 and factor this into the demonstration of 
rehabilitation. They have asserted that it is these factors, which the Tribunal President should 
consider for perpetrators who are released early and “often return to deeply divided societies”.264 
This thesis contributes to, and complements, this research as it further interrogates many of their 
assertions, through an analysis of the decisions and through interviews with stakeholders at the 
Tribunal itself, and perspectives gained from stakeholders in BiH (one of the societies to which Holá 
and colleagues refer).  
 
This more nuanced approach to understanding rehabilitation for perpetrators of atrocity crimes, 
their context and their communities speaks to the theme running throughout the literature – which 
is the challenge of punishing for the most heinous crimes – both for the perpetrator themselves but 
also for the society (s.4.3). This criticism is particularly relevant when it comes to ending the 
punishment already criticised for being “surprisingly low”.265 Merrylees supported Choi’s criticism 
that on reading the decisions the “gravity of the crime” consideration appears to be simply a tick-box 
 
259 The Tribunal judges noted for example in the case of Jelisić he had a disturbed personality and his crimes had been 
opportunistic. See The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, 14 December 1999, para. 105.   
260 A. Merrylees, ‘Two-thirds and You’re Out? The Practice of Early Release at the ICTY and the ICC, in Light of the Goals of 
International Criminal Justice’ (2016) Amsterdam Law Forum 8(2): 69-76. 
261 J.M. Kelder, B. Holá and J. van Wijk, ‘Rehabilitation and Early Release of Perpetrators of International Crimes: A Case 
Study of the ICTY and ICTR’ at 1193. 
262 B. Holá, J. van Wijk, F. Constantini, and A. Korhonnen, ‘Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ Reflections on Their 
Crimes in Early Release Decisions’ at 365. 
263 B. Holá, J. van Wijk, F. Constantini, and A. Korhonnen, ‘Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ Reflections on Their 
Crimes in Early Release Decisions’ at 365-366. 
264 M. Kelder, B. Holá and J. van Wijk, ‘Rehabilitation and Early Release of Perpetrators of International Crimes: A Case 
Study of the ICTY and ICTR’ at 1199. 





and asserted that “there is something particularly inflammatory about releasing early an individual 
convicted for some of the most heinous crimes in human history, without any real remorse or 
changed circumstances”.266 Choi argued that the practice, whereby perpetrators of atrocity crimes 
are considered for release along the same timeframe as ordinary criminals (indeed more favourably 
given that their early release is unconditional), lacks legitimacy and points to the disquiet that a 
number of early released perpetrators caused upon their return and concluded that “victims see the 
presumption [of early release] as reflecting a lack of seriousness on the part of the tribunal [and 
therefore] hurts the credibility of international criminal justice as a whole”. 267 This assertion is 
examined in the thesis’ findings.  
 
4.5.4. The Tribunal’s Non-Engagement with Regional Stakeholders as they Grant UER  
Other scholars have more recently268 addressed the Tribunal’s grant of UER. Trbovc asserted that 
celebratory homecomings of convicted perpetrators should be “viewed as a litmus test for the 
success/failure of the ICTY in changing values and conflicting historical interpretations … about what 
happened during the Yugoslav wars”. Nevertheless, Trbovc and others have been less critical of UER 
and their analysis has focused on the significance of unrepentant perpetrators’ return for the region. 
Unlike Holá et al, Choi and others they have not accorded the controversy to the Tribunal itself nor 
drawn any implication of the return being early and unconditional.269 Their critique focuses on the 
ethnically-divided, politically driven media outlets of the region.270 The special edition of the 
International Criminal Justice Review highlighted the celebrations many high-level (political and 
military elites) received as they return to the region.271 Karstedt’s article drew on a comparative 
analysis of Nuremberg and the ICTY perpetrators’ return to post-conflict society. Similarly to Holá et 
al and Choi she emphasised that perpetrators of atrocity crimes differ from ordinary criminals and 
asserted that “re-entry pathways [are] shaped by the nature of the conflict as well as by the political 
and social conditions of the society”.272 She recommended that society as well as the perpetrators 
should be considered in perpetrators’ release. In contrast to Holá et al she did not believe that the 
 
266 A. Merrylees, ‘Two-thirds and You’re Out? The Practice of Early Release at the ICTY and the ICC, in Light of the Goals of 
International Criminal Justice’ at 73.  
267 J. Choi, ‘Early Release in International Criminal Law’ at 1824-1825. 
268 December 2018 – post fieldwork in BiH (September – December 2017).  
269 J.M. Trbovc, ‘Homecomings From “The Hague”: Media Coverage of ICTY Defendants After Trial and Punishment’ 
(2018) International Criminal Justice Review: 28(4): 406-422 at 408.  
270 K. Ristić, ‘The Media Negotiations of War Criminals and Their Memoirs: The Emergence of the “ICTY Celebrity”’ (2018) 
International Criminal Justice Review: 28(4): 391-405.  
271 December 2018: ‘Special Issue: ICTY Celebrities: War Criminals Coming Home’ (2018) International Criminal Justice 
Review: 28(4). 
272 S. Karstedt, ‘I Would Prefer to Be Famous”: Comparative Perspectives on the reentry of War Criminals Sentenced at 





ICTY of the 2000s had “the type of oversight and vigilance that the Allies”273 had post Second World 
War, and did not make any assessments of the ICTY’s legitimacy. Nevertheless, she recommended 
that future ICTs “might become more proactive in monitoring return … and see it as part of their 
task”.274 This could, she argued, encompass the imposition of “conditions of release”,275 although she 
does not specify what these conditions may be.  
 
The scholars in this review all noted the significance of the unrepentant perpetrators’ return, firstly 
for impact on the reinforcement of relativisation of the crimes,276 the “promotion of particular 
historical narrative”.277 Their celebratory returns denoted that for the perpetrators’ supporters the 
issue of guilt or innocence determined by the ICTY is “largely irrelevant”.278 These assertions were 
spoken to in this research’s findings, discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
Others have highlighted that the other side in post-conflict society is also important here. Ristić has 
emphasised that victims have been belittled through the homecomings of the unrepentant and 
celebrated perpetrators. Ristić in her examination of perpetrators’ autobiographies outlined how 
they had denounced their victims,279 which was reaffirmed as they received heroes’ welcomes. 
Plavšić argued that rape victims, whose testimonies had been accepted by the Tribunal, were 
“staging testimonies for camera”.280 Karstedt shared this view as she argued that “victims [were] 
often blamed or seen again as enemies”281 in this discourse. However, as noted, these scholars do 
not attribute their assessments of the sociological legitimacy of the Tribunal to the Tribunal itself. 
They focus on the regional and national political and media elites in shaping the perceptions of the 
Tribunal. Karstedt urged nevertheless that future ICTs draw lessons from these homecomings. She 
proposed that institutions of international criminal justice could prepare and “support … victims’ 
 
273 S. Karstedt, ‘I Would Prefer to Be Famous”: Comparative Perspectives on the reentry of War Criminals Sentenced at 
Nuremberg and The Hague’ at 384.  
274 S. Karstedt, ‘I Would Prefer to Be Famous”: Comparative Perspectives on the reentry of War Criminals Sentenced at 
Nuremberg and The Hague’ at 384. 
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Nuremberg and The Hague’ at 384. 
276 K. Ristić, ‘The Media Negotiations of War Criminals and Their Memoirs: The Emergence of the “ICTY Celebrity”’– noting 
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communities when perpetrators are released back home”.282 This recommendation was echoed, 
although more fervently, by interviewees in BiH, discussed Chapters 7 and 8.  
4.6. Conclusion  
This chapter has outlined the most pertinent areas of literature on the Tribunal’s legitimacy of 
exercise (or its performance legitimacy)283 which linked to this thesis’ focus on UER. It began, 
however, by noting that the unique characteristics of the Tribunal, as argued in the scholarship and 
as this thesis also shows, has influenced the Tribunal’s exercise of power. It would be remiss not to 
recognise the Tribunal’s other stakeholders, the more nebulous international community who 
enabled it to function, and who are also an audience.284 However, for the purposes of this thesis, a 
key stakeholder of the Tribunal are those whose lives it directly affects - stakeholders in the region, 
to whom the Tribunal articulated they were bringing justice.285 Thus, literature analysing the 
Tribunal’s sociological legitimacy (perceptions of these stakeholders) in the region has been 
examined here (s.4.3). Chapters 6, 7 and 8 demonstrate that many of the practices which caused a 
lack of sociological legitimacy, primarily its oversight of victims and lack of outreach, reappear at the 
grant of UER.  
 
The chapter also examined the Tribunal judges’ exercise of power from its normative perspectives; 
primarily plea-bargaining and sentencing determinations. These judicial actions are pertinent as UER 
effectively “chops-off”286 one–third of the declared sentence. This sentence is already controversial, 
widely considered as unduly lenient and unclearly reasoned. The practice of plea bargaining, initially 
rejected by the Tribunal, was contested by scholars as being at odds with the Tribunal’s rhetoric; 
furthermore, it was an unknown to the FRY and often resulted in lower sentences. Finally, scholarly 
criticism of the Tribunal’s Presidents’ grant of UER was set out (detailed further in Chapters 5 and 6) 
primarily again for a lack of clear reasoning. Before turning to these findings of repeated patterns of 
sociological legitimacy deficits - the perceptions of this practice, by stakeholders in The Hague and in 
 
282 S. Karstedt, ‘I Would Prefer to Be Famous”: Comparative Perspectives on the reentry of War Criminals Sentenced at 
Nuremberg and The Hague’ at 384.  
283 See Chapter 3, s.3.4.3. 
284 M. Swart, ‘Tadić Revisited: Some Critical Comments on the Legacy and the Legitimacy of the ICTY’ (2011) Goettingen 
Journal of International Law 3(3): 985-1009 at 991. Acknowledging the reality of these multiple stakeholders is important, 
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ICTs and the ICC. See J.N. Clark, ‘International Criminal Courts and Normative Legitimacy’ (2015) International Criminal 
Law Review 25(4): 763-783 at 763.  
285 T. Meron, ‘Procedural Evolution in the ICTY’ (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 2: 520-525 – ‘While the 
work of the ICTY has been aimed principally at the people of the former Yugoslavia, it has had a broader significance as 
well’ at 520. 
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BiH (Chapters 6, 7 and 8), the following chapter addresses the law on early release, the practice itself 





Chapter 5: The ICTY and its Residual Mechanism Practice of Unconditional Early Release 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter argues that UER lacked normative legitimacy, principally legality, and had a sociological 
legitimacy deficit.1 The chapter begins by looking briefly at the black letter law of the Statute and an 
examination of the travaux préparatoires which indicates the original intention of the Statute’s 
provision on pardon or commutation of sentence (s.5.2). This is followed with analysis of early 
release decisions (empirical legal analysis) and interview data which conclude that UER was intended 
to be an exception (s.5.2) but became the standard (s.5.3).2 This was primarily due to the Tribunal’s 
Presidents exercise of broad discretion (s.5.3.1-s.5.3.3). The analysis indicates that Presidents’ 
capacity to use broad discretion resulted in them adopting a stare decisis3 approach (s.5.3.4) which 
included their refusal to consider additional negative factors as requested by the Prosecutor 
(s.5.4.1). This exhibited a pattern whereby the Presidents’ read the law in favour of the perpetrator 
(s.5.4.2) which effectively downplayed the gravity of their crime. On occasion, Presidents used their 
broad discretion to consider factors already counted in favour of the perpetrator, including the guilty 
plea (s.5.4.3). 
 
Generosity to the perpetrator is a pattern exhibited in the Presidents’ consideration of their 
rehabilitation which, given the perceived illegitimacy of their stated understanding of rehabilitation, 
warranted attention in its own right (Chapter 6). As the practice was on-going during the writing of 
the thesis, the chapter notes the developments at the Tribunal which may ameliorate the perceived 
illegitimacy of this practice - its unconditional nature. These conditions (prohibition from speaking 
with the media and political activities for example) may potentially make the practice legitimate as it 
is more in line with what many interviewees in BiH perceived as the most frustrating element of 
release – its unconditional nature. The chapter also notes the latest developments, whereby the 
President has rejected UER outright, a further demonstration of Presidents’ discretion (s.5.4.7). 
These developments, in particular conditional release (s.5.4.6 and s.5.4.8), reiterate the broad 
discretion of the Presidents, as they adopted a different approach. Further, the chapter begins to 
 
1 In the language of legitimacy, the chapter begins with the examination of the normative legitimacy of UER, the legal 
basis, and subsequently the belief in the practice’s legitimacy - that is, its sociological legitimacy. 
2 D. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Oxford University Press, 1991) at 16. The second pillar by which Beetham 
asserted that a power is legitimate is where the rules are practiced in accordance with shared beliefs of the power-holder 
and the subordinates. D. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, at 17. 
3 The Presidents, until February 2018, predominantly followed the precedent of granting UER when the perpetrator had 
served two-thirds of their sentence. This was in spite of the fact that under the Statute and more generally judges’ ruling 
on international law  are  not required to follow precedent: see G. Guillaume, ‘The Use of Precedent by International 





answer how selected stakeholders perceived the normative (legal) legitimacy of this practice (s.5.5). 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 discuss the sociological legitimacy of the normative (moral) elements of the 
practice and its repercussions for these stakeholders in the region.  
 
This analysis of the practice’s normative (legal) and sociological legitimacy is important as “it is 
crucial to acknowledge and learn … to develop better practice, and not just reinvent a broken 
wheel”.4 To develop better practice, the interview analysis discusses aspects of the practice that the 
majority of the stakeholders interviewed perceived as illegitimate, and why these perceptions were 
held. Thus, based on interviewee feedback relating to the factors the President is required to 
consider, the chapter concludes by proposing ways in which some specific actions can be undertaken 
at the Residual Mechanism to lessen the practice’s negative impact, and recommends actions for 
any future ad hoc tribunals where early release is an option for perpetrators of atrocity crimes 
(s.5.6).5  
 
5.2. Normative Legitimacy: The Legal Basis for a Pardon or Commutation of Sentence - 
subsequently Early Release  
5.2.1. The Statute  
From its inception, the ICTY set out the possibility of perpetrators not serving their full sentence. The 
first half of Article 28 of the Statute provides that: 
 
If, pursuant to the applicable law of the State in which the convicted person is 
imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or commutation of sentence, the State 
concerned shall notify the International Tribunal accordingly. 6 
 
Nemitz interpreted Article 28 to mean that perpetrators early release was foreseen as a general 
practice. Nemitz boldly asserted “it is quite obvious that the drafters of the Statute did not have in 
mind the possibility that a convicted person would serve the entire term of imprisonment”.7 
However, a close inspection of the travaux préparatoires, and affirmed in the interviews, counters 
Nemitz’s assumption and this chapter demonstrates that early release was foreseen as an exception 
not a general practice.  
 
4 T. Ward and S. Maruna, Rehabilitation: Beyond the risk paradigm (Routledge, 2007) at 7.  
5 Second public redacted version of “Observations of the Defence for Mr Lubanga on a reduction in sentence, referenced 
ICC-01/04-01/06-3151-Conf-Exp, of 14 July 2015, under ‘Applicable Law’, para.10 – “Although convicted perpetrators are 
not automatically released after two-thirds of their sentence, this factor is considered preponderant when examining an 
application for early release – citing Jokić, Early Release Decision dated 1 September 2008, para.16.  
6 Article 28 of the ICTY Statute, 25 May 1993.  
7 J.C. Nemitz, ‘The Execution of Sanctions Imposed by Supranational Criminal Tribunals’ in R. Haveman and O. Olusanya 






5.2.2. The Travaux Préparatoires 
In legal considerations and discussions at the United Nations Security Council where the possibility 
of early release from imprisonment was raised, the gravity of the crimes and their uniqueness were 
emphasised and not all legal experts even considered the possibility of pardon or commutation of 
sentence appropriate.8 Further, this section will show, that UER was operationalised in a manner 
which ran counter to these original proposals.  
 
The Statute was written speedily by the UN Secretary-General’s legal staff at the Secretariat and 
adopted without amendments by the UN Security Council, May 1993.9 In relation to sentence 
enforcement, it was noted that the details of how this was to happen were left until a later date, as 
priority was given to establishing procedures for indicting alleged perpetrators and establishing a fair 
trial process.10 Nevertheless, prior to the ICTY’s establishment, preparations were made by legal 
experts on its overall operationalisation (including enforcement of sentences). These documents 
would have been available to the drafters of the Statute, the judges, as they detailed the Rules and 
Procedure of Evidence (RPE) and the President himself, as he decided on perpetrators’ application 
for early release. A French committee of jurists undertook one such study.11 Their report included 
the provision for a “pardon or remission” of sentence. Choi highlighted this study and convincingly 
argued that, on the plain reading of the travaux préparatoires, a pardon or commutation of sentence 
was proposed as clemency. A grant of clemency in national law is an exceptional occurrence, not a 
routine practice. He cited the French version of the Statute, Article 28, which sets out “grâce et 
commutation de peine”, which, according to the French reading of criminal law, is the unconditional, 
unsupervised release granted at the discretion of the executive.12  
 
There are two important differences between the original intention and actual practice discernible 
on close reading of the French jurists’ report. First, the report recommended that the enforcement 
state, with the oversight of the UNSC, not the Tribunal, should have the responsibility for 
 
8 V. Morris and D. Scharf, Insider's Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Documentary 
History and Analysis, Volume 1 & 2, at 306-09, referenced in W. Schabas, ‘Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human 
Rights Approach’ (1997) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 7(2): 461-518 at 511.  
9 M.J. Matheson and D. Scheffer, ‘The Creation of the Tribunals’ (2016) The American Journal of International Law 110(2): 
173 - 190 at 176.  
10 R. Zacklin, ‘Some Major Problems in the Drafting the ICTY Statute’ (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 2(2): 
361-367. 
11 Letter Dated 10 February 1993 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations Addressed to the 
Secretary-General, UN Doc S/25266, para. 157. This commission submitted its recommendations to the UN Secretary 
General (UNSG) and Permanent Members of the Security Council (UNSC).  





determining a grant of pardon or remission of sentence for the convicted person. Second, this grant 
would be on the basis of “human and political”13 considerations. The proposition that enforcement 
states (overseen by the UNSC) take responsibility for this decision was based on the belief that the 
Tribunal itself would be an inappropriate body to grant a pardon or sentence remission for two 
reasons. First, given that it was the sentencing body it would “confuse its functions”. Second, it 
would unduly prolong the lifetime of the Tribunal.14 The second reason for the deciders of a grant of 
pardon or sentence remission being a combination of the enforcement state and the UNSC, was that 
perpetrators were detained in enforcement states’ prison system, under their rules. The report 
recommended that factors such as “illness, remorse” would be important, and could be determined 
by the enforcement state, given its proximity to the perpetrator, and would, therefore, be aware of 
the “real personal situation of that individual”.15 This reference to “human” suggests considerations 
based on the individual characteristics of the perpetrator, their ill-health and/or their personal 
reformed character. In the first instance, the enforcement state decision based on the perpetrator’s 
personal circumstances, would trigger the pardon or sentence remission. 
 
The proposals recognise the unique nature of the perpetrator and the possible implications of their 
release from imprisonment. Unlike ordinary perpetrators, a sovereign state could not grant a pardon 
or remission of sentence – a higher authority was necessary. The UNSC must approve the early 
release. The report noted that the “Security Council [would be] in a better position to take into 
account the political risks and advantages of a grant of pardon or a remission of the sentence”.16 The 
report suggests that repercussions were perceived as a possibility when a sentence was prematurely 
terminated; such as political instability in the region to which the early released perpetrator may 
return to, or, indeed, that the returning perpetrator may create. Therefore, as the UNSC is 
principally responsible for “maintain[ing] international peace and security” this oversight role was 
proposed. That the perpetrators’ release be considered for political risks further made sense, given 
that one of the Tribunal’s objectives was to contribute to the “restoration and maintenance of 
peace”.17 That the decision required approval of the UNSC suggests that a perpetrator’s pardon or 
remission of sentence was not envisaged to be a matter of routine. These details support Choi’s 
proposition that the Statute drafters had envisaged a pardon or reduction of sentence to be an 
 
13 Letter Dated 10 February 1993 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General, UN Doc S/25266, para. 157 
14 Letter Dated 10 February 1993 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General, UN Doc S/25266, para. 158.  
15 UN Doc S/25266, para. 157. 
16 UN Doc S/25266, paras. 157-158 – referenced in J. Choi, ‘Early Release in International Criminal Law’ at 1799.  





exceptional measure, based on unique circumstances of the individual which would be balanced 
against the political climate. 
 
Three months later, however, the drafters of the Statute had effectively rejected this 
recommendation and placed the responsibility with the ICTY itself. The President (in consultation 
with the judges) would be the authority to determine a grant of pardon or commutation of 
sentence, not the UNSC. Furthermore, it provided the President with broad discretion to consider 
matters beyond the perpetrator themselves and the political climate.  
 
Article 28 of the Statute, adopted 23 May 1993, reads broadly:  
 
If, pursuant to the applicable law of the State in which the convicted person is 
imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or commutation of sentence, the State 
concerned shall notify the International Tribunal accordingly. The President of the 
International Tribunal, in consultation with the judges, shall decide the matter on 
the basis of the interests of justice and the general principles of law. 18 
 
There are three important19 points to note here, concerning the divergence from the French jurists’ 
proposals and the original intention of the drafters with the subsequent practice. Firstly, the Statute 
provided a “pardon or commutation of sentence”, not an UER, (s.5.2.2). Secondly, the decision was 
to be determined ultimately by the President in consultation with “the judges” of the Tribunal. These 
judges were not identified, but the wording of Article 28 implies that all the judges of the Tribunal 
should be consulted, not a selected few which was the practice adopted. This was confirmed in one 
interview (s.5.3). Thirdly, the wide scope of discretion was laid out as the President was to base the 
decision on the “interests of justice” and “general principles of law”; these are “nebulous 
concepts”20 open to wide interpretation which meant the President could effectively decide at his 




18 Article 28 of the ICTY Statute, 25 May 1993. 
19 Another point of divergence is that the enforcement state has less power than originally conceived; the state would 
notify the ICTY of the convicted person’s eligibility under their law, it would not decide the matter but rather defer the 
decision to the Tribunal directly.  
20 A.M. Danner, ‘Enhancing the legitimacy and accountability of prosecutorial discretion at the international criminal 
court’ (2003) American Journal of International Law 97(3): 510-552 at 543. See Chapter 3, s.3.4.3. 
21 W. Schabas, ‘Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach’ (1997) Duke Journal of Comparative and 





5.2.3. The Law in Practice 
Five years after the original proposals were made by the French, subsequently altered by the 
Statute’s drafters, practicalities had given rise to a different approach being taken. The Statute noted 
that the decision would be determined by the President “in consultation with the judges”.22 As the 
ICTY judges developed their own Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE)23 the Tribunal’s Yearbook 
noted that this Presidential decision on the grant of pardon or commutation of sentence was 
deemed an administrative one, which required “Administrative action” rather than “Legislative 
Action”.24 This administrative designation narrowed the decision-making process; rather than being 
discussed in a plenary of judges (the 11 elected judges), it would be discussed by the Bureau. This 
Bureau was a five-person body: the President, the Vice-President and the Presiding Judges of the 
Trial Chambers. As outlined later, the early release decision, being determined by judges at the ICTY 
rather than diplomats at the UNSC, was one reason why the political considerations, or “risks”, as 
described by the French jurists, were rarely, at least on paper, taken into consideration. Further, the 
RPE, developed by a Rules Committee25 (appointed by the President) set out which other factors 
(not including political risks) should be considered in determining a pardon or commutation of 
sentence. As the Statute drafters shifted decision-making from the UNSC (a body of 15 Member 
States) to the Tribunal, so too did the Rules Committee shift decision-making to five judges of the 
Bureau, rather than 11 plenary judges.  
 
The trigger for a pardon or commutation of sentence was the perpetrator’s eligibility under the 
jurisdiction in which they were serving their sentence. In contrast to the French proposal, the 
enforcement state would notify the Tribunal of the convicted persons’ eligibility only. Perpetrators 
convicted by the Tribunal were to serve their sentences in European States who were willing to 
enforce the sentences.26 The Tribunal approached states directly, and entered into bilateral 
agreements. The agreements tended to follow a template: the majority of agreements have a 
provision for the “pardon or commutation of sentence” and, either separately or in a combined 
 
22 Article 28 of the ICTY Statute, 25 May 1993.  
23 Article 15 of the ICTY Statute stipulated that “the judges would adopt Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the pre-trial 
phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and 
other appropriate matters”. 
24 Note from the President: Statute’s provisions requiring national action’, IT/11/Rev.1. 29 November 1994, in ICTY 
Yearbook 1994 at 152.  
25 In December 1997, the President of the Tribunal established a working group ("the Rules Committee") see: Annual 
Report, 1998, para.107. The Rule Committee was “composed of Tribunal judges as voting members, with the Office of the 
Prosecutor, the Registrar and a representative of the Association of Defence Counsel as non-voting members”, Annual 
Report 2016, “The Rules Committee”, para. 48.  
26 Any European State could enforce the sentence other than the Netherlands and FRY. Article 27 of the Statute and Note 
dated 4 October 1994 from the UNSG to Member States which invited them to indicate whether they were willing to 
enforce prison sentences pursuant to Article 27, Note from the President: Statute’s provisions requiring ‘national action’, 





provision, “early release”.27 The wording of these country agreements supports Choi’s view that the 
Tribunal applied a “misguided modelling of international early release after domestic parole".28 The 
enforcement agreement with Norway (1998), where the first perpetrator serving a sentence was 
released, contained an article dedicated to a “pardon or commutation” of sentence, but under the 
article on “enforcement of sentence” the phrase “eligible for early release” was used.29  
 
This wording was later utilised in the Tribunal’s 1999 “Practice Direction on the Procedure for the 
Determination of Applications for Pardon, Commutation of Sentence, and Early Release of Persons 
Convicted by the International Tribunal”, which put early release on an equal pegging with the 
Statute’s provision for a “pardon or commutation of sentence”.30 The use of “early release” has 
mutated into a practice which went beyond what was originally conceived of by the Statute drafters, 
and beyond what the judges handing down the sentences had foreseen. This was noted by one 
interviewee in The Hague who argued that, at least in the first few years, “I don’t think judges ever 
contemplated when they gave fixed term sentences that they would be getting two-thirds credit just 
as standard”.31 Fundamentally, the above has shown that UER’s legality is problematic, given that 
the Rules and Practice Direction developed out of sync with the Statute. This set the path for the 
subsequent practice to be further out-of-line with the Rules (5.3). 
 
5.3. The Written Decisions: Unconditional Early Release: From the Exception to the Standard 
5.3.1. The Rules and the Practice Develop  
A chronological examination of the written decisions supports Choi’s assertion that originally early 
release was foreseen as an exception, but later became the “two-thirds standard”,32 as stated by the 
interviewee above. Analysis of the determinations reveals how this shift from the exception to 
everyday practice occurred. First, by judges applying the stare decisis principle; second, providing 
perpetrators with a generous benefit of the doubt, and third, being focused on the perpetrators, 
thus overlooking the originally envisaged “political risks”.33 These practices (stare decisis, providing 
 
27 ‘Early Release’ is noted, in addition to ‘pardon or commutation’, in the bilateral agreements with Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
28 J. Choi, ‘Early Release in International Criminal Law’, at 1788.  
29 Agreement between the Government of Norway and the United Nations on the Enforcement of Sentence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 24 April 1998. 
30 Practice Direction on the Procedure for the Determination of Applications for Pardon, Commutation of Sentence, and 
Early Release of Persons Convicted by the International Tribunal, April 1999.  
31 Interview, Senior Staff Member, The Hague, 24/01/2017, their emphasis.  
32 J. Choi, ‘Early Release in International Criminal Law’, at 1788.  
33 Committee of French Jurists set up by Mr Roland Dumas, Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to study the 





perpetrators with the benefit of the doubt and overlooking factors not related to the perpetrators) 
indicate that Presidents tended to favour the perpetrator. This tendency is both an explanatory 
factor in the grant of UER and an outcome. Presidents’ tendency and resulting approach was 
problematic: firstly, it neglected to take into account the nature of the perpetrators and their crimes; 
secondly, it gave a more generous approach to these perpetrators than ordinary criminals 
(overlooking the gravity of the crimes), and thirdly, it neglected to consider (as per 
recommendations of international experts) implications of UER for the community, including war-
affected people of the former Yugoslavia (FRY), and, primarily, victims and their communities.  
 
In addition to the Statute, Presidents’ determinations of a pardon or commutation of sentence was 
to be guided by the RPE which provide them with four factors that they must consider, within the 
framing of the general principles of law and interests of justice, set out as follows in Rule 125: 
 
In determining whether pardon or commutation is appropriate, the President shall take into 
account, inter alia, the gravity of the crime or crimes for which the prisoner was convicted, the 
treatment of similarly-situated prisoners, the prisoner's demonstration of rehabilitation, as well as 
any substantial cooperation of the prisoner with the Prosecutor. 
 
These factors and the Presidents’ consideration of them are discussed throughout this analysis. Prior 
to this, examined below is the practice which, based on close analysis, reveals patterns which 
identify why the practice evolved as it did. 
5.3.2. The Sentence  
The initial decisions, despite being brief, suggest that Presidents initially considered early release as 
a departure from the intended outcome of sentencing. In some of the initial decisions, Presidents 
Jorda and Meron noted the dates when the perpetrators should have served their sentences in full. 
President Jorda noted in his second decision that “pursuant to Rule 101(C) … and the above 
Judgement … provide … that, save in exceptional circumstances, Dragan Kolundžija must serve his 
sentence until 6 June 2002”.34 These two references to the Rules and the Judgment are telling, 
because Rule 101(C) makes no reference to any exceptional circumstances being required, it simply 
reads that “credit shall be given … for the period … during which the convicted person was detained 
… pending surrender … or pending trial or appeal”.35 President Jorda, citing both the Rules and the 
Judgment decision, implied that he considered that the judges sentencing (noting that Kolundžija’s 
 
the Letter dated 10 February 1993 from the Permanent Representative of France to the UN addressed to the Secretary 
General, UN Doc S/25266, at 41, para. 158. 
34 D. Kolundžija, Early Release Decision, 5 December 2001.  





time in detention to date would count as part of the time served) intended for the sentence to be 
served in full. Despite this recognition, the President provided no exceptional circumstances, but 
granted Kolundžija release prior to serving his full sentence. 
 
The notion that early release should not be presumed as a given was articulated by the Appeals 
Chamber, in the case of Dragan Nikolić. The Appeals Chamber reduced the sentence by three years, 
and justified the reduction on the basis that the Trial Chamber judges had erred in sentencing 
because they had, “attached too much weight to the possibility of early release”.36 Four months 
after the Dragan Nikolić Appeal Judgment, President Meron granted unconditional early release to 
Todorović. In his decision, the President referenced both the length of the full sentence and two-
thirds of that sentence, an indication that the full length was being actively considered. In contrast 
to President Jorda’s decision to grant early release to Kolundžija (without noting any exceptional 
circumstances) President Meron asserted that an exceptional circumstance existed for Todorović. 
This exceptional circumstance was Todorović’s indicated willingness to testify in pending cases.37  
 
However, as this chapter demonstrates, there are inconsistencies in the decisions, not only between 
the five Presidents, but within decisions of the same President. This is first noted in President 
Meron’s determinations. In his grant of release to Todorović, he recognised the need for exceptional 
circumstances to exist,38 but less than one month later, he neglected to indicate any such need to 
warrant the grant of early release to Mucić.39 The case of Mucić’s early release is significant for three 
main reasons: first, the requirement for exceptional circumstances to exist being abandoned; 
second, the beginning of dominance being accorded to the “similarly-situated prisoners” provision 
and the President’s reading of “similarly-situated”; and third, the failure to recognise that early 
release in national legal systems was generally conditional. 
 
Firstly, it set the written precedent that, at least on the written record, no exceptional circumstances 
were required for the grant of early release. Secondly, it marked the emergence of priority being 
 
36 President Meron was the President at this time and indeed the judges of the Trial Chamber had requested the Max 
Planck Institute to produce a report on both the sentences and pardon/commutation of sentence options available for 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes, or where the country had no laws on atrocity crimes, then the nearest possible crimes, 
including murder by prolonged beating, multiple rape and torture. In a small irony, Dragan Nikolić was granted early 
release after two-thirds of his sentence by President Meron in 2015. After serving two-thirds of the Appeals Chamber’s 
20 years sentence he was granted early release, two-years short of the two-thirds of the 23-year sentence handed down 
by the Trial Chamber. See Sieber Report, The Punishment of Serious Crimes – A comparative analysis of sentencing law 
and practice – Version 2.0 / 10 November 2003. 
37 S. Todorović, Early Release Decision, 22 June 2003.  
38 S. Todorović, Early Release Decision, 22 June 2003.  





accorded to the “similarly-situated prisoners” provision in the RPE. Rather than focusing on Mucić’s 
individual circumstances, the President turned his attention to the future status of perpetrators 
which the Tribunal would convict. He did so by undertaking a review of the practices of early release 
in the European countries which enforced the Tribunal’s sentences and established a threshold.40 
 
Setting this two-thirds threshold opened the door for future prisoners to apply for early release at 
this point, including in countries such as Spain, where perpetrators are generally considered eligible 
for release after serving three-quarters of their sentence.41 Effectively, a common “threshold”42 was 
now set for considering release at two-thirds, thus displacing the enforcement state law on 
eligibility. By establishing this threshold of two-thirds, the President fixed the interpretation of 
“similarly-situated prisoners” factor to all perpetrators convicted by the ICTY. They were to be 
considered “similarly-situated” by virtue of being convicted by the same Tribunal, rather than by the 
typology of the perpetrator; for example if they had been a direct perpetrator, or a senior state 
official instigating atrocity crimes, or a commander failing in his duty to protect civilians or punish 
crimes committed under his watch,43 or the types of crimes (rape, murder or beating) they had 
committed.  
 
Thirdly, the President does not consider the fact that, in nearly all the signatory states,44 early 
release was usually conditional and is explicitly recognised in 25 of the 54 decisions which noted that 
the perpetrator is eligible for early release “on probation”45 or “on parole”,46 or “on conditional 
release”47 under the eligible law of the enforcement state. Early release’s unconditional nature is the 
most controversial aspect of the practice.  
 
 
40 He did this because Mucić was not serving his sentence in an enforcement state, but was still detained in UNDU (UN 
Detention Unit) in The Hague. 
41 S. Todorović, Early Release Decision, 22 June 2003, para. 5; Šantić, Early Release Decision, 16 February 2009, para. 7; 
and Josipović, Early Release Decision, 30 January 2006, para. 4. 
42 B. Holá and J. van Wijk, ‘Life after Conviction at International Criminal Tribunals’ (2014) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 12(1): 109 -132 at 124.  
43 Kovač, Early Release decision, 3 July 2013, para. 20 – whereby President Meron distinguished typologies of 
perpetrators, refusing to consider a direct perpetrator as “similarly-situated” to a perpetrator found guilty under 
command responsibility. Obrenović’s criminal responsibility was derived primarily from his responsibilities as a 
commander and his failure to have prevented his subordinates from committing heinous crimes. In contrast, Kovač 
directly perpetrated the crimes.  
44 With the exception of the UK, whereby early release is granted in general unconditionally.  
45 Five decisions noted that the perpetrator was eligible under national law, ‘on probation’ – Bala, Blagojević, Kovač, 
Krnojelac, Obrenović.  
46 Seven decisions noted that the perpetrator was eligible under national law, ‘on parole’ – Alek, Borovčanin, Češić, M. 
Jokić, Josipović, Zelenović. 





This downgrading of eligibility for early release, from the exception to a general rule, was set by 
President Meron’s successor, Pocar. In only one of President Pocar’s eight grants of early release did 
he note the completion date of a perpetrator’s sentence. Thereafter, the completion date for a 
sentence was not mentioned in a successful application for early release. The only occasion in which 
President Pocar noted the completion date was to emphasise that Kubura had nearly served his full 
sentence, which weighed in his favour, another example of the balance being tilted in favour of the 
perpetrator. 48 By 2006, the measure for considering release had effectively been lowered by one-
third. The general calculation was when the perpetrator had served two-thirds of the sentence,49 
rather than when they were due to complete their full sentence.  
 
5.3.3. Other Special Circumstances  
In line with the reoriented focus on perpetrators’ time served, the word “exceptional” or phrase 
“other special circumstances” began to decrease under the Presidency of Pocar. The pattern which 
appears to have been initiated under President Meron, the emphasis on treating all perpetrators 
convicted by the Tribunal equally, continued under President Pocar. It was another indication that 
the balance had shifted in favour of the perpetrator. When President Pocar first granted early 
release, in the case of Josipović, he noted that the Spanish authorities had indicated that 
“exceptional circumstances” existed in favour of Josipović being granted early release at two-thirds 
of his sentence, rather than the usual three-quarters under Spanish Law.50 However, Josipović’s 
exceptional circumstances contrasted to Todorović’s. Todorović had promised to provide on-going 
cooperation with the Prosecutor,51 whereas Josipović’s circumstances were his good behaviour in 
prison, his family ties, and a positive report from the Spanish authorities.52 The assertion that good 
behaviour in prison constitutes exceptional circumstances, or that it was considered as a relevant 
factor, was strongly contested by almost all interviewees in The Hague and in BiH. It runs counter to 
logic to consider obedience to prison rules as significant as all perpetrators are “required to behave 
well in prison”.53  
 
 
48 Amir Kubura, Early Release Decision, 11 April 2006.  
49 The Presidential decision no longer calculated the date to which the perpetrators’ full sentence would be served. 
50 D. Josipović, Early Release Decision, 30 January 2006. 
51 S. Todorović, Early Release Decision, 22 June 2003.  
52 D. Josipović, Early Release Decision, 30 January 2006, paras. 10-12. 





5.3.4. Stare Decisis Approach  
Judicial writing and interview analysis indicate that the application of stare decisis caused the 
downgrading from exceptional circumstances being required to simply serving two-thirds of the 
sentence.54 This approach, adhering to established precedents, appears to have narrowed 
Presidents’ consideration to “similarly-situated prisoners”, and thus caused them to overlook factors 
such as “gravity of the crime”, a “demonstration of rehabilitation” and “substantial cooperation with 
the prosecutor”.55 President Pocar’s decision to grant early release to D. Tadić hints at this tendency. 
Despite President Pocar’s judicial colleagues raising doubts, “as to whether Tadić had actually 
demonstrated rehabilitation as opposed to good behaviour, none objected to his application being 
granted”.56 The one factor that weighed in Tadić’s favour was that he had already served over two-
thirds which appears to override the others. President Pocar concluded that “notwithstanding the 
gravity of his crimes, I also note that Tadić has served more than two-thirds of his sentence. 
Considering that other convicted persons similarly-situated have been eligible for early release after 
serving two-thirds of their sentence, this factor supports his eligibility for early release”.57 The stare 
decisis approach was made explicit by President Pocar a few months later in his grant of early 
release to Vuković. On this occasion, he noted that while some of his colleagues were not in favour 
of early release, he would grant Vuković early release, given that he had already served a little over 
two-thirds. He noted that, “while not a rule, early release has been granted to a number of convicted 
accused at the Tribunal on the serving of two-thirds of their sentence where their behaviour in 
prison has been exemplary and signs of rehabilitation established”.58 This approach was reflected in 
a statement by a Tribunal judge who had been consulted in a number of early release decisions. He 
recognised the similarly-situated factor as dominant59 and simultaneously implied that the balance 
would be in their favour: “I think the other considerations, namely ‘has he reached two-thirds?’ ‘Are 
there different circumstances to treat him differently?’ [These] are more important than the rest.”60 
 
Numerous interviews in The Hague emphasised the dominance of precedent, in addition to the 
Presidents’ habit of reading the law and details provided in the application in favour of the 
perpetrator, thus continually advantaging the perpetrator. There are two apt quotations: one 
 
54 A. Orie, ‘Stare decisis in the ICTY Appeal System: Successor Responsibility in the Hadzihasanovic Case’ (2012) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 10(3): 635-644.  
55 Rule 125 of the Rules and Procedure of Evidence, adopted 11 February 1994.  
56 D. Tadić, Early Release Decision, 17 July 2008, para. 20.  
57 D. Tadić, Early Release Decision, 17 July 2008, para. 17. 
58 Confidential, Decision of the President on Commutation of Sentence, Prosecutor v. Zoran Vuković, 11 March 2008, 
made public 15 July 2008. 
59 Second public redacted version of “Observations of the Defence for Mr Lubanga on a reduction in sentence, referenced 
ICC-01/04-01/06-3151-Conf-Exp, of 14 July 2015, under ‘Applicable Law’ – “released even though none of the other 
conditions laid down by the legal texts were met”, para.10. 





revealing how the practice began, and the second how it continued, relatively unchanged. One 
judge, when asked whether he remembered what the 2003 Annual Report referred to, when it 
noted that the Bureau worked on, “the harmonisation of early release of the accused”,61 responded 
that “the whole idea was to decide on a policy which would regulate early release and to stick to 
it”.62 This phrase “stick to it” is indicative of a stare decisis approach to judicial decision-making in 
the context of early release. Although judges have not formally adopted such an approach, they 
have recognised that they “are reluctant to overturn prior doctrinal pronouncements due to 
concerns of stability of the law”63… as reflected in President Pocar’s references giving weight to the 
general practice of granting early release after two-thirds of the sentence being served.64 This was 
similarly noted by another judge, who wished to make clear that he was “not criticising” the 
President, as he acknowledged his concern that the President’s approach was rather “formulaic”.65 
He explained the approach by emphasising that “it is well-established during many Presidencies … 
and they all are hesitant to change, because it is difficult to establish new things while such an 
institution is running”.66  
 
The principle of precedent is practised to provide certainty and consistency in the administration of 
justice, usually within a court setting, and for the benefit of those involved in the process. For those 
involved in a legal process, the law should be known (that is transparent) and predictable. In relation 
to ICL this principle of consistency is “one of the fundamental principles of justice”.67 Consequently, 
the practice of sentencing by the ICTs has attracted much academic scrutiny.68 In the context of early 
release for perpetrators convicted by the ICTY, it is apparent from both the practice and the 
interview material that judges believed that the law should be applied consistently, albeit not in a 
blanket manner.69 In addition to the sentiments expressed above by the two judges, it is reflected by 
the fact that the President largely accepted applications by perpetrators who directly petitioned the 
 
61 ICTY Annual Report 2002, para.31.  
62 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning 30/01/2017. 
63 A. Orie, ‘Stare decisis in the ICTY Appeal System: Successor Responsibility in the Hadzihasanovic Case’ (2012) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 10(3): 635-644. 
64 The two-thirds been served was cited in the perpetrator’s favour in three of eight of President Pocar’s grants of early 
release.  
65 Interview, Judge, The Hague, afternoon 30/01/2017.  
66 Interview, Judge, The Hague, afternoon 30/01/2017.  
67 B. Holá, ‘Sentencing of International Crimes at the ICTY and the ICTR: Consistency of Sentencing Caselaw’ (2012) 
Amsterdam Law Forum Fall Issue, citing A.J Ashworth, ‘Sentencing Reform Structures’ (1992) Crime and Justice 16: 181-
242 at 183.  
68 S. Beresford, M. Bassett, S. d’Ascoli, A. Danner, M. Harmon and F. Gaynor, B. Holá, M. Onderco, S. Ruiter, W. Schabas.  
69 All seven Tribunal judges noted that all perpetrators should be considered at two-thirds, and that the law should not be 





President (a point of concern raised by Symons in 2004)70 for a grant of early release, despite their 
not being eligible on a strict reading of Article 28 of the Statute.71 It was only five years later that the 
practice was formalised by law when the Practice Direction was amended on 1 September 2009 to 
enable perpetrators to apply directly to the President when they deemed themselves eligible. This 
amendment was noted in some interviews and most judges were not familiar with this specific in the 
Practice Direction. On the occasions where this was raised interviewees emphasised the importance 
of equality between all perpetrators and practising the law to accord with this general principle of 
law.72 Allowing a direct petition would ensure that perpetrators who may not be eligible under 
national law (or detained in the UNDU) would not be at a disadvantage compared to other 
perpetrators, thus ensuring the principle of equality.  
 
In addition to the dominance of “similarly-situated” prisoners and the stare decisis principle it 
indicates that Presidents went beyond a strict reading of the Statute, and applied a misguided 
reading of the principle of equality for all perpetrators convicted by the Tribunal. Not all 
perpetrators are equal, the gravity of their crime differs, as does their typology, a point explicitly 
emphasised by some judges themselves (s.5.4.2). The misguided principle of equality was that it 
became a blanket reading of “similarly-situated prisoners”, and thus resulted in a normative 
(legality) deficit at its core. 
 
The stare decisis approach lacked sociological legitimacy, including for those at the Tribunal itself. 
One interviewee in The Hague, albeit in a carefree manner, described the Tribunal’s Presidents as 
“doing a factory cookie-cutter approach. Everyone is getting two-thirds. Very rare departures … one-
third off, one-third off, one-third off … come hell or high water”. He reflected that the Presidents 
wanted to “apply a single mathematical standard”.73 His words “come hell or high water” implies a 
bias in the Presidents’ decisions, that there was an active tendency to grant early release. The 
phrases “cookie-cutter” and a “mathematical standard” imply a lack of rigour in the Presidents’ 
determinations. The prima facie superficiality in considering the other factors, in particular the 
demonstration of rehabilitation, is discussed in the following chapter, as a widely discussed 
legitimacy deficit, when interviewees were informed of this being a factor the President is required 
to consider. 
 
70 L. Symons, ‘The Inherent Powers of the ICTY and the ICTR’ (2003) International Criminal Law Review 3(4): 369-404. See 
Chapter 4, s.4.5.  
71 Kolundžija, Kos, Mucić, Josipović, Kubura, M. Jokić, Strugar, Šantić, all applied directly to the Tribunal for early release 
despite there being, up until September 2009, no provision in the Rules and Procedure of Evidence to do so.  
72 The principle of equality was emphasised by senior legal staff at the Registry and the President’s Office and several of 
the judges when this amendment was noted.  






5.4. The Power of the President  
5.4.1. The Presidents’ Capacity to Limit the Scope for Considering the Gravity of the Crimes  
The Presidents’ reading of the factor of “similarly-situated prisoners” under the RPE was read 
broadly and applied in a stare decisis approach which favoured the perpetrator (s.5.3.2 - s.5.3.4) 
contrasted to the Presidents’ consideration of the “gravity of the crime” factor.74 This implied a 
tendency to favour the perpetrator and had a similar effect of benefiting the perpetrator; and this 
was the second factor which led to the practice of UER becoming a standard rather than an 
exception.  
 
On occasion, the Presidents applied a strict reading of the black letter law when the Prosecutor had 
attempted to broaden its scope, for example by drawing the President’s focus onto the gravity of the 
crime,75 or the inability to apply conditions on release.76 The Prosecutor undertook these attempts 
through their response to one question deriving from the RPE. Under Rule 125, the President is 
required to consider whether the prisoner has provided any “substantial cooperation with the 
Prosecutor”.77 In line with the Practice Direction, the Registry writes to the Prosecutor and requests 
them to report “any co-operation that the convicted person has provided … and the significance 
thereof” during the perpetrator’s time in prison.78 When the Prosecutor submitted factors beyond 
this question, President Pocar (2005-2008) flatly rejected the Prosecutor’s attempts to influence him 
with negative factors (for example, a re-emphasis on direct perpetrator’s actus and personal 
circumstances on possible release, detailed below). Prior to President Pocar’s tenure, no decisions 
reference the Prosecution noting anything other than cooperation, or lack of, with their Office. 
During President Pocar’s tenure, direct perpetrators79 were being considered for early release. Until 
that time, the early released perpetrators (with the exception of Todorović,80 who had cooperated 
 
74 ICTY Rules and Procedure of Evidence, Rule 125.  
75 D. Tadić, Decision of the President on the Application for Pardon or Commutation of Sentence of Duško Tadić, 17 July 
2008; and H. Delić, Decision on Hazim Delić’s Motion for Commutation of Sentence, 24 June 2008. 
76 H. Delić, Decision on Hazim Delić’s Motion for Commutation of Sentence, 24 June 2008 and M. Jokić, Decision of the 
President on Request for Early Release, 1 September 2008.  
77 ICTY Rules and Procedure of Evidence, Rule 125. 
78 Practice Direction on the Procedure for the Determination of Applications for Pardon, Commutation of Sentence, and 
Early Release of Persons Convicted by the International Tribunal, April 1999, para. 3(c). 
79 Perpetrators who had directly committed acts of murder, torture or inhuman treatment rather than those who had 
failed to protect persons from these acts where it was their responsibility to do so or failed to punish perpetrators who 
did so. 
80 Todorović found guilty of rape and murder under Article 7(1) of the Statute, para. 36-41 and under Article 7(3) the 
crime of persecution (arbitrary detention, inhumane treatment, and wanton destruction, para. 42-48), See: Todorović, 





with the Prosecutor), were guilty of failing to prevent, punish or were complicit in crimes.81 Most had 
not voluntarily committed violent crimes first-hand. 82 This direct perpetrator may be one of the 
factors that motivated the Prosecution to push for broadening the scope of factors that the 
President considered. In the case of Delić, found guilty of directly committing murder and torture (as 
grave breaches of the Geneva Convention)83, the Prosecutor argued that standing should be granted 
to him to make submissions rather than solely answering questions concerning the “prisoner’s 
cooperation”.84 Although other perpetrators had been released early from prison in Finland, the 
Prosecutor took the opportunity, in the case of Delić, to advocate that they should be granted leave 
to submit objections to early release, given that under Finnish law the Prosecution had standing. 
They compounded this argument by pointing to the “seriousness”85 of Delić’s offences. President 
Pocar refused to consider this information, and observed that the Practice Direction “does not allow 
for the Prosecution to make submission on the national law of Finland, or any other matter, unless I 
specifically request it to do so”.86 
 
Although President Pocar’s decisions provided more detailed considerations of the gravity of the 
crimes, for example particular brutality of specific acts,87 than his predecessors had, he makes it 
clear in this decision that he would consider the details of the crime on his own terms only, and not 
in the way the Prosecutor described them. He further cited the stare decisis principle as a reason for 
his decision: “I do not consider it appropriate at this stage of the International Tribunal’s history to 
change its long-standing practice by allowing the Prosecution to make submissions on a convicted 
accused’s application”. 88 The President’s refusal to consider other factors that weighed against the 
perpetrator signifies two matters. First, the long-standard practice, the focus on consistency and 
foreseeability, overrides the logic of examining applications on a case by case basis, including the 
“gravity of the crime”,89 as he is required by RPE. The factor of “similarly-situated prisoners” 
apparently prevailed. Second, as demonstrated in the Delić decision, although he does not justify his 
refusal to exclude these factors, it is an indication of the balance being slanted firmly in favour of the 
 
81 Aleksovski, Blaškić, Mucić, Zarić, Furundžija, Došen, Kolundžija, Kos and Kvoĉka. 
82 M. Simić had been directly participated in the beating, including of the head and genitals, of four detainees. Erdemović 
had directly perpetrated crimes but had done so under duress. Erdemović, the first perpetrator convicted at the ICTY and 
the first granted early release had killed approximately 70 men as part of the Srebrenica massacre.  
83 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić, Hazim Delić and Esad Landžo (Čelebići Case), Appeals Chamber Judgment, 
20 February 2001. Delić, count 48 - “cruel treatment as a Violation of the Laws or Customs of War: Conviction Confirmed’, 
para. 60. 
84 Rules and Procedure of Evidence, Rule 125.  
85 H. Delić, Early Release Decision, 24 June 2008, para. 9.  
86 H. Delić, Early Release Decision, 24 June 2008, para. 10. 
87 For example, in the case of Delić, his particular brutality, including the specific act of electrocuting his victims; H. Delić, 
Early Release Decision, 24 June 2008, para. 19.  
88 H. Delić, Early Release Decision, 24 June 2008, para. 10.  





perpetrator. President Pocar refused to consider factors that would provide counter or additional 
elements which would disadvantage the perpetrator.  
 
President Pocar’s refusal to broaden considerations of gravity of the crime by allowing the 
Prosecutor to make specific submissions indicates the broad discretion afforded to the President. 
President Meron repeated this during his second Presidency (see s.5.4.2). In a number of early 
release applications, the Prosecutor emphasised that perpetrators did not cooperate with his office. 
In these instances, President Meron countered, “there is no obligation on an accused or convicted 
person to cooperate with the OTP absent [of] a pIea agreement to do so. I therefore place neither 
positive nor negative weight on this factor”.90 In this statement, the President makes explicit that his 
decisions on whether to grant early release will not be swayed into a negative reading for the 
perpetrator. This statement provides another illustration of the President making clear to the 
Prosecutor that, despite their attempts, he will not add further arguments against the perpetrator. 
Again, the President noted his broad discretion: he is determined to “stick to it”91 (the two-thirds 
threshold) against the other factors he was required to consider.  
 
Tribunal Presidents stated limited willingness to considering gravity of the crime was a deficit in 
UER’s sociological legitimacy for many BiH interviewees. With the exception of BiH judges, UER was 
considered incongruent, given the nature of atrocity crimes, which Chapters 6, 7 and 8 detail.92 The 
majority of interviewees in BiH were not aware that there was a list of factors that the President was 
required to consider in any application for an early release.93 When interviewees were informed of 
the factors and asked to list the priority they would accord them, 30 of the 51 interviews said that 
the primary factor for the President to consider was the gravity of the crimes. Of these 30 
interviews, six went on to argue that it was consequently illogical to grant early release if gravity was 
considered, given the nature of the crimes convicted at the ICTY: “I don’t see how, on the basis of 
the gravity of the crimes, anyone can be granted early release”.94 One interviewee expressed 
surprise to hear that gravity was required to be considered given the numbers granted UER. He 
reflected that perhaps this disconnect existed because of the length of time since the crimes were 
 
90 Early release decisions of Blagojević and M. Radić early release decisions in particular. 
91 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning 30/01/2017, cited above s. 5.3.3. Stare Decisis Approach 
92 The perceived incongruence: Chapter 6, the manner in which the President considered rehabilitation for perpetrators 
of atrocity crimes, given the nature of the crimes and in many instances the perpetrator. Chapter 7, the moral 
condemnation expressed by the sentence is diluted at UER; and Chapter 8, the grave crimes committed against victims’ is 
seen as being belittled by their perpetrators’ UER.  
93 Rules and Procedure of Evidence, Article 125 – the President is required to consider: gravity of the crime, similarly-
situated prisoners, substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor and evidence of the prisoner’s demonstration of 
rehabilitation.  





committed and, since it was a “paper decision” only, there being no oral testimony: “the 
tremendous cruelty, the tremendous suffering, we tend to forget about it if … you don’t refresh the 
memory [and] talk about it more or less academically, we get used to it in a way”.95 Certainly, the 
perpetrators’ crimes were generally referenced, and indeed in an academic way as the crimes were 
detailed through the language of, or cross-reference to, the Trial or Appeals Chambers judgment or 
both. However, the President has often been involved in convicting and or sentencing the 
perpetrator and would have heard the testimony of victims’ first-hand, and had a sense of the 
gravity of the crimes. Yet, as noted above, both Presidents Pocar and Meron made clear, in rejecting 
the Prosecutor’s attempt to put gravity to the fore again that they did not wish to refresh their 
memories, at least not through oral testimony.  
 
The decisions make clear that the Prosecutor had perceived gravity as an important factor which 
should be emphasised in considering release, and one senior staff member echoed the sentiment 
expressed by the interviewee above, that it would have been a better practice to “refresh” 
Presidents’ understanding of the gravity. He noted this in response to the point that President Pocar 
had refused to consider the Prosecutor’s submissions. The interviewee implied he supported this 
consideration being given special attention as he asserted that “the voice of the victims should be 
coming in at this point as to the gravity [and] saying ‘no, this is not what the judges expected’”.96 
Another interviewee at the Tribunal spoke to the point raised by an interviewee in BiH about 
memory and the need to refresh it; the suggestion that time will diminish the significance of the 
gravity factor. The Tribunal interviewee expressed his concern at the trajectory of the Presidents’ 
decision-making, as he commented that “as time passes, the focus will be on the accused’s ill-health 
and not enough thinking on the gravity of the crimes anymore, I think that this is a real risk”.97 These 
comments indicate that there were doubts in these interviewees’ mind as to the extent to which the 
Presidents fully considered the first factor, gravity of the crime. It is impossible to verify these doubts 
without speaking to the current98 and former Presidents themselves,99 how, or the extent to which, 
 
95 Interview, IGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 21/12/2017. This sentiment was expressed by another who noted that the judges should 
look at the details “when you put them as numbers it doesn’t mean much, he’s killed 20 people … but when you take it 
down to that level and say okay it’s a ten-year-old, a family, it paints a totally different picture”, Interview, Individual 
working in an independent state institution with extensive work experience in IGOs, Sarajevo, BiH, 20/12/2017.  
96 Interview, Senior Staff Member, The Hague, 24/01/2017. 
97 Interview, Senior Staff Member, The Hague, 02/01/2017. 
98 Current at time of interviews, January – February 2017. 
99 As noted, one former President was interviewed, when ask the extent to which gravity was considered he simply said 





gravity was and is considered.100 Nevertheless, gravity of the perpetrators’ crime has never, by itself, 
swayed the President to deny an early release outright.101  
 
5.4.2. The Presidents’ Definition of Similarly-Situated Prisoners 
The proposition that the President had decided on the two-thirds threshold and that he would “stick 
to it”102 was not without exception. As this chapter demonstrated, there have been incidents of 
inconsistencies across the 54 positive early release decisions (s.5.3.2) both between the various 
Presidents and within the decision-making of the same President. In the case of Kovač, the President 
refused to consider him “similarly-situated” to Obrenović – due to the differing nature of their 
crimes. Indeed, many interviewees, both in The Hague and in BiH, did not approve of the blanket 
application of “similarly-situated prisoners” on the basis of having been convicted by the same 
Tribunal. The provision was open to other interpretations, given that the Tribunal convicted 
perpetrators of different typologies. This was recognised on one rare occasion, when President 
Meron invoked a distinction in typology. The perpetrator had drawn attention to it, as his 
application had noted a fellow perpetrator who was granted early release without serving two-thirds 
of his sentence. President Meron rejected this argument for two reasons. First, he noted that Kovač, 
unlike Obrenović, had not provided any cooperation with the Prosecutor. Second, and significantly, 
he noted that “Obrenović’s criminal responsibility was derived primarily from his responsibilities as a 
commander, and his failure to have prevented his subordinates from committing heinous crimes. In 
contrast, Kovač directly perpetrated the crimes”.103 This was one of the exceptional cases104 where 
the President decided to deny early release at two-thirds, requiring Kovač to serve a further six 
months of his punishment. Kovač’s delayed early release serves to highlight that the President had 
the power to interpret factors at his discretion and he would not always do so in favour to the 
perpetrator. He was, “in very rare departures”105 willing to override the two-thirds practice – yet, 
this did not extend to deny UER outright.  
 
 
100 One former President interviewed began our conversation advising that I should not ask him about any specific cases 
because it had been some time since he was at the Tribunal and he would not be able to recall them with adequate 
accuracy.  
101 Galić, Kunarac and Miletić had other factors weighing against them. Galić – as a lifer, Kunarac due to lack of 
demonstrable rehabilitation and that the German authorities were against his release, and Miletić due to strong collegial 
objections. 
102 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning 30/01/2017. 
103 Kovač, Early Release decision, 3 July 2013, para. 20  
104 Of the 54 granted early release only 4 have been deliberately denied early release beyond the two-thirds stage - 
Blagojević, Bala, Kovač and Radić. 





The Kovač decision is also important as it underlines the inconsistencies in the Presidents’ 
determinations. In the majority of the determinations, Presidents simply referenced the “similarly-
situated prisoners” as being those who were convicted by the Tribunal. In this decision, the 
President appears to be swayed by his colleagues who were, he noted, against Kovač’s early release. 
The speculation that the President was influenced by colleagues who took a different approach to 
considering “similarly-situated prisoners” was spoken to by one judge interviewed in The Hague. This 
judge was keen to highlight the importance of considering gravity thoroughly, and implied that the 
President had not taken a nuanced approach: 
gravity of the crime, that is a very big contention for some of us … Some of the 
convicts had multiple counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
you could not really find any extenuating circumstance … I would look at the gravity, 
the gravity is not the same actually, you could find somebody imprisoned almost for 
the same period … as somebody who committed less crimes but he is serving the 
same sentence. I wouldn’t put the two in the same category, I would be slower to 
offer early release to the latter category where there is a multiplicity of grave 
crimes.106 
 
Although the judge here was dissatisfied with early release in relation to the gravity of the crime, the 
term “category” could also be applied to how the President considered “similarly-situated”, that 
those convicted by the Tribunal are - in fact- different types of perpetrators. In his consideration of 
Kovač the President could have reasoned and clarified that perpetrators were not similarly-situated, 
due to the nature of, and their role in, the crimes. Alternatively, he could have simply recorded that 
his decision to prolong the detention was influenced by his colleagues’ opinions. Here he did neither. 
This lack of clarity does a disservice to the Tribunal, as it appears to take a pragmatic (two-thirds 
mathematical standard) over a reasoned approach.  
 
This lack of an articulated and consistent approach has resulted in some academics concluding that 
“paradoxes and disharmony are often hidden and ignored … the absence of principles … weakens 
the claim that an international court has a rational basis for the execution of democratic principles of 
punishment”.107 This is argued in relation to the lack of penal principles for execution of sentences; 
the same reasoning applies to the early termination of these sentences. There have been occasions 
where the President has attempted to justify his approach; yet, the stated reasons are not without 
legitimacy challenges, or indeed deficits, including the re-consideration of a perpetrator’s guilty plea.  
 
106 Interview, Judge, The Hague, 03/02/2017.  
107 G. Vermeulen and E. De Wree, Offender Reintegration and Rehabilitation as a Component of International Criminal 
Justice? Execution of Sentences at the Level of International Tribunals and Courts: Moving Beyond Mere Protection of 






5.4.3. The Presidents’ Consideration of Guilty Pleas 
Two of the Tribunal’s four Presidents, Judge Robinson and Judge Meron,108 have both considered a 
guilty plea in favour of perpetrators being granted early release – albeit on different bases. 
Fundamentally, the consideration of the guilty plea poses a normative (legal) legitimacy challenge to 
these Presidents’ determinations, as it goes beyond the wording of Rule 125. This rule sets out the 
boundaries for Presidents to consider inter alia “the prisoner's demonstration of rehabilitation, as 
well as any substantial cooperation of the prisoner with the Prosecutor”.109 The use of the word 
“prisoner”, prima facie, indicates that a guilty plea lies beyond the scope for consideration, because 
an individual does not become a prisoner until they are actually serving their sentence, that is, once 
they have been convicted. This is also reflected in Rule 123, relating to the trigger for the President 
to consider a pardon or commutation of sentence which refers to the law of the state of 
imprisonment and the convicted person’s eligibility for pardon or commutation under this state’s 
law. The Rules, read together in a logical approach, direct the President to consider substantial 
cooperation of the perpetrator post-conviction, thereby making a guilty plea an irrelevant factor.  
 
The two Presidents’ reasoning for considering a guilty plea in favour of the perpetrator’s UER also 
illustrates the overly broad discretion Presidents had, as they provided two different bases.110 
President Robinson determined that a guilty plea was a “demonstration of rehabilitation”. As above, 
the Rule directs the President to consider a “prisoner’s demonstration of rehabilitation”; it would be 
logical to consider the perpetrator’s current demonstration of rehabilitation, rather than one 
demonstrated a number of years prior. Additionally, President Robinson’s decisions do not provide 
an acknowledgement that the guilty pleas had already been considered as a mitigating factor in the 
sentencing determinations.111 Choi critiqued President Robinson for “double-counting”112 and it 
remains unclear whether the President did this knowingly or whether it was an oversight.  
 
President Meron took a different approach, and, in contrast to his predecessor, he chose to justify 
his approach. He argued that a guilty plea could be considered, in the perpetrator’s favour, under 
“cooperation with the Prosecutor” “due to the impact such a plea has on the efficient administration 
 
108 No other Presidents noted their consideration of a guilty plea.  
109 Rule 125, Rules and Procedure of Evidence. 
110 President Robinson’s consideration noted in Early Release decisions of Rajić, Plavšić and Sikirica’s and President 
Meron’s consideration articulated in Early Release Decisions of Češić, Dragan Nikolić, Momir Nikolić and Zelenović.  
111 President Robinson’s Early Release determinations for Rajić, Plavšić and Sikirica.  





of justice”.113 The President’s formulation of the “efficient administration of justice” resonates with 
the Statute’s article on pardon or commutation, which should be decided on the “basis of the 
interests of justice and principles of law”.114 In contrast to President Robinson, Meron considered the 
value of the guilty plea, not in relation to the perpetrator, or specific benefits emanating from the 
perpetrator’s substantial cooperation, but, rather, in relation to the overall credibility of the 
Tribunal. A guilty plea, as conceived by President Meron, enabled justice to be dispensed more 
rapidly, which was, in turn, more beneficial for society in the round, and could enhance the 
sociological legitimacy of the Tribunal. This opinion is indicated in the two cases he referenced.  
 
Firstly, his own early release determination (which he denied) and, secondly, the Sentencing 
Judgment of Dragan Nikolić. This prisoner’s guilty plea was considered a mitigating factor. The 
Nikolić judgment listed a number of positive elements of a guilty plea – establishing the truth, 
freeing witnesses from the onus of testifying in court, encouraging others to come forward, and 
even promoting reconciliation.115 In terms of administrative efficiency, the judgment observes that a 
guilty plea reduces the trial length, thereby speeding up the time in which justice is dispensed.116 
These are arguably all positive factors for post-conflict society. It is noted on the Tribunal’s website 
that guilty pleas save costs, which is good for the Tribunal itself, as resources can be re-deployed. 
Moreover, investigative teams’ expenses for gathering corroborating evidence and travel expenses 
for witnesses to testify at The Hague are reduced.117 This more efficient use of funds does not affect 
the well-being of the perpetrator directly, but was aimed at increasing the perceived legitimacy of 
the Tribunal in the region. Yet, according weight to a guilty plea in the interests of post-conflict 
society means that perpetrators benefit - for the second time. 118 This hastens the perpetrator’s early 
release, an outcome which met with very mixed reactions in the region. 
 
Finally, the wording of Rule 125 directs the President to consider “substantial cooperation” rather 
than cooperation. In determining how a guilty plea is considered, President Meron’s decisions119 do 
not take a systematic approach. Generally, pleas were considered as “cooperation with the 
 
113 D. Zelenović, Early Release Decision, 24 June 2008, 30 November 2012 - denied, para. 21.  
114 Article 28 of the Statute. 
115 Dragan Nikolić Sentencing Judgment, 18 December 2003, para. 228.  
116 Set out in the footnote, Zelenović, denied early release decision, para. 21.  
117 See: http://www.icty.org/en/features/statements-guilt [accessed 20/01/2020]. 
118 Only one interviewee in BiH responded positively to this argument. As one interviewee reflected, it was “a double 
reward … if cooperation had been taken into account already … in my personal view, this overstretches the argument of 
… the efficient administration of justice”. Interview, 21/12/2017, IGO, Sarajevo, BiH. Two other interviewees perceived 
re-consideration of a guilty plea as a “double” reward or consideration. The mixed reactions are detailed in Chapter 7.  
119 President Meron’s decisions are the decisions which have taken guilty pleas into account under the factor of 






Prosecutor”,120 including where the section being considered is “substantial cooperation”.121 This 
incongruence indicates the flexibility of interpretation that the Presidents had in their decisions. 
Further, it is questionable whether the time and resources saved are considered appropriate for 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes.122 Yet, there were some occasions whereby interviewees in the 
region could have perceived “substantial cooperation” with the Prosecutor as being a factor to 
consider positively for the grant of early release; not, however, for the benefit of the Tribunal’s time 
and resources but for the welfare of society and victims in BiH (see s.5.5).  
 
5.4.4. Narrowing the Decision-Making Process 
Of the eight Tribunal judges interviewed, none were content with UER (as of January 2017 and 
September 2018 respectively); primarily due to the stare decisis approach, and the nature of the 
perpetrator. All but one judge interviewed had been consulted in an application for early release. 
Apart from one, six of the eight noted that they had raised concerns, and, on occasion, objections, 
but these six stressed that ultimately, “it is the President who decides”123 on an UER. This contrasts 
with many countries’ practice, where a parole board will decide jointly on early release, rather than 
one person deciding.124 It also contrasts with the practice of the Tribunal in relation to conviction, 
where the majority of the judges decides on a person’s guilt or innocence. Further, a majority 
opinion would also be in line with the “Collegiate direction of the Tribunal’s work” which was set out 
in the ICTY’s first Annual Report. This “collegial direction” was the stated purpose for the President 
to create the Bureau. The President, in 1994, in conjunction with his judicial colleagues, decided that 
it was “appropriate to place the governance of the Tribunal in the hands of a small group of 
members rather than of one individual.”125 Ironically, at the same time as noting the collegial nature 
of governance mechanisms, a judge noted at The Hague that the President wished to speed up 
certain matters and have a select few rather than a broader section of judges to consult with on 
applications under Article 28.126 On the examination of the ICTY Statute, the determination for a 
grant of pardon or commutation of sentence had the potential to be much more consultative, as it 
 
120 With the exception of the Češić Early Release decision, President Meron referenced the RPE factor as “cooperation 
with the Prosecutor” rather than substantial.  
121 Momir Nikolić, Early Release Decision, 5 October 2015, “the entry of a guilty plea by an accused person pursuant to a 
plea agreement with the Prosecution constitutes cooperation with the Prosecution, due to the impact of such a plea on 
the efficient administration of justice”, Public Redacted Version of the 14 March 2014 Decision on Early Release of Momir 
Nikolić, para. 28. 
122 M. Scharf makes this case in relation to lower sentences granted based on guilty pleas; M. Scharf, ‘Trading Justice for 
Efficiency: Plea-Bargaining and International Tribunals’ (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 2(4): 1070-1081; 
and see Chapter 4, s.4.4.1.  
123 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning 30/01/2017.  
124 See: https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_member_state_law-6-en.do [accessed 20/02/2020]. 
125 ICTY Annual Report 1994, para. 70.  





reads “The President of the International Tribunal, in consultation with the judges, shall decide the 
matter on the basis of the interests of justice and the general principles of law.127 The Tribunal judge 
noted, however, that: “at the time the way the rules were imposed on the President to consult 
basically the Plenary of Judges … from what I can remember … upon the suggestion of the then 
President this would be a cumbersome procedure, having to convene a plenary each time and 
therefore he said ‘can we substitute the Plenary with the Bureau?”128  
 
The judge also recollected that the President made this request on the presumption that holding a 
plenary would be a “cumbersome procedure which would allow huge objections each time and a 
consultative process which would be never ending”.129 In addition to the President actively 
narrowing the consultative process, this judge’s statement implies two further matters. Firstly, the 
President was deliberately overturning the written constraints on his power, those were “the rules 
imposed on him”.130 Secondly, there was a recognition at the early stage of the Tribunal’s lifetime 
that the grant of pardon or commutation of sentence would be a controversial decision as it would 
raise “huge objections”, making the process “never ending”. His statement implies that the 
President decided to avoid this broad consultative process, and, rather than consulting with 11 
judges of the plenary, he narrowed the decision to consult with only four judges of the Bureau.  
 
As the ICTY was the first International Criminal Tribunal which established a legal mechanism to 
allow for a pardon or commutation of sentence for perpetrators of the most grave crimes;131 it was 
effectively establishing a norm. With this in mind, having a full plenary of judges to consult with 
would could have increased the legitimacy of exercise. The consultative process, as a means to 
maintain legitimacy, echoes the standard of “legitimation through participation” (Chapter 3, s.3.5.6). 
That is “norms can be justified if … consideration is given to the interests of all those who are 
possibly involved”.132 As the plenary of judges, on strict reading of Article 28 of the Statute, were 
those intended individuals to be involved in the decision, in turn establishing principles underlying a 
new norm, it was these judges who should have also been involved at this stage.  
 
 
127 ICTY Statute 28 and UNMICT – emphasis added.  
128 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning 30/01/2017. 
129 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning 30/01/2017.  
130 Emphasis added. 
131 The Tribunal’s predecessors, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunal had not envisaged a pardon or commutation of 
sentence for perpetrators. Although a number of those convicted were granted clemency this was done through 
government and executive negotiations and decisions, see Chapter 1, Introduction.  
132 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, translated by 





So far the chapter has outlined the normative (legal) legitimacy deficits arising from the Presidents’ 
broad discretion of decision-making. Nevertheless, there are important exceptions to the narrow 
approach taken (notably limiting the scope for considering gravity of the crime and stare decisis). 
These exceptions are important and s.5.6 argues that they should be widely known, as findings from 
the interviews in BiH indicate that knowledge of the decision-making process and outcomes could 
have ameliorated the level of frustration with the practice of UER. This finding speaks to Tyler’s 
proposition that Procedural Justice enhances sociological legitimacy, even in cases of negative 
decisions (Chapter 3, s.3.5.3). 
 
The narrow decision-making process, whereby ultimately the President decides, prompted an 
exasperated response in one interviewee in BiH who stated that UER was a “one-man show”.133 
However, a careful reading of the decisions provides evidence that this was not always the case, and 
that the President has, on occasion, taken other opinions into account and decided accordingly.  
 
5.4.5. The President Considers Others’ Opinions  
When the fieldwork in BiH was conducted (September - December 2017)134 there were five 
instances, publicly available, in which the President had postponed an early release beyond the two-
thirds standard, due to consideration of others’ opinions. 135 In two of these decisions, the President 
noted his decision was taken, in part, due to his consideration of his colleagues’ opinions. He denied 
immediate release in Bala’s case, despite Bala having served two-thirds. In order to grant release he 
required Bala to continue to show good behaviour while in prison. He observed that, “these 
conditions and the fact that by 31 December 2012 Bala will have served almost 10 out of the 13 
years of his sentence should suffice to assuage my colleagues’ concerns over Bala’s lack of 
rehabilitation”.136 The President makes explicit here that his decision to prolong Bala’s detention was 
taken, at least in part, to satisfy his colleagues.  
 
On three other occasions, he appeared to accord weight to the enforcement state. As noted in 
s.5.2.1 under the Statute it is the perpetrator’s eligibility under the enforcement state law that 
 
133 Interview, IGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 01/12/2017.  
134 The BiH interviewee above who expressed the view that the Tribunal’s practice of UER was an unfortunate case of the 
President being a ‘one-man’ show was giving his immediate and frustrated response, as he was informed that it is the 
President who decides, although he consults colleagues. 
135 Noted in Blagojević, Bala, Kovač, Radić and Kunarac early releases decisions.  





triggers an application for a pardon or commutation of sentence. 137 The enforcement state has no 
authority to grant UER; it is the President who decides. Nevertheless, the enforcement states have 
on occasion indicated that they would not grant an early release if the decision was theirs. On the 
first occasion the President appeared to accord weight to the enforcement state; he noted he had 
considered the Norwegian authority’s decision to deny the perpetrator, Blagojević, release on 
probation under Norwegian law. Although the Norwegian authorities had denied Blagojević’s release 
on probation, they had sent, as per the Statute, notice to the Tribunal President that Blagojević was 
eligible under their law and it was for the President to make the final decision. However, Norway 
reasoned that they denied Blagojević probation due to the “serious crimes” for which he was 
convicted combined with the “universal sense of justice” and that there were a further five years 
remaining for the sentence “being completed”.138 The President acknowledged that he gave weight 
to this, noting that, although both the similarly-situated prisoners argument and his good behaviour 
in prison weighed in Blagojević’s favour, his immediate release was withheld due to his being denied 
release on probation by the Norwegian authorities, coupled with the gravity of his crimes.  
 
In February 2017, the President for the first time denied outright early release to a perpetrator who 
had served over two-thirds of his sentence.139 An interviewee from The Hague140 forwarded the 
decision and emphasised in the correspondence that the German authorities were not in favour of 
early release, which may have assisted the President in denying the application. This correspondence 
implied that the President’s decision was largely pragmatic, as he emphasised that the German 
authorities were willing (therefore they incurred the expense) to continue to detain Kunarac. One 
interviewee at The Hague directly noted this financial factor being a possible influence on UER. The 
reliance on the enforcement state was emphasised by the interviewee who further argued “no third 
state really wants to enforce a sentence of one of these people. Number one because it is 
expensive”.141  
 
Other pragmatic influences of the enforcement state were implied by another Tribunal senior 
member interviewed later the same day. This interviewee had noted that transferring a perpetrator 
from one enforcement state to another was “very diplomatically difficult” and argued that “we rely 
on third States to enforce sentences … no third State really wants to enforce a sentence of one of 
 
137 Article 28 of the Statute, cited s.5.2.1 and see s.5.4.3 outlining the divergence of the written law and practice for 
applications for UER.  
138 V. Blagojević, Early Release Decision, 3 February 2012, para. 15. 
139 D. Kunarac, Early Release Decision, 2 February 2017. 
140 The interviewee sent the President’s Decision to Deny Early Release to Kunarac (made publicly available that day) a 
few hours after the interview was conducted.  





these people”.142 The interviewee’s argument is supported by example of Krstić. Krstić, after being 
attacked in prison in the UK, spent over three years in transit at the UNDU before being transferred 
to Poland to serve his sentence.143 This meant the costs of his detention during these three years 
were also borne by the Tribunal rather than an enforcement state.144 Thus, the Kunarac decision, 
according to the interviewee who sent the decision, and supported by another interviewee who 
emphasised that the Tribunal relied on enforcement states, implies that the President’s decision to 
deny UER was influenced by pragmatism (financial and practical) in this instance. That was, the 
enforcement state’s willingness to continue to detain Kunarac at their own expense.  
 
The power dynamics between the Tribunal and the enforcement states are unknown but are hinted 
at above by these two senior staff members. That the Tribunal relies on states to bring the 
perpetrators they indict before them, given that it has no police force under its control, so too does 
it rely on states to enforce the sentences they determine, given that they have no prison of their 
own.145 The President cannot force states to enforce perpetrators’ sentences. Although they may 
have the power on paper, this does not necessarily translate into action. The discrepancy between 
written words and power, or “actualised power”146 is suggested in two early release decisions 
whereby it was noted that the enforcement state had approved a conditional release prior to the 
President’s approval. 147 Furthermore, bilateral agreements between the Tribunal and the 
enforcement state provide all states with a caveat of terminating the detention of a perpetrator if it 
becomes “impossible”148 to enforce their sentence. In relation to Presidents’ determination on the 
grant of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or an early release, most enforcement agreements 
require the states to “act accordingly” or “comply with” 149 the President’s decision. However, there 
 
142 Interview, Senior Staff Member, The Hague, 02/02/2017. 
143 Serb military commander Krstić was the convicted perpetrator of genocide in Srebrenica was attacked on 8 May 2010 
by Muslim prisoners in jail (BBC); returned to The Hague’s UNDU, 23 December 2011, see: 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/icty-radislav-krstic-transferred-back-to-the-hague transferred to Poland 21 
March 2014, see: http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/165901,Srebrenica-war-criminal-transferred-to-Polish-prison 
[accessed 30/10/2019]  
144 Enforcement states bear the costs of the perpetrators’ imprisonment. Although the UNDU is in The Hague, the costs of 
the detention are borne by the Tribunal not the Dutch state. See Host State Agreement Agreement between the United 
Nations and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning the Headquarters of the International Residual Mechanism for 
Criminal Tribunals, whereby the Detention Unit is included as an ICTY/UNMICT Premise (Article 1 (o) and that the 
ICTY/UNMICT and that the Tribunal / UNMICT has control over the premises, Article 7(1)  See:  
https://www.irmct.org/en/basic-documents/agreements-un-member-states [accessed 30/10/2019] 
145  See: https://www.irmct.org/en/about/functions/enforcement-of-sentences  [accessed 30/10/2019] 
146 J.N. Clark, ‘ International Criminal Courts and Normative Legitimacy: An Achievable Goal’ (2015) International Criminal 
Law Review 15(4): 763–783 at 771 who refers to A. Arendt “who argues that power is actualised, inter alia, 'only where 
word and deed have not parted company” The Human Condition (1958) (University of Chicago Press, 2nd edition, 2019)at 
200. 
147 Noted in Mrđa, Early Release decision, para. 15 and Josipović, para. 12. Both perpetrators were detained in Spain.  
148 See: http://www.icty.org/en/documents/member-states-cooperation  [accessed 30/10/2019] 
149 States shall “act accordingly” – Belgium, Austria, Poland, UK, Norway, Finland, Portugal and Ukraine, and Germany’s 





are some notable discrepancies in the Tribunal’s agreements with different states. The agreements 
with Spain, France, Slovakia and Italy provide that if the President rejects the application for early 
release that enforcement will no longer be possible, and the Tribunal will “make arrangements for 
the transfer of the convicted person”.150 The agreements with Denmark, Estonia, and Sweden note 
that they “will consider the President’s response”151 which implies that if the state declines to retain 
the perpetrator, the Tribunal will arrange for them to be transferred to another state or the 
Tribunal. The power of the enforcement state to influence the Presidents’ decisions on applications 
for UER was directly noted by two Victims’ Associations (VAs) in BiH, who stated that the President 
had informed them that early release was due to the Tribunal having to “rely” on enforcement 
states to detain the perpetrators.152 Although both VAs were disappointed and discontent with the 
practice they both accepted this explanation provided by the President.153 This finding speaks to the 
legitimacy standard of “legitimation through justification”154 whereby it has been asserted, and 
demonstrated in the above interviews, that by explaining “controversial decisions”155 institutions can 
maintain “a modicum of cognitive legitimacy”.156 Scholars have advocated the Tribunal adopt such a 
standard when it came to controversial decisions, such as plea-bargaining. Scholars proposed that 
implementing this standard may, and indeed was the case above, ameliorate stakeholders’ sense of 
frustration regarding otherwise unexplained practices. 157 
 
5.4.6. The President Applies Conditions to Release, defined as “Provisional Release’158  
Throughout the interviews on UER in The Hague, interviewees were keen to highlight the limited 
resources of the Tribunal. This included when asked their opinions on the merit of conditional 
release, which was the general practice of prisoner-release throughout the European countries 
 
Belgium “shall comply” with see: http://www.icty.org/en/documents/member-states-cooperation  [accessed 
30/10/2019] 
150 See: http://www.icty.org/en/documents/member-states-cooperation  [accessed 30/10/2019]  
151 See: http://www.icty.org/en/documents/member-states-cooperation  
152 Two Victims Associations one in Sarajevo, 06/11/2017 and one in the Republika Srpska 22 /11/2017 noted that the 
former President had informed them that early release was due to the weight of the enforcement states.  
153 This matter is discussed further in relation to Victims Sense of Justice, Chapter 8, s.8.6.3. 
154 See Chapter 3, s.3.5.5. 
155 A. Buchanan and R. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of global governance institutions’ in L. H. Meyer (ed.) Legitimacy, Justice 
and Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 49. See Chapter 3, s.3.5.5.  
156 M.C. Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’ (1995) The Academy of Management 
Review 20(3) at 598. See Chapter 3, s.3.5.5. 
157 See Chapter 4, s.4.4.1; J.N. Clark, ‘Judging the ICTY: Has it achieved its objectives?’ (2009) Southeast European and 
Black Sea Studies 9(1-2): 123-142.  
158 Another legitimacy deficit of UER, the ramifications of which are discussed in the next chapter, was its unconditional 
nature. Normatively, given that Article 28 and the RPE do not provide a means for the President to impose conditions on 
the perpetrators, given that its original intention was for a pardon or commutation of sentence, this lack of a measure is 






where the perpetrators are detained (s. 5.3.2).159 Some interviewees in The Hague (those who had 
been there as the procedures were developed, in the early 2000s) were further asked if there had 
been any consideration given to the possibility of conditions being attached to early release: 
responses were mixed. One senior staff member immediately responded that conditions on release 
were not considered given the difficult relationship the Tribunal had with the countries in the FRY.160 
A judge, who had been on the Bureau at the time, gave a similar response. When it was noted that 
this was the general practice in national law, and that the Tribunal imposed conditions in cases of 
provisional release, the judge was quick to respond:  
 
there is nothing to reflect, basically what you have [in relation to national law] early 
release on parole … you are talking of people who are Germans or Swedish or 
French who live in that country ... and continue to live in that county, that is not the 
case … we will decide to grant him early release or not … if we grant him early 
release he goes back to wherever he goes and … we have no jurisdiction over 
him.161  
 
The assertion that the Tribunal had “no jurisdiction” is valid but it downplayed the power of the 
President and the Tribunal. Another interviewee, when asked if conditions had ever been considered 
for early release gave an example where conditions had been applied – albeit under a provisional 
release.162 In 2015, President Meron decided to utilise his Presidential powers to impose conditions 
on a convicted perpetrator’s release.163 This included effective house arrest and prohibited the 
perpetrator from communicating with anyone other than his counsel.164 The President explained his 
decision to grant provisional rather than early release, or a commutation of sentence, as Drago 
Nikolić had not yet served two-thirds of his sentence. Nikolić was gravely ill,165 and the interviewee 
noted “terminally” ill and it was Nikolić’s illness that was the determining factor for his provisional 
release. The decision noted that, “it is essential that the Mechanism shows compassion and 
deference to the highest humanitarian principles”.166 This approach was affirmed by one judge 
interviewed who noted that, with regards to the Tribunal as a subsidiary body of the UN, albeit 
independent, its decisions were naturally “tempered with a measure of mercy”.167 It is further 
 
159 Krajišnik and B. Simić being imprisoned in the UK were eligible for automatic release at half of their sentence.  
160 Interview, Senior Staff Member, The Hague, 02/02/2017. 
161 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning 30/01/2017.  
162 Interview, Staff Member, The Hague, 03/02/2017 – because this interview was held on the last day this point could 
not be raised in any interviews in The Hague. 
163 In addition to broadening his powers of discretion he overrode his decision of The Prosecutor v. Mlado Radić, ‘A 
Decision on the Request for Provisional Release’, 13 July 2005, para. 3, where he had determined that it was beyond the 
scope of the Statute to grant a perpetrator with a final conviction provisional release, cited para. 38, Nikolić Decision.  
164 Drago Nikolić, Provisional Release Decision, 20 July 2015, para. 44.ii(f).  
165 Drago Nikolić, Provisional Release Decision, 20 July 2015, paras. 29-33.  
166 Drago Nikolić, Provisional Release Decision, 20 July 2015, para. 34.  





reflected in the bilateral agreements of the enforcement states. All agreements include either a 
provision on the enforcement being in accordance with the “Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners, the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment and the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners”168 which are UN 
Standards or invoke human rights standards more broadly, that treatment be “in accordance with 
the relevant human rights standards”.169 Interestingly, not all of the President’s colleagues believed 
these humanitarian considerations required an early release. Two asserted that there was adequate 
treatment in European prisons to address their poor health.170 The fact that the President was 
prepared to show mercy by allowing Nikolić to return home but at the same time prohibiting him 
from engaging with the outside world, provided a more balanced approach to early release of 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes. Imposing conditions indicated that relevant circumstances have 
been considered – the ill-health of the perpetrator but also the possible disquiet that could have 
ensued had Nikolić being released and greeted with a hero’s welcome,171 talked to the media and 
disparaged the court as others had on UER. The conditions imposed on Drago Nikolić172 indicate that 
by July 2015 the President had learned lessons from the release of other high-profile perpetrators 
and was loath to repeat the mistake. The President granted provisional release from 24 July 2015 to 
25 January 2016. The conditions imposed were strict; they included inter alia, 24-hour surveillance 
and a requirement for the authorities in Serbia to report daily to the President to confirm Nikolić’s 
whereabouts. Significantly, Nikolić was not allowed to “discuss his case with anyone, including the 
media, other than his Counsel”.173 Prohibiting Drago Nikolić from almost all connection to the 
outside world was effectively a gagging order. It suggests that the President wished to keep this 
decision low-key and avoid disquiet in the region. The President imposed conditions to ensure that 
Nikolić returned home directly, without any reception awaiting him and that he remained there with 
minimal connection to the outside world. He was effectively held under house arrest other than to 
travel to the hospital to receive treatment.174  
 
 
168 Bilateral Agreement Belgium.   
169 Bilateral Agreement, Austria  
170 Interview, Judge, The Hague, afternoon 30/01/2017 and Interview, Judge, The Hague, 23/01/2017 – although this 
judge noted that this was “one school of thought” and went on to present the other one, that perpetrators may be sent 
to die at home. 
171 See Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
172 Drago Nikolić, ‘Public Redacted Version of the 20 July 2015 Decision of the President on the Application for Early 
Release or other Relief of Drago Nikolić’, made public 13 October 2015 – two days after his death in Serbia.  
173 Drago Nikolić, Provisional Release Decision, para. 44  
174 Drago Nikolić, Provisional Release Decision, para. 44 (v)(a) – “Nikolic shall remain within the confines of his place of 
residence in Banja Koviljaca … and – if strictly necessary for the purpose of medical treatment – the local hospital 





This act of provisional, de facto, conditional release was more in line with the reasoning of the 
majority of interviewees in The Hague (below) and a number of interviewees in BiH. Although most 
interviewees in BiH were against early release, there were a number, notably judges, who initially 
did not object to early release per se, but went on to note that they were dissatisfied with its 
unconditional nature. This attitude was summed up best by one NGO interviewee. The interviewee’s 
immediate response to his thoughts on early release was that it was “ordinary”, but he then paused 
and took a more nuanced approach, as he considered the nature of the perpetrator and their return:  
the one problem I have with it [UER], the thing that undermines it: is it’s a one-off 
decision and nothing you do or say has any bearing on it … I will give you a very 
concrete example … Plavšić admitted guilt … you say … ‘she admits the crime and 
she feels terrible’ and … because of that you … release her after two-thirds of the 
time served and the first thing she said after going out she said that the ICTY is a 
political court and that she didn’t mean anything that she said. I don’t think that 
that’s acceptable … if you do it because of that and that turns out not to be true 
then you should arrest her and force her to serve the rest of the four years in 
prison.175 
 
When the prospect of conditional release was raised, senior staff and some judges in The Hague 
were often keen to point out that the Tribunal had limited financial resources, an implication that, if 
they had the resources, conditions may have been imposed. The interviewees often coupled this 
argument by noting that the Tribunal had struggled with FRY states’ cooperation. This argument did 
not satisfy many in BiH. The same interviewee above responded simply, “I don’t think that because 
it’s difficult you don’t do it”.176 Indeed, many in BiH believed that the ICTY had the capacity to 
impose conditions, for if they could impose conditions for provisional release, why could they not do 
the same for early release? This belief was not unreasonable, as indeed the Tribunal had granted 
provisional release and these FRY states had returned the perpetrators (then accused) to The Hague 
as instructed. One interviewee who had worked in BiH with the ICTY, was told that the ICTY 
interviewees reiterated that they neither had a police force at their disposal to monitor conditions, 
nor the leverage with the States retorted dismissively. She argued that the ICTY had the backing of 
the EU and other major donors and had ample leverage to put pressure on the regional 
governments.177 Indeed, a number of staff and judges at the Tribunal wished that practice of early 
release be conditional. One staff member said, speaking in his private capacity, when he had heard 
of the Special Court of Sierra Leone’s practice of conditional release: “I thought, well that’s how 
things should be done. Honestly, when I heard I thought, ‘why don’t we have that? We should have 
 
175 Interview, NGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 01/12/2017. 
176 Interview, NGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 01/12/2017.  





that”.178 One judge indicated that it had (as of January 2017) not being totally ruled out, as, when 
asked if he would like to have conditions attached, noted: 
 
I would appreciate to have that possibility. It is not in the Rules yet, it is not in the 
Statute yet, and we had many discussions also among the Judges if that would be a 
better way to put some pressure and to have the hand on them after their early 
release.179 
 
The judge indicated, as did another member of staff, that imposing conditions had been considered. 
His double-qualification with “yet” was at variance with the majority of his colleagues and staff 
members who believe that the practice’s unconditional nature was immutable. The grant of 
provisional release to Drago Nikolić, however, demonstrates that the President had room for 
manoeuvre if he so wished, and was prepared to use it. Furthermore, developments since February 
2017 illustrate that he will be more ready to act when directed to do so by UN Member States. And, 
from the side of the UNSC Members, they were keen to prevent the President from having too much 
flexibility. 
 
5.4.7. The President Concedes to his Colleagues  
In April 2018 the President’s broad discretionary powers were curtailed. When the enforcement of 
sentences became the responsibility of the Residual Mechanism, where no Bureau existed, the 
President was required to consult with the judges of the Sentencing Chamber who remained at the 
Mechanism. This reduced the number of judges the President could consult, and opened up the 
possibility that the President, alone, may decide early release. The Rules were amended in April 
2018, and the President is now required to consult with two judges of the Mechanism when the 
judges who had imposed the sentence are no longer at the Mechanism.180 This amendment prevents 
the portrayal of the decision-making process as a “one-man show”.181 The President’s requirement 
to consult with other judges conforms with the reasoning of the Tribunal’s first President who 
asserted that governance should not be delegated to “one individual”.182 Having more than one 




178 Interview, Senior Staff Member, The Hague, 31/01/2017.  
179 Interview, Judge, The Hague, afternoon 30/01/2017. 
180 Public Redacted Version of the 20 April 2018 Decision of the President on the Early Release of Berislav Pušić, made 
public 24 April 2018, cited in para. 19, and Rules Amended April 2018.  
181 Interview, IGO Staff Member, Sarajevo, 01/12/2017.  





From the perspective of perpetrators of atrocity crimes, early release decisions read favourably up 
until February 2017. No publicly available early release decision had been rejected outright, other 
than where they had not yet served two-thirds of their sentence.183 In October 2018, the President 
for the first time, at least publicly, denied outright the early release of a perpetrator, who had served 
two-thirds of their sentence, when the enforcement state was in favour of the early release.184 
Miletić been denied early release is significant for two reasons. First, despite the enforcement state 
being in favour of early release it was denied. Second, and most significantly, the President made 
explicit that the decision-making process was not a one-man show. 
 
In the Miletić decision, a section was designated to the “Views of Judges at the Sentencing 
Chamber”. This is the first time a section has been entitled in this way. Whether deliberate or not, it 
serves to highlight that the President is considering his colleagues. In this section the President 
asserted that the consultation process “forms a meaningful part of the President's assessment of 
applications”, although the ultimate decision, he said, was at his “discretion”.185 This paragraph 
clarified that decisions were majority-based. Interestingly, this majority-basis was not stated by any 
of the interviewees in The Hague, who indeed emphasised that it was for the President to decide 
(see s.5.3.4). The Miletić decision noted that “it has been the general practice that the President will 
grant early release where … a majority are in favour … and, conversely, that the President will deny 
early release where … the Judges consulted … a majority are opposed, absent of compelling 
circumstances otherwise”.186 He supported this assertion by referencing 38 such early releases, 
whereby the other judges’ views, in favour or against, are noted. However, none of these decisions 
make explicit that a majority decision is a general practice.  
 
Additionally, this is the first time a decision has named another judge and directly cited him. 187 This 
decision makes clear to the reader that the President listens to his colleagues. Although he has the 
ultimate power to decide, speculatively he was, perhaps, keen to show that, as per the changes to 
 
183 In the cases of Bala, Blagojević, Kovač and Radić had been denied immediate early release despite having served two-
thirds of their sentences. The President did not however reject outright their early release but rather set their early 
release for a number of months after the two-thirds standard.  
184 R. Miletić, Early Release Decision, 23 October 2018, para.8. The Finnish authorities supported Miletić’s application for 
early release.  
185 R. Miletić, Early Release Decision, 23 October 2018 para. 44. 
186 R. Miletić, Early Release Decision, 23 October 2018 para. 44.  
187 Miletić’s early release denied is a first time in the following ways: the President outright denies early release despite 
the enforcement state being in favour of it; and for the first time he cites and names his colleague who was against early 
release. The colleague named, Judge Agius, is now the President of the Residual Mechanism and has denied early release 





the Rules, whereby two other judges were required to be consulted, he was seriously taking into 
account these judges’ considerations as a matter of ongoing good practice.  
 
5.4.8. The President Introduces Conditions  
Just three months later, President Meron took more active steps than simply denying release. He 
formally introduced restrictive measures and granted Ćorić conditional release. President Meron 
clarified that he imposed these conditions taking into account UNSC recommendations to impose 
conditions on persons convicted by the ICTR.188 As the Mechanism is responsible for enforcement of 
sentences of those convicted by both the ICTR and the ICTY, the President decided to extend this 
recommendation to perpetrators convicted by the ICTY. The conditions attached to Ćorić’s release 
repeat the conditions Meron had imposed on Nikolić in July 2015, including an effective gagging 
order. The decision prohibited Ćorić, like Nikolić, from discussing his “case … including any aspect of 
the events in the former Yugoslavia that were the subject of his trial, with anyone, including the 
media, other than pro bono counsel”.189 Further, the President added that “Ćorić shall conduct 
himself honourably and peacefully in the community to which he is released, and shall not engage in 
… any political activities”.190 This action, silencing the perpetrator to the maximum possible extent, 
suggests that, by this time, the Tribunal has realised that UER had caused negative repercussions in 
the region (not only in Rwanda). The President also adopted measures similar to the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, which has conditional release, with prohibiting orders on political participation and 
the condition for the released perpetrator not to attend any political meetings.191 One Victims’ 
Association who had met on several occasions with the Tribunal’s Presidents stated that their 
association had recommended conditions being attached to early release, which the President had 
responded to as being beyond the Tribunal’s control.192 In June 2018, once the President had been 
directed to introduce conditions, by the UN, he did so. This action supports arguments proposed by 
observers such as Meernik and King, who have argued that the Tribunal has predominately 
prioritised the wishes of the international community (the UNSC Member States)193 over its other 
stakeholders.194 On this occasion, however, the wishes of the international community, a desire to 
 
188 Ćorić, Early Release Decision, 16 January 2019, para. 73 citing Resolution 2422 (2018) Adopted by the Security Council 
at its 8295th meeting, 27 June 2018. 
189 Ćorić, Early Release Decision, 16 January 2019, para. 78. 
190 Ćorić, Early Release Decision, 16 January 2019, para. 78(c).  
191 Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prosecutor Against Moinina Fofana / Allieu Kondewa, Public Decision of the 
President on Application for Conditional Release, 11 August 2014, para. 49.iii.  
192 Interview, Victims’ Association Director, Sarajevo, BiH, morning 06/11/2017.  
193 France, a Permanent Member of the UNSC ‘encourage[d] the Mechanism to continue its discussions on the 
introduction of early release conditions”, Record of UNSC meeting 8278M held 6 June 2018, UN Doc S/PV.8278.  
194 K.L. King and J.D Meernik ‘Assessing the Impact of the ICTY: Balancing International with Local Interests while doing 





reduce negative repercussions created by UER, are in line with the wishes of stakeholders in the 
region itself. Twenty-five of the 57 BiH interviewees believed that conditional release would have 
lessened their sense of disappointment with UER. Additionally, many interviewees195 reiterated that 
the return of unrepentant perpetrators was particularly difficult.196 Thus, the introduction of these 
conditions, especially the prohibition of speaking to the media and re-entering political life, were in 
line with the above cited interviewee, and a significant number of the other interviewees. Now, as 
per the wishes of these interviewees, the President has the power to bring the perpetrator back to 
prison if he violates any of the stated provisions.  
 
The impact of this recent change is unknown. However, between September–December 2017 
interviewees in BiH overwhelmingly perceived UER as the standard in The Hague.197 For example, 
when Prlić et al were convicted in November 2017, the media were already discussing their early 
release dates based on the two-thirds practice.198 
 
This discrepancy between the actual practice and the perceived practice is important because it left 
many in BiH, who, surveys indicate, were broadly in favour of the Tribunal,199 disappointed with the 
Tribunal for failing to live up to one of the stated purposes of sentencing perpetrators - retribution 
as a condemnation of the crimes (Chapter 7). Two interviewees believed that the Tribunal should 
conduct more outreach and highlight instances of denied UER. When one interviewee was informed 
that Kunarac had been denied UER, he responded that it was good to know that.200 Another 
interviewee reflected that victims’ communities might feel less aggrieved if it was known that not all 
perpetrators were automatically granted early release at two-thirds. It would confirm that the 
Tribunal are actually considering the implications of early release on the region and taking 
 
195 23 of the 57 interviewees in BiH.  
196 See Chapter 7, s.7.5.  
197 No interviewees had heard that some perpetrators had being made to serve more than 2/3 of their sentence and eight 
interviewees referred to UER as the “rule” and another noted that there was an “automism” to it – Interview, Prosecutor, 
Brčko, BiH, 13/11/2017.  
198 The article is about the possibility that Prlić, after serving two-thirds of his sentence, might be released in three years 
while Pušić should be released immediately and probably will ask for some kind of compensation since he has been 
detained since 2004 and sentenced to 10 years. The same for Ćorić. Stojić and Petković should be out soon as well since 
they were sentenced to 20 years and were detained since 2004. see: https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/prlic-moze-izaci-iz-
zatvora-vec-za-tri-godine-ostali-vjerovatno-uskoro-na-slobodi/171129024 [accessed 31/12/2019].  
199 South East Europe Public Agenda Survey, cited in J.Meernik, ‘Justice and Peace? How the International Criminal 
Tribunal Affects Societal Peace in Bosnia’ (2005) Journal of Peace Research 42 (3): 271–289, at 274. Meernik noted that in 
‘Bosnia was 51% (the ICTY was the most trusted international institution in Bosnia), although within Republika Srpska, 
public trust was only 4% - referencing Information found at: http://www.idea.int/press/pr20020404.htm on 29 
September 2004. 





perpetrators’ crimes more seriously.201 Actively demonstrating to the community that the UER is not 
a standard but that the President determines them on the perpetrator’s merit would be more in line 
with the Tribunal’s own standard of transparency, and may, in turn, increase the perception of 
better quality of decision-making, which Tyler asserted would increase sociological legitimacy.202 As 
the following chapter will discuss, in addition to its unconditional nature, Presidents’ assessment of 
perpetrators’ demonstration of rehabilitation aggrieved stakeholders in BiH. This was in large part 
due to the apparent lack of rigour in Presidents’ assessments; often perceived as a lack of concern 
about the repercussions UER of unrepentant perpetrators would have. However, a significant 
number of BiH interviewees identified one factor that the President could utilise to justify an early 
release, that of substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor. It was one way that the President could 
have acted to obtain legitimacy of the practice of early release (it is not unconditional) and a lesson 
that other ICTs and the ICC could learn from.  
 
5.5. Substantial Cooperation with the Prosecutor  
The President is required to consider substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor, Rule 125, and 
s.5.4.3 illustrated how, on occasion, consideration of this factor has been misapplied. However, 
interviewees in BiH indicated how this factor could be applied which would, in some cases, make the 
practice of early release legitimate. As a listed factor under the RPE, substantial cooperation is a 
legal rule, the first of Beetham’s three conditions for any institution of power to be legitimate. 
Interview analysis from BiH found that there was a degree of this being a “shared belief” that could 
act as a “justification” 203 for this legal rule - Beetham’s second condition. Beetham’s condition of 
“express consent”, is read to be the sociological legitimacy, and over one-third of these interviews204 
indicated that Beetham’s third element could be fulfilled through a principled approach to consider 
substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor.  
 
There were three principal reasons why persons, both in BiH and The Hague, believed that 
substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor could justify an early release: first, where cooperation 
led to convictions of other perpetrators; second, where cooperation tangibly assisted victims; and 
third, where cooperation had symbolic significance. These three reasons are largely victim and post-
 
201 Interview, Independent with professional experience engaging with victim-witnesses in Srebrenica, Sarajevo, BiH, 
21/12/2017. 
202 T. Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice, Legitimacy and the Effective Rule of Law’ (2003) Crime and Justice 30: 283-357 at 334. See 
Chapter 3, s.3.5.3.   
203 D. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edition, 2013) at 16. See Chapter 3, s.3.3.  
204 Beetham’s third condition, “express consent of the subordinate” cannot be measured here; it is simply proposed, 
based on the findings, as 18 of the 51 interviews stated along the line that cooperation with the prosecutor was the 





conflict-society-focused rather than perpetrator-focused. Thus, the use of this factor would be more 
in line with one of the Tribunal’s cited list of achievements, that of “bringing justice to victims”.205  
  
The first of these, substantial cooperation, which assisted in bringing other perpetrators to justice, 
advanced the aims of the Tribunal, and was also perceived as a legitimate justification for early 
release by a number of interviewees in BiH.206 Perpetrators providing significant cooperation has 
enabled the Tribunal to fulfil one of its core mandates, i.e. bringing “to justice” perpetrators of 
“widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law”.207 This belief was described 
coherently by one interviewee: “Momir Nikolić he is a top witness to Srebrenica, he admitted guilt … 
he got twenty years, he served two-thirds, that’s fine, he went out, whenever he’s called in front of 
the Bosnian Court, … the ICTY, he says ‘this is what I saw, this is what they said, they killed all these 
people.’ I think that’s fine”.208 Another interviewee noted that a good example of substantial 
cooperation with the Prosecutor as justifying early release is that of Erdemović, who had also acted 
as a prosecution witness.209 As Chapter 8 (s.8.7.2) discusses, one of the core reasons why the 
Tribunal’s practice of UER, although perceived by the majority of interviewees (with the exception of 
judges) in BiH as illegitimate, had not de-legitimatised the Tribunal itself was because of the 
perceived justice cascade which the Tribunal had triggered in BiH. This substantial cooperation was a 
legitimate factor to grant an early release, and the most important, as it advanced this justice 
cascade - it “can link to other … war criminals to be brought to justice ... [and] found guilty”.210 Early 
release granted on condition of testifying against others would have assisted victims and post-
conflict society by bringing other perpetrators to justice.  
 
The second reason why substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor could justify an early release 
was where it could assist in locating the disappeared. As of January 2019, the International 
Commission for Missing Persons (ICMP) estimate that there remain 10,000 missing persons from the 
war.211 One prosecutor in the Republika Srpska linked the disclosure of mass graves to benefiting 
both victims and perpetrators themselves. He argued that “if they provide some information they 
can be rewarded and it is a form of satisfaction, and for them also it is catharsis”.212 The prosecutor 
 
205 ICTY website: https://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/achievements [accessed on 31/12/2019].   
206 17 of the 18 interviewees who asserted that substantial cooperation was the most important factor to consider stated 
it was due to enabling testimony to be provided to hold other perpetrators to account.  
207 UNSCR 808, 22 February 1993.  
208 Interview, NGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 01/12/2017 
209 Interview, Defence Counsel, Republika Srpska, BiH, 13/11/2017. 
210 Interview, NGO, Republika Srpska, BiH, midday 24/11/2017. 
211 Website of the ICMP note that 70% of the approximately 31,000 missing persons created during the war have been 
accounted for.  





recognised two elements: practical merit, and just satisfaction to victims and, interestingly, 
perpetrators also. Providing information on the location of missing persons was of practical 
importance and was worthy of being “rewarded”; secondly, the word “satisfaction” followed by “for 
them” suggests that he was thinking of a form of “satisfaction” for the victims, or society who would 
be informed of the truth, recover the remains of their relatives and bury them. The notion that 
victims could gain some sense of satisfaction from this form of cooperation with the Prosecutor was 
shown first hand. One victim, when asked what could justify early release, stated that: “I would 
agree … with granting early release if the convicted war criminal gives the information where the 
remains of my dead brother who went missing in the camp are”.213  
 
Finally, substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor could have symbolic value, relevant for an 
ethnically-divided society.214 It was reflective of a sense of society’s catharsis: the value of 
condemning the crime and the motive behind the crime. The interviewee, an outspoken Serb peace-
activist in the Republika Srpska, throughout the interview emphasised the glorification of war 
criminals who were seen as fighting for a heroic cause and whose crimes were downplayed. He 
argued, “I cannot justify any early release except maybe the release of the people who testify 
against their superiors or their brothers in blood”.215 As Chapter 7 discusses, there is a significant 
level of denialism, and this interviewee believed the record of atrocity crimes being produced by a 
“brother in blood” was valuable. Atrocities being factualised by a member of the perpetrator’s own 
ethnic group would, this interviewee believed, be perceived as authoritative rather than the 
testimony of victims’ ethnic group. This, he suggested, may be a means to counter the majority 
ethnic level of denialism, which could have assisted in one of the Tribunal’s mandate under the 
UNSC Resolution, the restoration of peace – albeit a long-term objective.  
 
5.6. Conclusion  
Through doctrinal and empirical legal analysis, this chapter has answered the first two sub-research 
questions; it has outlined the law and practice of UER and the legal reasoning for it. In answering 
these questions, the chapter has shown how the practice of UER developed beyond the law’s 
 
213 Interview, Victims’ Association Republika Srpska, BiH, 21/11/2017. This interviewee referred back to Kolundžija, who 
has in fact been granted early release and lives in the same locality as this interviewee. This interviewee believed that 
Kolundžija did know where the mass graves were, and thus possibly his brother’s remains, and was disappointed that the 
Tribunal had not used the factor of “substantial cooperation” to incentivise Kolundžija to disclose this information. 
Conditioning release on this factor would have tangibly assisted this victim, and others, who would have been able to 
bury their dead.  
214 F. Beiber, Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance (UNRISD and Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 
and C. Grewe and M. Riegner, ‘Internationalized Constitutionalism in Ethnically Divided Societies: Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo Compared’ in A. von Bogandy and R. Wolfrum (eds.) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 15 (2011) 1-64. 





original intention. This was primarily due to the broad powers of the President under the Statute, 
coupled with the Presidents’ reading of the four factors under the RPE in favour of the perpetrators 
(save in few exceptional cases): the gravity of the crime factor was read narrowly, the factor of 
similarly-situated prisoners was read broadly, and, in a few cases, substantial cooperation with the 
Prosecutor was simply misapplied – guilty pleas should not have been considered by the President, 
as the RPE denote it is the “prisoners’ substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor, so only 
cooperation post-conviction should have been considered.  
 
Based on these findings, and interview data, the chapter has argued that the practice of UER lacked 
normative (legal) legitimacy in two ways. First, under a strict application of the black letter law,216 
UER was originally conceived of as an exception, but became the dominant practice. Second, the 
factors guiding the determination of an early release were interpreted too broadly in favour of the 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes. These legitimacy deficits meant that the practice lacked sociological 
legitimacy. UER was perceived as inappropriate, considering the gravity and nature of atrocity 
crimes, the apparent blanket application of the criterion of “similarly-situated prisoners”,217 and the 
overly generous approach taken by the President. The last two perceived normative (legal) 
legitimacy deficits also gave rise to a procedural justice deficiency – the perceived fairness and 
quality of the decision-making process.218 This practice was widely (with the exception of BiH judges) 
perceived as illegitimate, though as Chapters 7 and 8 will discuss, it has not delegitimised the 
Tribunal overall. Nevertheless, the practice has created a “blackspot”219 for the Tribunal.  
 
In highlighting these controversies, this chapter appeals to future ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals to take more seriously early release and for it to be communicated as such. The Tribunal’s 
lack of communication with the region, not explaining the reasoning behind early release, has done 
 
216 See Chapter 3, s.3.2. Based on Beetham’s three conditions of legitimacy - “power is acknowledged as legitimate to the 
extent that: it [has] legality, [holds] normative justifiability and [has] legitimation” in D. Beetham ‘Revisiting Legitimacy, 
Twenty Years On’ in J. Tankebe and A. Liebling (eds.) Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An International Exploration (Oxford 
University Press, 2013) at 19; and D. Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A coming challenge for 
International Environmental Law’ (1999) The American Journal of International Law 93(3): 596-624 at 603. 
217 Although the consideration of “similarly-situated prisoners” appeared to be applied in a blanket manner, there have 
been occasions when the President has indicated that the typology of the perpetrator could distinguish them and thus 
they would not be considered as “similarly-situated” – Kovač decision is important because, in addition to being an 
example of a lack of systematic approach to early release, it demonstrates the power of the President to distinguish the 
typology of the perpetrator at his broad discretion, according to his own morals; which may have been seen as 
sociologically legitimate, discussed s.5.4.2. – a shared value, whereby the gravity of the crime was considered more 
thoroughly.  
218 T.R Tyler, 'What Is Procedural Justice - Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures' (1988) Law 
and Society Review 22: 103 discussing G.S. Leventhal, "What Should Be Done with Equity Theory?," in K. J. Gergen, M.S. 
Greenberg, and R. H. Weiss (eds.) Social Exchange: Advances in Theory and Research (Plenum, 1980). See Chapter 3, 
s.3.5.3. 
219 Interview, Individual currently working in an independent state institution with extensive work experience in IGOs, 





a disservice to the most widely-stated purposes of sentencing, moral condemnation of the crime and 
the criminal (Chapter 7), and in doing so has disappointed one of its key stakeholders, victims’ 
communities (Chapter 8). The UER of unrepentant perpetrators has been at the heart of this rupture 
between the stated purpose of punishment and its termination, which has created a legitimacy 
deficit at the Tribunal. UER was an evident gap between the rhetoric and the reality of punishment. 
The early release decisions widely cited the rehabilitation of perpetrators as a ground for the grant 
of UER.220 Thus, how the President determined this is key to understanding how this legitimacy 
deficit arose and possibly how it can be ameliorated. 
 
220 That the perpetrator has served two-thirds of their sentence and thus similarly-situated to other prisoners is the most 





Chapter 6: Rehabilitation of Perpetrators of Atrocity Crimes 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Rehabilitation was accorded the least weight in sentencing perpetrators at the ICTY.1 Deterrence and 
retribution were given primacy due to the gravity of the crimes.2 However, rehabilitation was prima 
facie significant in many of the early release decisions: a “demonstration of rehabilitation” weighed 
in perpetrators’ favour in the grant of UER in 33 of the 54 decisions.3 This chapter argues that the 
Presidents’ assessment of perpetrators’ rehabilitation lacked both normative and sociological 
legitimacy. On the basis of document analysis and interview feedback from both The Hague and BiH, 
this chapter continues with the analysis of the Presidents’ early release decisions (Chapter 5), the 
focus now on the demonstration of rehabilitation which the President is required to consider under 
the Rules and Procedure of Evidence (RPE).4 The decisions appear to lack meaningful deliberation as 
to what rehabilitation for these types of perpetrators and their connected crimes could or should 
encompass to warrant their return to society. This normative legitimacy deficit was a significant 
reason why both Tribunal and BiH stakeholders perceived UER as an illegitimate practice.  
 
The chapter begins by briefly setting out the general parameters of rehabilitation for “ordinary 
criminals”5 which International Human Rights Law (IHRL) obliges states to make the primary 
objective of imprisonment.6 It raises the matter that, in many cases and especially those of, indirect 
perpetrators7 of atrocity crimes differ to that of ordinary criminals.8 It discusses the different factors 
 
1 Kunarac et al, Trial Chamber Judgement, 22 February 2001, “The Trial Chamber is therefore not convinced that 
rehabilitation is a significant relevant sentencing objective in this jurisdiction”, para. 844. 
2 B. Holá, A. Smeulers and C. Bijleveld, ‘Is ICTY Sentencing Predictable? An Empirical Analysis of ICTY Sentencing Practice’ 
(2009) Leiden Journal of International Law 22(1): 79–97, at 82. 
3 The most recent grant of early release, to Ćorić, 16/01/2019 has been released with considerable conditions attached. 
In the grant of 33 of the 54 UER’s the President determined that this was in part due to their “demonstration of 
rehabilitation”. Through the empirical analysis the chapter identifies how this in itself created (normative) (legal) 
legitimacy of exercise challenges, and secondly, from the normative (moral) dimension of legitimacy was lacking given the 
nature of the atrocity criminal. Based on its interview analysis the chapter discusses what a demonstration of 
rehabilitation could encompass to justify an early release, again, emphasising early release as conditional.  
4 The previous chapter considered the President’s consideration of the other statutory factors as well as identifying 
patterns and changes in the Presidents’ decision-making process overall.  
5 M. Harmon and F. Gaynor, ‘Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes’ (2007) Journal of International Criminal Justice 
5(3): 683-712. 
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Article 10(3) - “The penitentiary system shall comprise 
treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation”; and UN Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 1955, Rule 65 – “The treatment of persons sentenced to imprisonment or 
a similar measure shall have as its purpose, so far as the length of the sentence permits, to establish in them the will to 
lead law-abiding and self-supporting lives after their release”.  
7 See Chapter 5, s.5.4.2, noting the difference on direct and indirect perpetrators. Another example discussed in detail in 
this chapter is the significance of the difference between instigators of the crimes, those with command responsibility 
who do not physically commit the crimes and their level of engagement: instigators initiate the crime whereas those with 





debated in post-conflict justice literature9 which may be considered as rehabilitation appropriate for 
perpetrators of these crimes: notably remorse. It also notes the challenges which have been raised 
as to the suitability of remorse (s.6.7) and the connected act of forgiveness, again due to the nature 
of the crimes.  
 
Two examples of what Holá et al have described as the “superficial”10 approach taken by the 
Tribunal’s Presidents in their assessment of perpetrators’ rehabilitation are discussed (s.6.3), which 
demonstrate that the Presidents’ determinations of rehabilitation, in these instances, fell short of 
the standard of procedural fairness, adherence to clear procedure.11 The next section draws on the 
interview data in The Hague to explain why this apparently superficial approach was taken and 
responds to the reasons presented (s.6.4). Scholars have questioned the legitimacy of the Tribunal’s 
Presidents’ consideration and determination of a demonstration of rehabilitation.12 This chapter 
contributes to this literature as it discusses perceptions of stakeholders at the Tribunal itself and in 
BiH who echo Holá et al’s critiques. In doing so, it explores how stakeholders perceived the UER 
decisions as lacking in normative legitimacy (s.6.5). 
  
Interview analysis in BiH indicates that the perpetrators’ lack of remorse for the crimes they were 
convicted of was a key element confirming the perception that the practice of UER was illegitimate. 
This finding, therefore, addresses the sub-research question on how outside stakeholders perceive 
UER, as it highlights a factor which shaped their perception of the practice being illegitimate. Within 
the thesis’ framing of legitimacy, one factor is that legitimacy of the law depends on shared beliefs13 
between law’s decision-makers and its stakeholders, and that institutions wish to be perceived as 
legitimate.14 Accordingly the chapter identifies and discusses three key issues at the core of the 
legitimacy deficit of the Presidents’ determinations of “evidence of rehabilitation” weighing in 
favour of their UER (s.6.6). This section, firstly, outlines certain practices which stakeholders 
regarded as clearly not evidencing a perpetrator’s rehabilitation. Secondly, it identifies the possible 
 
8 A. Smeulers (ed.) Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice – Towards an Interdisciplinary Approach 
(Intersentia, 2010) 175-206 and M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2007) at 25. 
9 P. Gobodo-Madikizela, ‘Remorse, Forgiveness and Dehumanization: Stories from South Africa’ (2002) Journal of 
Humanistic Psychology 42(1): 7-32.  
10 B. Holá, J. van Wijk, F. Constantini, and A. Korhonnen, ‘Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ Reflections on Their Crimes 
in Early Release Decisions’ (2018) International Criminal Justice Review 28(4) 349-371 at 365; and A. Merrylees, ‘Two-
Thirds and You're Out: The Practice of Early Release at the ICTY and ICC in Light of the Goals of International Criminal 
Justice’ (2016) Amsterdam Law Forum 8(2): 69-76 at72. 
11 See Chapter 3, s.3.5.2.  
12 See Chapter 4, s.4.5.3.   
13 D. Beetham, see Chapter 3.  





means - genuine remorse - by which rehabilitation can be demonstrated. Thirdly, it recognises, as 
does the literature,15 that there are severe difficulties in actually evidencing remorse. This last point 
derives from the unique nature of the atrocity crimes committed, the complexity of perpetrators’ 
mens rea and the nature of the society to which they return. This complexity, rather than making 
redundant the factor of rehabilitation and an accompanying requirement for a perpetrator to 
evidence it, makes a rigorous assessment of rehabilitation critical when perpetrators of atrocity 
crimes are set to return to post-conflict society. Thus, the significance of remorse is discussed (s.6.7).  
 
6.2. Rehabilitation as a Purpose of Punishment and Imprisonment  
Rehabilitation, on occasion, was explicitly rejected as a purpose of punishment at the Tribunal. Some 
judges reflected that “in light of the serious nature of the crimes committed under the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, [rehabilitation] has not played a predominant role in sentencing”.16 However, this 
attitude was not taken by all judges. At certain junctures, consideration was given not only to their 
mandate of bringing justice to perpetrators and the gravity of their crime, but the mandate of 
restoration and maintenance of peace.17 In the Delalić judgement, judges argued that all purposes of 
punishment should be considered. They warned that “if retribution were to be taken as the only 
reason for punishment, this could be counter-productive … given the paramount objective of the 
Security Council, namely the restoration and maintenance of peace on the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia”.18 Thus, rehabilitation, although overall accorded less significance at sentencing was, at 
times, considered as a purpose of punishment.  
 
Beyond sentencing rehabilitation is not only a factor but under IHRL it should be the primary 
purpose of imprisonment.19 All perpetrators convicted by the ICTY were imprisoned in states bound 
by IHRL,20 a point reiterated in their bilateral agreements with the Tribunal.21 Yet, there is no 
 
15 R. Zhong, M. Baranoski, N. Feigenson, L. Davidson, A. Buchanan and V. Zonana, ‘So You’re Sorry? The Role of Remorse 
in Criminal Law’ (2014) Journal of American Academy of Psychiatry and Law 42(1): 39-48 at 47.  
16 Popović et al, Trial Chamber Judgment, 10 June 2010, para. 2130 citing Krajišnik Appeal Judgment, 27 September 2006, 
para. 806; Mucić et al, Appeal Judgment, 20 February 2001, para. 806. 
17 UNSCR 808, 22 February 1993. In addition to punishing perpetrators the ICTY was set the task of contributing to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace. 
18 Delalić et al, Judgment, 16 November 1998 at para. 1231 – cited (incorrectly) in G. Vermeulen and E. de Wree, Offender 
Reintegration and Rehabilitation as a Component of International Criminal Justice? (Maklu Publishing, 2014) at 77. 
19 ICCPR 10(3) and UN Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 1955. 
20 I.M. Weinberg de Roca and C. Rassi, ‘Sentencing and Incarceration in the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ (2008) Stanford Journal of 
International Law, 44(1): 1-62 at 45. 
21 All bilateral agreements had a clause of the following nature; ‘imprisonment … shall be in accordance with relevant 





universally accepted definition of rehabilitation22 though scholars and the general practice of 
rehabilitation services indicate “rehabilitation … ultimately aims at enabling the [individual] to 
socially function in a way that is acceptable to both himself/herself and society."23 This 
understanding of rehabilitation encompasses two subjects – the perpetrator and society. Society 
cannot be a subject of rehabilitation but the perpetrators’ relationship with it can be. These two 
subjects are reflected in the IHRL principles and standards underlying the normative character of 
rehabilitation and, consequently, how it should be assessed. Further, all enforcement states are 
party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which requires of states that 
the “essential aim” of the penitentiary system shall be prisoners’ “reformation and social 
rehabilitation”.24 These requirements consist of two dimensions. The first is internal - “their 
reformation” is personal and as such implies a change of mind-set, “making good”.25 The second is 
external - “social rehabilitation” relates to society and positions the perpetrator in relation to that 
society, “causing harm to members of the public is lessened”.26 IHRL obliges states to prepare the 
perpetrator to return to society: “the treatment of prisoners should emphasize not their exclusion 
from the community, but their continuing part in it”.27 Thus, from the “beginning of a prisoner's 
sentence consideration shall be given to his future after release”.28 
 
It is essential to emphasise that IRHL’s two dimensions of rehabilitation (the perpetrator’s character 
and their relationship with society) differ in the context of atrocity crimes.29 Some scholars have 
argued that perpetrators of atrocity crimes are fundamentally “ordinary people, like you and me, 
who commit genocide and mass killings”.30 Waller makes this assertion to emphasise that atrocity 
crimes happen in a context, whereby ordinary people, who are not necessarily violent, commit 
heinous crimes. This has implications for rehabilitation: how can one determine rehabilitation for 
 
22 J.M. Kelder, B. Holá and J. van Wijk, ‘Rehabilitation and Early Release of Perpetrators of International Crimes: A Case 
Study of the ICTY and ICTR’ (2014) International Criminal Law Review 14(6): 1177-1203. 
23 A. M. van Kalmhout and l. Durnescu, 'European Probation Service System. A Comparative Overview’ in A.M. van 
Kalmthout and l. Durnescu (eds.) Probation in Europe (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008) 1-49 at 28 cited in J.M. Kelder, B. Holá 
and J. van Wijk, ‘Rehabilitation and Early Release of Perpetrators of International Crimes: A Case Study of the ICTY and 
ICTR’ at 1185. 
24 ICCPR, 1966, Article 10(3) emphasis added.  
25 S. Maruna, Making good: How ex-convicts reform and rebuild their lives (American Psychological Association, 2001) 
referenced in Tony Ward, ‘Human Rights and Dignity in Offender Rehabilitation’ (2011) Journal of Forensic Psychology 
Practice 11: 103-123 at 112.  
26 T. Ward, ‘Human Rights and Dignity in Offender Rehabilitation’ (2011) Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice 11: 103-
123 at 112.  
27 UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 1955, Rule 61.  
28 UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 1955, Rule 61 and see Tony Ward, ‘Human Rights and 
Dignity in Offender Rehabilitation’ (2011) Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice 11: 103-123 at 112.  
29 Given the distinct nature of the perpetrator and the society to which they return, this chapter does not examine the 
broader and differing definitions of rehabilitation. Holá and others have undertaken this task and this thesis does not 
need to duplicate it; the empirical research emphasized the notion of remorse with rehabilitation and thus this element is 
a significant focus of this chapter.  





atrocity perpetrators who were “law-abiding citizens … in peacetime”?31 Alongside these 
perpetrators, ordinary people who commit heinous crimes in a context, there are perpetrators who 
instigate crimes, and this thesis argues along with others,32 that these perpetrators are different to 
ordinary people (s.6.6.1). Rehabilitation in these instances poses difficulties in determining (s.6.6.1 
and s.6.6.2) the extent to which these perpetrators are personally reformed. Secondly, in relation to 
crimes in context, the crimes, of “malevolent human evil” were “perpetrated in times of collective 
social unrest, war, mass killings, and genocide”.33 Thus, in terms of society, and the societal element 
of rehabilitation, they are not necessarily considered deviant34 at the time of the crime, and not 
necessarily upon return to society, as many in that society still endorse the ideology and animosities 
which fuelled the war.35 This context poses challenges for an assessment of their “social 
rehabilitation”.36 Should the President and his colleagues examine the perpetrators’ readiness to 
enter the society in the FRY – and how could they do this? Finally, perpetrators of atrocity crimes, as 
individuals, are not homogenous, there are different typologies,37 whose rehabilitation may 
encompass different elements (s.6.4.4 and s.6.6). Before turning to challenges the Presidents faced 
in considering perpetrators’ demonstration of rehabilitation and consequent sociological legitimacy 
deficits perceived in the Presidents’ assessment of rehabilitation (s.6.4-s.6.6), the following section 
(s.6.3) outlines how the Presidents’ written decisions lacked normative (legal) legitimacy.  
 
6.3. The Practicalities of the Presidents’ Consideration of Perpetrators’ Rehabilitation  
This section demonstrates that the Presidents’ written consideration of rehabilitation lacked rigour 
and generously granted the perpetrator the benefit of the doubt. A perpetrator’s evidence of a 
demonstration of rehabilitation was based on information provided by the enforcement state, the 
perpetrator themselves, and/or the perpetrator’s counsel.38 With this evidence the President was to 
determine, in consultation with the judges, the extent to which the perpetrator had demonstrated 
rehabilitation. The Practice Direction on the Procedure for the Determination of Applications for 
 
31 D. Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law’ in S. Besson & 
J. Tasioulas (eds.) The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 575. 
32 For a collection of arguments see: in A. Smeulers (ed.) Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice – Towards 
an Interdisciplinary Approach (Intersentia, 2010).  
33 J. Waller, How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing: Becoming Evil (Oxford University Press, 2007) at 14. 
34 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 32. 
35 B. Holá et al, ‘Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ Reflections on Their Crimes in Early Release Decisions’ at 352.  
36 ICCPR, Article 10(3).  
37 A. Smeulers and B. Holá, ‘ICTY and the Culpability of Different Types of Perpetrators of International Crimes’ in A. 
Smeulers (ed.) Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice – Towards an Interdisciplinary Approach (Intersentia, 
2010) 175-206 and M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 25. 
High-level political instigators of the crimes were not direct killers, but were instigators; others were direct perpetrators; 
others failed to prevent or punish their subordinates, the direct perpetrators.  
38 The Early Release decisions usually note that the President has received the application from the enforcement state, as 





Pardon, Commutation of Sentence and Early Release of Persons Convicted by the International 
Tribunal39 provides the President with the option to “hear him or her [the perpetrator] either 
through written submissions or, alternatively, by video or telephone-link”.40 This PD prima facie 
allows for a range of evidence of rehabilitation to be collated and enables the President not only to 
examine the evidence but to cross-examine the perpetrator in his determination. A comprehensive 
critique of the Tribunal Presidents’ consideration of rehabilitation has been undertaken by others.41 
Holá et al. have provided a detailed analysis of factors by which the President determined 
perpetrators’ apparent personal reformation, inter alia, their behaviour in prison, such as their 
attitudes towards fellow prisoners, prison staff and their activities42 and their reflections on their 
crimes.43 This section complements their work based on this research’s empirical legal analysis and 
interview data. It adds another level to their examination of the normative legitimacy of the 
Presidents’ consideration of rehabilitation (its legality and the standard of procedural fairness – the 
quality of decision-making).44  
6.3.1. Evidence of Rehabilitation Considered by the President  
The wording of the PD suggests that the Tribunal presumed that the enforcement state would, 
throughout the period of detention, monitor the behaviour of the perpetrators. The PD orders the 
Tribunal’s Registrar to “request reports and observations from the relevant authorities … as to the 
behaviour of the convicted person during his or her period of incarceration”.45 The word “during” 
denotes an ongoing timeframe, that of “the period of incarceration”. It also enables the Registrar to 
“request … any psychiatric or psychological evaluations prepared on the mental condition of the 
convicted person during the period of incarceration”.46 At the same time, this instruction implies 
that … psychiatric or psychological reports were not mandatory for the enforcement state to 
prepare. Nevertheless, they had been foreseen. President Robinson in the case of Rajić’s application 
for early release stated his interpretation of para. 3(b) as “envisage[ing] reports from the 
Enforcement States regarding the psychological condition of the convicted person during his 
incarceration”.47 Yet, despite noting his interpretation that such reports should be prepared, he 
accepted that none had been prepared by the enforcement state and made his decision on a 
 
39 Hereinafter the ‘PD’ original April 1999, updated 2009 and September 2010. 
40 Practice Direction on Pardon, Commutation of Sentence and Early Release, ‘Participation of the Convicted Person’, 
para. 5. 
41 See Chapter 4, s.4.5.   
42 J.M. Kelder, B. Holá and J. van Wijk, ‘Rehabilitation and Early Release of Perpetrators of International Crimes: A Case 
Study of the ICTY and ICTR’ at 1187. 
43 B. Holá et al, ‘Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ Reflections on Their Crimes in Early Release Decisions’ 349-371. 
44 See Chapter 3, s.3.5.2. 
45 Practice Direction on Pardon, Commutation of Sentence and Early Release, para. 3(b)  
46 Practice Direction on Pardon, Commutation of Sentence and Early Release, para. 3(b) 





demonstration of rehabilitation based solely on the perpetrator’s good behaviour in prison. Reading 
this decision, the President appears to have acted passively. He clearly recognised the proposed 
good practice of having a psychological report prepared but did not use his power under the PD to 
request “any other information that the President considers relevant”.48  
 
Despite the Presidents’ capacity under the PD to request detailed information from the enforcement 
state, including hearing directly from the perpetrator,49 the document analysis, as in Rajić above, 
supports Holá et al’s argument that the Presidents took a “superficial”50 approach in their 
assessment of the perpetrator’s rehabilitation. This superficial approach poses a simple legitimacy 
challenge in terms of the procedural fairness standard.51  
 
6.3.2. Evidence of Rehabilitation Not Considered by the President  
There are two examples of Presidential lack of rigour which fall within the “distant court” critique of 
the Tribunal posed by some scholars, who criticise the Tribunal for neglecting its stakeholders in the 
FRY.52 The first example was in the case of Plavšić, whereby the President gave significant weight to 
a retracted statement of remorse.53 The President cited Plavšić’s statement of remorse in her guilty 
plea (made seven years earlier) as evidence of her rehabilitation.54 His reference to this statement 
indicates that he lacked the knowledge that earlier in the year, January 2009, she gave a public 
interview retracting this statement of remorse.55 Although the President had considered other 
information provided by the enforcement state, including two psychologist reports,56 his 
determination indicates that he was unaware of this development despite it attracting considerable 




48 More unfortunate was that on this occasion the Prison Directorate noted that Rajić denied responsibility for the crimes 
for which he was convicted. However, President Robinson took Rajić’s at his word - that he accepted the sentence of the 
Tribunal, over that of the Prison Directorate.  
49 Practice Direction on Pardon, Commutation of Sentence and Early Release, para. 11.  
50 B. Holá et al, ‘Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ Reflections on Their Crimes in Early Release Decisions’ at 365. 
51 See Chapter 3, s.3.5.2.  
52 K. King and J. Meernik, ‘Assessing the Impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Balancing 
International and Local Interests While Doing Justice’ in B. Swart, A. Zahar and G. Sluiter (eds.)  The Legacy of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Oxford University Press, 2011) 7-54. See Chapter 4, s.4.3.  
53 This case was widely noted by interviewees in BiH and consequently is discussed throughout this chapter.   
54 Noted in Chapter 3, this reference also lacked normative (legal) legitimacy given that the guilty plea had already been 
accounted for as a mitigating factor in the sentencing.  
55 Swedish TV interview cited Choi, ‘Early Release under International Criminal Law’ 1787 and see: 
https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/1381132.html  
56 Plavšić, Early Release Decision, 14 September 2009. 





The President repeated the apparent lack of knowledge of the societal context within which UER 
occurred nine months later as he granted Sikirica UER.58 In this decision he referred to Sikirica’s 
guilty plea as evidence of his rehabilitation and supported his reason for doing so by referencing 
Plavšić’s statement of remorse at sentencing being weighed in favour of her UER. This positive 
reference, which had very openly been retracted on her return to Belgrade, suggests that no one 
had informed the President of this controversy surrounding her return. A senior staff member at the 
Tribunal when asked about the reference to Plavšić’s remorse in the Sikirica early release decision, 
responded that “he might not have known to be honest; it might not have come to his attention at 
the time the decision was rendered”.59 The interviewee’s comment illustrated the Tribunal’s 
shortcoming of not keeping abreast of the situation in the region; or if one part of the Tribunal was 
aware of the development, a shortcoming in internal communication. Ultimately, however, the 
President had the power to request additional information to keep abreast of regional current affairs 
and this lack of knowledge implies a lack of rigour as the President neglected to utilise this provision.  
 
In addition to neglecting to take into account the societal context to which the perpetrator was due 
to return, on reading the determinations alone, the Presidents’ decisions lacked rigour as they 
generally declined to apply provisions of the black letter law to interrogate further the perpetrator’s 
evidence of rehabilitation. Other than under the Presidencies of Kirk-McDonald, Jorda and, on one 
occasion, Meron (during his first Presidency), there is no visible questioning of enforcement state 
reports or perpetrators’ submissions.60 Until recently, on occasions where there have been 
unfavourable reports of the perpetrator by the prison or enforcement state, the Presidents have 
either considered them “outdated”61 or declined to accord the prison’s opinion too much weight in 
the absence of an expert report. In the case of D. Tadić, the prison’s submission suggested that he 
expressed no remorse for his crimes.62 Although President Pocar referenced the prison’s submission 
he declined to accord it “great weight in the absence of any psychological report”.63 As noted, the 
President had the power to request further information, which could have been, on this occasion, a 
psychological report to determine whether Tadić was remorseful; but he declined to do so. Holá et 
al. described cases, where perpetrators appear to lack remorse, as incidences of the “President 
 
58 D. Sikirica, Early Release Decision, 21 June 2010, para. 14. 
59 Interview, Senior Staff Member, The Hague 02/02/2017.  
60 The determinations show no record of the President requesting clarifications, despite having the power to do so.  
61 R. Kovač, Early Release Decision, 3 July 2013, para. 25. 
62 D. Tadić, Early Release Decision, 17 July 2008, although it was in favour of his release - conditional upon his deportation 
to Serbia, para. 8. 





sweep[ing] … concerns under the carpet and … not making any further inquiries”.64 By doing so the 
President provided the benefit of the doubt to a perpetrator who had (in addition to having been 
found guilty of atrocity crimes) lied under oath,65 over the findings of the relevant authorities of the 
enforcement state. 
 
The case of “outdated” information being rejected by the President and an apparent lack of further 
investigation was put to one interviewee, a judge at The Hague, and received a strong reproach. The 
judge argued that there was “nothing outdated” in the decisions and asserted “I know cases where 
we required more information and other cases where we had enough”.66 The very real and 
discretionary power of the President is highlighted by this judge’s statement. It suggests that judges 
too had the capacity to ask for more; nevertheless, his statement was balanced by the fact that he 
began his sentence: “The President decides”.67  
 
There have other decisions whereby the President emphasised one set of information favourable to 
the perpetrator over negative reports on the perpetrator. In the case of Tarčulovski, in spite of the 
psychological report explicitly noting that he lacked remorse for his crimes,68 the President decided 
to give greater weight to the prison authority’s report which stated that Tarčulovski appeared not to 
pose a societal threat.69 Although the President does consider the negative psychological report, he 
appears to accord it less significance as he granted Tarčulovski UER.  
 
6.3.3. A Naïve Benefit of the Doubt  
At times, the President applied a naïve benefit of the doubt to the perpetrator as he appeared to 
accord greater weight to their evidence, over evidence to the contrary. For example, President 
Robinson concluded in the case of B. Simić that his intention “to return to the practice of medicine in 
order to contribute to his community” outweighed concerns that a number of B. Simić’s statements 
appear to “attempt to attenuate his individual criminal responsibility”.70 There is no apparent 
reflection on whether Simić’s downplaying of his criminal responsibility would make him an 
unsuitable doctor on his return to his community. In the UK, where B. Simić was serving his 
sentence, a conviction for war crimes would be required to be declared and returning to medical 
 
64 B. Holá et al., ‘Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ Reflections on Their Crimes in Early Release at 359 – in the cases of 
Radić and Martinović.  
65 With the exception of those who had pled guilty.  
66 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning 30/01/2017.  
67 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning 30/01/2017. 
68 Decision of the President on the Early Release of Johan Tarčulovski, 8 April 2013, para. 20.  
69 Decision of the President on the Early Release of Johan Tarčulovski, 8 April 2013, para. 20.   





practice would not be without controversy.71 Statements which expressed the belief that a 
perpetrator who had not fully accepted the finding of personal guilt would make a contribution to 
“his community”, signify the apparent disconnect the Tribunal had with the region. Simić was found 
guilty of the crimes of persecution as the highest civilian leader in the Serb-run administration: 
effectively, he contributed to the ethnic cleansing of the area. Over 20 years later this small town 
remains ethnically cleansed and the Bosniak population are now in the minority.72 Simić’s 
contribution to the community, and the disputed nature of that contribution, was illustrated during 
the fieldwork. In autumn of 2017 Simić was appointed as the Director of a Medical Centre in 
Bosanski Šamac, raising controversy in the national media.73 One interviewee in the BiH Federation 
(not from the local area) raised this independently and reflected, “would victims feel comfortable 
coming to that health centre now he is the director?”74 The President’s decision in the case of Simić 
indicates a lack of rigour as the President gives no consideration as to what an effective lack of 
remorse would be for a doctor who returns to an ethnically divided small town.  
 
In 29 of 54 decisions,75 the President considers perpetrators’ return to their society under their 
demonstration of rehabilitation. This statistic indicates that the Presidents were aware of this 
element of rehabilitation under IHRL76 but rather did not consider it consistently or with any rigour. 
As above, responsibility for preparing the perpetrator to return to society is not the responsibility of 
the Tribunal, as the bilateral agreements stipulate that conditions of imprisonment will be the 
responsibility of the enforcement state.77 Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of the President to 
consider whether the perpetrator has evidenced a demonstration of rehabilitation to the extent that 
 
71 The UK General Medical Council lists a number of convictions which medical students are required to declare before 
applying for practice; these include convictions for war crimes, International Criminal Court Act 2001, s51, see: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dbs-list-of-offences-that-will-never-be-filtered-from-a-criminal-record-
check  
72 UK Newspaper, The Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/bosnian-war-criminal-jailed-
for-ethnic-cleansing-wants-to-be-town-mayor-to-apologise-550788.html and https://iwpr.net/global-voices/courtside-
bosanski-samac-trial-15 [accessed 9 December 2019]. The article refers both to Simić’s conviction and that he returned to 
an ethnically-cleansed Bosanski Šamac.  
73 BiH, National Newspaper, “For non-Serb citizens who live in the area of this municipality and still remember the war 
days when Dr. Simić was the sovereign ruler of life and death in Bosanski Šamac, his appointment caused discomfort. ... 
This is the man who was sentenced for the most serious criminal offenses in The Hague. A large number of Bosniaks and 
Croats go for medical treatment in Odžak, Orašje and Gradačac. They refuse to be treated in Bosanski Šamac and suffer 
humiliation - one of the inhabitants of Bosanski Šamac told us’; see: https://faktor.ba/vijest/sud-ponitio-imenovanje-
ratnog-zloinca-simia-za-direktora-doma-zdravlja-292266 [accessed 9 December 2019].  
74 Interview, Prosecutor, Federation BiH, 09/11/2017.  
75 P. Banović, B. Simić, H. Bala, Josipović, Krajišnik, M. Tadić, Tarčulovski, Todorović, Zarić, Borovčanin, Češić, Radić, Šantić, 
Šainović, M. Simić, Šljivančanin, Došen, Delić, Kolundžija, Furundžija, Jokić, Kos, Mucić, Zelenović, Pušić, Kordić, Lazarevic, 
Pandurević, and Žigić. 
76 Article 10(3) of the ICCPR and UNSMR, Rule 61 – “the treatment of prisoners should emphasise not their exclusion from 
the community, but their continuing part of it” – cited in R. Mulgrew, Towards the Development of the International Penal 
System (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 231.  





the President exercises his power under Article 28 of the Statute and releases them back into that 
society. What the above section outlines is that there was a lack of rigour applied by the Presidents’ 
consideration of rehabilitation. In addition to simply not keeping abreast of the situation in the FRY 
(s.6.3.1), they have declined to use their powers to interrogate perpetrators’ rehabilitation in 
relation to remorse, in cases where is has been raised by the enforcement state (s.6.3.2). 
Additionally, the practice of according greater weight to a perpetrator who has lied under oath to 
that of the enforcement state (s.6.3.3) appears misguided. These incidences demonstrate occasions 
where the legitimacy standard of procedural fairness was not met as the Presidents failed to adopt 
“clear procedures”78 to obtain up to date, impartial information (a psychological report rather than a 
prison warden or perpetrator’s own testimony) on the perpetrator’s level of rehabilitation.  
The following section, based primarily on interview data from The Hague, proposes why there was 
this apparent lack of rigour in Presidents’ assessment of rehabilitation.  
 
6.4. Considering Rehabilitation: Explaining the Presidents’ Apparent Lack of Rigour  
6.4.1. Basis of Explanation  
Interview analysis from The Hague provides three main reasons why the Presidents’ decisions 
indicate a lack of rigour in the assessment of the perpetrator’s rehabilitation. First, was the lack of a 
nuanced approach considering the nature of perpetrators of atrocity crimes as distinct from 
perpetrators of grave crimes at the national level. Second, were the practical limitations faced by the 
Tribunal and the acceptance of these limitations.79 Third, was the sense of resignation that 
rehabilitation of perpetrators of atrocity crimes was simply too complex an issue for the Tribunal to 
engage with.  
 
6.4.2. Lack of a Nuanced Approach  
Perpetrators’ right to rehabilitation was recognised early on in the Tribunal’s lifetime (albeit not 
accorded a priority). The judges, in determining a sentence for Furundžija, found guilty of torture 
and outrages upon personal dignity, noted that, despite the primary purposes of sentencing being 
retribution, stigmatisation and deterrence, “none … should be taken to detract from the Trial 
Chamber's support for rehabilitative programmes in which the accused may participate while serving 
his sentence”.80 This statement indicates two things: firstly, the Tribunal recognised perpetrators’ 
 
78 M. Adler, ‘A Socio-Legal Approach to Administrative Justice’ (2003) Law and Policy 25(4): 323-352 at 326. See Chapter 
3, s. 3.5.2.  
79 As a theme that runs throughout this thesis and see Chapter 5, s.5.4.5.  





right to rehabilitation and supported that right;81 secondly, responsibility for perpetrators’ 
rehabilitation lay with the enforcement state. There were a minority of interviewees (three judges 
and two staff members) who emphasised the principle of perpetrators’ right to rehabilitation, 
although there was an inconsistency as to the nature and means of that rehabilitation. One judge 
captured this underlying principle well:  
I am not so much talking about the ICTY, [any] singular cases but we should help all 
those who served their sentence to reintegrate into society …. this is difficult, of 
course, and not everybody is happy with some people running around [but] he has 
the right … to be rehabilitated … and to be reintegrated into society.82 
 
He asserted his belief that persons should be given a second chance where they seek one. This 
approach is in line with the ICCPR that prison should serve to rehabilitate the perpetrator and 
prepare them for return to society. 83 However, the judge’s assertion was somewhat misplaced. 
Firstly, the perpetrators granted UER by the Tribunal had not served their whole sentence. Secondly, 
his apparent principle is based on ordinary criminals returning to society where they are considered 
deviant by the majority. This is not the case for many of the Tribunal’s convicts upon release. As 
discussed in the following chapter, many high and mid-level political or military leaders receive a 
hero’s welcome by their community.84 The idea of treating perpetrators of atrocity crimes as 
ordinary criminals has led to the Tribunal being deemed out of touch with the war-affected 
communities, the society to which the majority of the perpetrators return.85 This removal of the 
perpetrator from the context of their crimes and their return was indicated later by the same judge. 
Although he expressed reservations at the rather “formulaic”86 approach the President took in 
considering rehabilitation,87 he too hinted at a blind-spot in relation to this rehabilitation 
assessment. He clarified that: 
they have to be treated equally as criminals … although for [ours] … when they 
return to their home country … they have a different status as normal criminals. I 
know that … but … we are a criminal court and not a political institution … we … 
apply our Rules, and that is the question ‘are they criminal or not’ and if they are 
 
81 A point reiterated by two judges in BiH – one a former War Crimes Chamber judge and another Cantonal Court judge, 
both adjudicating war crimes cases.   
82 Interview, Judge, The Hague, afternoon 30/01/2017.  
83 Article 10(3) ICCPR, 1966.  
84 J. M. Trbovc, ‘Homecomings From “The Hague”: Media Coverage of ICTY Defendants After Trial and Punishment 
Article’ (2018) International Criminal Justice Review 28(4):406-42.  
85 Additionally, the judge above was also emphasising those perpetrators who do want to live a legal life. In this regard, 
the judge would have been speaking about perpetrators such as Landžo who were remorseful, who unlike Plavšić and 
other high-level political or military perpetrators, did not justify their acts during the war. The same judge acknowledged 
that remorse was not the case for most of the perpetrators of atrocity crimes, in which case if this is not an achievable 
goal then the rhetoric should be abandoned. This did not mean that there should never be an early release, but that 
there is one factor that both stakeholders in The Hague and in BiH believe could justify early release, and this one should 
be accorded more weight by the President.  
86 Interview, Judge, The Hague, afternoon 30/01/2017. 





criminals we treat them as criminals, not as political enemies … the most important 
thing is that they are not recidivist.88 
 
The judge, whilst recognising that the nature of the criminal and their return was different to 
ordinary criminals, determined that the principle of treating them as ordinary criminals was the best 
approach.89 This approach was taken by another two judges, who refused to consider perpetrators’ 
“political nature”.90 However, other international courts, notably the ECtHR, have taken a more 
nuanced approach to perpetrators of atrocity crime and their eligibility for early release. If the 
judges had actively considered international law, as they had done in their sentencing decisions,91 
rather than simply the enforcement states’ reports, they may have been less willing to grant UER. 
The ECtHR has found that a sentence of life imprisonment, with the “prospect of release”,92 is not 
considered contrary to Article 3 (torture, inhumane and degrading treatment), or Article 5 (arbitrary 
or disproportionate punishment) if imposed for very serious offences. This was held in Sawoniuk v. 
UK (2001) specifically for a perpetrator found guilty of atrocity crimes committed against the Jews in 
World War II.93 
 
Furthermore, under international human rights law, there is no automatic right to early release or 
parole. There is a right to be considered, fairly, for parole. The UN Human Rights Committee has 
ruled that “release should not be a mere theoretical possibility”,94 although it is not to be assumed. 
The rule is that “right to parole arises at the time when the offender justifiably qualifies for it”.95 
Reading these two clauses implies that perpetrators must have their application for early release 
rigorously examined: their release should be justifiable.  
 
 
88 Interview, Judge, The Hague, afternoon 30/01/2017.  
89 This thesis is not proposing that perpetrators of atrocity crimes are treated as political enemies or that they do not 
have the right to be rehabilitated. The argument presented here is that their rehabilitation should be assessed differently 
and that not all human rights are equal, and specific provisions should be made for their return to a particular society. 
Counter-intuitively, in a few of the earlier UER decisions a perpetrator’s “capacity for rehabilitation” 
90 Interview, Judge, The Hague, afternoon 30/01/2017 and Interview, Judge, The Hague, 01/02/2017.  
91 See Chapter 4, s. 4.2.3 
92 Sawoniuk v. The United Kingdom, Third Section Decision as to the Admissibility of Application, ECtHR, no. 63716/00, 
see: http://echr.ketse.com/doc/63716.00-en-20010529/view/  
93 S. Snacken, ‘Reductionist penal policy and European human right standards’ (2006) European Journal on Criminal Policy 
and Research 12: 143-164 at 155.  
94 UNHRC, Communication N. 1968/2010, CCPR/C/112/D/1968/2010 (November 17, 2014) para. 7.7, cited in J.D. Mujuzi, 
‘A Prisoner’s Right to be Released or Placed on Parole: A comment on Ocalan v Turkey (No.2) (18 March 2014) Baltic 
Journal of Law and Politics 9(1): 2016, 78. 
95 UNHRC, Communication No. 1968/2010, CCPR/C/112/D/1968/2010 (November 17, 2014) para. 7.7, cited in J.D. Mujuzi, 





6.4.3. The Responsibility of the Enforcement State 
Almost half of Tribunal interviewees reiterated that it was the responsibility of the enforcement 
state,96 and not the Tribunal, to rehabilitate perpetrators.97 This view was presented by way of 
explaining the Presidents’ “formulaic” assessment of the perpetrators’ rehabilitation. Many of the 
interviewees who highlighted this reality did not come across as criticising enforcement states, but 
as emphasising the challenges of rehabilitating perpetrators of atrocity crimes. This underlying 
attitude contributes to the sense of futility of attempting rehabilitation, detailed below s.6.4.4. Their 
statements (six of the nine) were often accompanied with a sense of resignation that “rehabilitation 
programmes are not designed for war criminals”.98 The apparent lack of rehabilitation efforts during 
perpetrators’ enforcement of sentences is reflected in the broad and varied information that the 
Tribunal Presidents have considered in assessing rehabilitation. Holá and others’ analysis of early 
release decisions has identified 16 categories the President has considered.99 These categories have 
included perpetrators’ adherence to the prison rules,100 good relationships with other prisoners,101 
mountain walks,102 visits to the shops,103 and baking.104 These findings speak to a lack of provision for 
perpetrators to undergo personal reformation, as required under Article 10(3) of the ICCPR. This 
supports Mulgrew’s argument that perpetrators are simply “warehoused”105 in European prisons. In 
only one case does it appear that a perpetrator had received a form of tailored rehabilitation 
treatment. This one perpetrator, Landžo (s.6.6), had long-term therapy and twice-monthly meetings 
with a prison psychologist. This treatment appears to have come at the initiative of the enforcement 
state who had a “prison psychologist”.106  
 
In addition to a sense of an overarching, insurmountable, psychological challenge to rehabilitate 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes, three interviewees, two of whom were senior members of staff, 
spoke of the pragmatic challenges and inferred a power imbalance between the Tribunal and the 
 
96 Nine of the 18 Tribunal interviewees expressed this opinion. This practical matter speaks to another theme throughout 
the findings, the significance of the international community (and in the instance of UER - one segment of that audience - 
the enforcement state) and their dominance over other audiences and stakeholders, the local population in BiH. 
97 Three judges (including one former President) Former President, Senior Staff Member Registry, Staff Member Registry, 
Legal Officer, WVU, and Staff Member at the President’s Office. 
98 Interview, Staff Member, The Hague, 23/01/2017.  
99 B. Holá and J. van Wijk, ‘Rehabilitating International Prisoners’, in R. Mulgrew and D. Abels (eds.) Research Handbook 
on International Penal System (Edward Elgar, 2016) at 284.  
100 All decisions, note their compliance with prison rules or their non-breach of rules, or where they have breached 
regulations explanations as to why.   
101 All decisions, with the exceptions of Delić who explained his disagreements with fellow prisoners.  
102 Z. Vuković, Early Release Decision, 11 March 2008, para. 4.  
103 Momir Nikolić, Early Release Decision, 15 October 2015, para. 21.  
104 B. Plavšić, Early Release Decision, 14 September 2009, para. 9. 
105 R. Mulgrew, ‘Towards the Development of the International Penal System (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 25. 
106 The fact that a “prison psychologist” met with Landžo implies that the psychologist was assigned to the prison in 
general rather than specifically for Landžo himself but had during this time, as shall be discussed later, assisted in 





enforcement state (Chapter 5, s.5.4.5). This was put most directly by one interviewee: “No third 
state really wants to enforce a sentence”.107 The notion of states being reluctant to enforce 
sentences for ICTY perpetrators was implied in ICTY’s Manual on Developed Practice which 
applauded the Registry’s “persistent and creative approach to the negotiation of enforcement 
agreements”.108 The adjective “persistent” and the word “negotiation” imply that obtaining 
enforcement agreements was not a straight-forward task. The statement followed a list of different 
“constraints” on potential enforcement states, inter alia “the high costs of enforcement … the 
reluctance of Governments to accept inspections of their prisons by external monitoring bodies, and 
a State's lack of an appropriate socio-cultural environment in its prisons for persons from the former 
Yugoslavia (including the absence of other prisoners with similar socio-linguistic-cultural 
backgrounds)”.109 This context suggests that the President was not in a position where he could 
pressure enforcement states to have tailored treatment for these perpetrators. Tailored treatment 
would create practical challenges and financial burdens, for example, recruiting a Serbo-Croat 
speaking interpreter or a psychologist where the perpetrator did not speak the local language. In 
such a scenario, the enforcement state may be disinclined to accept other perpetrators. Additionally, 
these burdens could make other states reluctant to enforce these sentences. 
 
It is not disputed that it was the responsibility of the state rather than the Tribunal to put in place 
conditions which could assist the rehabilitation. What is asserted is that the President and judicial 
colleagues had the responsibility to fully consider all four factors110 outlined in the RPE in the 
termination of punishment. This included consideration of a demonstration of rehabilitation. Gravity 
of the crime is the first factor listed under the RPE. On a plain reading this implies that the 
subsequent factors listed have to counter the gravity of the crime, which determined the sentence. 
Gravity was a core determination in punishing. However, it appears some judges have detached the 
purpose of punishment and the purpose of imprisonment. One judge, when asked if he could 
prioritise the factors to consider in an early release application responded: 
Let’s go the other way. Which is the most unimportant? Gravity of the crime is 
reflected in the sentence. In my view, of course you should not … release someone 
 
107 Interview, Senior Staff Member, The Hague, 02/02/2017.  
108 ICTY Manual on Developed Practices Prepared in conjunction with UNICRI as part of a project to preserve the legacy of 
the ICTY.  
109 ICTY Manual on Developed Practices Prepared in conjunction with UNICRI as part of a project to preserve the legacy of 
the ICTY, at 152, see: 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/manual_developed_practices/icty_manual_on_develo
ped_practices.pdf  





too easily but, the decision on early release is not a moment where a President 
should review the gravity of crime as established by the Chamber.111 
Although the purpose of punishment and the purpose of imprisonment are distinct,112 when it 
comes to the moment of considering a premature ending of that punishment the two purposes 
coincide and should be examined alongside each other. Also, as a mere technical point, gravity of 
the crime is listed as a factor to consider, and thus should be considered. The question to ask is 
whether the perpetrator’s character appears to have been reformed to the extent that the purpose 
of imprisonment has been achieved, thus outweighing the original purpose of punishment.  
 
Further, the President was and is not powerless as the PD enables him or her to request further 
information considered to be relevant. Additionally, despite the apparent lack of specific 
programmes to address rehabilitation, 28 of the 54 perpetrators granted UER had met with a 
psychologist during their imprisonment; thus, although a challenge, psychological support was not 
an impossibility. As the PD enables the President to request additional information, nothing appears 
to prevent him from ordering an independent psychological assessment where none has been 
conducted. This action would have been more thorough than the dominant practice up until 
February 2017, namely, taking good behaviour in prison and perpetrators’ testimonies as adequate 
evidence of rehabilitation weighing in favour of their early release.  
 
6.4.4. The Complexity of Assessing Rehabilitation for Atrocity Perpetrators 
Over half of the Tribunal interviewees113 expressed doubts as to whether rehabilitation was a 
possibility for perpetrators of atrocity crime, especially those who were motivated by ideology. One 
staff member, though not a lawyer,114 expressed surprise on hearing that rehabilitation was listed as 
a purpose of imprisonment in the Tribunal’s case law: “Rehabilitation is not for war crimes – 
right?”115 The interviewee’s response was a blunt expression of what seven other interviewees, with 
legal training (three judges and two lawyers) or with professional prison experience (two staff 
 
111 Interview, Judge, The Hague, 01/02/2017. 
112 R. Mulgrew, Towards the Development of the International Penal System (Cambridge University Press, 2013) argued 
that the two are separate, “A Divisible Concept of Punishment: Imposition (Justification for Sanction) Retribution; and 
Implementation (Justification for the Penal Regime) Rehabilitation at 213. This thesis asserts that when it comes to a 
sanction being ended prematurely the two should be considered alongside each other. Also see: Henham cited in G. 
Vermeulen and E. de Wree, Offender Reintegration and Rehabilitation as a Component of International Criminal Justice? 
(Maklu Publishing, 2014) at 79. 
113 Eight of the 19 Tribunal interviews; 18 interviewees were from the Tribunal in The Hague and one interviewee in BiH, 
Sarajevo Office, 08/11/2017.  
114 A lawyer, with basic knowledge of International Human Rights Law, should be aware that the ICCPR provides that the 
primary purpose of imprisonment ought to be rehabilitation.  





members), who did consider rehabilitation as a purpose of imprisonment, had concluded. These 
interviewees spoke about the significance of the motivation of perpetrators’ crimes and asserted 
that rehabilitating those who were “ideologically driven”116 would be an insurmountable task. One 
judge expressed this view as he noted that he had read a study on perpetrators of atrocity crimes 
which found that of the fifty participants in the study “no one ever expressed remorse”. He then 
reflected on war criminals from the Second World War and concluded “remorse – it doesn’t 
exist”.117 The judge’s statement implied a sense of resignation that perpetrators of ethnically or 
racially motivated hate-based crimes could simply not be rehabilitated. Another judge expressed a 
similar sense of resignation. He believed he could see what rehabilitation was and had seen “a few 
cases” of “real remorse” but overall concluded that “I can’t say I am very optimistic about that at the 
Tribunal”.118  
 
The attitude that rehabilitation was only a remote possibility and too complicated to assess for 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes was expressed more forcefully by one judge. When discussing 
whether the President had the capacity to assess rehabilitation the question - whether early release 
should be denied to perpetrators who effectively deny their crime – was asked and the judge swiftly 
brought the discussion to a close. He asserted: “most of the time they would think that they are 
completely innocent and that they are unjustly imprisoned so how does that effect rehabilitation? 
It’s a complicated matter [and] I would prefer not to get into a discussion on that because it is never 
ending”.119 Here the judge recognised that perpetrators denying crimes had been problematic for 
the Presidents’ assessment of rehabilitation but simultaneously refused to engage with the problem. 
This attitude illustrates Holá et al.’s observation that “the President seems to be reluctant to draw 
any negative consequences from these discrepancies”.120 His stance reflected this as he refused to 
be drawn into a discussion “problematizing”121 this discrepancy, based on his belief that it was 
simply too complex an issue. Thus, the apparent discrepancy is swept under the carpet.122  
 
116 Interview, Senior Staff Member, The Hague, 02/02/2017.  
117 Interview, Judge, The Hague, afternoon 30/01/2017. Regrettably this study has not been found. The judge’s statement 
implied a sense of resignation that perpetrators of politically motivated crimes could simply not be rehabilitated. This was 
the same judge cited in s.5.4.2, emphasising that perpetrators had the right to be rehabilitated, and focused his attention 
on lower-level perpetrators who he believed could undergo rehabilitative programmes in order to prevent recidivism and 
the responsibility of the enforcement state to undertake these. He also noted that it was not for the Tribunal to reconcile 
the communities. As discussed in Chapter 5, many interviewees at the Tribunal were keen to highlight their limited role, 
and the notion expressed by judges that their role ended when they handed down the sentence.  
118 Interview, Judge, The Hague, 01/02/2017.  
119 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning 30/01/2017. 
120 B. Holá et al, ‘Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ Reflections on Their Crimes in Early Release Decisions’ at 359.  
121 B. Holá et al., ‘Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ Reflections on Their Crimes in Early Release Decisions’ at 366. 
122 This apparent refusal to fully reflect on what perpetrators’ denial of crimes signified in terms of rehabilitation has 
caused a number of the Presidential decisions on UER to read as, at best, “superficial”.122 In eight decisions where there 






Although these three judges perceived rehabilitation as too complex a matter to engage with, five of 
the eight Tribunal judges interviewed123 had given consideration to guilty pleas and the accused’s 
sincerity of remorse in sentencing. Thus, it is not inconceivable that, given that they had undertaken 
this task before, they had the capacity to do so again. Remorse is frequently taken into account as a 
mitigating circumstance in criminal law and similarly in parole board hearings.124 Although remorse, 
at the sentencing phase, has been accused of “lacking clarity and uniformity in both its definition 
and the characteristics that signal its presence or its absence,”125 that does not mean that this should 
not be considered at this stage of the justice system. Further, it is argued here that thorough 
examination of perpetrators sincerity of remorse would be more in line with the UN Human Rights 
Committee’s recommendation that release of offenders should be when they “justifiably qualif[y] 
for it”.126 
 
As discussed below, this apparent refusal to engage with what rehabilitation entails for these 
perpetrators has had a negative impact on the perceived legitimacy of the President’s decision-
making capacity as the perpetrators return to the region.  
 
6.5. A Proclaimed Demonstration of Rehabilitation – Impact on the Tribunal’s Sociological 
Legitimacy 
One judge noted the potential for the credibility of the Tribunal to be undermined by Presidential 
findings of “rehabilitation” in an unrepentant perpetrator:  
We have some … the President [has] said, ‘this person has obviously shown signs of 
rehabilitation’ and this person goes back to Banja Luka … and all of a sudden 
becomes a big campaigner against the Tribunal, against the other ethnic groups … 
What does it all mean? Either we are stupid, or we made a big mistake or this 
person is a bastard. It’s probably the last one.127 
 
The judge’s statement recognised that with this lack of a full consideration of rehabilitation and 
subsequent grant of early release, the ICTY can be perceived as, and, indeed, was cited as having 
 
President had determined, based on their good behaviour in prison, that the perpetrator had demonstrated 
rehabilitation nevertheless.  
123 Seven judges were interviewed in The Hague, January – February 2017. The eighth judge was interviewed in Paris in 
September 2018, thanks to a university grant.  
124 M. Proeve and S. Tudor, Remorse: Psychological and Jurisprudential Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing, 2010) 87.  
125 R. Zhong et al., ‘So You’re Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Criminal Law’ at 39. 
126  J.D. Mujuzi, ‘A Prisoner’s Right to be Released or Placed on Parole: A comment on Ocalan v Turkey (No.2) (18 March 
2014) at 85. See 6.4.2. 





been “tricked”128 by the perpetrator. He also recognised that was important as he added “the area 
of granting early release is a very delicate issue and should engage, not just us, but all … 
international criminal tribunals because it is very, very important”.129 Nevertheless, the judge 
followed his statement by arguing that the Tribunal was unable to make an assessment of the 
situation for itself as it relied on the enforcement states’ recommendations. He acknowledged the 
controversies of early release but in his overall conclusion he was clear that the Tribunal had 
limitations. When asked if there should be further probing of the states’ recommendations, and the 
perpetrators’ submissions, he concluded, “Someone goes to prison, tries his best or her best to 
behave because that way you are treated better; it’s better to behave rather than not … Doesn’t 
mean to say that suddenly from a very bad man you have become a very good man. People lie”.130  
 
This judge’s sense of inevitability that “people lie” was unfortunate because the UER of unrepentant 
and high-level perpetrators created a legitimacy deficit in the Tribunal. This finding (below) was 
articulated by one Tribunal staff member who reflected, UER “doesn't make any sense, it's just like 
giving someone the possibility of discrediting the organisation”.131 The notion that UER discredited 
the organisation was demonstrated by three interviewees in BiH. The two interviewees who began 
their attitudes on rehabilitation by their reaction to the release of Plavšić stated that she had tricked 
the Tribunal.132 The perception of the Tribunal having been tricked was summed up by one 
interviewee in BiH who had actually read the decision itself. Although she perceived the Tribunal as 
legitimate overall, she believed UER was wholly illegitimate. She recalled her disbelief at Plavšić’s 
UER (2011) and the hero’s welcome she received. Her shock had led her to find and read the 
President’s decision.133 Although she could not remember the details, she recalled the lack of 
scrutiny applied as the President “only describes her good behaviour in prison … there was 
something in it … like she's an old lady and her health is poor”. She spoke of her sense of 
disappointment: “Are you … judges or just some housewives? That didn't seem like at the very high 
professional level”.134 Her use of the term “housewives” denotes a sense of her perceiving the 
judges as faltering in the quality of decision-making, in the Tribunal’s legitimacy of exercise. She had 
 
128 Interview, Prosecutor, Sarajevo, Republika Srpska, 17/11/2017, and Interview, NGO Representative, Sarajevo, 
02/11/2017. 
129 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning 30/01/2017. 
130 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning 30/01/2017. 
131 Interview, ICTY, Sarajevo, 08/11/2017.  
132 Interview, Prosecutor, RS, Sarajevo, 17/11/2017, and Interview, Prosecutor, Republika Srpska 22/11/2017. 
133 Only three of the 51 BiH interviews had indicated that they had read an early release decision – one NGO, one 
independent expert and one defence lawyer, who had represented a perpetrator at the Tribunal.  
134 Interview, Independent with professional experience engaging with victim-witnesses in Srebrenica, Sarajevo, 





expected more of “highly-educated people”,135 her description of them later on in the interview. 
Within this interviewee’s framing therefore, if one of the President’s justification for granting an 
early release was on the basis that the perpetrator had demonstrated some evidence of 
rehabilitation, she had expectations that this would be the case. This particular decision was a 
demonstration of the Tribunal failing to meet one of Leventhal’s criteria for good procedural justice, 
that of “accuracy of decision-making”. This is evaluated as the “ability of a procedure to reach 
solutions that are objectively of a high quality, and this depends on using accurate information and 
informed opinion”.136 The information that the President bases his determinations on, discussed 
below, was not perceived by the majority of stakeholders interviewed as being accurate information 
which enabled him to make an objective decision on perpetrators’ demonstration of rehabilitation. 
 
6.6. Assessing a Demonstration of Rehabilitation  
Holá et al.137 have correctly asserted that the “Tribunal has not developed a clear and consistent 
conceptualisation of what rehabilitation of perpetrators of international crimes entails and how to 
assess it”.138 Within the thesis’ framing of legitimacy, the Presidents’ consideration of rehabilitation, 
therefore, fell short of the standard of procedural fairness.139 Rehabilitation programmes in many 
domestic settings (where indeed ICTY perpetrators are held) frequently engage “offenders … as 
moral actors with the capacity both to re-evaluate the past (anti-social) choices and to make … pro-
social choices in the future”.140 The first, backward-looking element implies perpetrators’ 
“reformation”, in the words of the ICCPR, whereby there is an acknowledgement that the criminal 
acts were wrong. The International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rules and Procedures of Evidence (RPE) 
encompass this notion of reformation. The ICC’s RPE were available at the time of the ICTY’s UER 
decisions, which require the ICC Judges to examine a perpetrator’s conduct in detention, and assess 
the extent to which this indicated a “genuine disassociation from his or her crime”.141 As s.6.7 
details, this understanding of rehabilitation closely aligns with what the majority of interviewees in 
 
135 Interview, Independent with professional experience engaging with victim-witnesses in Srebrenica, Sarajevo, 
21/12/2017.  
136 T. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Yale University Press, 1990) discusses one of Leventhal’s six criteria by which 
people evaluate fairness of a procedure, 119. 
137 Holá and colleagues have written on the rehabilitation of perpetrators of atrocity crimes by reference to the ICTY 
Presidents’ early release decisions. They called for qualitative research to be undertaken in the region to assess the 
impact these decision had.  
138 B. Holá et al., ‘Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ Reflections on Their Crimes in Early Release’ at 365. 
139 See Chapter 3, s.3.5.2.  
140 G. Robinson and I. Crow, Offender rehabilitation, theory, research and practice (Sage, 2013) at 121 cited in B. Holá et 
al., ‘Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ Reflections on Their Crimes in Early Release’ at 352.  





BiH believed would be a demonstration of rehabilitation: acknowledgement and remorse for the 
crimes, which could be one justification for an early release, albeit never unconditional.  
 
The following section turns to one factor which the stakeholders interviewed (insiders at the 
Tribunal and outsiders in BiH) believed should not be used to assess rehabilitation, and which has, 
ironically, been the only consistent element Presidents have considered as evidence for 
rehabilitation: their good behaviour in prison.  
 
6.6.1. Good Behaviour in Prison 
Examples of good behaviour in prison as evidence of rehabilitation include: perpetrators’ obeying 
prison rules;142 not breaking prison rules;143 being polite to prison staff;144 having good relationships 
with fellow prisoners;145 and undertaking activities such as woodwork,146 language classes.147 The 
Tribunal’s Presidents have considered the prison reports of perpetrator’s “behaving 
immaculately”148 or their behaviour being “exemplary”149 as evidence of rehabilitation. Good 
behaviour as a determining factor in a demonstration of rehabilitation was explicitly rejected by 
almost all interviewees in The Hague (with the sole exception of one judge, a former President) and 
almost half the interviewees in BiH.  
 
One Tribunal judge reflected on the challenge of determining rehabilitation generally - “What is 
rehabilitation in prison?”150 The majority of his colleagues and Tribunal staff were more categorical 
that the consideration of good behaviour in prison as an indicator of rehabilitation was “a 
stupidity”,151 a “nonsense”,152 a “false measure”.153 The perception that considering good behaviour 
as a sign of rehabilitation is an idiocy echoes the criticism of Galbraith in his censure of judges’ 
“undertheorized” approach in their consideration of how perpetrators’ “good deeds” should be 
 
142 Early Release decisions of D. Tadić, Zelenović, Blagojević, Delić, Bala, Strugar. 
143 Early Release decisions of Momir Nikolić, Obrenović, Šljivančanin, Dragan Nikolić. 
144 Early Release decisions of Jokić, Kubura, Kvočka, Momir Nikolić, Strugar, Landžo, Naletilić, Pušić, Borovčanin. 
145 Early Release decisions of A. Kubura, E. Landžo.  
146 R. Kovač, Public Redacted Version of the 27 March 2013 of Decision the President on the Early Release of Radomir 
Kovač, 3 July 2013.  
147 P. Banović, Decision of the President on Commutation of Sentence, 3 September 2008. 
148 N. Šainović, Early Release Decision, 27 August 2015, para. 20. 
149 Early Release Decisions M. Krnojelac, and T. Blaškić.  
150 Interview, Judge, The Hague, 01/02/2017.  
151 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning 30/01/2017. 
152 Interview, Judge, The Hague, afternoon 30/01/2017. 





considered as mitigating factors in sentencing.154 The attitude expressed by the interviewees in The 
Hague was reflected in BiH, although the language was not as strong. Several reasons were put 
forward as to why good behaviour in prison was totally irrelevant to consider as evidence of 
rehabilitation. Firstly, on a practical level, interviewees in both The Hague and BiH were quick to 
point out that perpetrators were required to behave well in prison, at least by obeying prison rules - 
if not, they were aware that they would suffer consequences.155 Secondly, by behaving well in prison 
perpetrators would benefit. Their good behaviour would mean that “they will be treated better”156 
and privileges may arise.157 This could include a remission of sentence.158 This second reason to 
discount good behaviour, more favourable treatment, was connected to a sense of frustration was 
and a theme throughout the findings, that is, interviewees perceived as ongoing favourable 
treatment to perpetrators of atrocity crime compared to the lived reality of their victims (detailed in 
Chapter 8, s.8.2). It frustrated many interviewees that perpetrators were continually being accorded 
high standards of treatment, including opportunities to communicate with their families – in stark 
contrast with a number of their victims whose family members had been murdered. In prison, by 
behaving well they received rewards such as leave of absences for family visits159 and relaxed 
security.160 These above reasons were practical and applicable for every criminal. The third reason to 
dismiss good behaviour was rooted in the distinct nature of atrocity crimes and the criminals.  
 
The third reason to discount good behaviour in prison was that perpetrators of atrocity crimes were 
believed to be fundamentally different to the average perpetrator of crime, given the nature of their 
crimes and the context in which they were committed. One interviewee at the Tribunal emphasised 
that although some perpetrators might have been of a violent character generally, these were a 
limited number. Most were not deviant people who would have a propensity to criminality. 161 
Further, many came from respected elements of society, including teachers,162 academics,163 and 
 
154 J. Galbraith, ‘The Good Deeds of International Criminal Defendants’ (2012) Leiden Journal of International Law 25(3): 
799 – 813 at 799. See Chapter 4, s. 4.4.2. 
155 12 interviewees in BiH noted this.  
156 Interview, Defence Attorney, Sarajevo, 03/11/2017. 
157 Explicitly noted in the Early Release Decision of Tarčulovski as he was considered a “well-behaved prisoner, enjoying a 
wide range of privileges available to him based upon his good conduct in prison. And Momir Nikolic was also noted to 
have benefits of unaccompanied visits to the local shopping mall based on good behaviour.  
158 Indeed, Šantić was granted remission of sentence and consequently served less than two-thirds of his original 
sentence. See Decision of the President on the Application for Pardon or Commutation of Sentence of Vladimir Šantić, 16 
February 2009, para.14. Other decisions which may also reduce the two-thirds calculation include Stakić, Decision of the 
President on Sentence Remission of Milomir Stakić, 17 March 2014. D. Mrđa, Early Release Decision, 13 December 2013, 
para. 7.  Further, President Meron has “provisionally recognised” the sentence remission of Jelisić, granted by the Italian 
authorities, Decision of the President on Sentence Remission of Goran Jelisić, 28 May 2013, para.34. 
159 Momir Nikolić, Early Release Decision, 15 October 2015, para. 21.  
160 Kordić, Early Release Decision, 6 June 2014, para. 19 – Kordić was detained under ‘relaxed pre-release detention’ 
161 Interview, Senior Staff Member, The Hague, 02/02/2017, and interview, Defence Lawyer, Sarajevo, BiH, 03/11/2017. 





medical doctors.164 Interviewees argued that the majority lived organised lives, they had indeed 
organised others’ lives, and knew how and when to obey rules for their own gain. They were not, 
unlike ordinary criminals of violent crimes, physically dangerous people and they were unlikely to 
reoffend in the same manner.165 As noted by Luban, these perpetrators were generally “ordinary, 
law-abiding citizens, good men and good neighbours, in peacetime”.166 However, the war had 
changed the situation, and although there was no war in BiH, life prior to the war had not been 
restored, for example, there are significant numbers of displaced people.167 Thus, perpetrators’ 
ordinariness and their good behaviour reflecting this, was not a relevant consideration for the 
President to consider as rehabilitation.  
 
Evidence of rehabilitation had to go beyond the everyday acts (good behaviour) of the perpetrator 
into their state of mind. It had to go beyond what the President had considered above and their 
assessment had to be rigorous – rather than granting the perpetrator the benefit of the doubt 
(s.6.3.3). This is due to the specific mens rea of atrocity crimes. Atrocities were committed within the 
context of ethnic hatred.168 The victims of the crimes were targeted based on their association with 
or belonging to a particular ethnic group. This is articulated most eloquently by the Tribunal in the 
case of Kunarac et al.169 As part of the ethnic cleansing of Foča, those found guilty of rape and sexual 
enslavement were convicted of crimes against humanity, as they “mistreated … Muslim girls and 
women, and only Muslim girls and women, because they were Muslims.”170 Their individual acts 
were committed because the perpetrators had “fully embraced the ethnicity-based aggression of 
the Serbs against the Muslim civilians, and all their criminal actions were clearly part of, and had the 
effect of, perpetuating the attack against the Muslim civilian population”.171 Just as the victims were 
symbolic, so too were the perpetrators now being considered for UER.172 Their return had potential 
to cause a societal impact. This element of the perpetrator’s state of mind speaks to the IHRL 
 
163 Plavšić had been a Professor of Biology at the University of Sarajevo.  
164 B. Simić had been a practising medical doctor.   
165 Indeed, this was noted by a Tribunal judge who stated that “a war criminal needs a war to commit crimes” Interview, 
Judge, The Hague afternoon 30/01/2017.  
166 See Chapter 3, s.3.4.2 in relation to considering the purposes for sentencing for perpetrators of atrocity crimes; D. 
Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law’ in S. Besson and J. 
(eds.) The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 575. 
167 D. Orentlicher, noting that one victim returning to her small home town of Prijedor was still unable to return to her 
home as Serb neighbours now occupied it and the local authorities refused to take action. D. Orentlicher, Some Kind of 
Justice: The ICTY’s Impact in Bosnia and Serbia (Oxford University Press, 2018). See Chapter – “The Quality of Justice: 
Bosnian Assessments” 127-189. 
168 Gvero, Early Release Decision, para.4, referring to the Trial Chamber Judgment, “Trial Chamber is satisfied that Gvero 
carried out his acts with the specific intent to discriminate on political, racial or religious grounds. The Trial Chamber 
therefore finds Gvero criminally responsible for committing persecution” 10 June 2010, para. 1833.  
169 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, Trial Chamber Judgment, 22 February 2001. 
170 Kunarac et al, Trial Chamber Judgment, 22 February 2001, para. 592. 
171 Kunarac et al, Trial Chamber Judgment, 22 February 2001, para. 669. 





obligation on states to prepare a perpetrator for social reintegration,173 which recognises 
rehabilitation as a relational matter. Thus, the perpetrator’s behaviour cannot be assessed in 
isolation from the society to which he or she will return. This social rehabilitation was articulated 
best by one BiH interviewee who, as a defence lawyer, said if she was a judge considering early 
release, she would examine “his reintegration into society ... if he can live in a multi-ethnic 
environment and not be hateful and not be discriminating or not be, whatever [he was] during the 
war”.174 Her statement emphasises that a reformed character is needed, that the hatred perpetrated 
during the war should be changed, that he is no longer hateful or discriminating. She then went on 
to list what she considered as evidence of a rehabilitated perpetrator: a man who has “apologised” 
to the woman he raped or written letters to the families of those he killed to “make amends”.175 
These actions both imply a sense of remorse.  
 
6.6.2. Personal Reformation - Remorse  
Interviewees in BiH, except for two,176 were asked what they would consider as evidence of 
rehabilitation. Half of these interviewees used the word “remorse”.177 Despite most interviewees178 
being principally against early release for perpetrators of atrocity crimes, when the question arose of 
what judges should consider as evidence of rehabilitation, they spoke of “remorse”. In contrast, only 
three interviewees (all judges) in The Hague used the word remorse. Most interviewees in The 
Hague responded to the question of how judges could measure rehabilitation by stating that it was 
simply too difficult. Similarly, interviewees in BiH frequently asserted that the sincerity of the 
perpetrator’s remorse was difficult to determine. Nevertheless, 26 of them regarded genuine 
remorse as evidence of rehabilitation, which could possibly justify an early release (s.6.7). These 
mixed views reflect discussions in the literature; those who argue the significance of remorse and 
the role of an apology,179 those who emphasise its difficulty to assess,180 and those who query its 
suitability for these crimes.181 
 
173 See s. 6.2.  
174 Interview, Defence Lawyer, Sarajevo, BiH, 03/11/2017. Another interviewee, a judge, similarly argued that “if we 
speak about the purposes of punishment it’s [a] confrontation with the atrocities committed, for them to be aware of the 
crimes committed, for them to show remorse and to offer apology”, 12/12/2017. 
175 Interview, Defence Lawyer, Sarajevo, 03/11/2017; Interview, NGO, RS, 24/11/2017; and NGO (Tuzla-based), Sarajevo 
07/12/2017 also believed in perpetrators findings their victim and apologising to them.  
176 Two Victims Associations, which included, three direct victims, interviewed were not asked this question as they 
asserted that rehabilitation was not applicable for these types of criminals and both were distressed at UER.  
177 In 26 of the 51 interviews in BiH interviewees used the words, ‘remorse, or ‘sorry’ to articulate what they understood 
as rehabilitation.  
178 16 of these 26 interviews.  
179 S. Bibas & R.A. Bierschbach, ‘Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure’ (2004) Yale Law Journal 114: 






Only five of the interviewees proposed the means by which it could be achieved.182 These 
interviewees asserted that in order to bring about remorse, perpetrators needed to engage with 
psychologists while serving their sentence. For one interviewee this was a prerequisite to early 
release: “Because of the gravity of the crimes they have committed I believe that without 
psychological help these people cannot be re-socialised”.183 At the Tribunal there was one judge who 
similarly advocated that enforcement states engage the perpetrator in rehabilitation efforts and did 
not believe that it was impossible. He argued that enforcement states (other than Norway, all of 
them members of the EU) should be better equipped for rehabilitating perpetrators who are 
motivated by ethnic hatred or nationalistic ideology. He said perpetrators of atrocity crimes in The 
Hague were not so unlike radical right-wing nationalist or Islamist extremists imprisoned in Europe. 
He noted that EU Member States were making efforts to develop rehabilitation programmes tailored 
for these criminals and that efforts, similarly, could be made for perpetrators of atrocity crimes.184 
The judge’s assertion that Member States should be making such efforts is correct as this approach 
is proposed by the EU’s Guidance from the European Agenda on Security. The EU has also 
established a Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) which provides guidance for Member States 
to develop policies to prevent and de-radicalise extremist ideologies.185 Indeed, ten of the 
enforcement states have a Prevent and De-Radicalisation policy in place.186 
 
This judge was also unsympathetic to the sense of resignation that others in The Hague had over the 
practical limitations of language barriers effectively barring perpetrators of sexual crimes from 
participating in rehabilitation programmes, where such programmes are available.187 He noted that 
European countries had a number of perpetrators incarcerated who were non-nationals, and that 
 
Madikizela, ‘Remorse, Forgiveness and Dehumanization: Stories from South Africa’ (2002) Journal of Humanistic 
Psychology 42(1): 7-32. 
180 R. Zhong et al., ‘So You’re Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Criminal Law’ at 39-48.   
181 J.M Coicaud, ‘Apology: A Small Yet Important Part of Justice’ (2009) Japanese Journal of Political Science 10(1) 93–124. 
182 Interview, Victims’ Association, Sarajevo, morning 06/11/2017.  
183 Interview, Victims’ Association, Sarajevo, morning 06/11/2017. 
184 Interview, Judge, The Hague, afternoon 30/01/2017.  
185 Interview, Victims’ Association, Sarajevo, morning 06/11/2017; Interview, Defence Lawyers, Sarajevo, 22/12/2017; 
Interview, Senior Staff of Policy, IGO, 21/12/2017; Interview, ICTY Staff Member, Sarajevo, 08/11/2017; and see 
recommendations https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network_en 
186 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-and-member-
states/repository  
187 Despite being convicted of crimes of sexual violence - R. Češić, D. Tadić, H. Delić, R. Kovač do not, on reading the UER 
decision, appear to have been seen by a psychologist or participated in any specific rehabilitation programmes for 





interpreters should be recruited to assist with their rehabilitation. Practical efforts should be made, 
he argued.188 
 
The case of Landžo is an important example as it speaks to the possibility that perpetrators of 
atrocity crime can be rehabilitated, when given the opportunity. Landžo, found guilty of directly 
committing sexual based torture and murder, has ostensibly been rehabilitated, as a result of 
treatment received during imprisonment. Scholars noted that he laughed throughout his trial189 and 
showed no remorse. While serving his sentence in Finland he had bi-weekly meetings with a 
psychologist and, as a result, the President determined that there were signs of genuine remorse.190 
This remorse was demonstrated in 2017 in a documentary by a Scandinavian film-maker who 
recorded Landžo’s efforts to locate his victims and his victims’ families and apologise directly to 
them. Through these efforts he had demonstrated rehabilitation in the sense of a personal 
reformation; he recognised his actions as morally wrong and wanted to recognise the harm he had 
caused to victims by apologising to them.191 It is noteworthy that only three victims were willing to 
meet with him and only one believed that he was remorseful. This victim reflected on Landžo’s 
youth when he committed the crimes and believed that prison had served him well. None were 
ready to forgive.192 
 
Some scholars have queried whether it is “even decent” for perpetrators of crimes against humanity 
to offer an apology. They have argued that the “sheer inhumanity of the crime, the dark 
transcendence of humanity by such crimes makes the issuing of an apology by the perpetrator 
somewhat absurd, if not obscene … is the perpetrator entitled to the relief he/she might get from 
the apology?”193 This thesis disputes this assessment. Firstly, from a human rights perspective, the 
perpetrator has not lost their humanity, and has the right to rehabilitation, here in the sense of 
repudiating both the crimes and their motive committed. This means that perpetrators are free to 
offer an apology. It does not oblige the victim to accept it; described by Govier and Verwoerd as the 
 
188 Additionally, he argued that in some cases there may be an actual danger of other offences in relation to some 
perpetrators, in particular perpetrators of sexual crimes. He believed that atrocity crimes such as sexual enslavement, 
were not in his view too dissimilar to sex-trafficking. Although they could not commit atrocity crimes they could 
nevertheless be dangerous if returned to society. Very little is known about these more direct perpetrators who do 
return. 
189 E. Neuffer, The Key to My Neighbour’s House, 301 cited in E. Stover, The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of 
Justice in The Hague (Pennsylvania University Press, 2005) 69.  
190 Prosecutor v. Esad Landžo, Order of President on Commutation of Sentence, 13 April 2006, para. 9. 
191 S. Bibas and R.A. Bierschbach, ‘Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure’ at 147.  
192 Thanks to an NGO interviewee (16/10/2017), who provided the link to this film.  





“victim’s prerogative”.194 Indeed, this was demonstrated in BiH as one interviewee said, “They say 
they are sorry, they are remorseful. Me personally, I cannot accept this. I cannot. I don’t believe 
these people can be remorseful”.195 This victim was not alone; two other interviewees also flatly 
rejected the proposition that an expression of remorse could provide a justification for early release. 
The scepticism of, and disregard for, any proffered apology, echoes others’ findings in relation to 
guilty pleas and statements of remorse being disbelieved.196 Many believed that such an apology 
was self-serving. Yet victims are not a homogeneous group;197 26 interviewees who had lived 
through the war, three being direct victims, spontaneously identified a role for “remorse”. These 26 
did not perceive an apology as obscene; rather, they felt it important for a genuine apology to be 
heard. Some also posited that this was not only for the perpetrators, or victims but also for the 
wider-post-conflict community.  
 
6.7. Remorse as Evidence of Atrocity Perpetrators’ Rehabilitation – Obtaining Sociological 
Legitimacy in the Grant of Early Release  
This section focuses on remorse as “evidence of a demonstration of rehabilitation” as it was 
proposed, and reflected at length, by many of the interviewees in BiH. Given that they are key 
stakeholders of the Tribunal, it is reasonable that their views be heard. Further, the release of a 
perpetrator affects them, and is perceived to be negative. To be a legitimate institution exercising 
power, it is sensible to reflect on propositions that have been put forward by them which could 
possibly justify (albeit not to everyone) a practice currently perceived as illegitimate by the majority 
of interviewees in BiH. That is, lessons can be learned by listening to stakeholders on the ground. As 
noted in Chapter 2, researching in the field of international criminal justice, is often not limited to 
exploring theories but striving for improvements in the system. Thus, making recommendations 
calling for adopting or amending practices based on empirical findings has the potential to 
contribute to maintaining or enhancing its overall legitimacy.198 Finally, from a human rights 
perspective exploring this societal relationship is important as a perpetrator’s rehabilitation under 
 
194 T. Govier & W. Verwoerdas, ‘Forgiveness: The Victim’s Prerogative’ (2002) South African Journal of Philosophy 21(2): 
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IHRL encompasses their “social rehabilitation”.199 This implies that reintegration into the society, and 
how best to achieve this, should be considered. Before turning to this, two counterarguments are 
presented as to why perpetrators of atrocity crime should evidence remorse rather than the lack of 
propensity to recidivism, as noted by the Tribunal judge in s.6.4.2.  
 
Some scholars have queried whether a state should concern itself with repentance.200 A simple 
response is asserted here, articulated best by Tasioulas, who asserted that providing opportunities 
for repentance “enables those citizens better to comply with the values that they already have 
reason to comply with”. Remorse as rehabilitation thus “facilitates criminal wrongdoers in atoning 
for their wrongs by reintegrating themselves with those values”.201 In the case of atrocity crimes, 
remorse for crimes motivated by ethnic hatred would be a recognition of the universal norm, that 
being “of the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family”.202 This universal norm (detailed in the following chapter) fits with Tasioulas’ proposition of 
repentance being the acceptance of “objectively correct”203 values which a perpetrator has 
transgressed. Therefore, assessing this remorse for crimes based on discrimination of another 
ethnicity is important as the perpetrator on early release is due to return to a society which is, in 
principle, not discriminatory. As noted by the Sarajevo-based defence lawyer, s.6.2, “can [he] live in 
a multi-ethnic environment and … not be discriminating?”204 
 
Another argument represented by scholars is that requiring repentance is a violation of a person’s 
autonomy – that a state power should not manipulate people to be repentant. This thesis is not 
proposing that perpetrators must be rehabilitated but that they have the opportunity to be 
rehabilitated205 and where they claim to be rehabilitated they should provide evidence. The notion 
of an intrusion into personal autonomy was raised by one interviewee in The Hague.206 The 
interviewee raised this, not as their own point of concern, but reported that “a group of prison 
authorities … were outraged that we needed evidence of rehabilitation”.207 The interviewee did not 
go on to explain why prison authorities were outraged. This thesis asserts that evidence of 
 
199 Article 10(3) ICCPR, 1966.  
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202 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble.   
203 J. Tasioulas, 'Repentance and the Liberal State' at 513.  
204 Interview, Defence Lawyer, Sarajevo, BiH, 03/11/2017.  
205 In accordance with IHRL.  
206 Under the Tribunal’s Rules and Procedure of Evidence (RPE), Rule 125, the President’s requirement to consider a 
perpetrator’s demonstration of rehabilitation generally encompassed that the perpetrator provide some evidence of 
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rehabilitation is not unreasonable, especially given the gravity of the crimes, their motivation and 
context (based on ethnic hatred) and the divided society to which they return. In the parameters of 
international law, it is, in fact, required by the International Criminal Court’s RPE. These rules outline 
the criteria for judges to consider in an application for a reduction of sentence for perpetrators of 
atrocity crimes. By listing a set of criteria judges are required to consider, it follows that evidence of 
these criteria is provided for consideration to be given. Although the Rules do not use the word 
“rehabilitation”, they do imply personal reformation and perpetrators’ capacity to return to society; 
the two principles as set out in the ICCPR. The ICC’s Judges who consider a perpetrator’s request for 
a reduction in sentence evaluate, inter alia, “(a) the conduct of the sentenced person while in 
detention, which shows a genuine dissociation from his or her crime; (b) the prospect of the 
resocialization and successful resettlement of the sentenced person; (c) Whether the early release of 
the sentenced person would give rise to significant social instability”.208 This third factor explicitly 
recognises the relational element of a perpetrator and makes clear that this societal factor should be 
given consideration. The ICC’s Rules are raised here because the elements were alluded to by 
interviewees in BiH. Further, these Rules were written for the purposes of a reduction of sentence 
for perpetrators of atrocity crimes, whose crimes and context of return can form a baseline 
comparison. Additionally, these rules were available for the ICTY’s President and judicial colleagues 
to consider at the first application for early release,209 and subsequently thereafter. 
 
Remorse is not mentioned in the ICC’s rules but the first factor - “dissociation from his or her crime” 
- on plain reading encompasses remorse for the crime. The Oxford English dictionary defines 
“dissociation (from something) [as] the act of showing that you do not support or agree with 
something”.210 Additionally, in the literature, dissociation from the crime is encompassed in a 
perpetrator’s apology for the crime. As noted by Garvey who asserted that “apology is the self’s way 
of accepting responsibility for its wrongdoing but at the same time disavowing the wrong”211 and 
where genuine can be of value. This definition and belief in the value of this is supported by the ICC’s 
two decisions on reduction of sentences, both of which encompass elements of remorse as 
described by BiH interviewees. These elements were: an acknowledgement of crimes as a wrong, 
recognition of the harm caused to victims and an apology. The first ICC decision on an application for 
a reduction of sentence rejected the perpetrator’s claimed disassociation from his crime as it 
 
208 ICC Rules and Procedure of Evidence, Rule 223. Emphasis added. The other two factors are: (d) any significant action 
taken by the sentenced person for the benefit of victims as well as any impact on the victims and their families as a result 
of early release; and (e) individual circumstances of the sentenced person, including a worsening state of physical or 
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209 D. Erdemović, Early Release Decision, June 1999, made Public, July 2008.  
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determined that his expression of remorse “did not acknowledge [the perpetrator’s] own culpability 
[or] express[ion] of remorse or regret to the victims of crimes for which he was convicted”.212 Thus, 
he was denied a sentence reduction. In contrast, in the case of Katanga’s application, the Panel of 
judges determined that Katanga’s two actions during imprisonment constituted evidence of 
dissociation. First, was his withdrawal of an appeal against conviction, thereby an apparent 
acceptance of the Trial Chamber’s finding of guilt. Second, was his public expression of regret to 
victims. He had a “filmed apology” to his victims – which the judges determined had shown that he 
had “genuinely dissociated from his crimes”.213 Thus, his application for a reduction of sentence was 
granted. A genuine expression of remorse, regret for specific actions, was considered as weighing in 
favour of his reduced sentence.  
 
The ICC’s consideration of perpetrators’ dissociation from the crime reflected much of what BiH 
interviewees proposed as measures of genuine remorse. Interviewees who perceived remorse as 
rehabilitation frequently spoke of a perpetrator showing remorse. To show remorse was a positive 
act with a receiving audience. In the context of a demonstration of rehabilitation, this was put 
bluntly by one prosecutor who said, “You want early release? Then show us you are sorry”.214 The 
use of the word “show” implies communication – that an act is seen. Fourteen of these interviewees 
delved further into what should be communicated. For them the concept of remorse was linked to 
an acknowledgement of the crimes,215 a recognition of harm to victims,216 and a public apology.217 
These threefold elements echoed traits encompassed in Proeve and Tudor’s model of “a remorseful 
person”. This is a person who “thinks about what he did, how it affected other people, and may 
experience a sense of a changed self”.218 That is, the crime is acknowledged, the harm caused to the 
victim is acknowledged and, as a result of this changed mind-set, the perpetrator may wish to 
provide an apology. This personal reformation and resocialisation element was articulated by one 
BiH judge who argued that punishment should be for perpetrators’ “confrontation with the 
atrocities committed, for them to be aware of the crimes committed, for them to show remorse and 
to offer apology”.219  
 
212 ICC Decision on the review concerning reduction of sentence of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 22 September 2015, ICC-
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214 Interview, Prosecutor Sarajevo, RS, BiH, 17/11/2017.  
215 Six of the interviewees in BiH noted that key to remorse was the perpetrator’s acknowledgement of the crime they 
were convicted of was morally wrong.  
216 Seven of the interviewees noted that encompassed in remorse was a recognition of harm done to victims.  
217 13 of the interviewees in BiH argued that perpetrators to be granted an early release should publicly apologise for 
their crimes.  
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Here the focus is on the perpetrator and remorse as benefiting the perpetrators themselves. The 
notion of the perpetrator confronting their crime speaks to the perpetrator’s personal reformation. 
By offering an apology the opportunity is opened for them “to be cleansed from the darkest aspect 
of their past”.220 This was described by one RS prosecutor who reflected that “show[ing] remorse for 
the crimes … maybe this would be a moment of catharsis for them”.221  
 
The emphasis on the acknowledgment of the crime was for most interviewees about the recognition 
of victims’ harm and for societal well-being rather than for the benefit of the perpetrator. These 
findings illustrate some scholars’ assertion that apologies222 hold significance as they can be a means 
to “vindicate victims and humble offenders”.223 Bibas’ and Bierschbach’s assertion was an opinion 
reflected in this research’s findings. Thirteen of the 26 interviewees in BiH who wanted a perpetrator 
to demonstrate remorse believed an apology should be made public. One prosecutor recognised 
that measuring remorse was difficult, but proposed that a perpetrator could “back up his remorse 
with a public apology to victims”.224 In advocating for this public apology the purpose was not 
apparently for the victims directly but rather for societal recognition of victims. One survivor 
articulated this, as she emphasised the lack of recognition of victims throughout the interview.225 
She reflected that in the RS none of “the perpetrators … had made public statements, nor did they 
offer their apologies” and she asserted that “people would believe them more, rather than the 
victims, if the apology came from them”.226 For her, perpetrators’ apology would be an authoritative 
recognition of the crime as a wrong and the harm caused to victims.227 Others also took this 
approach and believed that the Tribunal, not only the perpetrator, had responsibility to make these 
apologies known. One interviewee advocated “remorse expressed and for people to know about it, 
with outreach. That would generate so much for the region, a public apology”.228 One interviewee 
went further and proposed that if a perpetrator was genuinely remorseful, a condition could be 
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placed on him at early release to “work publicly … on reconciliation, on remorse – speaking about it 
on TV – and if he is not doing that, go back and serve your sentence”.229 This interviewee recognised 
that his proposal may have some legal difficulties, but the purpose behind it echoed the assertions 
of the preceding interviewee who spoke of the value a public apology could have and the assertion 
that it was for the Tribunal’s Outreach programme to make that known.  
 
Although interviewees believed remorse was evidence of rehabilitation, they remained sceptical that 
it would ever be possible to determine its genuineness. In noting their scepticism, four interviewees 
associated this with their recollection of Plavšić. Plavšić’s hero’s welcome and her retraction of 
remorse frustrated a number of interviewees who argued that with these unrepentant perpetrators 
the ICTY, as one said, “should have learned … why are they early released? We don’t see any change 
of attitudes … none of them show any remorse ... there should have been proper scrutiny”.230 The 
interviewee’s belief that there had not been proper scrutiny speaks to perceived lack of procedural 
justice in The Hague. The interviewee was disappointed that the judges had not thoroughly 
examined the perpetrators’ rehabilitation - their personal reformation, which would have been, for 
this interviewee and 25 others, an expression of remorse.  
 
6.8. Conclusion  
This chapter has argued that the Tribunal’s Presidents’ assessment of the perpetrators’ 
demonstration of rehabilitation lacked rigour and were poorly reasoned. As the decision-making 
process lacked rigour, decisions fell short of the legitimacy standard of procedural fairness.231 As the 
decisions, reasoning on what a demonstration of rehabilitation encompassed was considered 
misplaced by the majority of interviews, this element of the decision fell short of the procedural 
justice standard of informed and objective decisions.232 Thus, the Presidents’ determinations on 
perpetrators’ rehabilitation lacked sociological legitimacy in both The Hague and in BiH. 
 
Interview analysis from The Hague explains why this haphazard approach was taken: judges, 
seemingly, did not distinguish between perpetrators of atrocity crimes and ordinary criminals; an 
emphasis being placed on enforcement states’ obligations to rehabilitate perpetrators rather than 
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the judicial duty to consider evidence of rehabilitation thoroughly; and a sense of resignation 
regarding the impossibility of a rehabilitated perpetrator of atrocity crime. This approach meant that 
some judges appeared to provide a brushstroke benefit of the doubt to perpetrators, shirk post-
sentencing responsibilities and distance themselves from stakeholders in the region, actions and 
attitudes which are echoed in the following chapters.  
 
This chapter, in addressing the final sub research question, identifying the legitimacy deficit, has also 
identified one possible means by which future ICTs considering an early release from imprisonment 
could learn – the value of remorse. Although the majority of interviewees in BiH perceived 
rehabilitation for perpetrators of atrocity crimes as a challenging task, many of them were open to 
considering genuine remorse as evidence of rehabilitation. It had to be rigorously assessed, and 
where perpetrators gave false expressions of remorse, this ought to prompt the court to re-impose 
the remainder of their sentence.233 Thus, early release should not be unconditional; remorse had to 
be genuine and ongoing. Some interviewees asserted that genuine remorse and an apology was 
important; to others it meant nothing, and they wanted perpetrators to serve their whole sentence, 
given the gravity of the crime. Others further perceived remorse, not only as a justifiable reason for 
early release, but as significant for BiH in terms of societal well-being, rather than simply that of the 
perpetrator or, indeed, their victims. Remorse, the first step being an acknowledgement of crimes,234 
could counter the high level of denialism of atrocities in BiH (discussed Chapter 7). Further, an 
apology may indirectly assist victims at a societal level. Acknowledgement and an apology would be 
a recognition of the injustice inflicted on them. 235 It had the potential to confirm victims’ harms 
currently ignored or belittled (detailed Chapter 8). Granting an early release where a perpetrator 
expresses genuine remorse and makes a public apology may be one means by which to achieve 
sociological legitimacy. A public apology would be one way to meet the “legitimation through the 
justification” standard of legitimacy,236 whereby the perpetrator demonstrates, and an ICT 
emphasises, that release is justifiable. However, as the interview data showed and this thesis 
recognises, early release will not be justifiable to all. Nevertheless, even when some members of 
society are unwilling to listen to or accept, a public apology by a remorseful perpetrator may give 
rise to social debates and open the space for critical reflections on past atrocities.237 Further, 
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remorse and a public apology for the crimes would symbolise that the perpetrator has accepted the 
moral condemnation of punishment. As the following chapter outlines, many interviewees perceived 
the purpose of punishment (imprisonment) as being an authoritative assertion of an unjustified 
harm done to victims (Chapter 7, s.7.4.2). Therefore, granting an early release to a perpetrator who 
had expressed genuine remorse and apologised for their crimes may be less aggravating to sections 
of society. The perpetrator would have actively dissociated from their crime: early release would 
have been connected to the purpose of punishment, and the perpetrator would have accepted that 
they had unjustly committed a harm and that their punishment was deserved. Early release would 
not have been a poorly reasoned process whereby judges would be perceived as forgetting that they 
had condemned the crime and the perpetrator at sentencing as they now released them early 
without justification.  
 
Finally, genuine remorse as the understanding of rehabilitation speaks to the human rights framing 
of rehabilitation: perpetrators’ reformation and their reintegration into society. The criminal justice 
system, including rehabilitation, is meant to serve not only the perpetrator but all of society.238 
Perpetrators of atrocity crime, removed from society as they serve their sentence, are nevertheless 
due to return to that society. As they are granted UER, most do return.239 The following chapter 
discusses the impact of UER in BiH, where perpetrators do not express remorse for the harms they 
have caused to victims. It outlines the negative repercussions, the “shit-storm”240 UER has where 
perpetrators return early and unrepentant.  
 
238 R. Mulgrew, Towards the Development of the International Penal System (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 213, 
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Chapter 7: UER Negating the Expressive Value of the ICTY’s Punishment 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter argues that the UER of unrepentant perpetrators of atrocity crimes does a disservice to 
the two principal expressive purposes of punishment - moral condemnation and overall norm 
projection handed down by the Tribunal. This argument is based on the analysis of interview data 
which concurred with the existing propositions of scholars who posit that the most fitting purpose of 
punishment for atrocity crimes is its expressive capacity, that is, its authoritative moral 
condemnation of the crimes. The preceding chapter argued that perpetrators’ rehabilitation should 
be measured on a rigorous examination of their acceptance of the moral wrong of their actions 
rather than mere acceptance of illegality. Interview data, where several of the interviewees 
convincingly spoke of the value of perpetrators’ remorse and apology (Chapter 6, s.6.7) as well as 
the ICC RPE requirement for perpetrators to demonstrate a genuine dissociation from their crime, 
supports the argument that their remorse is fundamental to rehabilitation. The emphasis placed on 
remorse, as a recognition of the moral wrong, the harm caused to victims, speaks to why we punish 
in the first instance.  
 
This chapter begins by setting out how the expressive value of punishment as moral condemnation 
of the crimes was perceived by interviewees, as an important element of the Tribunal’s purposive 
legitimacy (its aims and values).1 This was articulated by the Tribunal itself (s.7.2) and the chapter 
argues that this justification for punishment is, indeed, the most fitting for atrocity crimes. 
Nevertheless, it recognises and addresses the fact that the expressive capacity for punishment raises 
challenges, primarily due to multiple audiences, that the Tribunal (and, indeed, any international 
criminal tribunal or court) addresses, who may have different priorities (s.7.3). This section, although 
not strictly linked to perceived negation of the expressive element of punishment, is relevant here as 
it continues to answer the second part of the Research Question, of why the early release practice 
happened, and how the stakeholders perceived its legitimacy and outlines why. Sections 7.4.2-7.4.3 
detail the proposed norm. The chapter discusses the extent to which UER undermines this norm to 
the different audiences that the punishment addresses, and why (s.7.4.4-7.4.5). Further, it outlines 
how UER projected unintentional messages,2 and discusses their significance in BiH (s.7.5). The 
chapter begins to answer the final aspect of the thesis’ Research Question concerning the impact of 
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UER on the overall legitimacy of the Tribunal in BiH (s.7.6). It does so by discussing the findings 
relating to the other valuable elements of expressivism, its truth-confirming nature,3 which was 
perceived to have been satisfied during the trial, the finding of guilt, and [some] subsequent 
punishment. Although the punishment was ended early by UER, these expressivist purposes were 
not ultimately undone.  
 
7.2. The Declared Expressive Value of Punishing Atrocity Crimes  
For the Tribunal the two main stated purposes in sentencing perpetrators4 were retribution and 
deterrence.5 Over the course of its lifetime, the judges tailored retribution to encompass what they 
had initially labelled “reprobation”, effectively, moral condemnation. The Tribunal’s first judgment 
concluded that “the International Tribunal sees public reprobation and stigmatisation by the 
international community” as a means to “express its indignation over heinous crimes and denounce 
the perpetrators” and thus was “one of the essential functions of a prison sentence for a crime 
against humanity”.6 Broadly, therefore, punishment, embodied in a prison sentence, is a tangible 
denunciation of the crime as a whole, the criminal act itself (actus reus), and its motivation, the 
criminal’s mind-set (mens rea). The Erdemović judgment above makes explicit three matters here. 
First, is that the Tribunal positions itself to speak for the “international community’ as they 
determine an appropriate sentence.7 Second, they are expressing the international community’s 
“indignation” at the crimes. Third, they are denouncing the perpetrator of these crimes. The first 
two elements mimic the Tribunal’s first President’s pronouncement of the legitimacy of international 
criminal tribunals more broadly; their legitimacy in prosecuting and punishing those found guilty, on 
the basis of “peremptory norms of international law … based on the values common to the whole of 
humanity”.8 Cassese labelled this “universal values legitimacy” which was described by Sandholtz in 
relation to the “purposive legitimacy” of the ICTY. This purposive legitimacy was based on the 
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universally recognised norms and on the “fundamental dignity and worth of the human person”.9 It 
is also noteworthy that in the Erdemović judgment the judges undertook a review of previous trials’ 
outcomes for crimes against humanity. In doing so, there was an implicit recognition of the distinct 
nature of these crimes and their desire for their punishment to reflect this. Taking this review into 
account, the Tribunal’s first judgment determined that moral condemnation was the most 
appropriate purpose for punishing atrocity crimes.  
 
The words “indignation”10 and “reprobation”11 adopted by the judges at the Tribunal resonate with 
the language of legal philosopher Feinberg, frequently cited when scholars have advocated for the 
expressive value of punishment to be applied to atrocity crimes.12 Other scholars13 have justified 
international punishment independently, based on its expressive capacity, its ability to 
authoritatively express moral condemnation of the crime, and have added new elements to 
Feinberg’s proposition (s.7.4.2-7.4.3). Interviewees in BiH voiced a number of Feinberg’s 
propositions14 and emphasised other elements identified by Feinberg who asserted that 
"[p]unishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and 
indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the punishing 
authority himself or of those 'in whose name' the punishment is inflicted.”15 First, addressed below, 
is the authoritative disavowal of the crime, and second, the vindication of the law, specifically in this 
instance, international criminal law and the norm underpinning this: that is, perpetrators of gross 
human rights violations, which atrocity crimes are, should be prosecuted and punished.16 Hence, 
hereinafter, validation of the law is referenced as the “norm projector”. The norm underpinning 
 
9 W. Sandholtz, ‘Creating Authority by Council: The international criminal tribunals’ in B. Cronin and I. Hurd (eds.) The UN 
Security Council and the Politics of International Authority, (Routledge, 2008) at 134.   
10 D. Mrđa, Sentencing Judgement, 31 March 2004, para. 14, citing Aleksovski, Appeals Judgement, 24 March 2000, para. 
185.  
11 The Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemović, 29 November 1996, Sentencing Judgement, para. 64. 
12 R. Sloane, ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the 
Potential of International Criminal Law’ (2007) Stanford Journal of International Law 43: 39–94, B. Wringe, ‘Why Punish 
War Crimes? Victor’s Justice and Expressive Justifications of Punishment’ (2006) Law and Philosophy 25: 159–191 at 176.  
13 Amann, Drumbl, Duff, Fisher, Meijers and Glasius, Luban and Wringe.  
14 These four factors were as follows: first, an ‘authoritative disavowal of the crime’, punishment is a means for society to 
express its condemnation of the crimes, which was subsequently negated at UER; second, symbolic non-acquiescence, 
punishment signalled that the international community was not complicit in the atrocities; third, it was a vindication of 
international criminal law, it put into action the black letter law; fourth, it “informally absolves others of blame”. This is 
summed up by his statement that “The condemnatory aspect of punishment does serve a socially useful purpose: it is 
precisely the element in punishment that makes possible the performance of such symbolic functions as disavowal, non-
acquiescence, vindication, and absolution.” J. Feinberg, ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment’ in Doing and Deserving, 
Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton University Press, 1970) at 115. 
15 J. Feinberg, ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment’ at 95. 
16 K. Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics (Norton, 2011) at 255; and 
M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Crime and Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 174. Generally, atrocity crimes are noted 
as grave human rights violations without any explicit rationalisation, see S.C. Carey and S.C. Poe (eds.) Understanding 





international criminal law, this thesis argues, is victims’ intrinsic worth, set out in s. 7.4.2. This thesis 
sought to uncover why the ICTY, as a criminal tribunal, fell short of its pledge to fully punish 
perpetrators, and the extent to which this non-fulfilment had an impact on the Tribunal’s legitimacy.  
 
7.3. The ICTY’s Audiences and their Multiple Perceptions of the Tribunal’s Purposive Legitimacy  
The belief (asserted by the Tribunal itself) that punishment is an expression of moral condemnation 
of the crimes and, ultimately, the norm projection, implies that this “expression” has a recipient, an 
audience or indeed audiences.17 The ICTY, as outlined in Chapter 4, had multiple audiences, some of 
which were simultaneously stakeholders.18 The fact that the ICTY had multiple audiences hints that 
the purposive legitimacy of the Tribunal was vulnerable to contestation from the outset. These 
different audiences may have perceived these expressive capacities of punishment differently; and, 
as highlighted in Chapter 5, the considerable weight of the enforcement state indicated, and 
reportedly noted by a former President,19 that the Tribunal did not always succeed in balancing the 
differing priorities20 of these audiences.21 By way of example, pertinent for UER, if one adheres to 
claims made that the Tribunal, its initial primary purpose of expressivist function of punishment, for 
at least one audience (some UNSC Member States), was of non-acquiescence to the grave breaches 
of IHL being perpetrated in the FRY. Some observers argued that the Tribunal was established as a 
means for the UNSC to express non-acquiescence to the atrocities being committed, to rid 
themselves of the accusation of ignoring the widespread killing.22 This expressive capacity was 
articulated by Feinberg, albeit not describing punishment for these crimes. Feinberg sets out the 
motive of the “non-acquiesce” capacity of punishment as arising from “the Kantian idea that in 
failing to punish wicked acts society endorses them and thus becomes particeps criminis”.23 With 
regard to the UNSC Resolutions, which established the Tribunal, the first two stated purposes for the 
 
17 Amann, Meijers and Glasius, Duff, Luban, Fisher and Wringe.  
18 Stakeholders being those who in contrast to an audience, have a tangible interest in the ICTY’s work and/or its 
outcomes.  
19 Discussed in the next chapter, according to one Victims’ Association the former President had explained that the 
practice of early release was a consequence of the enforcement state rather than being, at least on the RPE of the 
Tribunal the sole decision of the President.  
20 Priorities over the aims of the Tribunal. For a description of purposive legitimacy see Chapter 3, s.3.4.2. 
21 It was noted by one senior member of staff at the Tribunal (Interview, 02/02/2017) that due to the ad hoc nature of the 
Tribunal it was under constant pressure to close, despite many Victims Associations in BiH not wishing for it to do so. See 
D. Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY's Impact in Bosnia and Serbia (Oxford University Press, 2018) at 143.  
22 J. Meernik and K. King, ‘Crimes and Punishment: How the ICTY Distinguishes Among Massive Human Rights Violations’ 
in S.C. Carey and S.C. Poe (eds.) Understanding Human Rights Violations (Ashgate, 2004). Meernik and King list a number 
of authors who argued initial criticism of the ICTY was that it was an “attempt by the major powers to absolve themselves 
of responsibility for their inaction’, 147; referencing: R. Holbrooke, To End a War (Random House, 1998) at 190; Y. 
Beigbeder, Judging War Criminals (St. Martin’s Press, 1999) at 46; G. Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance (Princeton 
University Press, 2000) at 207.   
23 J. Feinberg, ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment’ in Doing and Deserving, Essays in the Theory of Responsibility, at 





Tribunal, prima facie give credence to these authors’ propositions. The Resolution asserted that the 
Tribunal would “put an end to such crimes” and “take effective measures to bring to justice the 
persons who are responsible for them”.24 This non-acquiescence function of the Tribunal’s purpose 
of punishment has been summed up best by G. Robertson who posited that “the ICTY was 
established by the Security Council … as if to stop the world laughing at its impotence”.25 The word 
impotence is used by Robertson to emphasise that the UNSC was the international body which had 
“primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”.26 Based on the 
wording of the UNSC Resolution, one of the stated primary purposes of the ICTY was to fulfil that 
mandate, which it asserted it would do by indicting perpetrators, with a view to incapacitate them, 
by bringing them to trial.27  
 
This perceived purpose of punishment was narrow and, as detailed in Chapter 4 (s.4.3), the Tribunal 
itself added additional purposes - broader ones as its judges wrote judgments, its President and 
Prosecutor reported annually to the UNSC, and it developed a website for the public at large. One 
such stated purpose was that punishment symbolised a vindication of victims’ value,28 which 
resonated with a significant number of interviewees in BiH (s.7.4.2). This chapter argues, based on 
interview analysis, that this additional purpose was the core of the norm projection element that a 
number of scholars have advocated for, 29 and was overlooked. The impact on victims’ perceptions of 
UER is the theme of the next chapter, but the relevant aspects of the concept of victims’ value being 
vindicated by the act of punishment is discussed in Sections 7.4.2 - 7.4.3, as it is integral to the norm 
projection expressive value of punishment, which is subsequently negated at UER.  
 
7.4. The Impact of UER on the Expressive Values of Punishment  
The finding that moral condemnation was negated by UER spoke to many interviewees’ perceptions 
of the Tribunal’s key purpose in punishing these crimes. Of the 57 interviewees in BiH, 21 individuals 
articulated that punishment was about sending the “message”30 that the crimes were wrong and 
warranted punishment, using phrases such as “to show”, “send the message”, “to say” etc. They 
 
24 UNSCR 808, 22 February 1993.  
25 G. Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (Penguin, 2012) at 446. 
26 UN Charter, Chapter V, Article 24 on the ‘Functions and Powers’ of the UNSC; see: https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-
charter/chapter-v/index.html  
27UNSCR 808, 22 February 1993. 
28 See Chapter 4, s.4.3.1.   
29 Drumbl, Luban and Amann.  
30 Interviewees used phrases such as ‘to show’, ‘message’ followed by a range of audiences to which the Tribunal was 





spoke of the purpose of punishment having an expressive element. To do justice to this finding, the 
suitability of the expressive capacity of punishment for atrocity crimes, the two most relevant 
elements of Feinberg’s theory are laid out, and the following sections outline how these elements 
are negated at the grant of UER of unrepentant perpetrators. The first aspect of Feinberg’s 
expressive capacity that is negated by UER is the authoritative disavowal of the crimes; the second 
aspect is the validation of the law. For this thesis, in part, examining punishment for atrocity crimes, 
this validation of the law is the validation of a particular norm: crimes committed against a person, 
or persons, based on discrimination against them as another31 is inherently wrong and without any 
justification; consequently, UER negates this norm projector of punishment. 
 
7.4.1. Authoritative Disavowal Diluted at UER  
The Tribunal seated in The Hague, established by the UNSC in New York, with foreign judges32 
elected by UNSC Members,33 embodied to many in BiH the rather nebulous international 
community, and the Tribunal itself articulated that it spoke on behalf of the international 
community. The Tribunal indicted those suspected of atrocity crimes, held public trials which were 
broadcast live on television (from 2000 onwards) across the FRY,34 and sentenced convicted 
perpetrators to a term of imprisonment. Punishment represented an authoritative disavowal of the 
crimes. In terms of Feinberg’s proposals, the Tribunal was categorically stating that the perpetrator 
had “no right to do what he did”.35 Yet, this punishment was rarely fulfilled in practice. For ten of the 
interviewees in BiH, UER was perceived as a direct negation of that condemnation. This sentiment 
was articulated by one interview who queried: 
can you morally condemn a certain person, a person's behaviour … your 
condemning … is not a mere act of condemning but it has consequences and in this 
case it's a prison sentence and if you do away with this … what remains of this initial 
act … the signal … of this moral condemnation [is a] question mark. And then we get 
back to the beginning … which is how far is it legitimate, or even legal to grant … an 
early release? 36 
 
For this interviewee, a non-native working for an IGO, a lawyer, with over ten years of professional 
experience in BiH, the expression of moral condemnation was realised via the prison sentence. 
 
31 Emphasis added.  
32 See ICTY judges: https://www.icty.org/en/about/chambers/judges  
33 See: https://www.irmct.org/en/about/judges  
34 E. Stover, The Witnesses, noted that coverage was “irregular at best” due to lack of funding, at 144. 
35 J. Feinberg, ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment’ in Doing and Deserving, Essays in the Theory of Responsibility, at 
103.  





Condemnation by words alone would not be adequate, as he noted, it has to have “consequences”. 
When the perpetrator was granted UER, the sentence was not fulfilled. Further, the phase, “then we 
get back to the beginning” suggests that he, an audience of the message, looks back to the initial 
signal and queries the act of early release. 
 
There was a notion of the trajectory of the declared sentence being undermined by the grant of UER. 
The interviewee above queried, “what remains of this initial act” hints at the notion of the act being 
thwarted in some way. The sense of a trajectory losing its course was expressed by a BiH Prosecutor 
who was frustrated by UER and asserted that the sentence declared should simply be fulfilled. He 
noted that the ICTY “should stick to the purpose of punishment – deterrence and sending the 
message”.37 Another interviewee, a self-identified Serb, working with another IGO, was bitterly 
disappointed with UER. Through his work, he was engaged with smaller communities, which had 
often been badly affected by the war. When asked if he believed UER could be reconciled with moral 
condemnation of the crime, he responded “if you want to give this message then we should not 
more or less change that narrative and provide an early release … it’s wrong messaging”.38 Although 
he did not speak of legitimacy, his phrasing speaks to his understanding of the purposive legitimacy 
of the Tribunal and this category of legitimacy being negated at the grant of UER. His wording, the 
phrase “if you want to give this message”, indicates that he perceived an aim of the Tribunal as 
expressing moral condemnation, and that he perceived the grant of early release as a contradiction - 
“we should not … change that”. His concluding thought, of “wrong messaging”, speaks to how he 
perceived the purposive legitimacy of the Tribunal being negated by the act of UER.  
 
These three quotations capture two elements of Feinberg’s own example of an act of an 
authoritative disavowal of a wrong committed, and the notion of the expression of this disavowal to 
a wide audience. The punisher is not addressing the perpetrator alone in condemning their act, as 
noted by the Prosecutor in asserting that the purpose was “deterrence” in terms of general 
prevention rather than specific deterrence for that perpetrator. Therefore, the message was to an 
audience beyond the sentenced perpetrator. Feinberg uses the analogy of a nation state punishing a 
pilot of its own who has shot down another country’s aeroplane and asserted that the punishment:  
tells the world that the pilot had no right to do what he did, that his government 
does not condone that sort of thing. It testifies to government A’s recognition of the 
 
37 Interview, Prosecutor, Sarajevo, RS, 17/11/2017. 





violated rights of government B in the affected area and, therefore, to the 
wrongfulness of the pilot’s act.39 
 
The purpose of punishment is that of a disavowal – the punisher “does not condone” the 
wrongfulness of the act. Feinberg here hints at the why element, although he does not elucidate it. 
The wrong that has occurred is that the punished pilot has violated the rights; here those rights are 
of the other state by virtue of their pilot being shot down, which is denoted as the wrong and 
consequently punishment follows. The reason why punishment is required is that a wrong has been 
committed. Before exploring further how this why element (the norm projection) is negated at UER, 
let us first examine the underlying reasons why people (scholars, and most importantly, a significant 
number of interviewees in BiH) perceive these crimes as wrong and as requiring punishment.  
 
7.4.2. Why this Authoritative Disavowal? A Vindication of Victims’ Value 
Although Feinberg’s work scarcely mentions victims, and he is not writing in terms of atrocity crimes, 
a parallel can be drawn from the above quotation in relation to the “violated rights” of government 
B, by virtue of having their pilot shot down, to the context of atrocity crimes and subsequent 
punishment by the ICTY. Feinberg implicitly asserted that there is a world order that recognises that 
violent crimes committed against any innocent individual are morally wrong – regardless of which 
government they belong to and any government should punish such acts.40 Feinberg’s argument 
speaks to there being an underlying sentiment which is so deeply ingrained that scholars frequently 
feel no need to explicate it. As noted by Sikkink, “prohibition of murder, rape and other violent 
crimes exist in the criminal law of virtually all societies and cultures, there are obvious moral rules 
for which people believe that punishment is deserved”.41 Feinberg’s argument is that punishment 
validates the law (s.7.4.3). This thesis draws on Hampton’s theory, which explicates why the law 
itself is valid. This, in turn, speaks to the significance of the norm projection element of punishment 
for atrocity crimes, and the subsequent harm that is done at the blanket grant of UER for 
perpetrators. 
   
 
39 J. Feinberg, ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment’ in Doing and Deserving, Essays in the Theory of Responsibility, at 
102.  
40 The ICTY can be read as Feinberg’s “government A”. The pilot who is been punished (perpetrator from the FRY but who 
belongs to a common humanity), is being punished due to the fact that he has shot down another pilot, not belonging to 
government A. This implies that although the pilot does not belong to government A, in fact the pilot belongs to another 
government, (government A wishes to recognise that the act is wrong and requires recognition. That is the ICTY, an 
outside body, punishes for the death of victims inside of a sovereign state (the states of the FRY). Fundamentally, it sends 
the message, or “tells the world” that the perpetrator was wrong.   





This element of the expressive value of punishment, a recognition of victims’ value, was proposed 
explicitly by Hampton, and supported by Glasgow,42 though similarly to Feinberg, neither was 
justifying punishment in the context of atrocity crimes. Duff, however, implicitly extends this 
underlying value into the auspices of ICL as he asserted that “some kind of crimes are properly our 
business, in virtue of our shared humanity with their victims”.43 For Hampton and Glasgow, 
punishing the perpetrators is an act of recognition that the perpetrator has purposely harmed the 
victim and is deserving of punishment. Punishment is the means by which society acknowledges the 
victim’s value – a means of expressing to the victim, to the perpetrator and to society at large that all 
human beings have an intrinsic value. As argued by Hampton: 
retribution is a response to a wrong that is intended to vindicate the value of the 
victim denied by the wrongdoer’s action through the construction of an event that 
not only repudiates the action’s message of superiority over the victim but does so 
in a way that confirms them as equal by virtue of their humanity.44  
 
By punishing the perpetrator, their acts are condemned, and the punishment humbles them. As 
Hampton explained, “retribution is … inflicted to nullify the wrongdoer’s message of superiority over 
the victim”.45 This reason for punishment, the repudiation of the perpetrator’s message of 
superiority over the victim, and the recognition of the victim’s worth, was articulated by one 
interviewee in BiH, in relation to perpetrators of atrocity crimes. She argued, “sentencing somebody 
to prison … does [give] satisfaction to survivors … it sends a message … [it] basically shows that the 
world recognises the amount of crime, that the victims were innocent and that persons, or groups of 
people have been guilty for what they have been convicted of”.46 Additionally, the interviewee 
affirmed that the expressive act of punishment has audiences and she identified two. First, victims 
are an audience, as she reasons that survivors, direct or indirect victims, are being provided with 
some satisfaction by the perpetrator’s wrong being punished. Second, more broadly, this 
punishment projects to the world that the perpetrator has done wrong, and that wrong being that 
they harmed victims.  
 
 
42 A. Glasgow, ‘The Expressivist Theory of Punishment Defended’ (2015) Law and Philosophy 34: 601–631. 
43 A. Duff, ‘Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law’ in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds.) The Philosophy of 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) at 601 referencing R. Gaita, Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception 
(Macmillan, 1991).  
44 J. Hampton, ‘Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution’ (1992) UCLA Law Review 39: 1659-
1701 at 1686.  
45 J. Hampton, ‘Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution’ at 1698.  





These multiple audiences view UER through different lenses from the outset. As Meijers and Glasius 
noted, audiences of international criminal trials, are not “tabula rasa”,47 a blank slate. Rather, 
audiences view an institution and its actions from the vantage point of their own lived experiences. 
This meant from the outset that different audiences (including stakeholders) could perceive the 
Tribunal as having different aims or purposes (noted s.7.3). Additionally, external influences 
continue to cloud the lenses, that is, actions are “filtered” 48 to these audiences through different 
mediums, such as media coverage and the political discourse in the country. Accordingly, these 
multiple audiences may require the messages to be delivered differently in order to navigate these 
lenses. That there are multiple audiences who perceive different messages projected by trials, based 
on the lenses through which they are received, is similarly the case that they see the UER differently, 
which was evident as interviewees in BiH articulated, detailed in section 7.5.  
  
7.4.3. Punishment as a Vindication of International Criminal Law and its underlying Norms   
The proposition that international criminal trials and subsequent punishment act as an expression of 
vindication of ICL, and, consequently, as a means to further the norm underlying ICL, is advocated by 
a number of scholars.49 Sloane paraphrased Feinberg’s expressive capacity of punishment as being a 
means to “validate the law” to read, in the context of international criminal law, as being a means to 
“vindicate international human rights norms and the laws of war”.50 Before going further, however, 
it is important to identify the human rights norms that Sloane is referring to here, as this section 
addresses the extent to which, and why, these norms were perceived to be challenged by UER. 
Sloane identified the norm as international human rights and international humanitarian law. He 
referred to a distinct group of international human rights norms. These norms have best been 
captured by Sikkink who argued that there was a crystallisation of the no impunity norm for mass 
human rights violations.51 The no impunity norm derived from civil society and victim groups’ 
advocacy from the late 1980s, which culminated in the early 2000s. Sikkink argued that the no 
impunity norm for mass human rights violations derives from the basic hallmark of all humans 
intrinsically sharing the moral reasoning that people deserve to be punished for breaking moral 
rules; which can be demonstrated since prohibitions of murder, rape, and other violent crimes exist 
 
47 T. Meijers and M. Glasius, ‘Trials as Messages of Justice: What should be expected of International Criminal Courts’ at 
443. 
48 T. Meijers and M. Glasius, ‘Trials as Messages of Justice: What should be expected of International Criminal Courts’ at 
443. See s.7.5.  
49 M.D. Amann; M. Drumbl, R. Sloane, T. Meijers and M. Glasius, D. Luban, A. Duff, K. Fisher and B. Wringe.  
50 R. Sloane, ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the 
Potential of International Criminal Law’ at 71 - altering Feinberg’s ‘validation of law’. 





in the criminal law of virtually all societies and cultures.52 In the context of atrocity crimes, it is 
argued that these shared norms are distorted. Drumbl emphasised that atrocities occur in a different 
context, where these intrinsic shared moral values become overridden by other values propagated 
by leaders – based on group identity over core human identity. For example, the violation of another 
group’s human rights, murder and forced displacement becomes justified on the basis of self-
defence from a threat of another group or an alleged inferiority of the other group. As Drumbl 
asserted, this norm projection through consistent and adequate punishment could lead to 
internalisation of these norms by individuals which could act as a bulwark to indoctrination in 
conflict situations, where elites attempt to normalise hatred.53 The norm proposed by Drumbl for 
the context of atrocity crimes was the “universal repugnance of discriminatory group-based 
killings”.54 He did not elucidate why there was a universal repugnance. As suggested above, this may 
have been simply because Drumbl himself has internalised the morality that violent discriminatory 
crimes are intrinsically morally wrong. For Drumbl, a key audience for this moral condemnation is 
the everyday citizen, a potential perpetrator. Luban articulated a similar argument, although his 
audience appears to be political elites and their followers. Luban, whose focus was on trials rather 
than punishment, nevertheless, asserted that “punishment following conviction remains an essential 
part of any criminal process that aims to project a no-impunity norm”.55 Luban described this “norm 
projection”56 as “international criminal law’s moral truth”, which, he argued, was the “criminality of 
political violence against the innocent, even when your side hates the innocent as an enemy”.57 
 
Although Luban described the norm he did not articulate the reason behind the norm. This 
reasoning was proposed by Fisher. Fisher suggested that punishment should support the norm of a 
liberal society whose members have the right to socially and politically organise, and that, when this 
right is violated, accountability shall be applied, via punishment, by the international community at 
large, where a sovereign state is unwilling to do so. The international community in punishing 
perpetrators of these crimes will, therefore, affirm this global order. Although few interviewees 
explicitly articulated the why of Fisher’s norm, the notion of norm projection being at the heart of 
the expressive purpose of punishment was reflected across the range of stakeholders interviewed – 
 
52 K. Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics (Norton, 2011) at 255. 
53 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Crime and Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 174.  
54 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Crime and Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 174.  
55 D. Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law’ in S. Besson 
and J. Tasioulas (eds.) The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) at 575.  
56 D. Luban, ‘After the Honeymoon Reflections on the Current State of International Criminal Justice’ (2013) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 11: 505-515 at 509. 





judges, lawyers, NGOs, IGOs and VAs, who are in turn, a number (albeit not all)58 of the Tribunal’s 
audiences.  
 
7.4.4. The Audiences of the Norm Projection and its Negation at UER  
This section examines the interview data, predominately from BiH, which indicated that norm 
projection was perceived as a primary purpose of the ICTY. Several interviewees emphasised that 
when the ICTY punished perpetrators it signified that the international community abhorred 
perpetrators’ motivations for committing the crimes. These interviewees, in effect, expressed 
Drumbl’s proposition that the ICTY’S punishment signified the “universal repugnance of 
discriminatory group-based killing”,59 which in turn was a recognition of the worth of the victims of 
those crimes. When this punishment was cut short by UER the purposive legitimacy60 of the Tribunal 
was, therefore, being undermined by the Tribunal itself, as it was not fulfilling its primary purpose – 
holding these perpetrators to account for their crimes. Consequently, for these interviewees UER 
was perceived as illegitimate.61 Section 7.3 outlined the multiple audiences who viewed the ICTY and 
this section outlines the extent to which interviewees in BiH believe these audiences are important, 
as well as interviewees’ beliefs as to how UER can negate the norm projection element in the eyes of 
these audiences.  
 
Analysis of the interview data fits with Amann’s argument that, for expressivist theorists of 
punishment, “the intended audience … is not just the wrongdoer … it is also the Everyone … the law-
abider and the law-maker, the activist and the private citizen, and even the potential victim, today 
and tomorrow”.62 The idea that “the everyone” is addressed came out strongly in interviews in BiH. 
Over one-third perceived the ICTY punishing perpetrators of atrocity crimes committed in the 
Balkans as having significance beyond their own borders.63 Additionally, interview analysis reflected 
 
58 The perpetrators themselves are an audience although this thesis limited itself to post-conflict society who would be 
more readily accessible.  
59 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Crime and Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 174. 
60 See Chapter 3, s.3.4.2, the initial stated purpose of the ICTY was prosecution of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, which was effectively the recognition of the international human rights law, which is, at its core, fundamentally 
the intrinsic value of every human being.  
61 In responding to the sub-research question on how outside stakeholders (those in BiH) perceived the legitimacy of UER.  
62 D.M. Amann, ‘Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide’ (2002) International Criminal Law Review 2: 93-143 cited 
in R. Sloane, ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the 
Potential of International Criminal Law’ at 85. 
63 Nineteen interviewees in BiH expressly referenced the purpose of punishment as showing ‘the world’, ‘everyone’, 
‘other leaders’ that such crimes were wrong, should or will be punished. Thus, indicative of this recognition of the ICTY 





Amann’s proposition that the message was for future as well as for current audiences. First, the 
relevant audiences are discussed.  
  
Scholars and observers have proposed that political and social groups (both elites and their 
followers) are a key audience of the no impunity norm.64 Fisher argued that this no impunity norm 
should be expressed by focusing on punishing high-level perpetrators65 of atrocities. This 
prosecutorial strategy, she asserted, would affirm a global order wherein groups of human beings 
are free to organise socially and politically. Luban recognised both these elites and followers as 
relevant audiences of what he labelled the “norm projection”.66 Punishment for people who commit 
mass human rights violations expresses the no impunity norm. Luban suggested that this norm 
projection may have a deterrent effect, that foot-soldiers internalise the “moral unacceptability of 
[discriminatory and violent] politics”.67  
 
This proposition of any political and social group being a key audience who receive the message of 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes being punished was echoed in BiH. Interviewees recognised other 
members of the international community as being an audience for the ICTY. The President of a 
regional court in BiH argued that punishment of atrocities “sends a message to the entire world that 
this kind of behaviour during war, which is a specific situation, is not allowed and it should not 
happen again”.68 Likewise, a current judge at the War Crimes Chamber (WCC) said that “the ICTY … 
sends a message, to the people of Myanmar now.”69 These two judges perceived the ICTY as being 
able to send a powerful message not only to the region but across the world. Additionally, that the 
message outlived the Tribunal was reflected by the judge’s use of the word “now”. He believed that 
people in Myanmar were aware of the message now. Further, these people could encompass not 
only the leaders instigating the crimes but their followers too.  
 
As the conviction and subsequent punishment projects the no impunity norm, does the early 
termination of the punishment undermine the no impunity norm, or does UER send another 
 
64 Drumbl, Luban and Damaška.  
65 K. Fisher, Moral Accountability and International Criminal Law: Holding Agents of Atrocity Crimes Accountable to the 
World (Routledge, 2012) at 6,9 and referencing Osiel emphasising the importance of distinguishing different types of 
perpetrators.  
66 D. Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law’ at 576. 
67 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Crime and Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 174. 
68 Interview, Judge, Federation, BiH, 21/11/2017. 





message? Unintentional as they may be, the answer for the several interviewees in BiH was a clear 
“yes” (detailed in s.7.4.5 and s.7.5). In terms of receiving audiences, UER by the ICTY not only had a 
negative impact for the societies in the FRY, it also sent a negative message to others. For one 
interviewee, UER was a direct contravention of the no impunity norm. Most worryingly for her, state 
leaders who instigate the atrocity crimes received this message. She asserted that UER for 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes is: 
sending the message to the world that crimes can be committed. You will be 
released, you can change the border[s] of territories, you can forcibly move people, 
and you can change ethnic structures of one nation for your own personal 
interest.70 
This interviewee worked with a number of victims of the war, who are now victims of displacement 
as a consequence of the war’s conclusion. They are internally displaced, removed from their family 
home due to the terms of the Dayton Agreement, which divided the country along ethnic divides, 
and, consequently, many displaced did not return to their pre-war homes.71 For her, UER was 
particularly offensive as she witnessed directly the on-going harms experienced by displaced people, 
victims of these perpetrators who were now being granted early release from their punishment. The 
matter of victims suffering as ongoing contrasting to that of UER perpetrators is developed in 
Chapter 8, s.8.2. This interviewee’s comment, however, indicated that she perceived parallels with 
other countries experiencing atrocities whereby the crimes’ purposes, ethnic cleansing, are 
achieved, and through UER this mass displacement, ongoing, is being relativised for current and 
would be high-level perpetrators. 
 
Another interviewee referred to the bitter irony of UER for political leaders at the national level. He 
emphasised the same matter of contention, the significance of the crimes and their impact - ethnic 
cleansing which resulted in mass displacement. He reflected on the Bosnian-Serb political leaders, 
Plavšić and Krajišnik, who had called for areas to be ethnically cleansed.72 When released, they had 
 
70 Interview, NGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 14/12/2017. - This interviewee was disappointed with UER. She had worked closely with 
victims, including Internally Displaced People and understood first-hand the long-term consequences for them. Twenty 
years after the war, the UNHCR in 2015, reported that 98,000 people remained internally displaced in BiH, and the issue 
of minority returns was still an issue (minority returns of ethnic groups in ‘ethnically cleansed areas)’. See: 
http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/15810  
71 D. Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY's Impact in Bosnia and Serbia (Oxford University Press, 2018) at 93 – “the 
division of their country under the terms [of the Dayton Agreement] many Bosniaks experience as the ratification of 
ethnic cleansing’ as many of the victims have not been able to return to their former homes; and M. Buljubasic and B. 
Holá ‘Perpetrators on Trial: Characteristics of War Crime Perpetrators Tried by Courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina & ICTY’ 
citing Pejanović, 2010) in A. Smeulers, M. Weerdesteijn and B. Holá, Perpetrators of International Crimes: Theories, 
Methods, and Evidence (Oxford University Press, 2019) at 276. 





returned to these ethnically cleansed areas to be received as war heroes with their purposes 
achieved – he argued “it is counter-logic”.73 For him, the unconditional nature of their release, which 
meant that they were received by well-organised political supporters, ran counter to the message of 
the global no impunity norm. Yes, they had been held accountable, but less than initially declared, 
and now they flaunted this at their homecoming after UER. Thus, the norm projection had been 
negated, for other leaders (noted above) and simultaneously for their supporters, this counter-logic 
being projected to the people in the region who were an important audience for the ICTY, and 
particularly so in the context of being a post-conflict, ethnically divided state. The expressive act of 
granting UER had ramifications for society at large, discussed Section 7.5.  
 
The other audience who receive the norm projection of punishment and its premature ending is the 
“average citizen”.74 Although moral condemnation and norm projection element of punishment is 
the focus of this chapter, it is important to recognise that some interviewees in BiH saw an overlap 
between the no impunity norm and deterrence. A number of scholars are cynical about the 
deterrent effect of punishment on the average citizen, but one interviewee’s assertion responds to 
that of Drumbl, along with others,75 that punishment for atrocity crimes cannot be sensibly justified 
in terms of deterrence and this finding is important to highlight. Drumbl argued that many lower-
level perpetrators are not simply indoctrinated; some use the context of mass violence to participate 
solely for their own “gratification”,76 others perpetrate violence due to peer pressure.77 However, 
this interviewee contended that this was exactly why punishing low-level perpetrators would further 
the no impunity norm at the lower level. It was important for the average citizen to see that despite 
their lower profile in the scheme of mass atrocities, these low-level perpetrators would also receive 
punishment. She argued that these lower-level perpetrators “knew what they were doing was wrong 
but, in the chaos, they thought ‘anything goes’ or would never be held to account”.78 For the norm 
of no impunity to be effective, it should address all typologies of perpetrators.79 Interviewees in BiH 
did not state that UER would weaken the internalisation of norms in relation to potential murderers, 
nor the extent to which it would weaken the general deterrent effect in society overall. The 
speculative nature of measuring a non-happening was not discussed, but this interviewee did believe 
 
73 Interview, NGO, Banja Luka, RS, BiH, 24/11/2017. 
74 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Crime and Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 174.   
75 Smeulers and Sloane.   
76 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Crime and Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 171.  
77 A. Smeulers, ‘What Transforms ordinary People into Gross Human Rights Violators?’ in Understanding Human Rights 
Violations – New Systematic Studies, S. Carey and S. Poe (eds.) (Ashgate, 2004) at 239, 247 cited by M. Drumbl, Atrocity, 
Crime and Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 172. 
78 Interview, NGO, Tuzla, Federation, BiH, 15/12/1207.  





that general deterrence in punishing, including the average person, was important, and this thesis, 
therefore, reports this finding.  
 
“Lawmakers”80 in national jurisdictions were a target audience of expressivism, according to Amann. 
In BiH, no interviewees specifically referenced BiH judges (the deciders rather than makers of ICL) at 
the national level, as an audience. However, analysis of the 12 interviews with BiH judges indicates 
that they were a recipient audience in relation to the expressive element of punishment inherent in 
the Tribunal’s practices of sentencing and UER. This finding came across as the judges interviewed 
expressed significantly different attitudes towards UER to all other interviewees in BiH – 
prosecutors, defence lawyers, IGOs, NGOs and VAs. These judges’ attitudes towards UER reflected 
the capacity of audiences sometimes to internalise practices uncritically. The capacity was indicated 
in several judges’ responses of both the purpose of punishment and their views in relation to UER. 
One judge spoke to his perception of the ICTY’s value in punishing atrocity crime. For him, the value 
of International Criminal Justice, adjudicated by the ICTY and subsequently in BiH was as the norm 
projector of no impunity:  
international tribunals such as The Hague I observe them primarily as courts that 
are making some foundations for standards … to say that war crimes and crimes and 
against humanity and violation of international humanitarian law will not be 
allowed … people [are] aware that it will be adjudicated, that these crimes will gain 
world attention.81 
The interviewee’s reference to the Tribunal, establishing “foundations for standards”, suggests that 
the Tribunal has been successful in developing ICL, which it lists as one of its major achievements.82 
The development of ICL is valuable, however, the extent to which this should be a priority of the 
ICTY is disputable. As noted in Chapter 4, s.4.2.3, some observers of the Tribunal critiqued this 
apparent judicial focus on the development of ICL as they argued that this focus led them to neglect 
the context on the ground. However, this thesis’ interview analysis indicates, at least for the Tribunal 
judges interviewed, that they were not unaware of the context on the ground – noted in the 
following paragraph. Although a number noted with pride the Tribunal’s role in the refinement of 
ICL, which they had played a part in, this does not prove these observers’ assertion that this judicial 
focus acted to the detriment of others. However, it does indicate that they were keenly aware of the 
 
80 D.M. Amann, ‘Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide’ (2002) International Criminal Law Review 2: 93–143, at 
124. 
81 Interview, Judge, formerly WCC, Sarajevo, BiH, 03/11/2017. 
82 Indeed, five of the eight ICTY/MICT judges asserted that the development of ICL was a major contribution of the ICTY. 
See also the Tribunal website “has irreversibly changed the landscape of international humanitarian law” see: 





role they had in being the deciders and interpreters of law. Nevertheless, the critique of ICL being 
practised without active consideration of the context, was illustrated by judges in BiH, the majority 
of whom apparently adopted these norms unquestioningly, including the norm of UER.  
 
In adjudicating crimes, writing judgments, determining sentences and granting UER, the Tribunal 
established standards, and as learners of those standards, judges in BiH were trained to apply them 
as they adjudicated war crimes cases at the national level. Thus, the judges in BiH were an important 
audience who could internalise these norms. For half (six of the 12 judges interviewed), this 
internalisation of norms was successful, especially those who had received training from 
international judges, albeit not Tribunal judges. This internalisation of judicial norms was implied by 
one judge who noted, “I respect judgments coming from the court, I have a great deal of trust and 
faith in the judgments that are made by the international courts … they are working in accordance 
with regulation and normative acts”.83 Two judges, both from the War Crimes Chamber, reflected 
this attitude when asked about their initial thoughts on UER. They responded dismissively, 
immediately responding that “it’s not a novelty, it’s not new, it’s not surprising”.84 These judges 
appear not to have given any consideration to the legitimacy of UER. This attitude, contrasted with 
five of the eight judges from the Tribunal who were, in the round, uncomfortable with the practice 
of UER, and recognised there were challenges to its legitimacy. This finding demonstrates the 
capacity of audiences to internalise practices, sometimes uncritically. The judges at The Hague were 
uncomfortable with UER primarily due to the gravity of the crime and the Presidents’ assessment of 
perpetrators’ rehabilitation. The judges in BiH, adjudicating war crimes, however, did not appear 
aware of, or consider on their own initiative, the nuanced thinking of ICTY judges and many had 
apparently accepted UER for perpetrators of atrocity crimes due to the fact that it originated from 
senior and respected international judges.  
  
7.4.5. UER as a Relativisation of Atrocity Crimes  
The perceived illegitimacy of UER, for the majority of interviewees in BiH, was due to the gravity of 
the crime, 85 aggravated by the typology of the perpetrators, their lack of remorse, all compounded 
by its unconditional nature. The first three factors (gravity, typology and lack of remorse) speak to 
the specific nature of atrocity crimes. The vast majority of interviews (with the exception of judges, 
 
83 Interview, Judge, Sarajevo, BiH, 12/12/2017.  
84 Interview, Judge, WCC, Sarajevo, BiH, 20/12/2017.  
85 17 of the 57 interviewees raised the gravity of the crimes committed, the mass number of victims, the ethnic hatred 





one NGO representative and one survivor) perceived UER as both unexpected and inappropriate for 
extra-ordinary crimes.86 A number used words such as “surprised”,87 “shocked”88 in addition to 
“disappointed”89 and “devastated”90. This included practising lawyers, including defence lawyers. 
Approximately one-third of the interviewees raised the issue of proportionality in the ICTY’s early 
termination of punishment of atrocity crimes. UER was perceived as a derision of the proportionality 
element of retribution, including the moral condemnation of the crime. One interviewee said she, 
like the victims, had a sense that the Tribunal had failed to live up to its word: “if you get five years - 
be there in prison for five years”.91 This assertion was for all types of perpetrators, implied as the 
interviewee then compared this sentence of five years to the most recent judgment at that time, 
Karadzic’s 40 year sentence. She urged that this sentence be upheld92 and served in full. She stated: 
“Karadzic, the verdict ... The Tribunal gave him 40 years, [they] need to respect that”.93 Her 
reference to respecting the verdict suggests that this interviewee perceived UER as disregarding the 
Tribunal’s judgment itself. Her statement reflects that of Choi’s who directed this as a criticism of the 
Tribunal’s Presidents (as the ultimate decider of UER). Choi suggested UER was a derision of the 
original verdict and the sentence that accompanied it: “if the President's assessment of just deserts 
differs from that of the trial and appeals chambers, it is difficult to argue that her judgment should 
substitute for theirs”.94  
 
The opinion that UER dishonoured the Tribunal’s purposive legitimacy, perceived as the 
authoritative condemnation of the perpetrators who violated the “fundamental dignity and worth of 
the human person”,95 was expressed by one BiH lawyer. She said her immediate thought on hearing 
of early release was quite simply that “it doesn’t serve justice [...] war crimes really deserve this 
punishment”.96 Her statement indicates that she perceived justice as being served through the 
enforcement of the declared sentence; now enforcement of this sentence was terminated 
prematurely and the service of justice was unfulfilled. This was inappropriate given the gravity of 
 
86 One interviewee, an NGO, responded in a similar vein to judges that he was not surprised as it was a practice that 
happened in every country. Later, however he expressed his anger that the practice was unconditional.  
87 Interview, NGO, Banja Luka, RS, BiH, 24/11/2017.  
88 Interview, NGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 27/10/2017. 
89 Interview, NGO Director, Sarajevo, BiH, 07/11/2017. 
90 Interview, NGO Director, Sarajevo, BiH, midday 06/11/2017. 
91 Interview, NGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 27/10/2017. 
92 On Appeal, which is underway.  
93 Interview, NGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 27/10/2017. 
94 J. Choi, ‘Early Release in International Criminal Law’ (2014) Yale Law Journal 123: 1784-1828 at 1808. 
95 See Chapter 3, s.3.4.2. The legitimacy of the Tribunal was said to be affirmed on the jus cogens obligation to punish 
those found guilty of the most grave crimes, thus it was questionable as to what factor could effectively override this 
obligation by terminating prematurely that punishment.  





atrocity crimes – “war crimes really deserve punishment”. This opinion was expressed more bluntly 
by one NGO Director who believed that in UER “we totally lose the sense for justice … this is not a 
traffic incident … we are talking about crimes against humanity … grave breaches of international 
law”97. He, too, believed that early release “served no purpose” and, worse still, in relation to 
proportionality, that UER led to a “total relativism of the crime”. For him, the gravity of the crimes 
deserved “hard punishment”.98 Not detailing what “hard punishment” actually encompassed, he 
implied that at the very least their punishment should be served in full.  
 
The typology of perpetrators granted UER was also perceived as a significant factor in the gravity of 
the crime, and the interviewee also expressed a sense of anger on this basis. He cited the case of 
Plavšić as being the leading example of the unacceptability of the practice. This was due to the 
nature of her crimes (crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing), she being an instigator in ethnic 
cleansing and her retraction of remorse – her retraction of the acceptance of moral condemnation. 
The UER of Plavšić was raised, without prompting, in 24 of the 51 interviews in BiH. Her UER was 
recalled, either as the interviewees’ first recollection of hearing about UER or being the “best 
evidence against early release”.99 The dominance of Plavšić’s UER illustrates the significance of the 
moral condemnation and norm projection element of punishment for atrocity crimes. It is asserted 
here that Plavšić’s UER was widely cited as she was the most high-level political perpetrator who, at 
trial, accepted the moral condemnation of the judges as they passed the sentence. At sentencing, 
her publicly televised statement of guilt indicated (for some) that the moral condemnation and norm 
projection value of punishment had been fulfilled. Her acceptance of moral condemnation and the 
norm underlying it was apparent in two sentences of her statement “our leadership, of which I was a 
necessary part, led an effort which victimized countless innocent people. Explanations of self-
defence and survival offer no justification”.100 The norm, as Hampton asserted, the recognition of 
the dignity of the victims (s.7.4.2) is spoken to by Plavšić as she described the victims as “innocent 
people”. Further, the acceptance of the wrong, rather than the acceptance of illegality, is spoken to 
as she recognised that her actions had “no justification”. Although this statement of remorse was 
not accepted by all the audiences in BiH,101 it was significant nonetheless and widely reported. The 
significance of remorse to international criminal justice more broadly was argued by Karstedt who 
 
97 Interview, NGO Director, Sarajevo, BiH, 07/11/2017. 
98 Interview, NGO Director, Sarajevo, BiH, 07/11/2017. 
99 Interview, NGO Director, Sarajevo, BiH, 07/11/2017. 
100 Plavšić’s statement of guilt, available on the ICTY website and cited in J. Subotić, ‘The Cruelty of False Remorse: Biljana 
Plavšić at The Hague’. Emphasis added.  
101 Emir Suljagić, a Srebrenica massacre survivor said, “I feel like crying. There was nothing human in her words, not a 
note of apology. She didn’t do it for me. She did it for the Serbian cause” cited by Subotić, ‘The Cruelty of False Remorse: 





declared that “any admission of guilt and … moral responsibility address vital exigencies of the 
international criminal courts and tribunals, their rationale, justification, and legitimacy”.102 Karstedt 
supported her assertion as she recalled that the ICTY was keen to emphasis Plavšić’s statement of 
remorse and that many victims’ organisations in BiH welcomed it. Effectively, perpetrators’ remorse 
was perceived as enhancing the Tribunal’s sociological legitimacy. Indeed, at the time, one NGO 
argued that Plavšić’s guilty plea “opens the way to the reconciliation of individuals and ethnic 
groups, and to restoring the dignity of the victims”.103 There is no evidence of her guilty plea in 
assisting in reconciliation or as restoring the dignity of the victims, as interviews did not recall their 
feelings on hearing the statement. However, the fact that her case was spontaneously recalled by 
almost half the BiH interviewees as having a negative impact on the moral condemnation of the 
Tribunal’s punishment implies that her statement of remorse was significant as her latter rejection 
was found deeply offensive, so much so that it had stayed with interviewees six years later.  
 
When Plavšić was granted UER, she was collected by President Dodik’s, a denier of the genocide in 
Srebrenica, private jet and received by cheering grounds in Belgrade. A crowd had been gathered for 
her arrival. A few days later she received a similar welcome in Banja Luka, RS, BiH. She thanked her 
supporters and decried the Tribunal, saying that she regretted none of her actions during the war 
and explained that her guilty plea was for pragmatic purposes only.104 At a minimum, one 
interviewee asserted that Plavšić’s UER distorted the message of moral condemnation:  
Condemnation … to say ‘this is wrong … and now you are being put away because 
we want to send this message to everyone … like Plavšić, there are so many people 
who still thinks she is a hero and her early release didn't help spread that message. 
She was convicted, but so what … she is released … all good. So that … message got 
scrambled completely.105  
The belief that early release distorted the original message of moral condemnation was reflected in 
the use of the word “message” having negative and tangible consequences. The NGO Director, who 
had asserted Plavšić’s release was the “best evidence against early release”, applied this to the 
bigger picture of UER in BiH as he reflected that UER: “it’s a message - you can achieve your political 
 
102 S. Karstedt, ‘“I would Prefer to be Famous”: Comparative Perspectives on the Reentry of War Criminals Sentenced at 
Nuremberg and The Hague’ (2018) International Criminal Justice Review 28(4): 372-390 at 384.  
103 Humanitarian Law Center 2002 statement cited in J. Subotić, ‘The Cruelty of False Remorse’ at 46 
104 Fadila Memišević, President of  the Society for Threatened Peoples in BiH” on Plavšić’s early release: "We were the 
ones who constantly expressed their dissatisfaction and protested, first because of the verdict for Biljana Plavsic, 11 
years, and because she was freed from the most serious guilt, that is a crime of genocide, due to her false admission of 
guilt. And now it has been revealed - her admission was not honest. It is a huge dissatisfaction.” reported in the local 
media, 27/11/2009; see: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/plavsic/1857949.html. 






aims with war … punishment [but] you will survive. Everything will be okay, and we will give you 
[UER] and further [you] become a hero in your country, or your national or your ethnic group or 
religious group”.106 As noted in Chapter 4, some scholars have detailed the “celebratory 
homecomings”107 that perpetrators of atrocity crimes, especially high-level perpetrators, receive as 
they return to the region. They outline how perpetrators portray themselves as defenders of their 
communities108 and are welcomed as such.109 
 
Another interviewee, an NGO representative was deeply frustrated with UER. He too recalled 
Plavšić’s release, although his emphasis was on the low-level perpetrators return. He was 
disappointed with the ICTY’s apparent lack of realisation of the context of return, given the nature of 
atrocity crimes, which had required, at the time of commission, at the very least bystanders.110 He 
argued that perpetrators were not like ordinary criminals being released, those who are “silently 
going home … and that they [others around him] are also ashamed [of] ‘what he was doing, but 
what the heck he is member of our family so yes, okay. We won’t tell him ‘fuck off from our lives’. 
That’s supposed to be normal and that’s not normal here ... [here] they are coming into that area, 
where they did the crime … to be welcomed by the folks who are living there, as a hero”.111 This 
interviewee was particularly angry at the Tribunal, further believing that UER was dangerous, 
although he did not believe an intimate war was likely, he reflected that with the “conditions that 
we have here in Bosnia and still in the region there is always a possibility”.112 He believed that the 
Tribunal should be aware of this and made the message of condemnation clear by not granting any 
early releases.  
 
One interviewee, a prominent Serb human rights activist in the RS, also spoke to this specific context 
of return and perpetrators, and their supporters’, rejection of moral condemnation: “he didn’t 
change [and] he’s coming back a hero … instead of the shame, instead of the guilt [no] … all the 
 
106 Interview, NGO Director, Sarajevo, BiH, 07/11/2017. 
107 J. M Trbovc, ‘Homecomings From “The Hague”: Media Coverage of ICTY Defendants After Trial and Punishment’ (2018) 
International Criminal Justice Review 28(4): 406-442 at 408.  
108 K. Ristić, ‘The Media Negotiations of War Criminals and Their Memoirs: The Emergence of the “ICTY Celebrity”’ (2018) 
International Criminal Justice Review: 28(4): 391-405 – ‘Image of the Offender’ at 397-398.  
109 Although as noted in Chapter 4, these scholars do not make the link between early release and the perpetrators’ 
homecomings.  
110 Noted by M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Crime and Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 2007): “Atrocity would not be able 
to reach truly epidemic levels but for the vigorous participation of the masses. For many … rank-and-file killers, 
participating in atrocity is not deviant behavior. Even less deviant is the complicity and acquiescence of the bystander” at 
26. 
111 Interview, NGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 02/11/2017. 





things that these war criminals [were] fighting for … it’s legitimised, privileged … as their … war glory 
effort”. Indeed, this has been detailed in the literature documenting perpetrators’ rhetoric on 
return. Ristić has detailed Šljivančanin’s113 self-portrayal as a defender of the nation. He does not 
discuss the crimes for which he was convicted but emphasises his efforts in fighting those “trying to 
destroy Yugoslavia”.114 Thus, Ristić noted that despite being found of atrocity crimes he is regularly 
invited to TV interviews and is reported with “a sense of intimacy” in the media and is spoken of as a 
“proud, heroic and truthful individual”.115 
The lawyer cited above proffered an explanation for the continued UER practice. He argued that: 
The Hague Tribunal … everything looks according to the Statute, according to the 
rules … international standards … everything is very neat there. When it comes here 
- it faces what? It faces that all the heritage, all the consequences … the 
international community misunderstands that … they don’t think about the wider 
political context.116 
His explanation that judges focused on following the black letter law117 without considering the 
societal context echoed critiques of Tribunal judges made by observers. These observers criticised 
judges on the grounds that their focus solely on the development of the international criminal law 
led to side-lining the social context of the crimes.118 However, this research found that a number of 
Tribunal judges were aware of the social consequences UER had on the region but took a deliberate 
approach as deciders of law only.119 These judges asserted that it was for the leaders in the region, 
not the Tribunal to deal with the consequences of unrepentant perpetrators who stir up antagonism 
on return. The Serb human rights activist, however, without prompting, provided a response to 
these judges, as he argued that the Tribunal should have made provisions to punish perpetrators 
differently – not to provide perpetrators with the opportunity to stir up antagonism in the first 
instance. He believed that the Tribunal should have had the foresight to do so. He asserted that they 
should have known from the “history [of the] Nuremberg Trials [and] the case of Albert Speer” who, 
after being sentenced at Nuremberg “never changed, decades later”.120 For this interviewee, the 
Tribunal should never have allowed them to return to the region. He believed that for people like 
Plavšić and Krajišnik the Tribunal should impose “more political consequences”, and for their 
 
113 V. Šljivančanin, was  convicted of torture as a war crime based on his failure as a commander, a Major in the Yugoslav 
Army to fulfil prevent and intervene in mistreatment of prisoners of war, see Case Information Sheet for a brief overview: 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mrksic/cis/en/cis_mrksic_al_en.pdf  
114 K. Ristić, ‘The Media Negotiations of War Criminals and Their Memoirs: The Emergence of the “ICTY Celebrity”’ at 397.  
115 K. Ristić, ‘The Media Negotiations of War Criminals and Their Memoirs: The Emergence of the “ICTY Celebrity”’ at 400.  
116 Interview, NGO, Banja Luka, RS, BiH, 24/11/2017.  
117 Chapter 5 argued that the President in fact misapplied the law.  
118 R. Hodžić, in particular (see Chapter 4, s.4.3) and this thesis’ findings show that some judges disregarded the social 
context; see Chapter 6, s.6.4.2. 
119 See Chapter 8, s.8.5.  





sentence to include that they “never to return to the country”. For him, “ostracism is a really proper 
… measure for these people put in a modern, contemporary context”.121 This was a stricter condition 
than most interviewees suggested, but he was clear to point out it was not for “retaliation” but also 
for the wider and, indeed, future audience, as it “is giving a message to everybody else in the future 
– ‘if you exit the jail you will not return to any way of normal life of an ordinary citizen that you 
had’”.122 It was a fitting punishment rather than a retaliatory one. Although ostracism may sound 
extreme,123 it is not arbitrary, and in effect a practice under national law perpetrators who are 
judged to remain dangerous beyond their imprisonment. For example, an IGO policy officer 
interviewee had applied this to lower-level perpetrators returning to smaller communities. All 
interviewees were asked what they would suggest to the Tribunal for conditions on early release, 
and she recommended “relocation” because of the “hurt” caused by perpetrators’ return … because 
that same person … is reinstate[d] where he or she committed war crimes”.124 Her comment reflects 
the example of the NGO describing the return of lower-level perpetrators. She, along with other 
interviewees cited above, noted the Tribunal was too remote from the region and should have some 
consideration for the context and not simply the black letter law of the Statute, as return had a 
tangible impact not on perpetrators but victims and the community as a whole.  
In addition to UER being perceived of as a relativisation of the crime, many of these interviewees 
spoke of other “messages” which had been received by the multiple audiences in BiH itself. 
 
7.5. UER’s Unintended Messages  
The opinion of UER relativising the crime and being a symbolic negation of the Tribunal’s moral 
condemnation and norm projection embodied in the sentence, is directly linked to symbolism of 
punishment itself. However, in the case of UER, there were other messages received, given the 
specific context, connected to the gravity of atrocity crimes, but more specifically connected to the 
nature of criminals who commit them. As noted by Sunstein, “actions are expressive, they carry 
meaning”,125 and in relation to laws and legal institutions, all institutions have the potential to send 
 
121 Interview, NGO, Banja Luka, RS, BiH, 24/11/2017. 
122 Interview, NGO, Banja Luka, RS, BiH, 24/11/2017.  
123 Under UNDHR there is a prohibition on “arbitrary arrest, detention or exile” Article 9; and under the ECHR there is a 
prohibition on the imposition of “a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal 
offence was committed” Article 7. 
124 Interview, IGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 21/12/2017.  
125 C. R. Sunstein, ‘On the Expressive Function of Law’ (1996) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144(5) cited in D.M. 





messages, intentional or not, and that “sometimes our audiences misinterpret what we are 
doing”.126 These misinterpretations are noted in Sections 7.5.2 and 7.5.3.  
 
In the context of return to a post-conflict society, perpetrators of atrocity crimes differ from ordinary 
criminals as they are not necessarily considered deviant.127 An ethnically divided post-conflict 
country is divided into different communities who view the conflict differently, as noted by one BiH 
prosecutor, “when we speak about the attitude … all three sides unfortunately; the attitude toward 
the war crimes is not the same”.128 Therefore, perpetrators can return as a hero in the eyes of one 
community, but be considered a “monster”129 in the eyes of other communities. This can be the case 
anywhere, but is particularly the case in post-conflict BiH which is dominated by ethnic divides.130 
This is emphasised throughout the literature on the Tribunal’s relationship with its regional 
stakeholders. In terms of stakeholders’ perceptions, this is discussed in relation to different groups 
viewing the Tribunal based on “ethnic-political allegiances rather than the legality of their 
judgments”.131 In addition to its stakeholders’ perceptions of the Tribunal, that BiH is a deeply-
divided society is widely written as fact in the literature on BiH. For example, in relation to Plavšić’s 
early release and mixed reactions, Subotić noted that this was not surprising, given “the still 
profound ethnic divisions that run through post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina”.132 Subotić’s statement 
resonated throughout the fieldwork,133 and is important to highlight here as it testifies to the 
importance of recognising multiple audiences and stakeholders of an institution. In over half of the 
51 interviews in BiH, it was emphasised that BiH was divided and that there was no reconciliation 
amongst the three main ethnic groups. On one occasion, this was made explicitly clear at the outset 
of the interview. The interviewee began his introductions by asking the interpreter to point out the 
following: “he hopes that you were aware before you came here of the deep national divisions that 
exist in the country” which he believed were not only current but eternal, as he concluded, “we 
 
126 T. Meijers and M. Glasius, ‘Trials as Messages of Justice: What should be expected of International Criminal Courts’ at 
432. 
127 See Chapter 4, s.4.5.4 and Chapter 6, s.6.6. For literature on the specificities of return in BiH, see December 2018: 
‘Special Issue: ICTY Celebrities: War Criminals Coming Home’ (2018) International Criminal Justice Review: 28(4).  
128 Interview, Prosecutor, Brčko, BiH, 13/11/2017. 
129 As one interviewee described Plavšić in her recollection of her return. Interview, Independent Investigative Journalist, 
Sarajevo, BiH, 22/12/2017.  
130 F. Beiber, Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance (UNRISD and Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); 
J. Subotić, ‘The Cruelty of False Remorse: Biljana Plavšić at The Hague’ and D. Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY's 
Impact in Bosnia and Serbia (Oxford University Press, 2018).  
131 R. Kerr, ‘Peace through Justice: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2007) Southeast 
European and Black Sea Studies 7(3): 373-385 at 376. See details in Chapter 4, s.4.3.2.   
132 J. Subotić, ‘The Cruelty of False Remorse: Biljana Plavšić at The Hague’ at 40.  
133 The divisions were also physically apparent over the course of three months living in Sarajevo and travelling 
throughout in BiH: street signs in the RS in Cyrillic only, the disjointed bus system between the Federation and the RS, and 





won’t have reconciliation nor trust”.134 Certain cities and towns are considered segregated.135 The 
major national media outlets generally have a political affiliation, and their coverage of the ICTY’s 
work was aligned with these affiliations,136 with a limited number of exceptions. As noted by Trbovc 
“ethnic divisions within the media sphere determine the way local media cover such stories”.137 This 
was spoken to directly by a BiH judge who pointed out that, “you always have [to] question which 
media house belongs to which political party and then how you are going to give certain context to 
certain war criminals”138 which, in turn, is how individuals as members of groups, if so aligned, 
receive the message, albeit unintentional, of UER. This interviewee made explicit the above noted 
assertion that different audiences receive the judgment and the UERs through lenses which the 
media outlet colours. Certainly, it was apparent over the course of the interviews that different 
communities heard and believed different messages as they witnessed UER. As perpetrators are 
granted early release often with no accompanying official explanation, such as a press release, it was 
left open for individuals in the divided society to interpret the motive and meaning behind the 
practice. These actions projected messages, and people, each with their different lenses, view UER 
through the different filters of the respective media outlets.139 Thus, in a country where “politics is 
everything”,140 these communities and the individuals received different messages as they witnessed 
UER.  
 
7.5.1. UER Rewarding Perpetrators  
The least harmful message that was received was that UER was an inexplicable and inappropriate 
reward to the perpetrator for behaving well in prison. UER was another privilege that the 
perpetrator received as a result of being prosecuted in The Hague. It was a continuation of the 
messages already projected through the television coverage of Tribunal, whereby perpetrators 
received overly generous treatment. This treatment began at the trial, whereby the accused was 
 
134 Interview, Victims’ Association, RS, 23/11/2017.  An NGO representative also … we are still living in the politics who 
are not allowing us to live … to be with each other like that, we are still in those separate sides, we are not fighting, we 
are not in the war, we are even working with each other but we have one thing which still has influence on us, and even 
now when I put it like that we cannot actually know, does that have, what impact that has on the people around us. 
135 M. Palmberger, How Generations Remember: Conflicting Histories and Shared Memories in Post-War Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Palgrave McMillan, 2016) in relation to Mostar, the Eastern side of the city being Bosniak and the Western 
side. 
136 S. Basic, 'Bosnian Society on a Path to Justice, Truth and Reconciliation' in M. Fischer (ed.) Peacebuilding and Civil 
Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ten Years after Dayton (Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 
2nd edition, 2007) at 371. 
137 J. M Trbovc, ‘Homecomings From “The Hague”: Media Coverage of ICTY Defendants After Trial and Punishment’ at 
409. 
138 Interview, Threes Judge in one interview, Brčko, BiH, 13/11/2017.   
139 K. Ristić, ‘The Media Negotiations of War Criminals and Their Memoirs: The Emergence of the “ICTY Celebrity” who 
focuses on “the different ways the war criminals reappear in media discourses” at 395.  





addressed as “Sir or Mister”. This was noted by one judge with a clear sense of irritation, as she then 
asserted that the “judge is not obliged to address them with this respected title … the moment when 
indictment gains legal power [they are] only [an] accused person and nothing more than that”.141 In 
addition to expressing frustration as to how the individuals were addressed at the Tribunal, the 
judge pointed to their physical treatment in detention as they were housed in the Scheveningen 
Detention Unit (DU) and had enjoyed all the “privileges”142 of a European justice system. The 
perpetrators’ physical situation in the DU (access to television, internet and family visits) sharply 
contrasted to their victims, who had received very little or nothing from the state. This sense of 
perpetrators being treated with inappropriate benevolence was articulated by an Embassy official 
who requested anonymity. She noted that victims’ communities viewed the coverage of the 
perpetrators’ treatment in The Hague within the surroundings of relative impoverishment in BiH. In 
her work with victims she had been told “‘look at them [perpetrators] washed and fed, they are 
given everything they need and then they are being granted early release. And we are still living our 
punishment.’” 143  
 
UER being perceived as yet another unwarranted privilege being accorded to perpetrators, this was 
sometimes linked to this being a “reward … for their good behaviour”.144 Eight interviewees used the 
word “reward” in relation to their perceptions of UER.145 One prosecutor in the Republika Srpska 
(RS) had gone back to his law books before our interview, to find parole’s purposes in national 
jurisdictions. When asked about the four factors146 that the President considered in the application 
for early release, he reflected that he did not believe they were easy to prioritise. From his reading, 
he “perceived [parole] like some kind of reward for good behaviour of the prisoners [not] as a means 
for rehabilitation”. For him “it is the tool that could be used to get prisoners’ obedience and to keep 
them obedient … if they behave accordingly the parole could be the reward they could get”.147 This 
apparent objective understanding (objective to the extent the Prosecutor had looked at the 
purposes of parole in legal textbooks) was focused on by one interviewee who had worked in prisons 
 
141 Interview, Judge, Federation, BiH, 21/11/2017. 
142 The words ‘privileges’ or ‘benefit’ were noted by four interviews who were frustrated with the apparent generosity of 
the ICTY detention facilities.  
143 Interview, Embassy Official, Sarajevo, BiH, 13/12/2017. 
144 Interview, Defence Lawyer, Sarajevo, BiH, 03/11/2017. 
145 Interview, NGO Representative, 14/12/2017; Interview, Judge, Federation, 21/11/2017; Interview, Defence Lawyer, 
Sarajevo, 03/11/2017; Interview, Prosecutor, Federation, 09/11/2017; Interview, Prosecutor, RS, 22/11/2017; Interview, 
Prosecutor, Federation, 08/12/2017; Interview, Prosecutor, Federation, 21/11/2017; and Interview, Chief Prosecutor 
Brčko, 13/11/2017.  
146 Under Article 125 of the RPE – gravity of the crime, similarly-situated prisoners, substantial cooperation with the 
Prosecutor and evidence of a demonstration of rehabilitation.  





at the national level in the EU. It could be argued that she too considered early release from a 
professional position. She asserted that early release was a means to “manage the prisoners”.148 The 
prosecutor believed that the practice of early release at “the international level is very similar to the 
... system here”.149 Although he raised this in the context of rehabilitation, his words reflect how 
early release was perceived as simply a reward for good behaviour150 and maintaining good 
behaviour in prisons. The diplomat who had spoken of how the victims and survivors perceive, and 
are frustrated by, the early release practice as yet another reward to perpetrators was a sentiment 
shared by professionals also.  
 
7.5.2. UER Correcting Errors 
From the other side, that of the perpetrators’ communities, early release can be interpreted 
differently, as noted by Meijers and Glasius.151 This point came across when meeting with individuals 
in the RS. The only openly pro-Milosevic Serb interviewed acknowledged that his perspective on 
early release very much depended on who had been freed from prison. For him, early release was 
not a reward, deserved or undeserved, rather it was an affirmation that “the Tribunal has corrected 
the errors that they made throughout the proceedings”.152 This sentence makes clear what he 
emphasised throughout the interview; that he did not perceive the ICTY as a legitimate institution. 
From his perspective, the ICTY was biased - anti-Serbian and NATO dominated. Another interviewee 
commented on having seen this same opinion, of the Tribunal as anti-Serb, being expressed by the 
President of Serbia, as he had stated on television that the “Hague Tribunal is a court that is just 
adjudicating Serbs”.153 The pro-Milosevic interviewee argued that the ICTY was “a revenge … not … a 
trial, there was selection if you look at the persons”. He correctly noted that the majority of those 
convicted were Serbs.154 The sentiment of revenge was articulated by him as he questioned, 
rhetorically, “how many were imprisoned for life do you know, except Serbs?”155 The interviewee 
appeared to be emphasising the fact that of the 90 individuals convicted, the six who received life 
imprisonment were Serbs – there was no Albanian, Bosniak or Croat who had received this 
 
148 Interview, ICTY Staff Member, Sarajevo, BiH, 08/11/2017.  
149 Interview, Prosecutor, RS, BiH, 22/11/2017. 
150 See Chapter 6, s.6.6.1.   
151 T. Meijers and M. Glasius, ‘Trials as Messages of Justice: What should be expected of International Criminal Courts’ at 
432. 
152 Interview, Victims’ Association, Banja Luka, RS, BiH, 23/11/2017. 
153 Interview, Judge, Federation, BiH, 21/11/2017. 
154 Empirical studies show that Serbs who perceive the ICTY as anti-Serb will reference the statistics of the high number of 
Serbs convicted; see D. Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY's Impact in Bosnia and Serbia (Oxford University Press, 
2018) at 182.  





sentence.156 For him the Tribunal had mistreated Serbs (focusing attention on their crimes rather 
than the crimes of others), punished them too harshly, and was now recognising this mistake as they 
granted UER. This belief was summed up by another interviewee, an international from an IGO, who 
was overall unhappy with UER. Having worked in divided and minoritised areas such as Foča and 
Goražde, he believed that early release would be “‘twisted” by perpetrators’ communities. He said 
that early release would not be received as “‘oh, it’s great to see they showed this leniency, despite 
all he has done’. No, it is not perceived as [this but rather] an admission of guilt from an illegitimate 
court”.157 This description of the reaction of perpetrators’ communities mirrored exactly by the 
above interviewee’s belief that the biased court was attempting to make amends for its treatment of 
hard-done-by Serb veterans as he further noted that: “90 percent of the Serbs will never accept the 
trials as valid ones, they perceive it as punishment because they are not pro-western policies and 
NATO pact”.158 UER was for him not a measure of mercy but an illegitimate court recognising its 
errors. The statistic noted by the interviewee is reflected in opinion polls relating to different 
ethnicities’ perceptions of the Tribunal.159 Additionally, empirical studies have similarly found “some 
communities in … the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina have regarded the ICTY from the 
outset, as being biased”.160  
 
The belief that the pro-war Serb population perceived UER as a correction of the Tribunal’s error was 
reflected by other ethnic groups in the RS. One interviewee captured this as he stated that the 
“perception of the local community here, [is that early release] appears as a revision of the 
judgment”.161 This interpretation of UER as a “revision of judgment” was described by a prosecutor 
elsewhere in BiH who had cautioned that where early release was not, as he said, “evaluated with 
criticism” (i.e. a thorough process), it ran the risk of “twisting the whole idea of justice as well as the 
sentence and the verdict given by the court”.162 The use of the word “verdict” suggests that UER 
could be perceived as a distortion of the verdict, the overall finding of guilt. This speaks to the 
warning given by Damaška who asserted that “it is communities sympathetic to the defendant that 
… should be the target of moral messages. And unless the carriers of these messages are perceived 
 
156 Life sentences were handed down to Milan Lukić, Tolimir, Galić, Beara, Popović and Mladić.  
157 Interview, IGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 21/12/2017. 
158 Interview Victims’ Association, Banja Luka, RS, BiH, 23/11/2017.  
159 For a detailed description of opinion polls, undertaken by the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, sponsored by the 
OSCE (BiH polls - 2010 and  2012) see M. Milanović The Impact of the ICTY on the Former Yugoslavia: An Anticipatory 
Postmortem’ (2016) American Journal of International Law 110(2): 233- 259. 
160 J. Mertus ‘Findings from Focus Group Research on Public Perceptions of the ICTY’ Sudosteuropa, 55(1): 107-117 cited 
in M. Fischer, ‘Dealing with past violence as a long-term challenge’ in M. Fischer and O. Simić (eds.) Transitional Justice 
and Reconciliation: Lessons from the Balkans (Routledge, 2016) at 247. 
161 Interview, Victims Association and detention camp survivor, RS, BiH, 22/11/2017.  





as being fair to the defendant, messages are likely to fall on deaf ears”.163 Yet, the message of early 
release did not fall on deaf ears.  
 
This perceived message of the Tribunal correcting its errors had further ramifications in the post-
conflict community. UER was perceived not only as a correction of an overly harsh sentence but at 
best a diminution of the severity of the crimes or, indeed, an overturning of guilt for that particular 
individual. The perception of UER as an overturning of guilt for that specific individual, in that 
particular case, had the capacity when manipulated by politicians such as Dodik, to distort the bigger 
picture of the crimes.  
 
7.5.3. UER Fuelling Denialism  
The wider ripples of UER were felt by all communities.164 This was articulated best by one 
interviewee who queried whether UER ran counter to the ICTY’s purpose of contributing to peace.165 
He was against early release altogether and asserted that judges considering it should reflect on the 
extent to which their “decision is influencing society – is it really concentrating on peace and 
reconciliation or actually putting fuel on the fire?”166 For him UER had an impact on the immediate 
ethnic divisions in the context of revisionism. Eight of the interviewees in BiH spoke of high levels of 
denialism of the war atrocities.167 Two interviewees suggested that this denialism was directly linked 
to the UER of high-level perpetrators, compounded by their rhetoric and their reception upon 
release. One interviewee asserted that UER early release “serves as a confirmation of their claims of 
not being guilty”.168 This Sarajevo-based interviewee believed that many perpetrators and their 
communities still denied the crimes for which they had been convicted. This belief was affirmed by 
interviewees in the RS, both Bosniak and Serbian. The first was a Bosniak camp survivor, as she 
reflected that “the ambience here is quite different, the denial is supported by the political and 
intellectual elite, there are very few people who are willing to openly acknowledge the crimes 
 
163 M. Damaška, ‘The Competing Visions of Fairness: The Basic Choice for International Criminal Tribunals’ (2011) Chicago 
Kent International and Commercial Law Review 38: 365 at 379.  
164 As noted by one NGO Director as he argued UER “is not a good message for direct victims and second and third 
generation of victims. That’s very dangerous, very dangerous for the peace process, and generally for this country”, 
Interview, NGO Director, Sarajevo, BiH, 07/11/2017. 
165 UNSCR 808, 23 February 1993, “restoration and maintenance of peace”. 
166 Interview, IGO Senior Staff Member, Sarajevo, BiH, 01/12/2017.  
167 Interview, NGO Director, Sarajevo, BiH, morning 06/11/2017 described the denialism as ‘a constant revision of the 
past’.  





committed, a few of them openly speak about atrocities, these are brave people”.169 Another 
interviewee, a prominent Bosnian Serb human rights activist was one of those few people.170 He 
spoke at length about the current state of denialism, especially under the RS Premiership of Dodik 
(first elected 2006) who, as noted above, had sent Plavšić his private jet to bring her to Belgrade, 
Serbia upon her UER. The NGO director cited above spoke of denialism not only in BiH but 
throughout the region, as she continued that “things that have been established as facts by the ICTY 
are still a matter of dispute in this region … after [UER] they come back to the communities and they 
are in a position where they are denying all of the things that have happened during the conflict”.171 
The impact of UER had ripples not only in the local communities, at the national level but also at the 
broader regional level.  
 
The ongoing denialism of atrocity crimes, the context of UER, can be illustrated by Dodik and other 
political elites in the denial of the genocide in Srebrenica. Similar to legitimacy, acceptance of the 
truth, is not a permanent state of affairs.172 The ICTY’s Final Krstić decision,173 April 2004, confirmed 
the genocide in Srebrenica, as found in the judgment by the Trial Chamber in 2001. After the ICTY’s 
Trial Chamber 2001 decision, families of the disappeared from the Srebrenica area filed applications 
to the Human Rights Chamber for BiH. The Chamber ordered the Government of Republika Srpska to 
“conduct a full, meaningful, thorough, and detailed investigation into the events”.174 After ongoing 
pressure from the Office of the High Representative,175 the RS Government reluctantly176 established 
a commission to investigate alleged RS state involvement in the massacre. The Commission 
concluded its work in June 2004 – which uncovered a number of mass graves.177 Nevertheless, the 
RS official apology, pronounced by the then Prime Minister Cavić, avoided the term genocide.178 
Instead, he stated that the “Bosnian Serb Government shares the pain of the families of Srebrenica, 
 
169 Interview, Victims Association and detention camp survivor, 22/11/2017. 
170 He was the interviewee who advocated for ostracism, NGO, Banja Luka, 24/11/2017.  
171 Interview, NGO Director, Sarajevo, BiH, afternoon 06/11/2017. 
172 See Chapter 3, s.3.2, Popovski and Turner argue that legitimacy is “fluid”, see V. Popovski and N. Turner, ‘Legality and 
Legitimacy in International Order’ (2008) United Nations University Policy Brief 5(1).  
173 Radislav Krstić, Chief of Staff/Deputy Commander of the Drina Corps of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) was found guilty 
of, on the basis of individual criminal responsibility (Article 7(1) of the Statute), inter alia, aiding and abetting genocide. 
The Appeal Chamber overturned his original genocide conviction. 
174 Human Rights Chamber for BiH 2003, §212. 
175 The High Representative is an EU appointed Officer who oversees the implementation of the 1995 Dayton Agreement, 
see: http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1161  
176 The Commission was established almost two years after the Chamber decision.  
177 J. Trbovc, ‘On the Capacity of the ICTY to Shape Public Perception of the Bosnian War: Narratives of Genocide inside 
and Outside of the Courtroom’; Paper presented at the CEEISA-ISA 2016 Joint International Conference Faculty of Social 
Sciences, University of Ljubljana, 23-25 June 2016, see: http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/CEEISA-ISA-
LBJ2016/Archive/92e2778c-77f1-46a5-951d-ebd41eed8f15.pdf  
178 Also noted in D. Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY's Impact in Bosnia and Serbia (Oxford University Press, 





is truly sorry and apologises for the tragedy”.179 Six years later, RS President Dodik was quick to 
dismiss the “tragedy” of Srebrenica. In August 2010 the Steering Committee of the Peace 
Implementation Council, issued a declaration in Sarajevo which “reaffirmed that genocide in 
Srebrenica, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the course of the conflict in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina must not be forgotten or denied”.180 Dodik reacted strongly. He stated that the 
international community was attempting “to impose responsibility for the genocide – which did not 
happen – on an entire nation”.181 Dodik’s rhetoric was matched in August 2018 when the RS 
government repealed the 2004 RS Government Report on Srebrenica, despite the Commission’s 
report coming from a final and binding decision of the Human Rights Chamber of BiH.182 The RS 
Government of 2018 asserted that the 2004 Report was accepted at the time because of external 
pressures.183 This explanation of a retraction of an apology, reasoning that international pressure 
was being exerted, is strikingly similar to Plavšić’s retraction of her statement of remorse in her 
guilty plea. Plavšić too had argued that she had been pressured by the prosecutors to accept the 
guilty plea.184 The success of this narrative, the projection of the Bosnian-Serbs being victimised by 
Western powers, noted in the literature on the post-conflict lack of reconciliation in BiH,185 was 
illustrated by the VA/War Veterans’ Association in Banja Luka as he noted the ICTY was backed by 
NATO powers (s.7.5.2). There has not been an UER of a perpetrator convicted of genocide at the 
ICTY, to date, but a number of interviewees argued to the effect that many who return “are not 
accepting the judgment from the Hague … their behaviour after they return to communities … they 
believe that they have been unfairly convicted … they are refusing to acknowledge the things they 
have been convicted for”.186 Denialism of the atrocity crimes continues, at the political elite level and 
also in the everyday.  
  
 
179 Associated Press, 11 November 2004, cited in M. Fischer and O. Simić, Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Lessons 





182 Office of the High Representative (OHR) 54th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace 
Agreement on BiH to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (6 November 2018), see: 
http://www.ohr.int/?p=100167  
183 M. Fischer and O. Simić, Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Lessons from the Balkans (Routledge, 2015) and see 
https://balkaninsight.com/2010/07/12/bosnian-serb-leader-denies-srebrenica-was-genocide/   
184 O. Simić, ‘“I Would Do the Same Again”: In Conversation With Biljana Plavšić’ (2018) International Criminal Justice 
Review 28(4): 317-332 at 321.  
185 D. Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY's Impact in Bosnia and Serbia, noted that the ICTY judges were “mindful 
of Serb narratives casting the Tribunal as anti-Serb” at 160.  





The “ambience” of denialism, spoken by one interviewee in Prijedor, is reflected in the 
anthropological scholarship of post-conflict BiH, in the everyday life of people.187 A pertinent 
example is in Prijedor itself, now a Serb-dominated area. The Trnopolje detention camp, which held 
thousands of non-Serbs during the war, is not publicly acknowledged as such. Families of victims 
killed in the camp have not been permitted to erect a memorial either in Trnopolje or in the centre 
of Prijedor. Repeated efforts to erect a memorial have been frustrated by the Prijedor Municipal 
Assembly.188 This micro and current state of denialism, discussed in the literature,189 resonated in 
this research’s findings. However, thanks to the Tribunal’s verdicts, judgments and archives there is 
and will remain an authoritative counter narrative to this current denialism. This was explained by 
interviewees who asserted that despite current denialism the truth had now been established, and 
UER would ultimately not alter that.  
 
7.6. What UER cannot erase: The Impact of UER on the ICTY’s Overall Legitimacy  
Despite the majority of BiH stakeholders interviewed, with the exception of judges, expressing, at a 
minimum, disappointment at the practice of UER, the majority were positive with the overall work of 
the Tribunal. The reasons as to why this was the case are discussed in Chapter (s.8.7). One is of 
particular relevance in relation to the negation of moral condemnation and norm projection at UER. 
The overall positive legitimacy assessment was expressed, mostly implicitly, but on one occasion 
explicitly. This was asserted by one interviewee on the basis that the establishment of facts, the 
finding of guilt, the conviction, was the most important element of the ICTY’s justice. Punishment 
was required, but an early ending of that punishment would ultimately not have enduring 
consequences, whereas the finding of guilt remained forever. This was eloquently summed up by 
one interviewee. After speaking at length of her frustration of Plavšić’s release, when asked whether 
the practice of UER had had an impact on her assessment of the Tribunal’s overall legitimacy, she 
responded: 
No, I can't say that it did … ICTY did a really good job … of course it wasn't perfect, 
but these are like, in a bigger picture, these are like glitches … they are not small, 
 
187 M. Brenner, ‘The Struggle of Memory. Practices of the (Non-)Construction of a Memorial at Omarska’ (2011) 
Südosteuropa 59(3): 349–372.  
188 See: https://www.sarajevotimes.com/memorial-to-victims-in-prijedor-to-be-opened-in-canada/  
189 For a comprehensive oversight on the current state of contested understanding of the 1991-1995 war, see: N. Moll, 
‘Fragmented memories in a fragmented country: memory competition and political identity-building in today's Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’ (2013) Nationalities Papers 41(6): 910-935; and H. Halilovich, and P. Phipps, ‘Atentat! Contested 
histories at the one hundredth anniversary of the Sarajevo assassination’ (2015) Communication, Politics & Culture 48(3): 





but I wouldn't discount everything else … [Plavšić] they have convicted her, and that 
is on the books … Early release will not play a role in that narrative.190 
That the finding of guilt has established a narrative, which has being written “on the books” is the 
most important element – this narrative is the “bigger picture”. Her focus is on this bigger picture of 
trial and conviction. This statement speaks to Luban’s assertion that “the curious feature about 
international criminal law is that the emphasis shifts from punishment to trials”.191 He asserted, on 
the basis of the widespread belief, that no punishment can match the gravity of these crimes. With 
that in mind, he argued it is the finding of guilt that holds most value rather than the punishment 
which follows. Although Luban discussed the importance of fair trial proceedings, the interviewee’s 
emphasis was on the trial outcome, the conviction, as the big picture; and it is this big picture which 
will remain in her mind. The understanding of the lasting effects of proclaimed punishment reflects 
Drumbl’s assertion that “prosecution and punishment can manufacture an authoritative version of 
the truth, and thereby narrate a story that later becomes history”.192 The truth may not be accepted 
by everyone, and not in the current time, but it is the written record of facts, now history, which the 
UER cannot erase. This long view is spoken to by Karstedt as she paralleled the release of 
unrepentant perpetrator Plavšić to that of Nuremberg convict Albert Speer. Karstedt concluded that 
in the case of Germany “the historical account is one of slowly changing collective attitudes in 
addressing the past … a course which returning … perpetrators obviously did not change”.193 
Karstedt’s and Drumbl’s assertions echo the sentiment of the BiH interviewee: perpetrators can 
return and be welcomed now but there is an established counter record to their rhetoric and current 
popularity. The relativisation and denial of crimes, therefore, may not be permanent.  
 
7.7. Desired message  
As discussed in Chapter 6, remorse for the crimes and a recognition of the moral194 rather than legal 
wrong of the crime speaks to the significance of the norm projection element of punishment. This 
norm projection of the micro, an understanding of the dignity of each individual, based on our 
shared humanity, regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, this thesis argues, is key. This was articulated 
by one interviewee who argued that punishment should express that there is “no national reason” 
 
190 Interview, Independent with professional experience engaging with victim-witnesses in Srebrenica, Sarajevo, BiH, 
21/12/2017. 
191 D. Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law’ at 575.  
192 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Crime and Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 175.  
193 S. Karstedt, ‘“I would Prefer to be Famous”: Comparative Perspectives on the Reentry of War Criminals Sentenced at 
Nuremberg and The Hague’ at 384-385.  





for crimes.195 An internalisation of this norm would mean that individuals would have a sense of a 
shared humanity with all other individuals regardless of their specific religious, ethnic or political 
group. With this desired message in mind, caution is noted here in relation to focusing on the macro-
norm, perceived by Fisher, which placed emphasis on the group desire and right of groups to socially 
organise. Through this right or desire, the group focus places the emphasis on groups and shared 
values between groups rather than shared values across all human beings, qua being human. 
Perpetrators convicted before the ICTY frequently had committed crimes against victims due to their 
membership or affiliation with an ethnic group.196 They committed crimes on the basis of group 
identity, or in the context of group identity being emphasised. A Serb, a Croat, or a Bosniak 
perpetrator violated another individual’s, or individuals’, human rights (their right to life, not to be 
arbitrarily detained, or tortured, for example) based on the identification of that individual as a 
member of another group, or who has associated with that other group. If, however, a simpler, more 
fundamental message can be projected, that being that all humans are equal regardless of ethnicity, 
nationality etc., leaders of groups would find it more difficult to shift a mind-set towards group 
affiliation. A mind-set which focuses on groups’ rights implies that people differ in some way, which 
immediately opens up the potential for division rather than universality. A mind-set which 
recognises the universality of each individual having equal value simply by virtue of what Duff calls 
our “shared humanity”197 would be less susceptible to finding differences from a mind-set that is 
already focused on differences.  
 
7.8. Conclusion  
The dominant view, among inside stakeholders in The Hague and outside stakeholders in BiH, is that 
punishment for perpetrators of atrocity crimes is important primarily to send “messages” to people, 
a variety of different people, that certain acts committed are wrong, inexcusable, and fitting for 
punishment. These findings resonate with Feinberg’s assertion of punishment’s capacity to morally 
disavow wrongs. This dominant view that punishment projects a moral condemnation of the atrocity 
crimes supports scholars who have argued that the most appropriate reason for punishing atrocity 
crimes is “expressivism”.198 This chapter argues, based on the interview data, that a stronger 
emphasis should be placed on why punishment for atrocity crimes is appropriate, that is as a 
 
195 Interview, Prosecutor, RS, BiH, 17/11/2017.  
196 Kunarac et al, Trial Chamber Judgement, 22 February 2001, para. 592. See Chapter 6, s.6.6.1.  
197 A. Duff, ‘Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law’ in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds.) The Philosophy 
of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) at 601.  
198 M. Drumbl uses this term, for the purposes of atrocity crimes and the expressive capacity is used by D.M. Amann, R. 





vindication of the dignity of the victims. In punishing atrocity crimes, motivated by the hatred of the 
other, enabled by the belief that killing persons based on their difference (ethnic or religious 
background in this context), it is important to emphasise this element of the crime that is specifically 
been condemned. This is the norm that was, and is, projected in punishing perpetrators of atrocity 
crimes. It is argued here that for many in BiH itself, those who supported the ICTY’s dispensation of 
punishment, had internalised this norm – that all humans are of equal worth regardless of ethnicity 
or race.  
 
When UER is granted to unrepentant perpetrators, the moral condemnation and norm projection, 
symbolised in the punishment, is distorted. Thus, UER undermined the perceived purposive 
legitimacy199 of the Tribunal for a number of interviewees. This was signified in the dominance of 
Plavšić’s UER being widely referenced by interviews in BiH. Plavšić’s UER, despite her acceptance of 
the moral condemnation handed down to her in the 11-year sentence, being retracted, was 
emphasised as the “best evidence against early release”,200 because her UER directly contradicted 
the message of the original punishment.  
 
In BiH, UER was widely201 perceived as relativising atrocity crimes, which should not be considered as 
ordinary crimes. This was based not only on the gravity of the crime but the justification for those 
crimes – that of the other (the victims) being of lesser value. That the majority of interviewees in BiH 
had internalised the norm was reflected by interviewees who perceived punishment for 
perpetrators as holding valuable messages for others beyond their own border. In turn, they 
perceived UER as harmful to this message, not only to persons in BiH but to persons outside their 
borders, that is, all humans intrinsically have value. In addition to this broader picture, UER sent 
specific and damaging, albeit unintentional, messages which were significant in the immediate 
context of a post-conflict, ethnically divided BiH – where others had not internalised the norm and 
who perceived UER as an illegitimate Tribunal correcting its errors. Nevertheless, Luban’s assertion 
that the focal point of ICL is the trial rather than punishment is reflected in the fact that for the vast 
majority, UER had not undermined the overall legitimacy of the Tribunal. Perpetrators had been 
brought to justice and their conviction, their finding of guilt, remained.  
 
 
199 See Chapter 3, s.3.4.2.  
200 Interview, NGO Director, Sarajevo, BiH, 07/11/2017. 





It is the victims who have suffered directly from these atrocity crimes and, in the eyes of the 
majority of stakeholders in BiH, suffered again as perpetrators are granted UER – therefore, it is the 





Chapter 8: Victims Sense of Injustice 
8.1. Introduction  
This chapter builds on the previous one which sets out how an important element of the expressive 
purpose of punishment is conceived of (particularly amongst stakeholders in BiH) as an official 
recognition of the dignity of the victim. With this in mind, this chapter argues that UER is 
sociologically illegitimate for the majority of stakeholders in BiH (with the exception of judges) and 
discusses how ending this punishment early has negative implications for the victims. The chapter 
begins with a discussion of how the majority of stakeholders in BiH perceive perpetrators’ early 
release as an on-going injustice to victims, whereby perpetrators are, again, being accorded 
favourable treatment (s.8.2). It outlines how victims were originally constructed as stakeholders at 
the ICTY (s.8.3), it then contrasts the rhetoric with the reality. Based on interview analysis, it explains 
how decision-makers perceive victims’ sense of justice as these findings go some way to explain how 
victims were overlooked in this element of the justice system (s.8.4). The thematic analysis of these 
findings confirms much of the existing international criminal justice literature, which asserts that 
victims are frequently conceptualised as passive stakeholders by decision-makers at the Tribunal, 
which has created a performance legitimacy deficit, as the Tribunal overlooked a core 
“constituency”.1 It then contrasts these sentiments with the views expressed by others at the 
Tribunal and interviewees in BiH (with the notable exception of judges), who largely perceive the 
Tribunal as having an ongoing duty of care to victims (s.8.5), and highlights the different criteria of 
procedural justice which stakeholders in BiH indicated could ameliorate the sense of injustice to 
victims caused by UER (s.8.6). Finally, it elaborates on the context in BiH, and how this has affected 
perceptions of the Tribunal’s overall legitimacy (s.8.7). Therefore, the chapter concludes (s.8.8) by 
addressing the overarching element of the research question: the extent to which the UER affected 
perceptions of the Tribunal’s overall legitimacy, and provides an explanation of why.  
 
8.2. Victims’ Sense of Injustice Perpetuated by UER: Perpetrators’ Justice Trumps Victims 
UER was perceived by many interviewees, notably Victims Associations (VAs) and NGOs and those 
working with victims, as an on-going injustice to victims, whereby perpetrators were afforded more 
respect than victims by the Tribunal. Ironically, perpetrators who violate victims’ human rights 
already benefit from the principle of lenity in criminal law as has been noted in the literature on 
 
1 A. Cassese, ‘The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals and the Current Prospects of International Criminal 





international criminal law, in particular at trial.2 Chapters 5 and 6 illustrate that the principle of lenity 
went beyond the trial stage to enforcement of sentences. This view of a continuum of injustices 
experienced by victims in contrast to perpetrators came across in two different ways in the 
interviews in BiH: firstly, in a material sense, perpetrators had visibly received more resources than 
victims, and, secondly, in the grant of UER the Tribunal repeated the same act of unjustified leniency 
towards the perpetrator as they had done in sentencing. In BiH there was an overall belief that the 
interests of perpetrators were the sole focus at the enforcement stage of the international criminal 
justice, to the exclusion of victims who were nevertheless still suffering due to these atrocity crimes. 
Further, some war victims, especially victims of rape, were restricted or denied access to reparations 
due to prescriptive requirements (detailed below)3 and for the relatives of those murdered, many 
are unable to bury their dead as 10,000 bodies remain disappeared.4 This sentiment was expressed 
by the majority of interviewees (except for judges) in BiH, and was articulated by one judge at the 
Tribunal itself who believed that “we lean too much towards the accused persons and forget about 
the victims”.5  
 
The view that victims were being overlooked by the Tribunal due to a bias toward the perpetrators 
was illustrated by one NGO early on in the interview. After noting that the researcher had conducted 
17 interviews in The Hague and was now in BiH to hear from the war-affected communities, she 
immediately asked for an explanation for UER, stating that her NGO had “never got a clear answer 
how actually this practice was developed” 6 and she wished to know the answers the researcher had 
obtained from the Tribunal. Her statement indicates she had either asked but not been provided 
with a clear answer as to why the practice was happening, or that she had simply not heard any 
explanation from the Tribunal. Either of these scenarios, not receiving a clear answer or not being 
provided with one, indicate a lack of procedural justice, whereby stakeholders were either not 
 
2 D. Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law’ in S. Besson and 
J. Tasioulas (eds.) The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 582, emphasising A.M Danner 
and J.S. Martinez who noted that, “human rights law adopts the standpoint of protecting victims and therefore requires 
the law to be read broadly in cases of ambiguity but criminal law adopts the standpoint of protecting defendant and the 
principle of lenity requires ambiguous statutes to be read narrowly”, see A.M Danner and J.S. Martinez, ‘Guilty 
Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law’ 
(2005) California Law Review 93(1): 75 -170 at 93. 
3 Amnesty International, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee 119th 
Session, 13 February 2017, at 8-10, ‘Access to Justice and Reparations’, see: 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur63/5554/2017/en/ [accessed 27/12/2019].  
4 ICMP figures, see: https://www.icmp.int/where-we-work/europe/western-balkans/bosnia-and-herzegovina/  [accessed 
27/12/2019]  
5 Interview, Judge, The Hague, 03/02/2017.  





informed or not comprehensively informed of the process.7 When she was informed that 
perpetrators of crimes had the right to be considered for early release from imprisonment under the 
European Convention of Human Rights, which all enforcement states were a party to, she responded 
with a rhetorical question: “are international courts being established so we can protect the rights of 
war criminals or are they being established in order to get justice for victims?”8 Her rhetorical 
question expressed more bluntly what the Tribunal judge above had articulated, a sense of 
perpetrators’ human rights continually trumping victims’ interests.9 
 
From the outset of their time at The Hague, perpetrators were afforded status along with fair trial 
rights, which translated into material benefits, which was picked up by the BiH media. For example, 
one media report noted how those indicted before the Tribunal had their defence lawyers paid for 
initially by the Tribunal itself.10 Though this is a legal right, it contrasts with material deprivation still 
felt by victims of the conflict in BiH. Perpetrators are removed from the economically difficult reality 
in BiH. In general terms, BiH, in 2017, had an unemployment rate of approximately 20%.11 The data 
is not disaggregated in relation to the level of unemployment amongst victims, but this is the context 
within which their reality is lived. Although statistics cannot be provided here, an Amnesty 
International report to the UN asserted that victims often had low “socio-economic status” and 
“subsist on the margins of society”.12 Beyond the material side, scholars have noted that the 
“legacies of the conflict are still very much alive [and] victims [are] still awaiting acknowledgement of 
their suffering or redress for their harms”.13 From 2000 onward, the ICTY trials were broadcast live 
across the region14 and the media reported on their life in the UN Detention Unit (UNDU) and later 
the prisons in the enforcement state.15 As Meernik and King’s research found, the public in BiH were 
more aware of the open prison where Plavšić, convicted of crimes against humanity, was serving her 
 
7 Y. Huo and T. Tyler, Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and the Courts (Russell-Sage 
Foundation, 2002) and J. Thibaut and L. Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (Erlbaum, 1975) cited in R. 
Killean, ‘Procedural Justice in International Criminal Courts: Assessing Civil Parties’ Perceptions of Justice at the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ (2016) International Criminal Law Review 16: 1-38 at 5. 
8 Interview, NGO Director, Sarajevo, BiH, afternoon 06/11/2017.   
9 One interviewee in The Hague emphasised that victims’ do not have specific rights in the ICTY Statute, in contrast to the 
accused and perpetrators – victims’ interests are to be taken into account only (Article 22, Statute). Interview, Staff 
Member, The Hague, 03/02/2017.   
10 See: https://balkaninsight.com/2017/11/17/hague-tribunal-and-serbs-spend-2m-on-mladic-trial-11-15-2017/ [accessed 
27/12/2019].  
11 See https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/bosnia-and-herzegovina/unemployment-rate [accessed 29/01/2020].  
12 Amnesty International, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee 119th 
Session, 13 February 2017, at 8-10, ‘Access to Justice and Reparations’.  
13 M. Fischer and O. Simić, Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Lessons from the Balkans (Routledge, 2015) at 14.  
14 ICTY Annual Report 2000, para. 215.  However E. Stover, The Witnesses, noted that the live broadcasts were not aired 
consistently due to funding at the Tribunal, at 114. 





sentence and the horse-riding lessons available to her, than they were with the crimes for which she 
was finally sentenced.16 These privileges experienced by the perpetrators contrasted to the position 
of the victims in BiH, where there was a lack of state recognition and subsequent lack of reparations 
for injuries inflicted in the war, murder of a family-member who contributed financially to the family, 
and the non-return of property.17 
 
At the same time as perpetrators were benefiting from the European justice system,18 the Republika 
Srpska (RS) financially supported some ICTY indictees and their families.19 Albeit not the fault of the 
Tribunal, perceptions, as s.8.7.1 illustrates, are shaped by this context. There was the sense of bitter 
irony that perpetrators were materially better-off than victims, as they were “brought to justice”20 
for the crimes they had perpetrated (or were accused of), in contrast to the victims who were 
harmed directly by the atrocities. This disparity is recognised in BiH as the public, including victims, 
are “aware of the enormous sums spent ... on supporting defendants … in contrast, victims feel 
there is little money spent to support and care for victims and the victim communities”.21 
 
Although the injustices faced by victims in BiH are not due to the Tribunal, but the intransigence of 
an ethnically divided Bosnian state,22 it is this context within which victims experience the early 
release of perpetrators. Perpetrators benefitting from UER, who - as one interviewee noted - had 
received a “hotel package”23 in the UNDU, have now been granted freedom by an official authority, 
The Tribunal. In contrast, in BiH civilian victims were frequently denied victim status under the 
peculiarities of state laws.24 Due to the autonomy of the state entities (the RS and the Federation), 
 
16 K. King and J.D Meernik, ‘Assessing the Impact of the ICTY: Balancing International with Local Interests while doing 
Justice’ in B. Swart, A. Zahar and G. Sluiter (eds.) The Legacy of the ICTY (Oxford University Press, 2011) cited by R. 
Mulgrew Towards the Development of an International Penal System (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 229.  
17 Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights’ Compilation Report – Universal Periodic Review, 2014, at 1.  
18 See Chapter 6, s.6.2 on the human rights standards applicable to perpetrators serving their sentence in European 
States. The European Convention on Human Rights has accorded relatively high standards of fair trial rights to the 
accused. During detention the European Committee Against Torture, Minimum Standards etc. are, under the ICTY’s 
bilateral agreement with enforcement states, due to comply with the highest human rights standards.  
19 http://archive.balkaninsight.com/en/article/ethnic-politics-dictate-payments [accessed 27/12/2019]. 
20 UNSCR 808 22 February 1993.  
21 E. Ramulić, ‘Victims’ Perspective’ in R. Steinberg (ed.) Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2011) at 104. 
22 C. Grewe and M. Riegner, ‘Internationalized Constitutionalism in Ethnically Divided Societies: Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo Compared’ in A. von Bogandy and R. Wolfrum (eds.) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2011) 15, 1-64 
at 31. 
23 Interview, NGO Director, Sarajevo, midday 06/11/2017 and Prosecutor, Federation, 21/11/2017. These two 
interviewees referred to prison conditions as ‘hotel packages’ and ‘hotel service’ respectively. 
24 Amnesty International, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee 119th 





access to reparations for civilian victims is lacking. Alongside this, war veterans, in contrast to civilian 
victims, are afforded pensions and financial compensation for injuries incurred. This is demonstrated 
by two laws in each entity which deal with reparations for loss incurred during the war. The 
Republika Srpska Law on Protection of Civilian Victims of War, 2007 did not recognise survivors of 
wartime sexual violence as a specific category. It also had a stringent requirement to demonstrate 
bodily damage of at least 60% as a direct consequence of the violation.25 At the Federation level, 
applicants were originally required to apply for civilian victims-of-war status with selected civil 
society organisations, of which not all survivors were members or with which they wanted to be 
associated. In 2016, legal amendments addressed this by introducing an independent expert 
commission with a mandate to issue certificates, but as of February 2017 the Commission had not 
commenced its work.26 There was no overarching reparations system at the state level and no 
overarching law on the rights of victims of torture, as of February 2017.27 At the national level, there 
was a lack of recognition of victim status and victims were frequently denied economic reparations; 
this is contrasted with the position of war veterans (though not necessarily war criminals), who were 
part of the larger group who had inflicted atrocities against them. The material well-being of those 
convicted by the ICTY, and, in parallel, their supporters and comrades, war-veteran groups, 
contrasted with the majority of victims who had received no material reparation for their losses. UER 
was another benefit that perpetrators received while the victims received nothing.  
 
UER was sociologically illegitimate for most interviewees in BiH,28 primarily perceived as double 
injustice directly levied by The Tribunal. The initial injustice was that of a lenient sentence, now 
compounded by its non-completion. It was a “second slap in the face”29 by the Tribunal. The Tribunal 
routinely argued that their work would bring victims a sense of satisfaction by punishing those found 
guilty,30 yet that promise was dashed by what many perceived as lenient sentences, and this same 
injustice was being repeated as the perpetrators were now not serving the pronounced sentence. In 
effect, the Tribunal had failed to fulfil its retributive pledge to victims. In 2003 it had stated that 
victims as well as perpetrators mattered in the administration of justice: “the Tribunal is not only 
 
25 Law on protection of civilian victims of war of RS (Zakon o zaštiti civilnih žrtava rata RS-a) Official Gazette of RS, nos. 
25/93, 32/94, 37/07, 60/07. See Amnesty International, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Submission to the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee 119th Session, 13 February 2017, at 9. 
26 Amnesty International, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee 119th 
Session, 13 February 2017, at 9.  
27 Law on the Basis of the Social Protection, Protection of Civilian Victims of War and Families of Children in the 
Federation  
28 With the expectation of BiH judges.  
29 Interview, Senior Staff Member, The Hague, 02/02/2017.  





mandated to search for and record, as far as possible, the truth of what happened in the former 
Yugoslavia, but also bring justice to both victims and their relatives and to perpetrators”.31 This 
legitimacy deficit, through the non-fulfilment of a lenient sentence which, although it was not a 
reduced one, was described as such. One Victims’ Association (VA) interviewee, a direct victim 
himself, noted that “sentences are too low to begin with [then they] are reduced by one-third. It is 
some sort of attack on those who were direct victims of persecution and those … who felt war 
crimes on their own skin”.32 This sense of an infliction of suffering by the Tribunal on top of an 
existing hurt caused by lenient sentences was described by another interviewee: “additional[ly] early 
release … is like putting salt into the wounds of the victims”.33 This same metaphor of “salt on 
wounds” was used by the VA, Mothers of Srebrenica, who upon Krajišnik’s early release made the 
statement that his early release and the subsequent celebratory return was like “rubbing salt into 
the open wounds of the people who lost a family member”.34 
 
The view that there was a negligent absence of consideration for victims in the grant of UER was 
prima facie reflected in the publicly available early release decisions of the President. At the time of 
these the BiH interviews, only 25 of the 54 positive early release decisions35 considered victims. Ten 
of these considered them in general terms, whereby perpetrators had expressed remorse for 
victims,36 or under gravity of the crimes, notably when perpetrators were high level37 or direct 
perpetrators.38 Four decisions did detail the gravity of the specific crimes, notably that of sexual 
enslavement and rape.39 This statistic supports interviewees’ views that the focus is now on the 
perpetrators despite there being space to allow victims to be considered at this stage – under gravity 
of the crimes. As set out in Chapter 5, the first factor the President is required to consider under the 
Rules and Procedure of Evidence (RPE) is the “gravity of the crime”. Under gravity, the impact of the 
crime on the victim could be considered. When victims remain unacknowledged (in the written 
record and in practice) by the Tribunal, as perpetrators are granted early release, it runs counter to 
the principles now widely accepted in the field of criminal justice, both national and international, 
that “what victims need is acknowledgement [and that] … to acknowledge the victimhood of others 
 
31 Dragan Nikolić, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-94-2-S, 18 December 2003, para. 120. Emphasis added.  
32 Interview, NGO, Prijedor, RS, BiH, 22/11/2017.  
33 Interview, NGO Representative, Sarajevo, BiH, 14/12/2017. 
34 Hatidža Mehmedović, President of the Mothers of Srebrenica’s statement to Federalna TV, 2013 cited in J. M. Trbovc, 
‘Homecomings From “The Hague”: Media Coverage of ICTY Defendants After Trial and Punishment Article’ (2018) 
International Criminal Justice Review 28(4): 406-42 at 416.  
35 54 of the decisions which granted an UER.  
36 Furundžija, Ojdanić, Pandurević, Naletilić, Plavšić, Pušić, Radić, B. Simić, M. Simić and S. Zarić.  
37 Blagojević, Kordić, Momir Nikolić, Dragan Nikolić, Šljivančanin and Tarčulovski.  
38 Češić, Delić, Martinović, Mrđa, D. Tadić, Rajic, Sikirica, Vasiljević, Vuković, and Zelenović,  





is to express … in word or deed, awareness that he is injured, likely damaged, and still suffering”.40 
One third of the interviews in BiH41 expressed a sense frustration that victims were not 
acknowledged at this stage. As one interviewee noted, “prior to making this decision, [they should 
consider] what is at stake; every single principle compared to the harm that was inflicted on the 
communities, on individuals. Compared to their [perpetrators’] problems, all of them would be 
insignificant”. He concluded his statement by noting that: “the question, which is completely 
justified, by the victims’ family from their perspective … why are we not being properly assessed? 
Our suffering … with regards to the sentencing, to early release policies”.42 
 
This statement captures the two elements of the sociological legitimacy deficit of UER: first; that 
perpetrators’ well-being is perceived as being accorded priority by The Hague, which leads to the 
second legitimacy deficit; victims’ suffering (which is on-going and worse than that of the 
perpetrators) is overlooked. There is no literature to support this finding, because, to the author’s 
knowledge, there has been no other research examining the impact of UER in the region,43 although 
the value of such research has been identified by others.44 However, as discussed below, this 
research has, to the extent possible, been able to find a number of reasons why victims were not 
considered. One of the reasons, a focus on perpetrators’ human rights, is best summed up by Abels, 
who asserted that “the real worth of international punishment: showing the former conflict region 
and the convicted persons how communities that respect the rule of law treat their most unpopular 
and vulnerable members”.45 Abels’ assertion that convicted persons are the most unpopular and 
vulnerable members of society is ill-conceived in the case of BiH,46 in which, as the preceding 
chapter discussed, returning perpetrators are not in-the-round unpopular: many receive heroes’ 
 
40 T. Govier, Victims and Victimhood (Broadview Press, 2015) at 157. Emphasis is added here in the phrase ‘still suffering’ 
as it is this aspect that the thesis has focused on, in contrast to international criminal justice scholarship which has almost 
exclusively examined victims in the trial process, not after its conclusion. This thesis picks up on this element, which is 
notably lacking in the general scholarship which has focused on victims’ limited role in the trial process, rather than the 
post-trial stage.  
41 16 of 51 interviews in BiH.  
42 Interview, NGO Director, Sarajevo, midday 06/11/2017.  
43 Although as noted, there has been literature which has examined the return of those indicted by the ICTY to the region 
but it has not examined the unconditional and early nature of the release. See: December 2018: ‘Special Issue: ICTY 
Celebrities: War Criminals Coming Home’ (2018) International Criminal Justice Review 28(4). 
44 B. Holá, J. van Wijk, F. Constantini, and A. Korhonnen, ‘Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ Reflections on Their Crimes 
in Early Release Decisions’ (2018) International Criminal Justice Review 28(4): 349-371 at 366. 
45 D. Abels, ‘Limiting the Objectives of the Enforcement of International Punishment’ in R. Mulgrew and D. Abels (eds.) 
Research Handbook on the International Penal System (Edward Elgar, 2016) at 273. 
46 And this may be the case for other post-conflict societies where perpetrators are not necessarily unpopular in the eyes 





welcome47 by a number of their former comrades and on-going supporters,48 appointed director of 
health centre and appointed as a chief military advisor.49 Further, this assertion is in sharp contrast 
to what the ICTY promulgated as the raison d’être of international punishment. In addition to 
condemning the perpetrator and deterring others, the Tribunal has frequently cited bringing justice 
to victims through the punishment of the perpetrators, and this rhetoric had resonated with many in 
BiH – almost one third, 14 of the 51 interviews50 in BiH perceived punishment at the Tribunal as 
primarily a means of victims’ satisfaction.51 Fundamentally, victims’ expectations were raised, and 
then disappointed,52 to which we now turn.  
 
8.3. Victims as Stakeholders in the ICTY’s Administration of Justice  
The concept of victims as rightful but dispossessed stakeholders53 in the criminal justice system, 
Christie’s “conflicts as property”54 argument – whereby lawyers capture and overtake the rightful 
place of the victim, was reflected in interviews in The Hague. The interview analysis supports 
Christie’s assertion of victims as simply the “trigger-offerer”.55 Additionally, it supports more recent 
scholarship which has asserted that at the ICTY victims were perceived and treated as passive 
stakeholders.56 At the practical level, the interviewee feedback found that there was no policy of 
communicating the practice, either from a passive or more pro-active approach. The minimum 
 
47 December 2018: ‘Special Issue: ICTY Celebrities: War Criminals Coming Home’ (2018) International Criminal Justice 
Review 28(4). See Chapter 4, s.4.5.4. 
48 N. Zupan, 'Facing the Past and Transitional Justice in Countries of Former Yugoslavia' 327-342 in M. Fischer (ed.) 
Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ten Years After Dayton (Berghof Research Centre for 
Constructive Conflict Management, 2nd edition, 2007) at 337, “very often perpetrators are celebrated as "heroes" in their 
communities. This is not only a hurt to survivors of human rights violations, but also affects how 
collective historical memories of wartime are developed". 
49 ‘Only in Serbia: Convicted War Criminal To Train Young Officers’, see: https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-convicted-war-
criminal-to-train-young-officers-hague/28825964.html [accessed 27/12/2019].  
50 One of the interview questions was what interviewees perceived the purpose of punishment at the Tribunal as being; 
14 to 51 of these began their response in relation to justice for the victims.  
51 Consequently, when the punishment was terminated early with no explanation provided, it led to a sense of victims’ 
injustice.  
52 Empirical research on ICTs and the ICC in particular has found that the international tribunals frequently raised victims’ 
expectations unrealistically, often through rhetoric, which has led to disappointment. See: T. Obel Hansen and C. Lekha 
Sriram ‘Fighting for Justice (and Survival): Kenyan Civil Society Accountability Strategies and Their Enemies’ (2015) 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 9: 407–427 at 416. This was forewarned in the literature, for example – 
“allowing victims to participate and then disrespecting them or flagrantly failing to meet their expectations will lead to 
secondary victimisation” argued by R. Letschert, ‘International Criminal Proceedings—An Adequate Tool for Victims’ 
Justice?’ in K. Tibori-Szabó and M. Hirst (eds.) Victim Participation in International Criminal Justice Practitioners’ Guide 
(Asser Press, 2015) at 468, who references generally U. Orth, ‘Secondary Victimisation of Crime Victims by Criminal 
Proceedings’ (2002) Social Justice Research 15(4): 313-325.  
53 Noted in relation to international criminal justice by L. May and S. Fyfe, “Athena’s trial stands completely outside of the 
charges and counter charges of the people who have been affected, namely the victims. … Athena pushes the 
proceedings forward by focusing on the question of Orestes’ guilt” - see L. May and S. Fyfe, International Criminal 
Tribunals: A Normative Defense (Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 27.  
54 See Chapter 3, s.3.6 - N. Christie, ‘Conflicts as Property’ (1977) The British Journal of Criminology 17(1).  
55 N. Christie, ‘Conflicts as Property’ at 3. 





(passive) approach was not taken. Direct victims were not, as a routine practice, informed of the UER 
of perpetrators prior to or after the release, despite there being a provision in the Practice Direction 
for the President to inform “other relevant parties”.57 Informing relevant parties, was a minimal 
step, flagged up to the President on reading the Practice Direction. This communication would have 
met an element of the standard of good procedural justice, whereby stakeholders are kept informed 
of their case.58 
 
Indirect victims, and the general public were also not routinely informed. On a number of occasions, 
Annual Reports did note that an early release had been granted, but not consistently. Neither was an 
active approach taken, encompassing an explanation as to why the practice occurred in the legal 
sense (as noted by the NGO Director in s.8.2). No reasons or justification was provided for the 
practice of UER.59   
 
This is not to say that the Tribunal was disingenuous or that they did not care about victims. A 
number of judges spoke of how they had advocated for reparations and that they wanted to hear 
from victims - for the sake of victims. This active approach to understanding the harm caused to 
victims, and to encompass this into an appropriate punishment - thereby providing victims with a 
sense of satisfaction, was indicated by one example provided by a Tribunal judge. When asked about 
a role for victims, he noted that there was some victim participation at the Tribunal, although it was 
“not in the way conceived by the ICC”; the Tribunal “had made in-roads”.60 He pointed out that 
space had been made for victims to come and testify when the accused had pled guilty. He said that 
when he started work at the Tribunal there was just a “sentencing hearing lasting a few hours and 
then a sentence”. For him, he said, this was “unacceptable” because “there were hundreds of 
victims whose hope was to be able to come here so someone will hear their story; and all of a 
sudden they find this person is going to deny them that by pleading guilty and as a recompense he’s 
 
57 Practice Direction on the Procedure for the Determination of Applications for Pardon, Commutation of Sentence, and 
Early Release of Persons Convicted by the International Tribunal, April 1999. See Chapter 5, s.5.3.  
58 J.A. Wemmers, ‘Victim Notification and Public Support for the Criminal Justice System’ (1999) International Review of 
Victimology 6(3): 167-178 and Y. Huo and T. Tyler, Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and 
the Courts (Russell-Sage Foundation, 2002) and J. Thibaut and L. Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis 
(Erlbaum, 1975) cited in R. Killean, ‘Procedural Justice in International Criminal Courts: Assessing Civil Parties’ Perceptions 
of Justice at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ (2016) International Criminal Law Review 16: 1-38 at 
5. See further Chapter 3, s.3.6.3. 
59 As was noted by the NGO Director; Interview, NGO, Sarajevo, BiH, afternoon 06/11/2017.  





even going to get a lighter sentence”.61 The first section of his example speaks to the sense of care 
he had to victims; he took an active step to provide them with the opportunity to speak, which he 
believed they wanted. This sense of duty was indicated by another judge, formerly at The Tribunal 
(also asked about the role of victims); although he did not provide any examples, he noted that 
“Article 20 gives the victims’ rights. It provides for full respect of the rights of the accused but with 
due regard for the interests of the victims. There is an obligation to pay attention to the victims”.62 
The first judge, cited above, did just this by making a provision for some victims to come and testify – 
listening to the victims directly before them in the Chamber. In doing so, they were actively listening 
to them.  
 
In connection with the sentiment that victims were stakeholders in the system, this judge also gave 
another reason for bringing them to testify, which shows a desire to understand the impact of the 
crime on the victim, not simply the perpetrator’s guilt. Interviewees were not asked if victims’ harm 
was or should be a factor considered at sentencing; rather, they were asked the broader question of 
what role, if any, victims could have during and after the trial. This judge continued his example, 
detailing that he and another judge called on the Prosecution to “hand-pick the most important 
witnesses” to “bring them in and let them say what … hell they went through. It will help [us] assess 
the sentence better”.63 The judge was speaking here of victim-witnesses, and expressed the belief 
that by allowing victims to speak of the harm they had experienced as part of, and resulting from, 
the criminal act, judges could encompass this in their determination of the sentence. Similarly, 
another judge, when asked about the role of victims, expressed his belief that victim-witness 
testimony should be considered in sentencing the perpetrator. He stated that “coming forward with 
your story is I think often every important … then of course, that should be reflected in, one way or 
another, in sentencing”.64 These judges’ reasoning spoke to the respect that victims had been 
accorded, by bringing them into this stage of the justice process, despite not being a necessary 
provider of evidence. This was an indication by the Tribunal that they cared not only about 
prosecuting the guilty, but also about the harm caused to victims. The judge’s example is one 
positive counter to Christie’s “conflict as properties”65 as the Tribunal afforded (albeit a limited 
number) victims space to speak. This meant that the focus was not solely on the perpetrator. It was 
a recognition of the harm victims suffered, and a demonstration by the Tribunal that they were 
taking this into account. It was an example of putting into practice a criterion of good procedural 
 
61 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning of 30/01/2017. 
62 Interview, Judge, The Hague, 25/01/2017, record of hand-written notes, not an audio-recorded interview.  
63 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning of 30/01/2017. 
64 Interview, Judge, The Hague, 01/02/2017.  





justice, as victims were given voice66 in the justice process. At the same time, however, the purpose 
of giving the victims voice is primarily for the judges to use in their role in determining a sentence; 
the reason was not for the well-being of the victim, though this may be a positive side-effect.  
 
Another judge believed that victims’ sense of justice had been achieved for those in their role in 
testifying, which he believed was therapeutic. He acknowledged he was “not in the shoes of the 
victims of the Balkan War [and] I am not talking to them, of course not,” but from his position as a 
judge hearing testimonies, he had “the feeling the most important moment is that they can testify in 
court in the presence of this accused sitting here and he has to listen to the story of the victim. This 
is the most important thing”.67 For this judge, having their day in court was the best satisfaction that 
the ICTY could provide for victims. The judge’s notion of victims’ being able to tell their story is 
questioned throughout the literature on victims’ participation68 in criminal processes and by staff at 
The Hague itself. In relation to having the opportunity to tell their story, one staff member reflected 
that “the problem is that they want to tell you everything, and they’re not allowed to. The judge has 
to stop them … so for some […] it can be quite a traumatic experience to come here and give 
evidence.”69 Scholars have also pointed out the negative effect of judges’ interrupting70 and, 
additionally, the adversarial approach wherein the prosecution challenges victims’ testimony and 
status,71 which had caused them to feel undermined. Victim-testimony in the trial chamber was not 
an opportunity for victim-witnesses to “tell their story” at ease as the judge believed. Furthermore, 
scholars who have empirically studied victim-witnesses have dismissed the notion that testifying 
produces a cathartic effect.72 The judge’s sentiment also hints at the notion of victim as being 
perceived as passive. From this judge’s perspective, he believed that “the most important thing” for 
them was that they had their day in court, thus their role was now over.  
 
These judges spoke of victims as witnesses, not victims more broadly. The judge who noted that he 
had asked the Prosecution to “handpick the most important” witnesses implicitly recognised that 
other victims were excluded. His action of handpicking a few victims from a large number underlines 
 
66 T. Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law’ (2003) Crime and Justice 30: 283-357 at 350. See 
Chapter 3, s.3.5.3.  
67 Interview, Judge, The Hague, afternoon 30/01/2017. 
68 See Chapter 4, s.4.3.1. 
69 J. N. Clark, ‘Judging the ICTY: has it achieved its objectives?’ (2009) Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 9: (1-2) at 
128, citing ICTY Chef de Cabinet, Gabrielle McIntyre.  
70 M.B. Dembour and E. Haslam, ‘Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials’ (2004) European Journal of 
International Law, 151-177 and cited in E. Stover, The Witnesses, at 87.  
71 E. Haslam, ‘Victim participation at the International Criminal Court: a triumph of hope over experience?’ in D. 
McGoldrick, P. Rowe and E. Donnelly (eds.) The Permanent International Court: Legal and Policy Issues (Hart, 2004); J. N. 
Clark, ‘Judging the Tribunal: has it achieved its objectives?’ at 128; and E. Stover, The Witnesses, at 131.  





the reality that in cases of atrocity crimes, not all the perpetrators’ victims can be heard. This 
sentiment of there being too many victims was noted by others, who were keen to highlight the 
Tribunal’s limited resources and capacity to do more for victims; this is discussed further below. In 
contrast to the rhetoric of the Tribunal’s website that by punishing perpetrators it was bringing 
justice to victims, insiders at the Tribunal routinely noted that they simply could not bring justice to 
victims and presented different reasons for their attitude.  
 
8.4. Victims’ Sense of Injustice as Inevitable  
This section considers how interviewees in The Hague (as well as many in BiH) expressed an attitude 
that victims would inevitably have been unsatisfied with the ICTY’s dispensation of justice, as, given 
the nature of the crimes, no penal sentence can achieve substantive justice.73 As sentences were 
perceived as lenient in the first instance, victims would have been dissatisfied regardless of UER. This 
underlying sentiment of victims’ sense of injustice as inevitable further explains how victims were 
overlooked when it came to UER. This is not to say that judges and staff of the Tribunal did not care 
about victims; the sentiment of empathy for them was a theme throughout the course of the 
seventeen interviews in The Hague. A few interviewees expressed their hopeful belief that one of 
the Tribunal’s outcomes was that victims would have a sense of justice,74 but the majority of 
interviewees frequently resigned themselves to the practical limitations the Tribunal faced.75 Some 
expressed the sentiment of an impossibility of achieving just satisfaction for victims when it came to 
punishing atrocity crimes,76 others applying victims’ sense of injustice to all victims of crimes in 
general.77 The notion of the impossibility of just satisfaction in retributive punishment was also 
reflected by interviewees in BiH. However, BiH interviewees perceived UER as compounding an 
injustice – the lenient sentence; and furthermore, in contrast, the majority of BiH interviewees did 
not share the sentiment of The Hague’s limited capacity (detailed s.8.5).  
 
 
73 A. Carcano, ‘Sentencing and Gravity of the Offence in ICL’ (2002) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
51(3): 583-609; S. Kutnjak Ivković and J. Hagan, Reclaiming Justice: the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
and Local Courts (Oxford University Press, 2011) at 19 and  K. McEvoy and L. Mallinder, ‘Amnesties in Transition: 
Punishment, Restoration and the Governance of Mercy’ (2012) Journal of Law and Society 39(3): 410-440 cited in R. 
Killean, ‘Procedural Justice in International Criminal Courts: Assessing Civil Parties’ Perceptions of Justice at the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ (2016) International Criminal Law Review 16: at 6. 
74 Five of the 17 expressed their belief that the ICTY had, albeit to a limited extent, brought a sense of justice to victims.  
75 Ten of the 17 interviewees reiterated that the Tribunal had an extremely limited mandate in relation to victims (as 
witnesses) and further a limited budgetary capacity in relation to outreach.   
76 Six of the 17 interviewees expressed the sentiment that no punishment could achieve satisfaction due to the gravity of 
the crime.   
77 Four of the 17 interviewees expressed the sentiment that there was the general rule in criminal law that victims would 





8.4.1. Too Many Victims  
The nature of atrocity crimes, primarily mass victimisation, practically produces an overwhelming 
task of bringing justice to individual victims. In contrast to ordinary serious crimes in a national 
setting, where there is typically an identifiable number of victims,78 atrocity crimes often encompass 
tens of thousands of victims. Apart from the fact that the Tribunal only prosecuted a limited number 
of perpetrators, even where a perpetrator is brought before the Court, not all the crimes he is 
accused of (with their corresponding victims) are prosecuted. Sometimes, the Prosecutor cannot 
obtain enough evidence to build a case for certain crimes, or will remove charges strategically. The 
“sheer number of victims require[s] selectivity in the procedures.”79 This fact was raised by one 
judge who was asked if he believed there would be any place for victim impact statements when it 
came to the consideration of early release. The judge was informed that, in the UK, in cases of 
serious harms, victims had the opportunity to provide a Victim Impact Statement to the Parole 
Board when the perpetrator was due for a grant of parole.80 He responded by contextualising the 
issue in relation to victims who had been expected to testify, those who had been questioned by the 
OTP, but who had later been struck off the indictment when certain charges had been dropped. He 
reflected that this practice was already an injustice for these victims as it silenced them, and they 
had been denied the opportunity to testify: “I would emphasise again and again [in this context] – 
[who] should you ask? [victims] only from those municipalities that he was convicted [of crimes]?”81 
His statement suggests that there was a sense of it being almost unfair to actively engage those who 
had the good fortune to be recognised as victims in a process which had already excluded other 
victims because the areas where the crimes against them were perpetrated were struck off the 
indictment. This judge’s statement suggests one reason why even victim-witnesses were not brought 
into the process of early release. This attitude was not readily accepted by the judge’s colleagues or 
most stakeholders in BiH who suggested measures which could overcome them (s. 8.5).  
 
8.4.2. Victims Will Never be Satisfied  
In addition to this practical (victim population) limitation faced by the Tribunal in delivering justice to 
victims, interviewees in The Hague indicated that victims would never be satisfied with just 
 
78 R. Letschert and S. Parmentier, ‘Repairing the Impossible: Victimological approaches to international crimes’ in. I. 
Vanfraechem, A. Pemberton and F. Mukwiza Ndahina (eds.) Justice for Victims: Perspectives on rights, transitional and 
reconciliation (Routledge, 2014) at 223. 
79 S. Karstedt, ‘From Absence to Presence, From Silence to Voice: Victims in International and Transitional Justice since 
the Nuremberg Trials’ (2010) International Review of Victimology 17(1): 9-30 at 26.  
80 United Kingdom, Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004. 





retributive justice, in particular because sentences would always be perceived as too lenient; 82 this 
view was often reflected in BiH itself.83 One judge went further and applied this sentiment to all 
victims. Responding to the open question about the merit of victims’ participation, he concluded 
that “everyone who is trained in criminal law knows that the sentence is always too high for the 
convicted person and is never high enough for the victim. That is part of the rule for criminal law”.84 
The use of the word “rule” reflects the attitude that these early releases would, for these already 
perceived lenient sentences, inevitably be met with disappointment, and that any attempt to shift 
this would only be met with defeat. The sentiment of predictability of victims being disappointed by 
perceived lenient sentences was expressed by another Tribunal judge who argued that victims could 
never be satisfied with the sentences, which, in turn, led to the assumption that they would 
inevitably be aggrieved by early release. He stated that “it is difficult for the people on the ground to 
understand that someone who has been sentenced, someone who has been found guilty of such 
serious crimes, not only is not given the death sentence … but is given a sentence and then he 
doesn’t even serve that sentence, he gets out … [at] two-thirds”.85 What these statements indicate is 
a sense of resignation, due to victims expressing disappointment with perceived lenient sentences, 
which could be done to counter this at UER.  
 
With the view expressed that substantive justice was not obtainable for victims who desired “hard 
justice”,86 that is, longer sentences - served in full, he (along with others) was asked if any particular 
procedural practices could have been employed to bring a sense of justice despite a sense of 
disappointment with the sentence and the subsequent early release – i.e. whether legitimacy of 
exercise through good standards, such as transparency, clear communication and justification87 
 
82 Six of the 17 interviews expressed the sentiment no punishment could achieve satisfaction due to the gravity of the 
crime. 
83 21 of the 51 interviews argued that sentences would always be perceived too lenient. S. Kutnjak Ivković and J. Hagan, 
Reclaiming Justice: the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Local Courts (Oxford University Press, 2011) 
at 19. Kutnjak Ivković and Hagan conducted seven surveys in Sarajevo, Zagreb, Vukovar, Belgrade and Croatia between 
1997 and 2005 and found that victims were generally in favour of the heaviest possible penalties from the death 
sentence to life imprisonment.  The judge’s assertion was illustrated by a member of staff who worked with victim-
witnesses, and who applied it more pertinently to victims of atrocity crimes convicted at the Tribunal. She reflected that 
“victims seeking justice that means the maximum possible conviction that there could be. What you hear often is … ‘I 
have lost two sons and this equals to twenty-five years?’ They are thinking in a very human … way. [I]f you have lost … a 
family member, or you have been a victim of rape, [what] does that mean that this is only ten years? [whereas] - I have 
been ruined for life”. 
84 Interview, Judge, The Hague, 01/02/2017. 
85 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning, 30/01/2017. 
86 This expression was used by one NGO Director in BiH, 07/11/2017.  
87  J. Thibaut and L. Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (Erlbaum, 1975) and cited in R. Killean, 
‘Procedural Justice in International Criminal Courts: Assessing Civil Parties’ Perceptions of Justice at the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ (2016) International Criminal Law Review 16: 1-38 at 3.  See standards by which 





could ameliorate a deficit in the legitimacy of outcome, i.e. the declared sentence not being fulfilled. 
The concept of “legitimation through justification”, as set out in Chapter 3, whereby scholars have 
argued that institutions “must offer public justifications of at least the more controversial … 
policies”88 was put to Tribunal interviewees. For example, in the case of an early release, an 
accompanying explanation could be provided. This idea was put to a Tribunal judge, who sharply 
responded in the negative, asserting a sense of inevitable victim dissatisfaction: “Outreach can do a 
lot, but they are limited ... you have to forget the living generations … those are hopeless, lost. Our 
hope is with the children that are still at school and the children who will be born”.89 This attitude 
was not expressed in interviews with Outreach staff, but this judge’s statement points to a mind-set 
that he had given up on the current generations and why judges felt it unnecessary to explain their 
reasoning to the victims in BiH. Outreach could try, but there was a sense of inevitability that they 
would not succeed in bringing a sense of justice to the current generations.  
 
8.4.3. Judicial Decisions too Complicated for the Layman  
This judge did not believe the practice of “legitimation through justification”,90 providing clear 
reasoning and justifications as to why the UER decision was taken, could ameliorate injustice which 
resulted from perceived lenient sentences and UER. This thesis’ findings counter this judge’s 
assertion that the provision of reasons as to why UER occurred could not lessen a sense of grievance 
at controversial practices (detailed in s.8.6.3). Further, the findings reiterate what empirical studies 
have found, that is, that the respectful treatment of victims and those engaged with courts and law 
enforcement agencies can ameliorate frustration with the overall outcome.91 Although these studies 
focus on stakeholders engaged in the process, the same could be applied to those engaged with the 
ICTY via Outreach or Public Relations. Respectful treatment would include an explanation of why the 
decision, perceived as illegitimate, was taken. This assertion is reflective of Suchman’s 
recommendations for institutions “Managing Legitimacy”, where he proposed that institutions may 
be able to “preserve a modicum of cognitive legitimacy” even where they cannot justify [disruptive 
events], [they can] at least explain them.92 As noted in s.8.2 in the interview with the NGO Director 
 
‘Between ‘Faith’ and ‘Facts’: By What Standards Should We Assess International Criminal Justice?’ (2012) Leiden Journal 
of International Law 25: 251–282 at 268-269.  
88 A. Buchanan and R. O. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’ in L. H. Meyer (ed.) Legitimacy, 
Justice and Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 29.  
89 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning 30/01/2017.   
90 See Chapter 3, s.3.5.5.  
91 Y. Huo and T. Tyler, Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation d with the Police and Courts (Russell-Sage 
Foundation, 2002) and Thibault and Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (Erlnaum, 1975).  See Chapter 3, 
s.3.5.3. 
92 M.C. Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’ (1995) The Academy of Management 





in Sarajevo, there was a sense of frustration that they had “never received a clear answer”93 as to 
why the practice of UER occurred. Her statement and accompanying frustration indicated that either 
her NGO had asked but had not been provided with clear reasons, or she had never heard one 
articulated clearly by the Tribunal. Her sense of frustration was not only at the grant of an UER, but 
the fact that she had not received an explanation as to why it happened.  
 
The same judge was asked whether the standard of “legitimation through justification” could be 
applied to justify redactions from early release decisions – albeit not using this phrase. A number of 
the Presidents’ early release decisions text has been either blacked out or replaced with [REDACTED] 
which denotes secrecy. Usually, redactions relate to physical and/or mental health issues, or 
cooperation with the Prosecutor, although this is not made explicit.94 One possibility to lessen the 
sense of information being hidden would be providing an explanation for the redaction; additionally, 
an explanation would also enhance transparency, a standard by which legitimacy of exercise can be 
assessed.95 Although providing such an explanation would not disclose information (the standard of 
transparency), it would make it less opaque by providing an explanation for why the text has been 
removed. The judge was asked if he believed that an explanation as to why redactions were made 
could be provided to explain the reasons for them - for the sake of the public reading them and as a 
matter of transparency, which was one of the purported good administration of justice goals of the 
Tribunal.96 He was quick to disregard this option:  
No … we have a job to do … We are a court of justice, many of the decisions are 
legal and the public will never understand it in any case. So, if there is a need to 
redact – full stop. The public needs to be educated to understand that there must 
have been a reason for the redaction, full stop. You can’t go beyond that to explain 
to the public “listen there are redactions because of this, because of that’ it would 
be a never-ending story.97 
The statement is contradictory, as the judge asserted that the “public will never understand” but 
also that “they should be educated”. This statement was made as the judge responded to the 
question of the President himself or herself providing an explanation in the early release decision, 
for example by way of a footnote. His sharp response indicated that he did not believe that it was for 
 
secure organisation, especially if such misfortunes … are left unaddressed”, that is; where these anomalies arise positive 
actions may be required for legitimacy to be “repaired”. 
93 Interview, NGO Director, Sarajevo, BiH, afternoon 06/11/2017.  
94 For example, in regard to the Presidents’ early release decisions of Bala, Kovač, Lazarevic, Naletilić, Radić, Ojdanić, 
Sainović, Strugar the redactions have a footnote which references a psychologist report, and are considered. In relation 
to cooperation with the Prosecutor, the Mrđa, Momir Nikolić, Šantić and Vasiljević decisions have redactions under the 
section of cooperation with the Prosecutor.  
95 See Chapter 3, s.3.5.4. 
96 M. Schrag, ‘Lessons Learned from ICTY Experience’ (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 2: 427-434 at 428.  





the judges themselves to explain to the public, although the public need to “be educated”, he does 
not suggest by whom. Further, the judge’s word “‘educated” denotes a top-down approach he had 
in thinking about the Tribunal’s engagement with the war-affected population (including victims). 
The judge’s top-down approach reflects an approach, prima facie, taken by the Tribunal in its 
establishment of its Outreach Programme. The 1999 Annual Report’s explanation for Outreach, 
sounds much like an education programme, which would ensure “victims [were] aware of and 
understanding the war and its causes” and the “populations of the region are informed about the 
work of the Tribunal and understand its significance”.98 Outreach was effectively an “information 
campaign” which sought to “improve [The Tribunal’s] reputation”99 to its stakeholders, rather than 
listening and actively engaging with them. They were considered “passive recipients”100 who would 
be educated about the conflict they had survived, and informed as to how they were being brought 
justice by the Tribunal. And at the same time, the judge noted that there were limitations as to the 
lengths to which they would be willing to go in order to do so.  
 
He did not elucidate as to who would educate the public, and this point was not followed up. But it 
expresses the sentiment that there was a responsibility of some other entity to “educate” the public. 
Unfortunately, an interview with Outreach was not obtained, but, in speaking with staff from 
External Relations, they perceived early release as a judicial role and did not see any role for 
themselves in clarifying the matter with the public. Bridging the gap between the judicial decision 
and the impact that decision had on how the Tribunal was perceived was not considered to be 
within their remit. This interviewee stated, in relation to her views on redactions and how they may 
be perceived in the region, “[this] decision is a judicial matter so leave it up to the judge. I can’t 
really comment on that”.101 These two comments, from the judge himself and External Relations, 
indicate that there was an unwillingness to take up the role of explaining judicial practice.  
 
This perception that there was no value in judicial details being explained was extended to the 
overall early release practice. This failure to engage with victims on the matter of early release has 
 
98 Emphasis added.  
99 M. Tripovic, ‘Not in Our Name! Visions of Community in International Criminal Justice’ in M. Aksenova, E. van Sliedregt 
and S. Parmentier (eds.) Breaking Cycles of Mass Atrocities: Criminological and Socio-Legal Approaches in International 
Criminal Law (Hart, 2019) at 171. 
100 M. Tripovic, ‘Not in Our Name! Visions of Community in International Criminal Justice’ M. Aksenova, E. van Sliedregt 
and S. Parmentier (eds.) Breaking Cycles of Mass Atrocities: Criminological and Socio-Legal Approaches in International 
Criminal Law (Hart, 2019) at 175. 





created a sense of injustice for victims, often as an ongoing sense of disappointment in the Tribunal. 
UER is a practice, like plea bargains, which was not expected, where a perpetrator benefits and no 
justification is provided to those who have been harmed by that perpetrator. J.N. Clark’s study on 
victims’ community’s perceptions of plea bargains found little outreach was undertaken to explain 
the practice of plea bargains, in a country where there had been no such practice in the domestic 
criminal courts.102 Although judges had articulated the foreseen benefits in their sentencing 
judgments, no victims had read the statement made by the defendant.103 The purported benefits to 
reconciliation and truth-finding were absent for victims.104 Clark suggested that, if reasons were 
given for controversial practices, they may be perceived as less controversial.105 This thesis’ findings 
demonstrate that the same may be said for UER; if their reasoning (a second chance to perpetrators 
who were rehabilitated, Chapter 6, s.6.7) and an explanation (limited capacity - reliance on 
enforcement state, see s.8.6.3) was provided to people in the region, it may be perceived as less 
offensive.  
8.5. The Perceived Boundaries of a Duty of Care to Victims  
8.5.1. Perceptions of a Duty of Care to Victims Post-Trial 
In addition to the sense of resignation that led to victims being overlooked at this stage, another two 
reasons for UER operating as it did, without decisions being communicated to either victim-
witnesses or victims more broadly, were presented through the interviews. One was a strictly 
legalist approach, that in domestic law early release (albeit not unconditional) was a general 
practice; and the other more philosophical approach stressed the right of the perpetrator to a 
second chance, which, however, neglected to consider the extent to which that may differ in a post-
conflict society. Both approaches raise important questions, which this thesis argues should be 
addressed, about the principle of a duty of care to victims and where its boundaries lie; and how this 
duty of care may differ in relation to victims of atrocity crimes.  
 
The view that there was a limited duty of care to victims and that the duty ends post-trial was 
expressed by the minority of interviewees in The Hague and strongly argued against by the overall 
majority of interviewees. The converse opinion, that a duty of care lies beyond the realm of the trial 
stage, is indeed more in line with the international standards, practice in EU states, and, perhaps, 
 
102 S. Kutnjak Ivkovic, ‘Justice by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2001) Stanford Journal of 
International Law 37: 255-346 at 288 and see Chapter 4, s.4.4.1. 
103 J.N. Clark, ‘Plea Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation’ ‘Plea Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and 
Reconciliation’ (2009) The European Journal of International Law 20(2): 415-436 at 432.  
104 J.N. Clark, ‘Plea Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation’ at 418. 





most significantly, the guidelines of the Tribunal itself. A number of questions were asked of The 
Hague interviewees, as to whether they believed UER was in line with good standards of legitimacy 
(transparency, participative legitimation and legitimation through justification), outlined in Chapter 
3,106 were ever contemplated by The Tribunal or considered as potentially beneficial for maintaining 
the legitimacy of the Tribunal. Similar and additional practices were frequently proposed, 
unprompted, in BiH by interviewees themselves. Their proposals echoed the practice proposed by 
scholars who have advocated for good procedural justice107 to increase victims’ sense of justice in 
International Criminal Justice which, they argue, assists in enhancing and maintaining International 
Criminal Justice’s perceived sociological legitimacy. Before turning to these recommendations, the 
following section sets out two views raised by interviewees in The Hague. Both these views, in 
effect, conceive perpetrators as equivalent to ordinary criminals rather than focusing on their nature 
as perpetrators of atrocity. These views led to an approach of excluding the victims at this stage.  
 
8.5.2. A Narrow Application of the Law  
The strict legalist approach was taken by one staff member who responded to the question of 
whether she believed a role should be accorded to victim-witnesses after the trial process. She was 
quick to respond: “Is it necessary to inform them of the early release? It is not in the Statute. From a 
purely legal position it is all about the application of the law”.108 As outlined in Chapter 5, the black 
letter law relating to early release was minimal, and showed how an approach, in favour of the 
perpetrators, was taken (benefit of the doubt in their evidence of rehabilitation, for example). Yet 
until April 2018,109 in the case of the decisions of early release, this did not extend to a broad 
approach to victims’ interests formally being taken into account. For example, although there was an 
explicit provision in the Practice Direction, which provided the President with the option to request 
the Registry to “inform persons who had testified … during the trial of the convicted person of his or 
her release” and further to “forward the decision” of early release to “other interested parties” 
neither of these options were taken.110 The interviewee’s rhetorical question and response were 
followed by a broader question of where she believed the rights of victims ended; she responded in 
 
106 See Chapter 3, s.3.5.  
107 See Chapter 4, s.4.3.1: Stover, Dembour and Haslam, N. Patterson, L. Moffet and R. Killean specifically in relation to 
how ICTs treat witness-victims; and J.N. Clark, Hodžić and Klarin who effectively advocate for better outreach to war-
affected communities.  
108 Interview, Staff Member, The Hague, 03/02/2017.  
109 Pušić, Early Release Decision, 20 April 2018. In the Pušić decision the President refers to two statements provided by 
Victims’ Associations which indicates that the President had actively considered these statements, in contrast to the 
President referencing the Prosecutor’s attempt to draw attention to victims by explicitly stating he would not take any 
further information into account.   






the narrow sense of the ICTY itself: “In the Statute victims don’t have “rights”, they are considered. 
For me at this stage it is about the prisoner having the opportunity to apply for early release”.111 This 
statement reflects two sentiments. First, is a strict legalist approach, and second, that this stage of 
the justice system is purely perpetrator focused (s.8.5.3). 
 
The strict legalist approach illustrates one reason as to how victims were overlooked at this stage. As 
noted above the Statute did not give victims any place, other than as witnesses, and the provision 
was for their “protection”.112 This provision frames them as passive recipients of paternal care rather 
than as right-holders – for example the right to be informed of an early release decision being 
granted. As Weinstein argued, international justice has construed the notion of the ideal victim as a 
“sacrificial animal”113 who should be considered but not necessarily communicated with. This strict 
legalistic approach was the stance taken also by one judge who was interviewed. This judge when 
asked if there was a role for victim-witnesses to be “consulted or notified” in relation an early 
release decision in home country – which was to be followed by whether this could have been 
considered by the Tribunal - interjected and said that in his home country victim-witnesses were not 
consulted, although he did not know whether they were notified. He then stated his justification for 
his country’s domestic approach: “Victims are victims, and witnesses testifying and then the guilt 
and so the amount of guilt is established by the court; later on they shouldn’t have a say in it 
because it is the state who is enforcing the sentence, not the victim”.114 His response was 
categorical; he took a narrow question and began discussing it in broader terms as he spoke about 
victims generally, rather than his country’s law. This is certainly the case that the state (and in the 
case of the ICTY – the President) is enforcing the sentence, but the question was whether or not 
victims should be consulted or notified of the decision, not whether they could decide its outcome. 
He then concluded his statement as he reflected: “And I don’t know what criteria they [could] apply: 
they [victims] would say “no, no, no, no, he shouldn’t be early released’ or “fine there is some 
remorse, he should be early released”. Thus, he concluded that “it shouldn’t be for the victim to 
have a say in that respect”.115 His statement indicates that this judge was unwilling to probe into the 
complicated territory of contemplating criteria (other than rationalisation of the President and his 
 
111 Interview, Staff Member, The Hague, 03/02/2017.  
112 Article 22 notes largely defines victims as persons to be protected in the course of the trial process: “Article 22 
Protection of victims and witnesses” – emphasis added – providing protective measures for their safety.  
113 H. Weinstein, ‘Victims, transitional justice and social reconstruction: Who is setting the agenda?’ in I. Vanfraechem, A. 
Pemberton and F. Mukwiza Ndahina (eds.) Justice for Victims: Perspectives on rights, transitional and reconciliation 
(Routledge, 2014) at 177. 
114 Interview, Judge, The Hague, afternoon, 30/01/2017. 





colleagues) to apply for the justification for an early release of perpetrators. His final remark “victims 
shouldn’t have a say in that respect” implies an underlying sentiment, that victims are perceived as 
passive. Here, certainly, the judge did not consider them as being agents in the justice process post-
trial; they have had their day in court and now there is no legal duty afforded to them under the 
black letter law. A counter to this judicial attitude was stated by one judge in BiH, detailed s.8.6.4.  
 
This view of victims having a strictly limited role was asserted by another judge. In the interview it 
was noted that the President had the option to inform “other interested parties”; he interrupted and 
quickly stated, correctly, that this was “not in the Statute the Rules” and thus “it is not 
mandatory”.116 His statement indicates that consideration for victims to be notified had not been 
given, since it was not required for them to do so. These three interviewee statements considered in 
this section illustrate a strict black letter law approach – the legal boundaries of a duty of care to 
“consider”117 the victim was only in their role as victim-witnesses during trial, and when the judges 
were not formally required to consider them, they would not. This strict approach, is, as discussed in 
s.8.6, out of step with good practice when it comes to EU standards which recommends victims of 
serious, violent crimes are notified of their perpetrators’ release from imprisonment.118  
 
8.5.3. The Perpetrator and their Right to a Second Chance  
In addition to a strict reading of the law, another more philosophical approach was indicated in the 
second half of the Staff member’s assertion that “in the Statute victims don’t have “rights”, they are 
considered. For me at this stage it is about the prisoner having the opportunity to apply for early 
release”.119 This philosophical approach was premised on giving the perpetrator a second chance. 
The emphasis at this stage is on the perpetrator alone. The judge above, who asserted that victims 
should not have a say, took this same approach and articulated that, despite being uncomfortable 
with the “little formulaic” approach of the Tribunal’s Presidents’ assessment of rehabilitation of the 
perpetrator, it was for the Tribunal not the victims to decide on the process of early release. He 
believed all perpetrators had the right to be reintegrated into society. He did not, however, consider 
 
116 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning, 30/01/2017.  
117 Article 22 of the Statute  
118 EU Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 October 2012, Article 6 (5). There are 
similar provisions set out in the 2001 Framework Decision which this Directive replaced and extended, notably – 
“Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that, at least in cases where there might be danger to the 
victims, when the person prosecuted or sentenced for an offence is released, a decision may be taken to notify the victim 
if necessary”, Article 4(3) of Council Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal 
proceedings. 





the different nature of return for perpetrators of atrocity crimes returning to BiH; rather he spoke in 
terms of his home country whereby controversial prisoners, “lifers”, were released, thereby not 
serving their potential full sentence of life and thus effectively being granted early release. This 
meant that:  
not everybody is happy with some people running around … and then all of a 
sudden some newspapers, groups, found out “oh, he is living here’ and … even with 
violence prohibits the reintegration of this person … if you notify for instance groups 
or organised victims, where should these people go? … it is a very delicate question 
and I have no final answer … but I know sometimes those who are released and do 
their utmost to have a legal life now … [get] pushed into hiding again … there is a 
high risk of treating them in a wrong way. 120  
This approach, however fails to take into consideration the context of atrocity crimes. In post-
conflict BiH, civilian victims’ groups are not in a position to hound perpetrators into hiding - rather, 
as Chapter 7, s.7.5 illustrated, many perpetrators return to a hero’s welcome. This judge’s mind-set 
of perpetrators returning as potential outcasts is simply not the reality on the ground. It speaks to 
the criticism of the Tribunal as being a “distant court”121 removed from the lived reality of its 
stakeholders in the region. 
Another type of flaw revealed in this attitude of emphasising perpetrators’ right to a second chance 
can be seen in the assertion of one judge in BiH that victims should not be considered at this stage 
because once imprisoned, the perpetrator moves into: 
the category of convicted persons ... he does not have anything to do with the court 
now, nor with the victims, no relations with anybody for that matter. Now he lives 
in another world, in the world of convicted persons. What are standards for these 
kinds of people? First standard is to respect human rights and freedoms, and what 
after that? Right to rehabilitation”.122 
As argued in Chapter 6, this thesis does not disagree with the right to rehabilitation, but the 
significant point from this judge’s statement is the misconception that the perpetrator no longer has 
any “relations with anybody”. At the point of early release, the perpetrator returns from the “world 
of the convicted person” to that of the post-conflict society, and included in that society are their 
victims, who are, as the interview analysis indicated, still experiencing their loss and are not 
unaffected by the early release.123  
 
 
120 Interview, Judge, The Hague, afternoon 30/01/2017. 
121 ‘A Distant Court’ Part I in B. Swart, A. Zahar and G. Sluiter (eds.) The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (Oxford University Press, 2011) 7-82. 
122 Interview, Judge, Sarajevo, BiH, 03/11/2017.  





8.5.4. A Duty of Care to Victims 
In contrast to these approaches which focus on a duty to give the perpetrator a second chance, 
many interviewees both in The Hague and in BiH believed there was an ongoing duty of care to 
victims. Primarily, this duty of care was in relation to victim-witnesses but was applied more broadly 
to victims who had experienced harm. All NGOs, IGOs VAs, Independent Experts, and Prosecutors in 
BiH perceived the Tribunal as having an ongoing duty of care to victim-witnesses, and most believed 
that victim-witnesses should be notified of early release. As one independent lawyer asserted, they 
owed it to victims, because without victim-witnesses testifying before the Tribunal, it would not 
have the evidence to convict those it indicted; “the verdicts actually rely on the victims”.124 This 
belief was expressed by another interviewee who said that not notifying victim-witnesses was 
“unfair … you asked for their help … they come and give their testimonies … and then what do you 
do? Convict the person and let him out so quickly”.125  
The notion of there being a duty of care despite not being a legal obligation was articulated by 
another interviewee who was asked if victim-witnesses should be notified of an early release. She 
immediately answered: 
absolutely … it’s kind of a moral duty … to notify the person who has given a lot … 
when they are testifying. They should at least, if the perpetrator is coming back 
earlier … be informed … imagine … the state of shock of the person if they see the 
perpetrator somewhere in a local shop and they [were] thinking that he should be 
in prison. So … that is a very important moral obligation that we all have to the 
survivors who testify, or not testified even, but especially those who have 
testified.126  
The duty of care to victims-witnesses extending beyond the trial process as being a matter of good 
practice, an ought to be, despite not being a mandatory obligation, was raised by Tribunal staff who 
had direct and ongoing contact with victim-witnesses. One reflected that “in an ideal situation that 
would be the best [for them to be informed] because … one of the major guidelines [VWS] is that we 
have to provide witnesses with information”.127 The Witness and Victims Unit remains part of the 
Tribunal’s Residual Mechanism, and has ongoing responsibility to provide “support services to 
witnesses who have previously been called to appear before the Tribunal or the Mechanism and 
liaises with national and local authorities on those issues”.128 This interviewee’s colleague, based in 
 
124 Interview, Independent Lawyer with professional experience with the Tribunal in BiH, Sarajevo, BiH, 22/12/2017. 
125 Interview, Independent with professional experience engaging with victim-witnesses in Srebrenica, Sarajevo, BiH, 
21/12/2017. 
126 Interview, Independent expert with professional experience of working with Victims of SV of the conflict, Sarajevo, 
BiH, 16/11/2017.  
127 Interview, ICTY/MICT Staff Member, The Hague, 26/01/2017. 
128 Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, 





Sarajevo, agreed that “they should be considered in this process more than they are”129 but 
explained that as of yet they had “not reached a final conclusion” as to what were “the key 
milestones” in the process about which to inform witnesses.130 This finding from the Witness and 
Victim Unit speaks to the fact that realities on the ground shape practices, that is, that practices 
develop not only necessarily from a deliberate approach but simple oversight, which can be 
addressed, and practices are altered, which, as we shall turn to below, may now have been the case.  
 
8.6. What can be done for victims at this stage of the justice process?  
8.6.1. Standards to Regain Legitimacy  
The notion of the Tribunal’s limited capacity to bring a sense of justice to victims, frequently 
expressed with a sense of resignation in The Hague, contrasted to interviewees in BiH who often 
spontaneously proposed specific measures which they believed could increase victims’ perception of 
The Hague’s legitimacy, despite the non-fulfilment of the sentence. These findings, of proposed 
measures, in part answer the sub-research question on the perceptions of the legitimacy of UER. The 
interviewees’ proposed measures which they believed could counter or lessen frustration of UER 
indicated that they perceived the Tribunal as having the capacity, which it failed to utilise, to put in 
place these standards of legitimacy. Two of these recommendations reflect criteria spelled out by 
scholars exploring procedural justice as a standard by which to obtain legitimacy. Such scholars have 
argued that elements such as the “the quality of interpersonal treatment … when dealing with 
authorities”131 and “voice”132 increase confidence in the criminal justice system. These standards 
have been advocated for by victimologists and criminologists who assert that these are valuable, as 
victims’ underlying wish is recognition by the system.133 This research, as far as this researcher can 
see, has been applied to exploring perceptions of victims within the criminal justice system. Findings 
from this study indicate that these elements of good procedural justice can be extended to victims 
outside the criminal justice system, and beyond the trial process. Let us first turn to those who were 
already engaged in the system, recognising that, in the case of atrocity crimes, these victim-
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witnesses do not represent the general victim population, the majority of whom have been excluded 
from the justice process.134  
 
8.6.2. Treating Victims with Respect 
The first measure that could be undertaken would be to inform victim-witnesses that an UER is 
forthcoming. One interviewee, a lawyer by training, and working with an IGO, recognised that there 
may be no “right” for a witness to be notified, no legal obligation to do so, but by “officially 
informing [it’s] a sign of respect to the role of the victim and the survivor”.135 His assertion was 
already indicated by two interviewees at The Hague, who had noted on a few occasions specific 
victims had been informed by their office of upcoming early releases, and victims had appreciated 
being informed. One interviewee emphasised that when they informed victims they had been clear 
from the outset that: 
it wasn’t for the purposes of getting their views … of whether it should happen but 
rather “it’s going to happen’ and because the particular sexual-gender based 
violence … it’s better that you hear from us rather than you read it in the 
newspaper, or you bump into him at the corner. And they appreciated it; and it’s a 
good practice.136  
 
His assertion that they appreciated being informed, whilst being clear that their opinions were not 
being requested, echoes empirical research conducted by victimologists in the national criminal 
justice system, who have found that keeping victims of crime informed of the outcome of their case 
overall improved their sense of satisfaction even when they were not in favour of the sentence137 or 
overall outcome.138 It is an indication that victims do not necessarily wish to control the process139 
but do wish for recognition within the process. The value of information sharing speaks to the 
importance of the “interpersonal aspects” of procedural justice which Tyler described as the value of 
 
134 D. Rothe, ‘Can an International Criminal Justice System Address Victims’ Needs? in D. Rothe and D. Kauzlarich (eds.) 
Towards a Victimology of State Crime (Routledge, 2014) at 246.  
135 Interview, IGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 19/12/2017. 
136 Interview, Senior Staff Member, The Hague, 24/01/2017. He then immediately spoke to the challenges posed in cases 
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“being treated politely and having respect shown for both their rights and themselves as people”.140 
Other studies have found that not all victims wish to be informed of an upcoming early release.141 
However, offering them the opportunity to decide if they wish to be informed would be a means to 
show respect for them. 
 
The use of the phrase “good practice” by the interviewee in The Hague speaks to the fact that 
supranational bodies have indeed already recommended these good practices. For example, the EU 
Directive on Victims recommends that Member States apply their penal laws, fundamentally to 
“ensure that persons who have fallen victims of crimes are recognised, treated with respect and 
receive proper protection, support and access to justice”.142 Although this Directive is categorised 
under “Victims of Crime in Criminal Proceedings” these recommendations extend beyond the trial 
process as they recommend “Member States … ensure … victims are offered the opportunity to be 
notified, without unnecessary delay, when the person … sentenced for criminal offences concerning 
them is released from or has escaped detention”.143 This includes the families of victims of who have 
died as a result of the crime.144 
 
The value of these “good practices” has been illustrated through studies at both the national145 and 
international146 level. Studies have demonstrated the value of treating victims with respect through 
both positive and negative findings. In the negative, studies have indicated that victims engaged 
with the process, who wished to be informed, were disappointed when ongoing information was 
promised by the system but not fulfilled. This finding speaks to the importance of fulfilling promises 
when they are made. These pledges can be made implicitly, by treating victim-witnesses with 
respect at the outset, implying that they will be treated with respect on a continual basis. Stover’s 
study of 87 victim-witnesses who had testified before the Tribunal illustrates this point. Stover noted 
that interviewees appreciated being well-prepared for their testimony in the courtroom, the support 
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provided by the Prosecutor and the Witness Support Unit who arranged travel arrangements and 
escort from their homes to the Hague and back.147 Satisfied with this treatment, most of these 
witnesses wished for ongoing contact with the Tribunal post-trial,148 and many who had no or little 
follow-up by the Tribunal staff expressed a sense of “abandonment”.149 The notion of a duty of care 
as on-going and valuable for victim-witnesses was expressed by one interviewee who had extensive 
experience with victims in BiH. She noted that:  
I don’t think that is only necessarily the number of years that the person gets … it is 
the whole package … how they feel when they testify, how they are taken care of or 
not taken care of, what happens to them after they testify … if some other 
segments of the process would be better taken care of, maybe even the number of 
years that the perpetrator gets would have a lesser meaning for them if other 
segments were really nicely taken care of for them.150 
 
The recommendation by the interview above, the notion of “the whole package” being important, 
was supported by Stover’s findings that victims valued a follow-up thank you letter from The 
Hague.151 The interviewee’s statement above, and Stover’s example, speak to the value of an 
element of procedural justice, good inter-personal treatment whereby those who have engaged 
with the criminal justice system are accorded respect.152 The whole package, treating victims, 
including at the post-trial stage, proposed by this interviewee above, who had close engagement 
with victim-witnesses, was a standard of legitimacy which, when met, could maintain an institution’s 
legitimacy. 153  
 
8.6.3. Legitimation through Justification  
In BiH many interviewees wished for more than a notification of early release; many wanted the 
Tribunal to provide an explanation for UER. The vast majority of interviewees154 (with the exception 
of judges) in BiH expressed a sense of shock when hearing of UER, many due to the gravity of the 
 
147 E. Stover, The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005) 
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1998 ) at 111 cited in R. Killean, ‘Procedural Justice in International Criminal Courts: Assessing Civil Parties’ at 19. 
153 See Chapter 3, s.3.5.3 and Chapter 4, s.4.3.1. 





crimes which perpetrators were found guilty.155 Stover’s study did not explore the practice of UER, 
although he found that some victim-witnesses wished that Tribunal staff had explained how the 
verdicts and sentences had been reached in their case. This stated desire, of having controversial 
decisions explained, resonates with this thesis’ findings from BiH and quantitative studies who have 
proposed that people, victims or not, “value having the reasons for actions of authorities justified 
and explained”.156 The proposition that people value decisions being explained and justified, was put 
forward in the context of atrocity crimes and prosecutorial strategy in the case of BiH. Judge 
Kroner’s list of recommendations urged the BiH Prosecutor’s Office to do just this:  
however unattractive a proposition it may be, it must be made clear to the public 
that, in order to make best use of … resources not all perpetrators can be 
prosecuted … Prosecutors must be honest with victim groups … Criticism … for a 
decision to prosecute or not to prosecute … may be mitigated if full and reasoned 
explanations are provided for the decision.157 
 
Her recommendation implicitly denoted a duty of care to victims, as she asserted that “prosecutors 
must be honest with victims’ groups”.158 She does not clarify why she authoritatively stated that 
victims’ groups must be engaged with and honestly so. It is taken for granted that victims being 
treated respectfully is a widely accepted standard which requires no justification.  
 
The complementary nature of procedural justice criteria (proffering honest explanations) and 
standards of legitimacy of exercise (transparency) expressed above by Judge Kroner’s 
recommendation was illustrated in this thesis’ findings. This finding does not claim to be 
representative but is nevertheless significant. There was a striking difference in attitudes between 
Victims Associations (VAs) who had actively engaged with the Tribunal and those who had not – that 
is, those who had experienced “legitimation through justification”159 and those who had not. This 
standard of legitimacy, and the difference it made to perceptions where it was met and where it was 
not, also provides an answer to the sub-research questions as to perceptions of UER and why victims 
viewed the practice in the way they did. The two VAs who had the practice justified to them, despite 
being disappointed with the practice, were not aggrieved by it. One VA had been informed directly 
 
155  Across the range of stakeholders, NGOs, Independent Experts, Most interviews expressed either a sense of anger or 
shock, surprise, devastation at the grant of UER – the notable exception to this was judges, who, with the exception of 
one judge, indicated during the course of the interview that early release was a general practice that they had expected 
from the Tribunal also.  
156 T. Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law’ at 350.  
157 Her Honour Judge Joanna Korner CMG QC, ‘Processing of War Crimes at the State Level in BiH’ (OSCE, 2016) at para. 
31. 
158 Her Honour Judge Joanna Korner CMG QC, ‘Processing of War Crimes at the State Level in BiH’ (OSCE, 2016) at para. 
31. Emphasis added.  





of early release, and believed it was a general practice under domestic law, and the other had the 
practice explained to him when he expressed his disappointment with it. The latter nodded as he 
recalled that the President had explained that the Tribunal had relied on the enforcement states, 
when the interviewee had asked the President as to why early release was happening. The President 
in this instance was perceived as proffering an honest explanation, and the interviewee’s nod of 
recognition as he recalled that moment suggested that he did appreciate the honesty of the 
President. His and the first interviewee’s sense of resignation contrasted to a sense of palpable 
distress and anger expressed by the other two VAs who had no contact with the Tribunal, thus no 
explanation provided to them. One of the VAs, as we were leaving, requested: “please underline: the 
Tribunal has lost all credibility”.160 This interviewee was informed at the outset of the interview that 
an executive summary of the thesis would be sent to all interviewees, both in The Hague and in BiH. 
Her request, “please underline” echoes the importance of voice and representation emphasised in 
procedural justice theories.161 She clearly wanted her opinion of the Tribunal’s legitimacy to be 
heard.  
 
8.6.4. Giving Voice to Victims  
The importance of allowing victims to be heard was a matter raised explicitly by other interviewees. 
This sentiment was not only expressed by NGOs, but by judges and lawyers, who asserted that some 
“space to acknowledge victims”162 be provided - even at the grant of early release. One judge 
suggested that the establishment of “shadow courts” would have been valuable.163 Shadow courts 
would allow victims’ to go on record to voice their opinions on the release of perpetrators. She did 
not believe victims should be “consulted” at the grant of early release, as they would not “be 
objective” but asserted that shadow courts would give the opportunity to state their objections to it 
and why. The judge’s proposition of “shadow courts” echoes recommendations voiced by Trumbull 
who has called for a more a victim-oriented approach to international criminal justice to take place 
outside of the criminal trial, notably at the sentencing stage and in reparations hearings.  
 
 
160 Interview, Victims’ Association, Brčko, BiH, 14/11/2017. 
161 L. Musante, M.A Gilbert and J. Thibaut, ‘The Effects of Control on Perceived Fairness of Procedure and Outcome’ 
(1983) Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 19: 223–238; T.R Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective 
Rule of Law’ at 350; J.A. Wemmers, Victims in the Criminal Justice System cited R. Killean, ‘Procedural Justice in 
International Criminal Courts’ 1-38. 
162 Interview, Prosecutor, Banja Luka, BiH, 22/11/2017.  





In the case of the Tribunal this is too late, but for future tribunals it would be a recognition of victims 
as legitimate stakeholders in the international criminal justice system, beyond the trial process. One 
interviewee in BiH argued that “being consulted would show them [victims] that they are thought of 
as competent”.164 It would give them voice and allow their views to be heard, it may not change the 
outcome but asking their opinion would be a sign of respect. Some interviewees expressed 
reservations about consulting victims, noting that expectations should not be raised. However, 
raising expectations is not inevitable. As indicated by the two VAs victims are capable of 
understanding an institution’s limitations; what is necessary is honesty, preferably from the outset. 
Further, establishing clarity from the outset assists in enhancing accountability, provides 
benchmarks both to guide the Presidents and by which external stakeholders could use to evaluate 
the President’s actions.165 If the practice had required justification, it may have made the President 
more mindful of the different stakeholders to whom he or she should seek to justify these decisions. 
In turn, having created this may have caused them to pause and reflect on establishing clear 
reasoning which could be justified to their stakeholders, including victims.  
 
Despite the majority of interviewees in BiH, again with the exception of judges, believing that UER 
was an illegitimate practice, and with the exception of the one VA noted above, it did not undermine 
their perceptions of the Tribunal’s overall legitimacy. As others have argued, legitimacy is not an 
assessment undertaken in isolation and perceptions are influenced by many other factors,166 two of 
which we shall now turn to.  
8.7. Sociological Legitimacy Assessments: Perceptions Shaped by the Context  
8.7.1. Subjectivity: Injustices are Relative  
Sociological legitimacy is subjective, as set out in Chapter 3; sociological legitimacy is a belief in an 
institution’s normative legitimacy - it is an assessment of an institution’s right to rule. A person’s 
belief is influenced by other factors beyond that institution’s control.167 Simply put, context matters. 
As Orentlicher, in her most recent study on Bosnian and Serbian assessments of the ICTY has 
remarked, “the nature of [the ICTY’s] influences has been shaped in no small part by each country’s 
 
164 Interview, NGO, Tuzla, BiH, 15/12/2017.  
165 A.M. Danner, ‘Enhancing the legitimacy and accountability of prosecutorial discretion at the international criminal 
court’ (2003) American Journal of International Law 97(3): 510-552 at 548.  
166 S. Ford, ‘Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts: Implications for the 
Success of Transitional Justice Mechanisms (2012) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 45(2): 405-476. 
167 M.C. Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’ (1995) The Academy of Management 
Review 20(3): 571-610 at 574. ‘Legitimacy is a perception or assumption in that it represents a reaction of observers to 





political, social and economic landscapes”.168 In relation to legitimacy from victims’ perspective, the 
overall “landscape” was the sentiment that victims of the war faced greater injustices at the hands 
of the BiH state. Victims’ sense of injustice due to the perceptions of the perpetrators’ human rights 
trumping theirs (s.8.2) was compounded by the fact that an appropriate reparations scheme was 
lacking at the state, entity and local levels. Moreover, BiH’s population, victims included, faced 
economic hardship – high-level unemployment, loss of property and a devastated and fragmented 
infrastructure.169 This factor was beyond the Tribunal’s control, but the poverty besetting BiH was 
the lens through which victims saw perpetrators benefitting from “cushy European prisons”.170 
 
UER and the sense of injustice to victims was seen as relative to the injustice felt by victims at the 
hands of the Bosnian Courts prosecuting atrocity crimes. The perpetuation of an injustice to victims 
(s.8.2); the outcome of a lenient sentence handed down by the Tribunal as an injustice to victims’ 
dignity, coupled with perpetrators UER after serving two-thirds of that sentence, was noted by a 
number of interviewees in light of the equally lenient sentences meted out by the Bosnian Courts 
sentencing these crimes.  
 
There were two particular matters of controversy in BiH Courts’ sentencing practices noted by 
interviewees. First, there was the live issue of fines in lieu of a prison sentence of less than one 
year.171 This measure had been adopted by some courts in the RS and Brčko, including for 
perpetrators of wartime rape. The injustice of this sanction was noted by one interviewee when UER 
was being discussed; just as UER was perceived as a belittling of the gravity of the crime and the 
vindication of the dignity of the victim, so too was a fine in lieu of a prison sentence. Second, was a 
controversy at the end of 2013 beginning of 2014 whereby the State Court ordered the immediate 
release (pending retrial) of 14 perpetrators of atrocity crimes, including a number of perpetrators 
involved in the genocide at Srebrenica.172 This was a decision taken in light of the Bosnian 
 
168 D. Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY's Impact in Bosnia and Serbia (Oxford University Press, 2018) 3.  
169 C. Philpott and R.C. Williams, ‘The Dayton Dialectic: The Significance of Property Deprivation and Repossession in the 
Context of Ethnic Cleansing’ 149-176 and M. Moratti, ‘Tackling Obstruction to Property Rights and Return: A Critical 
Assessment of the Practice of Removing Housing Officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ 177-204 in D. F. Haynes (eds.) 
Deconstructing the Reconstruction: Human Rights and the ROL in Post-war BiH (Ashgate, 2008) and G. Ó Tuathail & J. 
O'Loughlin, ‘After Ethnic Cleansing: Return Outcomes in Bosnia-Herzegovina a Decade Beyond War’ (2009) Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 99(5): 1045-1053. 
170 E. Stover, The Witnesses, at 142.  
171 See: https://balkaninsight.com/2016/08/10/bosnian-war-crimes-convicts-pay-to-stay-free-08-09-2016/ [accessed 
27/12/2019].  





Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the ECtHR’s 2013 Maktouf and Damjanović decision173 which 
ruled that the BiH State, in these two specific cases, had violated Article 7 by failing to apply the lex 
mitor principle under Article 7 of the Convention.174 The sentences imposed for the crimes convicted 
were done under the 2003 Criminal Code which were more severe than under the 1976 Criminal 
Code.175 This instance of blanket releases was raised as an example of how lenient the BiH criminal 
system was in its treatment of perpetrators. A large number of perpetrators were released, some of 
whom had returned to Srebrenica, where victims were reported to be “re-traumatised” by the early 
release of the perpetrators.176 Although perpetrators convicted at The Hague frequently returned, 
they did so individually rather than in large numbers, and not at the same time.  
 
The second type of victims’ injustice was around the lack of transparency at the State Court’s War 
Crimes Chamber. Two interviewees raised this matter as the question of redactions in early release 
decisions was raised. These interviewees had professional experience following the work of the 
domestic courts. As the redacted documents were handed over, both expressed an aversion to the 
redactions but noted to the effect that it was nothing in comparison to the lack of transparency at 
the state court. The redactions on a limited number of early release, some more extensive than 
others, was seen in light of practice of closed hearings for war crimes cases, which began in 2009 
(after the OSCE trial monitoring programme ceased) and the anonymisation of court documents.177 
Redactions in early release decisions were frustrating, but the removal of perpetrators’ health 
details was minimal in comparison to the anonymisation of court documents at the State Court’s 
War Crime Chamber, which began in March 2012 (although modified in 2014).178 In a number of 
cases, names of the defendants, the location of the crimes and other key information was replaced 
with initials.179 The interviewee noted this practice after providing her thoughts on redactions in the 
early release decisions, “I understand that because the indicted people [have] rights like everybody 
 
173 Case of Maktouf and Damjanović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (Applications nos. 2312/08 and 34179/08), 18 July 2013.  
174 Article 7 – no retroactive punishment “nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the 
time the criminal offence was committed”. Subsequently, BiH Constitutional Court’s decisions on 27 September 2013, 22 
October 2013, 5 November 2013 and 23 January 2014 quashed entirely the criminal verdicts issued against the 
perpetrators. This finding rendered the relevant criminal convictions void and the perpetrators release was ordered 
immediately pending a retrial. para. 82 in TRIAL and others, General Allegation on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
to the Special Rapporteur on Truth, Justice, Reparations and Guarantees of Non-recurrence, February 2014. 
175 The FRY 1976 Criminal Code provided a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment or the death penalty.  
176 TRIAL and others, General Allegation on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Special Rapporteur on Truth, 
Justice, Reparations and Guarantees of Non-recurrence, February 2014. This case was raised by two interviewees; 
Interview, NGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 27/10/2017 and Interview, Independent, 21/12/2017. 
177 D. Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY's Impact in Bosnia and Serbia (Oxford University Press, 2018) at 346 and 
was raised by two interviews in BiH. Interview, NGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 27/10/2017 and Interview, Independent expert with 
professional experience of working with Victims of Sexual Violence of the conflict, Sarajevo, BiH, 16/11/2017. 
178 D. Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY's Impact in Bosnia and Serbia, at 346. 





else”. Although she did want to know what was redacted, she accepted the practice. She concluded 
her reflection by considering that “we have censorship from the State Court, we have censorship 
from the Prosecutor’s office”.180 Her assessment of the legitimacy of exercise concerning redactions 
by the Tribunal was made in the context of what she considered censorship at the WCC. The second 
interviewee commented that, although she didn’t like the practice, she “trusted” international 
judges more than the national judges.181 These examples of stakeholders determining legitimacy via 
a comparison to other institutions is reflected in the scholarship on sociological legitimacy, and some 
scholars have recommended this comparative approach. Bottoms and Tankebe cited Aristotle, 
“[o]ften one of a pair of contrary states is recognized from the other contrary hence … we can learn 
a good deal about justice from studying instances of injustice, and vice-versa”.182 This examination of 
what characteristics illegitimate institutions have is, in fact, what the interviewees above have done 
– whereby their perceptions of the ICTY’s legitimacy deficits are shaped by the parallel examination 
of the BiH justice system. The interviewee’s reference to censorship indicates that she perceived the 
legitimacy standard of transparency183 as being flouted by the BiH Courts, and thus the redactions in 
the ICTY’s Early Release decisions paled in comparison. The domestic system was perceived to have 
greater legitimacy deficits, thereby making the ICTY more legitimate.  
 
8.7.2. The Justice Cascade  
The perceived illegitimate practice of UER and the injustice felt by victims was outweighed by the 
justice that the ICTY did bring about. Victims had seen all the indicted perpetrators face justice 
(although some were acquitted, and others died which spared them from full justice); that “some 
justice was done”184 was better than none. There was the overarching opinion, expressed with 
conviction directly in seven interviews, that victims in BiH would have received no retributive justice, 
had it not been for the ICTY, a finding noted in other studies and most recently by Orentlicher in her 
most recent study.185 The ICTY and its completion strategy186 led to a “justice cascade”187 in BiH. 
 
180 Interview, NGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 27/10/2017. 
181 Interview, Independent expert with professional experience of working with Victims of Sexual Violence of the conflict, 
Sarajevo, BiH, 16/11/2017. 
182 A. Bottoms and J. Tankebe, ‘Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogical Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice’ (2012) 
The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 102(1) at 137. 
183 See Chapter 3, s.3.5.4.  
184 D. Orentlicher, That Someone Guilty Be Punished: The Impact of the ICTY in Bosnia (Open Society Justice Initiative and 
International Center for Transitional Justice, 2010).   
185 D. Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY's Impact in Bosnia and Serbia (Oxford University Press, 2018) at 96; and 
M. Klarin, ‘The Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former Yugoslavia’  (2009) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 7:  89-96 who argued that “Bosnian Muslims, who although disappointed with The Hague “know that had 





Other victims, albeit not all, had seen their perpetrators brought before the domestic criminal 
courts. As the first interviewee above noted that if “The Hague didn’t do that after the war we will 
not have sentences here in Bosnia’s state court”.188 This was one of the ICTY’s positive contributions 
to other victims who were not recognised as such on the ICTY’s indictments. Some of these victims 
would now see their perpetrators punished, thanks to the ICTY. 
 
This retributive justice was important for many, as it was recognition of the worth of the victim that 
their perpetrators were punished. The ICTY, in sentencing those it found guilty, had done so, and its 
completion strategy had given capacity to national courts to continue retributive justice for the 
remaining perpetrators, and UER, no matter how unpopular, could not erase that contribution.  
 
8.8. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has argued how the unconditional early release of perpetrators was widely perceived as 
an injustice to victims in BiH. It was a “second slap in the face”189 from the Tribunal - an additional 
bitter pill to take after the lenient sentences it handed down, where the perpetrators were accorded 
the highest fair trial rights and, when punished, lived in comparative luxury to victims, who remained 
in BiH where they received no or little recognition from the state. For many victims, the punishment 
of the perpetrators was their only form of just satisfaction.  
 
The chapter highlighted how victims, who were accorded pride of place in the ICTY’s rhetoric of 
bringing justice to them, were overlooked at this stage, by a sense of resignation of retributive 
justice as never being able to achieve satisfaction and by a focus on the perpetrator’s right to a 
second chance. From the interview analysis, the chapter has set out suggestions for the 
implementation of early release that could have ameliorated victims’ sense of injustice. Almost all 
 
186 F. Donlon, ‘Rule of Law: From the ICTY to the War Crimes Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ in D. F. Haynes (ed.) 
Deconstructing the Reconstruction: Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ashgate, 
2008) at 284. 
187 K. Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics (Norton, 2011). S. Kutnjak 
Ivković and J. Hagan’s study of victims’ from countries in the FRY noted that perceptions of the Tribunal’s legitimacy had 
declined over the years, and their surveys indicated that the local populations chose national courts over the ICTY. The 
very fact that the local courts have taken on prosecutions of war crimes was they note due to the ‘justice cascade’ from 
the ICTY, see: S. Kutnjak Ivković and J. Hagan, Reclaiming Justice: the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and 
Local Courts (Oxford University Press, 2011) at 152. 
188 Interview, NGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 27/10/2017. 





interviewees (in both The Hague and BiH) believed that the Tribunal should explain and justify their 
decisions for early release. As a controversial practice, the Tribunal could have taken positive steps 
to sustain its legitimacy by explaining it. This course of action has been proposed in terms of other 
controversial decisions; by J.N Clark in relation to plea bargains being explained to victims’ 
communities by ICTY Outreach staff,190 and by Judge Kroner in relation to Prosecutors explaining 
their strategy.191 This approach aligns with the standard of legitimacy of “legitimation through 
justification”.192 This is not impossible, and the Tribunal has on occasion made public statements 
explaining decisions and strategy.193 The chapter provides some suggestions for any further ad hoc 
criminal justice mechanisms dealing with mass victimisation.  
 
The chapter has also contributed to assessing the practice’s impact on the ICTY’s overall perceived 
legitimacy, and, as the preceding chapter noted, that illegitimate practice of UER was perceived as a 
blackspot, a flaw, but did not, ultimately, for the vast majority of interviewees, undermine the 
legitimacy of the Tribunal itself. Perpetrators had escaped one-third of their punishment, but they 
had not escaped justice completely. The preceding chapter outlined how, due to the specificity of 
BiH as a post-conflict ethnically-divided country, UER had aggravated repercussions, notably 
denialism (Chapter 7, s.7.5.3). This chapter, in contrast, has illustrated how the specificities of BiH, 
post-conflict justice system is perceived as lacking legitimacy, and appeared to have lowered a sense 
of injustice for victims created by UER. Victims faced greater injustices by their Court system – 
domestic sentences are more lenient and there is a greater lack of transparency which makes the 
Tribunal’s illegitimate practice of UER pale in comparison.  
 
As one interviewee reflected, “they expected justice from internationals, they know they will not get 
justice here”.194 Simply put, they expected more from The Hague Tribunal and they were 
disappointed. Nevertheless, if it had not been for the Tribunal “everything would have been swept 
 
190 J.N. Clark, ‘Plea Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation’ 415-436. 
191 Her Honour Judge Joanna Korner CMG QC, ‘Processing of War Crimes at the State Level in BiH’ (OSCE, 2016) para. 31. 
192 See Chapter 3, s.3.5.5.  
193 ICTY Press Release ‘International Tribunal issues first indictment dealing with Bosnian-Serb victims’ 22 March 1999, 
which noted that the Čelebići “indictment, the first dealing with Bosnian Serb victims, illustrates the even-handed policy 
which has been repeatedly stated by Justice Goldstone, namely to "investigate and prosecute persons who may be 
responsible for crimes irrespective of the political or ethnic group to which they belong”. See: 
https://www.icty.org/en/press/international-tribunal-issues-first-indictment-dealing-bosnian-serb-victims [13/01/2020]  





under the rug”.195 For the victims, who wanted justice, some justice, even when cut short, was 
better than none. 
 





Chapter 9: Conclusion 
9.1. The ICTY, UER and Legitimacy 
This thesis has examined the final element of the Tribunal’s exercise of power – the premature 
ending of the punishment it dispensed. It drew broadly1 upon Beetham’s framing for understanding 
legitimacy: “for power to be fully legitimate … three conditions are required: its conformity to 
established rules; the justifiability of these rules by reference to shared beliefs; and the express 
consent of the subordinate”.2 Thus the research explored UER,3 and people’s perceptions4 to UER. 
Through empirical legal analysis of the decisions and qualitative interviews with stakeholders in The 
Hague and in BiH, the thesis argues that UER lacked normative legitimacy (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). 
It also lacked sociological legitimacy. The research found that UER of perpetrators convicted by the 
ICTY was considered an illegitimate practice by the majority of inside (Tribunal interviewees) and 
outside (BiH interviewees) stakeholders, yet it did not de-legitimatise the ICTY overall. In the round, 
UER was considered a “blackspot” on the overall legitimacy of the Tribunal (Chapters 6, 7 and 8).  
 
UER’s legitimacy deficit arose due to judicial practice, fundamentally the Tribunal’s Presidents’ use of 
their broad discretion in deciding an application for a pardon or commutation of sentence.5 
Nevertheless, it was not the President alone who was responsible. His judicial colleagues at the 
Bureau were primarily responsible for developing and updating the Tribunal’s rules,6 and were 
consulted in these decisions. Thus, they too bore responsibility for establishing and maintaining 
good practice for this additional duty under their remit. Although deciding an application for early 
release is an unusual task for a judge, and not originally planned for them,7 they were tasked with 
this decision. Additionally, they had a responsibility to the stakeholders in the region, under their 
Code of Conduct,8 to be seen to be fair overall. Fundamentally, justice should be seen to be done 
and judges should do what is reasonable to achieve this. Justice does not end with the passing of the 
 
1 The researcher took Beetham’s broad framing and then applied the detailed understandings of legitimacy, its different 
elements, types and standards, when engaging with the literature on the ICTY and in exploring the practice of UER.  
2 D. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Macmillan International Higher Education, 2nd edition 2013). See Chapter 3. 
3 The extent to which the practice was done in accordance with established rules.  
4 The shared beliefs were explored by interviewing both stakeholders at The Hague (the decision-makers and those 
around them) and those subordinate to them, stakeholders in BiH. Express consent was read in-line with “consent” to 
“actions by relevant subordinates which confirm their acceptance or recognition of it [the rules and power of the state]”. 
See D. Beetham ‘Revisiting Legitimacy, Twenty Years On’ in J. Tankebe and A. Liebling (eds.) Legitimacy and Criminal 
Justice: An International Exploration (Oxford University Press, 2013) at 20. 
5 Under Article 28 of the ICTY Statute.  
6 The Statute was written by the UNSG and his legal advisers, the RPE were written by the 11 judges elected to serve at 
the Tribunal and were published nine months later. First Annual Report. The Rules have been amended 49 times, see: 
http://www.icty.org/en/documents/rules-procedure-evidence  
7 See Chapter 5, the Travaux Préparatoires, s.5.2.2.  
8 Article 4(1) of the Code of Professional Conduct for the Judges of the Tribunal” adopted on 6 July 2016. 
“Judges shall conduct themselves with probity and integrity in accordance with their judicial office, thereby enhancing 





sentence: the overall process of justice, from indictment to a perpetrator’s return, forms part of the 
overall assessment of the Tribunal’s legitimacy.9 This thesis has shown (Chapter 8) that to obtain 
legitimacy for this practice, at a minimum, better procedural justice could have been undertaken 
without any detriment to perpetrators. For the immediate stakeholders (victim-witnesses), 
procedural justice was well within the Tribunal’s capacity under the Practice Direction that guided 
the President to inform witnesses and any other relevant parties of the perpetrator’s release.10 It is, 
more generally, simply a matter of good practice under regional standards on the release of violent 
criminals.11  
 
UER lacked sociological legitimacy, both in The Hague and in BiH. This sociological legitimacy deficit 
also arose, in one instance, from poor judicial practice, specifically, the President’s consideration of 
the perpetrator’s demonstration of rehabilitation.12 Chapter 6 demonstrated a lack of rigour and at 
times, inappropriateness, which the President applied in his consideration of perpetrators’ 
rehabilitation. Additionally, the chapter queried the applicability of good behaviour (such as 
adhering to prison rules and being polite to staff), and attendance at skills-workshops (woodwork 
and language) as evidence of rehabilitation. Perpetrators who ordered mass-killings, ethnic 
cleansing, committed torture, including rape and sexual violence, and those who turned a blind eye 
to this behaviour were considered well-practised in adhering to orders or complying with rules. The 
consideration of this factor was a source of disappointment for most in The Hague and in BiH. This 
was, however, only one of the factors the President was required to consider. Other factors had the 
potential to be considered legitimate, notably a perpetrator’s substantial cooperation with the 
Prosecutor (see s.9.2). Further, as legitimacy is not a permanent state, just as it can be lost it can also 
be regained;13 in fact, the institution appears to have recently sought to do so.14 
 
Findings indicated that the ICTY’s sociological legitimacy would have been improved if the Tribunal 
had communicated its early release determinations, both positive and negative, and their reasoning 
 
9 C. Kress and G. Sluiter, ‘Enforcement: Preliminary Remarks’ in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, J.R.W.D. Jones (eds.) The Rome 
Statute of International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2002), at 1753 cited in B. Holá and J. van 
Wijk, ‘Life after Conviction at International Criminal Tribunals: An Empirical Overview’ (2014) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 12: 109-132, at 110. 
10 Practice Direction on the Procedure for the Determination of Applications for Pardon, Commutation of Sentence, and 
Early Release of Persons Convicted by the International Tribunal’, paras. 11 and 12.  
11 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 October 2012, Article 6 (5) see Chapter 8, 
s.8.6.2.  
12 Rules and Procedure of Evidence, Rule 125. 
13 V. Popovski and N. Turner, ‘Legality and Legitimacy in International Order’ (2008) United Nations University Policy Brief, 
5(4) see Chapter 3, s. 3.4.3.   
14 As the President has introduced Conditions upon release and has also been less inclined to grant early release. See 





for early release to the region.15 This finding points to the legitimacy standard of “legitimation 
through justification”16 proposed by scholars who seek to advance international law. They have 
argued that it is incumbent on international legal institutions to “offer public justifications of at least 
the more controversial and consequential institutional policies”.17 In general, it is simply sensible 
practice to “preserve … legitimacy” where “disruptive effects” cannot be justified, to at least explain 
them.18 Such disruptive events would include the UER of perpetrators of the most heinous crimes 
known to mankind. Further their UER frequently enabled their return to a hero’s welcome, where 
they were to proudly proclaim to their supporters and the national media that they had duped the 
Tribunal in their statement of remorse, which had resulted in a lenient sentence and in the grant of 
early release.19 
 
The thesis has also outlined the negative repercussions UER had in post-conflict BiH (Chapter 7, 
s.7.5). The possibility of early release had been envisaged at the time of the Tribunal’s creation; this 
was in line with international human rights standards,20 although not in the manner in which it 
developed. Further, international jurists made recommendations at this time and forewarned that 
repercussions, such as political instability, might arise if an early release was granted. They advised 
that the UNSC, not the Tribunal, have oversight of this decision. The UNSC had the expertise to 
ensure that an early release would not jeopardise the Tribunal’s mandate to “contribute to the … 
maintenance of peace”.21 Thus, these jurists recognised the unique nature of atrocity perpetrators, 
especially those who had initiated the ethnic cleansing. They also recognised the different type of 
society to which they may return, whereby perpetrators may still have a following and where 
societal peace may remain fragile.22  
 
Large portions of this thesis are dedicated to a key set of stakeholders in the international criminal 
justice system – the victims who have suffered.23 It has argued that punishment for perpetrators of 
atrocity crimes fundamentally differs to that of ordinary perpetrators – based on the nature of the 
 
15 Finally, based on the fieldwork, this chapter has identified a shared belief that could still be put into practice to 
enhance the Mechanism’s (and future ad hoc tribunals’) legitimacy: substantial cooperation with the prosecutor post-
conviction.  
16 See Chapter 3, s.3.5.5. 
17 A. Buchanan and R. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of global governance institutions’ in L. H. Meyer (ed.) Legitimacy, Justice 
and Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) (Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 49. 
18 M.C. Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’ (1995) The Academy of Management 
Review 20(3) at 598.  See Chapter 3, s.3.5.5. 
19 J. Subotić, ‘The Cruelty of False Remorse: Biljana Plavšić at The Hague’ (2012) Southeastern Europe 36(1) 39-59. 
20 W. Schabas, ‘Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach’ (1997) Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law 7: 461-517.  
21 UNSCR 22 February 1993 and see Chapter 5, s. 5.2.1.  
22 See Chapter 5, s.5.2.2. 





crimes – their mass victimisation and motive. Mass victimisation was not simply about the numbers 
killed but the motive; those killed represented a group.24 Punishment is primarily symbolic: 
imprisonment signifies the moral condemnation of the crime and the criminal who committed it. As 
atrocity crimes are enabled by successful propaganda spreading distrust and/or hate of the other, 
punishing perpetrators is a symbolic validation of victims’ worth. It sends the message that all 
human beings are of equal worth and nothing can justify the killing of the other based on differences 
of culture, ethnicity or race.25 This message of moral condemnation of the crime and its motive also 
provides a norm projection – that is, that all humans are equal by virtue of shared humanity. This 
message was negated at UER and consequently the norm floundered.  
 
The victims received a “second slap in the face”26 when they witnessed perpetrators’ sentences 
effectively having one-third “chopped off”.27 The lenient sentence was now compounded by UER - it 
was a further belittlement of their suffering.28 Chapter 8 discussed how many of the practices 
experienced by victims during the Tribunal’s lifetime as injustices – its plea-bargaining strategy,29 the 
perceived lenient sentences,30 the hotel package perpetrators received in the UNDU31 and the lack of 
outreach32 - were seen to be repeated by UER. The Tribunal had treated victims as passive 
stakeholders,33 having justice brought to them, but in doing so had frequently overlooked them.  
 
9.2. The Main Contributions of the Thesis  
Broadly, the thesis contributes to the field of international criminal justice: how important practices 
of international criminal institutions develop, are justified and perceived by its key stakeholders.  
 
 
24 Kunarac et al, Trial Chamber Judgement, 22 February 2001, para. 592, see Chapter 6, s.6.6.1. 
25 D. Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law’ in S. Besson 
and J. Tasioulas (eds.) The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) at 576-577. 
26 A. Merrylees, ‘Two-thirds and You’re Out? The Practice of Early Release at the ICTY and the ICC, in Light of the Goals of 
International Criminal Justice’ (2016) Amsterdam Law Forum 8(2): 69-76. 
27 Interview, Senior Staff Member, The Hague, 02/02/2017. 
28 S. Szoke-Burke, ‘Avoiding Belittlement of Human Suffering A Retributivist Critique of ICTR Sentencing Practices’ (2012) 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 10: 561-580. 
29 Noted by interviewees in BiH and see Chapter 4, s.4.4.1 and Chapter 8, s.8.2.  
30 Lenient sentences as an injustice to victims, see Chapter 4, s.4.4.2 and Chapter 8, s.8.4.2.  
31  Noted by two interviewees in BiH - Interview, NGO Director, Sarajevo, midday 06/11/2017 and Prosecutor, Federation, 
21/11/2017. These two interviewees referred to prison conditions as ‘hotel packages’ and ‘hotel service’, respectively, 
see K. King and J.D Meernik ‘Assessing the Impact of the ICTY: Balancing International with Local Interests while doing 
Justice’ in The Legacy of the ICTY (eds.) B. Swart, A. Zahar and G. Sluiter (Oxford University Press, 2011) cited by R. 
Mulgrew, Towards the Development of an International Penal System (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 229. 
32 See Chapter 4, s.4.3.2.   





The thesis expands the field of knowledge of the ICTY in its enforcement of sentences and 
contributes to the small amount of literature which has explored the normative legitimacy of UER. 
Moreover, it adds to understanding enforcement’s normative legitimacy and has extended the 
legitimacy frame into an exploration of enforcement’s sociological legitimacy. It does so on the basis 
that justice doesn’t end with the sentence, and the researcher is not alone in this understanding. 
Sentence enforcement, its “nature … and application in practice must form part of a complete 
judgment about the legitimacy of this system”.34 Kress and Sluiter’s argument that enforcement 
forms “part of a complete judgment”35 implies that it cannot be understood in isolation. Firstly, 
given that this study forms part of an overall legitimacy assessment, it was important to understand 
the existing literature which has evaluated legitimacy - that is, both its normative legitimacy as 
examined in scholarly assessments of the ICTY’s penal practices, and engagement with its 
stakeholders, its sociological legitimacy (Chapter 4). The thesis has explained that the injustice 
experienced by victims at UER was perceived as a continuation of the injustices experienced by the 
Tribunal’s sentencing practices, notably plea bargaining and lenient sentences, as well as a sense of 
remoteness from the Tribunal which appeared to focus on perpetrators’ well-being over their 
suffering (Chapter 8, s.8.2).  
 
Secondly, “part of” implies that the larger context should be recognised. Just as it was recognised 
that enforcement had a preceding practice, it is recognised that enforcement is surrounded by other 
factors. Through analysis of the reasons given by interviewees as to why they perceived UER as 
illegitimate or legitimate, this thesis has contributed both directly and sometimes implicitly, to the 
studies examining the sociological legitimacy of the ICTY in post-conflict BiH. Stakeholders’ reasoning 
clarified why these perceptions were held, or at the very least, what these stakeholders said these 
perceptions were. Interviewees spoke of the context within which their perceptions of legitimacy are 
shaped (Chapter 8, s.8.7). In the BiH criminal justice system, the prosecution of war criminals is 
perceived as lacking legitimacy on a bigger scale; it has a greater lack of transparency, whereby 
names of perpetrators are removed from the indictment; and lenient sentences, whereby 
perpetrators of rape, for example, can pay a fine in lieu of a prison sentence.36  
 
 
34 C. Kress and G. Sluiter, ‘Enforcement: Preliminary Remarks’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, J.R.W.D. Jones (eds.) The Rome 
Statute of International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2002), 1751–1756 at 1753, cited in B. 
Holá and J. van Wijk ‘Life after Conviction at International Criminal Tribunals An Empirical Overview’ Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2014) 12: 109-132 at 110. 
35 Emphasis added.  





The research does not claim to be representative of the general BiH population perceptions of UER 
but it does provide an in-depth understanding of a significant range of stakeholders’ perceptions. 
Judges and lawyers were interviewed, as were Victims’ Associations and NGOs and CSOs working 
with victims, and IGO representatives who had similarly worked with victims or on post-conflict or 
criminal justice policy. By taking the actor-orientated approach,37 recruiting a broad selection of 
stakeholders, the research provides a rich understanding as to what particular aspects of UER were 
lacking legitimacy and why these views were held.  
 
The qualitative research, namely, interviews with Tribunal stakeholders with direct knowledge of the 
decision-making process, has enabled the thesis to provide explanations as to why this practice 
occurred in the way that it did. It has confirmed Choi’s argument that the practice was foreseen as 
an exceptional grant of clemency but became a standard. However, counter to Choi’s assertion, this 
practice resulted not from the misapplication of the domestic system of parole to the international 
setting but from a combination of factors. First, the perceived pragmatic restraints (relying on states 
to enforce the sentences);38 second, remoteness from the region and subsequent lack of awareness 
of the repercussions of UER;39 third, the Presidents’ and judicial colleagues’ personal philosophy – 
such as: ensuring they were independent of politics,40 giving perpetrators a second chance,41 and a 
sense of fatalism that victims will never be satisfied with criminal justice outcomes.42 These findings 
confirm scholars’ critiques of the Tribunal’s exercise of power prior to UER. For example, in relation 
to pragmatic challenges dominating, the Tribunal was seen to act as if it were at the mercy of 
states.43 Second, were the judges’ focus on developing international criminal law and their general 
refusal to recognise that the Tribunal’s judgment had a broader societal impact, and that politics did 
play a role in that society.44 This thesis argues that if it were not for the judges themselves to engage 
with this political element of society then it should have been the task of Outreach – but the judges 
nevertheless needed to clarify their reasoning with Outreach. This also spoke to a lack of internal 
communication – as noted in Chapter 8, whereby the staff member noted, in relation to redactions 
from UER decisions, that this “is a judicial matter so leave it up to the judge. I can’t really comment 
on that”.45 Her attitude ran counter to the judge who did not perceive their role as explaining 
anything to the region; “we are a court of justice, many of the decisions are legal and the public will 
 
37 See Chapter 2, s.2.4.1. 
38 See Chapter 5, s.5.4.5.  
39 See Chapter 6, s.6.3.1. 
40 Chapter 6, s.6.4.2. 
41 Chapter 6, s.6.4.2. 
42 Chapter 8, s.8.4. 
43 See Chapter 4, s.4.2.2. 
44 See Chapter 4, s.4.3.2. 





never understand it in any case”.46 This judicial attitude is connected to the third factor that this 
thesis has also found, that judicial philosophy played a role in shaping practices.47 Some 
philosophies48 were perpetrator-focused, whereby perpetrators’ human rights and their right to 
rehabilitation are accorded priority which led to the societal context being overlooked. Other 
philosophies were more fatalistic, whereby victims are perceived as inevitably dissatisfied with 
criminal justice outcomes, or due to mass victimisation, whereby the criminal justice process had 
already excluded other victims, that it would be unfair to actively engage those who had the good 
fortune to be recognised as victims. 
 
This thesis is not simply a critical assessment of the Tribunal, and it is not a moral critique of the 
Tribunal’s UER. In addition to exploring its normative legitimacy (the empirical legal analysis of the 
decisions) it explores the extent to which UER holds sociological legitimacy amongst groups of 
stakeholders, and discusses the elements whereby legitimacy is perceived to be lacking. Many of 
these legitimacy deficits may arise from beliefs which are based on personal morals and this thesis 
has examined these beliefs.  
 
Although the focus is on the past practice, this thesis’ findings have made forward-looking 
recommendations.49 Although morals are not universal, this thesis has identified shared beliefs as to 
the legitimacy deficits of UER and has explored them. These legitimacy deficits are worthy of 
reflection. Future ICTs and the International Criminal Court, which dispense justice from afar, and 
even domestic courts which grant early release, may do well to reflect on these legitimacy deficits 
and adapt accordingly to maintain or regain legitimacy as they continue with what is a controversial 
practice. One easy step would be better communication as to the reason for UER. Given the gravity 
and nature of the crime, it was a shock to most (with the exception of judges) that UER was granted 
to these perpetrators. Stakeholders in BiH were frustrated by the lack of justification for UER.50 
Those who had received no explanation from The Tribunal were most aggrieved.  
 
 
46 Interview, Judge, The Hague, morning of 30/01/2017. See Chapter 8, s.8.4.3. 
47 See Chapter 5, s.5.4.3 for example President Meron, explicitly stating his decision to consider a guilty plea for a second 
time, due to the efficient administration of justice. And see M. Scheinin, H. Krunke and M. Aksenova, Judges as Guardians 
of Constitutionalism and Human Rights, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016). 
48 See Chapter 8, s.8.5.  
49 G. Schaffer, ‘International Legal Theory: International Law and its Methodology: The New Legal Realist Approach to 
International Law’ (2015) Leiden Journal of International Law 28: 189 cited in M. Aksenova, Elies van Sliedregt and 
Stephan Parmentier (eds.) Breaking Cycles of Mass Atrocities: Criminological and Socio-Legal Approaches in International 
Criminal Law, (2019, Hart Publishing, Oxford) 25.  





Additionally, analysis of the interviews has identified some possibilities that could justify an early 
release. Pertinent to note here is that these justifications are based on the assumption that early 
release is never unconditional. The argument is that, fundamentally, perpetrators must atone for 
their crimes. Atonement can come in many forms: an apology, testimony and provision of 
information. A genuine apology being offered acts as a validation for the victims’ worth. Providing 
testimony against “brothers in blood”51 could hold symbolic value in a country whereby crimes are 
perceived as justifiable by large segments of the perpetrators’ ethnic-political group; or, 
pragmatically, testimony could assist in bringing other criminals to justice. When they have 
information of where missing bodies are, they should cooperate and thus provide a tangible benefit 
to victims who can bury their dead.  
 
Apologies may not be accepted; that is the victims’ prerogative.52 Some may consider it offensive 
that such perpetrators are offered the opportunity to apologise but, arguably, it is no less offensive 
than them gloating at their lack of remorse, boasting that they would “do it all again”.53 Further, 
when apologies are public this means they are audible not only for victims but for post-conflict 
society, where war criminals often remain heroes for many54 and this, in turn, may promote 
reflections on past atrocities.55  
 
Substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor was perceived as an act which could justify an early 
release for many because it would lead to other convictions, thus affirming Orentlicher’s empirical 
research findings that victims largely wanted retributive justice.56 A principal finding in this thesis 
was that justice is relative: interviewees frequently referenced the injustices faced by the domestic 
criminal courts sentencing war crimes to their sense of injustice at the Tribunal’s UER; 
fundamentally, many interviewees believed that without the Tribunal no perpetrator would have 
been brought to justice.57  
 
This finding, that some justice is better than none, does not call for complacency, rather that 
criminal justice can always do better for the society it is meant to serve. Many people wanted 
 
51 Interview, NGO, RS, 24/11/2017.  
52 See Chapter 6, s.6.6.2. 
53 V. Šljivančanin cited in B. Holá, J. van Wijk, F. Constantini, and A. Korhonnen, ‘Does Remorse Count? ICTY Convicts’ 
Reflections on Their Crimes in Early Release Decisions’ (2018) International Criminal Justice Review 28(4) 349-371 at 360.  
54 See Chapter 7, s.7.5.2-7.5.3. 
55 L. Payne, Unsettling Accounts: Neither Truth nor Reconciliation in Confessions of State Violence (Duke University Press, 
2008,) 34. See Chapter 6, s.6.7.  
56 D. Orentlicher, That Someone Guilty Be Punished: The Impact of the ICTY in Bosnia (Open Society Justice Institutive and 
ICTJ, 2010) at 56. 





criminal justice for perpetrators of atrocity crimes; they were pleased that it was done, but it still 
could have been done better. As argued by one interviewee “just because it’s difficult it doesn’t 
mean you don’t try”.58 Alongside this, the thesis’ reiterates here that ICTs should not raise 
expectations unrealistically,59 or purport to achieve what they cannot obtain or are mandated to 
do.60 Fundamentally, international jurists should do their jobs to the best of their ability61 yet also 
practice some “legal humility”.62 
9.3. Limitations of the Research 
The thesis’ argument that UER lacked both normative and sociological legitimacy is based on the 
researcher’s data collection and analysis. Chapter 2, detailed the methods used in data collection 
and analysis and has done so transparently. It is believed that research can never be truly 
objective.63 This is one reason why the interviewees’ words have been used as far as possible, and 
the interpretation of these detailed. The reader may not arrive at the same interpretation but, in 
detailing the analysis, it is hoped that the reader can see why this interpretation is taken.  
 
One limitation of this research is that only one former Tribunal President, the ultimate decision-
maker, was interviewed, and he was reluctant to discuss details. This limitation reveals two things: 
first the constraint of this research, that the other four Presidents who had granted release are not 
represented here.64 Second, that qualitative analysis may only capture a small amount of what the 
interviewee actually perceives. The interviewee can say as much or as little as he wishes. However, 
semi-structured interviews, to an extent, provide flexibility to engage with unforthcoming 
interviewees. Further questions can be probed, other information provided for the interviewee to 
consider and reflect on rather than what has been questioned directly.  
 
58 Interview, NGO, Sarajevo, BiH, 01/12/2019.  
59 U. Orth, ‘Secondary Victimisation of Crime Victims by Criminal Proceedings’ (2002) Social Justice Research 15(4): 313-
325 (generally); J. Subotić, ‘Legitimacy, Scope and Conflicting Claims of the ICTY: in the Aftermath of Gotovina, Haradinaj 
and Perisic’ (2006) Journal of Human Rights 13: 170-185, 172 (specifically regarding the ICTY); and see Chapter 4, s.4.3.1.   
60 Bringing justice to victims, giving them a voice and establishing facts. See Achievement section of ICTY website: 
https://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/achievements 
61 ICTY, Rules and Procedure of Evidence, Section 1: The Judges, Rule 14(A) – ‘Before taking up duties each Judge shall 
make the following solemn declaration: "I solemnly declare that I will perform my duties and exercise my powers as a 
Judge of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 honourably, faithfully, impartially and 
conscientiously". 
62 K. McEvoy ‘Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice’ (2007) Journal of Law and 
Society 34(4) 411-440, at 411, see Chapter 4, s.4.3.1 and. J. Subotić, ‘The Cruelty of False Remorse: Biljana Plavšić at The 
Hague’ (2012) Southeastern Europe 36 (1) at 57 specifically, in relation to the ICTY and ICTs.  
63 See Chapter 2, s.2.5. 
64 All Presidents, Presidents Kirk-McDonald, Jorda, Pocar and Meron were invited for an interview. With the expectation 
of Judge Jorda, all effectively declined. Unfortunately, due to personal circumstances Judge Jorda was not able to be 
interviewed at the last moment. However, he kindly provided details of another Tribunal judge who agreed to be 






A limitation of the qualitative research in BiH was the lack of interviewees who were, at least openly, 
anti-ICTY, who did not perceive the ICTY as holding legitimacy.65 Other interviewees, although often 
critical of the Tribunal’s practice, did not perceive the Tribunal as an illegitimate institution. Another 
limitation may be that a number of nuances were lost in translation. This could be the case for the 
25 interviews66 which required interpretation as well as the interviews which were conducted with 
interviewees whose second language was English.  
 
9.4. Alternative Approaches to this Understanding UER  
One set of stakeholders at the ICTY whose voice is absent from this thesis, are the perpetrators.67 
UER is about them, and the research is about stakeholders’ perceptions of perpetrators and their 
treatment in the process. Fundamentally, however, the motivation for the thesis was an interest in 
victims and post-conflict communities’ perceptions of UER, their assessments of the Tribunal’s 
legitimacy and if UER had repercussions in their lives. Further, scholars are exploring the position of 
the perpetrators, their imprisonment,68 their rehabilitation69 and their return.70  
 
A more legalistic approach to understanding victims in the grant of UER could have been 
undertaken: examining the rights of victims in the criminal justice process, examining the extent to 
which these could be advanced in the post-sentencing phase. There is a significant body of soft law, 
the UN “Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power” 1985 and 
the Council of Europe’s Recommendation on “The Position of the Victim in the Framework of 
Criminal Law and Procedure” 1985, which recommends states to take a more victim-oriented 
approach to criminal justice, which was touched upon in Chapter 3 and Chapter 8, s.8.6.2. However, 
 
65 Only one interviewee expressly acknowledged his disregard for the ICTY. Although others may have shared a similar 
view this was not asked nor disclosed. Interviewees were not asked directly if they perceived the Tribunal as legitimate, 
rather if the grant of UER had affected their perception of the overall legitimacy. The focus of the thesis was not about 
the Tribunal’s overall legitimacy but concerned whether the practice was perceived as lacking legitimacy and if it had an 
impact on perceptions of the Tribunal’s legitimacy.  
66 24 interviews in BiH were conducted with an interpreter. One interview was conducted with a Tribunal judge with an 
interpreter, in September 2018.  
67 Only the case of perpetrator, Esad Landžo, is raised, his remorse and search for victims to apologise to: see Chapter 6, 
s.6.6.2. 
68 M. Weinberg De Roca and C. Rassi,’Sentencing and Incarceration in the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ (2008) Stanford Journal of 
International Law 44(1); R. Mulgrew, Towards the Development of the International Penal System (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014); see Chapter 4, s. 4.5.2.   
69 See Chapter 4, s.4.5.2.   






understanding victims’ perceptions of UER and its impact is important so as to understand the reality 
of victims’ justice rather than the black letter law.  
 
Another approach would be a comparative study. There were two possible options for comparisons, 
one examining early release for perpetrators of hate crimes at the national level, or one examining 
early release at other ICTs. The case of domestic practice was touched upon, the EU Directive in 
particular which found that perpetrators of serious crimes are generally not granted UER and victims 
are often provided with information on release.71 However, the societal context is fundamentally 
different. Post-conflict countries, and BiH in particular, are often deeply divided and thus “tend to 
have sharply different perceptions regarding the … dynamics of the conflict … [and an] inability of 
social groups to acknowledge criminal responsibility of their co-nationals”,72 to relativise crimes73 
(our group had the most victims) or for groups to counter their group’s crimes with the “tu quoque” 
defense74 - that the other parties to the conflict committed similar atrocities or that they were the 
ones who commenced the atrocity.75 
 
The comparative study approach was considered, the UER of perpetrators by the ICTY and by its 
sister Tribunal, the ICTR. However, the two cases are distinct. First, the ICTY has a significant number 
of UER (54 of the 90 convicted); whereas only 12 of 62 ICTR perpetrators have been granted UER,76 
one in 2019 was granted conditional release.77 Second, the nature of perpetrators’ return differs. In 
Rwanda, the Tutsi government is in power, which means that perpetrators, Hutus, do not return.78 
Many remain at the UN “safe house” in Arusha and others have remained in the enforcement states 
of their sentences.79 
 
 
71 See Chapter 8, s.8.6.2. 
72 M. Tripkovic, ‘Not in Our Name’ in M. Aksenova, E. van Sliedregt and S. Parmentier (eds.) Breaking Cycles of Mass 
Atrocities: Criminological and Socio-Legal Approaches in International Criminal Law (Hart, 2019) at 177. 
73 D. Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY’s Impact in Bosnia and Serbia (Oxford University Press, 2018) at 264-265, 
“BCHR surveys capture stark differences in the responses of citizens in predominately Serb, Croat, and Bosniak regions, 
respectively, to questions about relative victimization and responsibility for war crimes” at 264.  
74 R.A. Wilson, Writing History in International Criminal Trials (Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 155. 
75 Decision of the Good Character of the Accused and the Defence of Tu Quoque, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al, IT-
95-16-t, 17 February 1999, cited in R.A. Wilson, Writing History in International Criminal Trials (Cambridge University 
Press, 2011) at 155-156. 
76 G. Ruggiu, M. Bagaragaza, T. Muvunyi, J. Rugambarara, P. Bisengimana, O. Serushago, O. Ruzindana, I. Sagahutu, G. 
Ntakirutimana, F. Nahimana, A. Nteziryayo, E. Rukundo and see https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal   
77 A. Simba, released on condition, 7 January 2019, see: https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/ictr/41861-early-
release-of-ictr-convicts-the-practice-beyond-the-outrage.html [accessed 10/12/2019]. 
78 B. Holá and J. van Wijk, ‘Life after Conviction at International Criminal Tribunals: An Empirical Overview’ (2014) Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 12: 109-132, at 131. 





9.5. The Research’s Significance and Broader Relevance to International Criminal Justice  
 
The findings of this thesis, in addition to specific proposals (s.9.2), provide broader reflections for 
international criminal justice. Paying heed to these reflections may benefit other international 
criminal tribunals, or indeed any criminal justice system punishing atrocity crimes, if they wish to be 
perceived as legitimate by those whose lives they affect, post-conflict communities.80 In addition to 
demonstrating a normative legitimacy deficit, the research’s findings from BiH stakeholders’ 
interviews provide unique insights into why UER lacked sociological legitimacy. There are three main 
reasons and three subsequent recommendations.  
 
First, atrocity crimes are fundamentally different to ordinary crimes due to their discriminatory 
motive or perpetration within a context of group-based hatred. Atrocity crimes happen in a context 
and in post-conflict society elements of that context may be ongoing.81 In relation to UER for 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes this means that, when they return to the same post-conflict 
community, their social reintegration is radically different to that of perpetrators of ordinary crimes. 
As Chapters 6 and 7 illustrated, this belief was shared by the majority of stakeholders interviewed, 
insiders at The Hague and outsiders in BiH. One of the reasons why the Tribunal’s Presidents’ early 
release decisions lacked legitimacy was that this fundamental difference was not, until recently,82 
accounted for in their consideration of rehabilitation.  
 
It follows from this that any institution considering a grant of early release to a perpetrator who 
plans to return to a post-conflict society should take into account that society, and the perpetrator’s 
willingness to peacefully and respectfully return to that society. This is not an unreasonable 
proposal. It is in line with the second element of the notion of rehabilitation under international 
human rights law, the perpetrator’s “social reformation”.83 Although it may not be the normal role 
of a judge, where they are tasked with this responsibility, they should fulfill it to the best of their 
ability. This recommendation appears to have been adopted by the current Tribunal President.84 
 
80 These insights may be pertinent to the punishment and its premature ending and thus are of broader relevance for any 
institution (international or local) which punish atrocity crimes and consider early release from that punishment.  
81 Detailed in Chapter 7.  
82 Prosecutor v. Miroslav Bralo, Public Redacted Version, Decision on the Early Release of Miroslav Bralo, 31 December 
2019, paras. 38 and 39. 
83 Article 10(3) ICCPR.  
84 Prosecutor v. Miroslav Bralo, Public Redacted Version, Decision on the Early Release of Miroslav Bralo, 31 December 
2019, whereby UNMICT President Agius noted that, “in my opinion, it is not appropriate to look at the rehabilitation of 
perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes through the exact paradigm as rehabilitation of 





Future Presidents, and other tribunals and courts which consider early release for atrocity 
perpetrators, could possibly manage their legitimacy in continuing this practice.  
 
Second, punishment of perpetrators of atrocity crimes (mass victimisation motivated by or within 
the context of group-based hatred) symbolises the condemnation of the act of hatred and is 
simultaneously a recognition of the dignity of the victims. Consequently, UER was widely perceived 
of as a negation of the expression of condemnation and vindication of the victims.85  
 
With this finding in mind, early release (unconditional or not) of perpetrators should be explained to 
stakeholders in post-conflict societies to counter these misunderstandings.86 This recommendation 
accords with the legitimacy standard of legitimation through justification. Although not everyone 
may agree with the reasoning, notifying and explaining the decision would accord respect to the 
victims, which this thesis argues should not be discounted at the early release stage. Paying respect 
to victims is also in line with UN and EU Standards on the Rights of Victims.87  
 
Third, primarily due to its own rhetoric, a majority of stakeholders, especially victims, in BiH 
expected more from the ICTY than its “sole purpose” of bringing perpetrators to justice – which was 
its core mandate under the UNSCR. This is important to emphasise as international criminal justice is 
fundamentally about criminal accountability, despite some aspirations, expressed by scholars and 
others, of bringing voice to victims, providing an authoritative truth or being a means of 
reconciliation.88 Findings from BiH showed that many victims wanted criminal justice for the crimes, 
and the fact that some justice was done meant that UER did not delegitimise the Tribunal overall. 
Nevertheless many, especially victims, were deeply disappointed and one factor was that the 
Tribunal had promised more than it could achieve.  
 
Going forward, therefore, international criminal tribunals and courts should not purport to do more 
than they are mandated, or able to do. They should focus on fulfilling, to the best of their abilities, 
their core mandate: holding perpetrators to account through a fair trial. When unrealistic promises 
are made, they are heard and this can lead to disappointment for those who have already suffered, 
the victims.  
 
85 Chapter 7.  
86 Again, President Agius adopted this practice as he denied early release to Bralo, stating that, “I consider that it is in the 
interest of transparency to identify some of the principles that guide my reasoning”, Decision on the Early Release of 
Miroslav Bralo, 31 December 2019, at para. 38.  
87 See Chapter 3 and Chapter 8, s.8.5.1.  






These three recommendations are reasonable and in accordance with international human rights 
standards. Moreover, they are straightforward; they could be followed by practitioners in the field of 
international criminal justice simply by bearing in mind the old truism – that justice should be seen 
to be done. Keeping this in mind, practitioners would be more aware that their actions have 
consequences for the people whom justice is meant to serve and would, therefore, consider them in 
this final dispensation of justice, that is, the grant, where appropriate, of atrocity perpetrators’ early 
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2004. [GRANTED] 
A. Furundžija, Order of the President on the Application for the Early Release of Anto Furundžija 29 
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P. Strugar, Decision of the President on the Application for Pardon or Commutation of Sentence of 
Pavle Strugar, 16 January 2009. [GRANTED] 
V. Šantić, Decision of the President on the Application for Pardon or Commutation of Sentence of V. 
Šantić, 16 February 2009. [GRANTED] 
M. Krnojelac, Decision of the President on the Application for Pardon or Commutation of Sentence, 9 
July 2009. [GRANTED] 
B. Plavšić, Decision of the President on the Application for Pardon or Commutation of Sentence of 
Biljana Plavšić, 14 September 2009. [GRANTED] 
 
2010  
M. Vasiljević, Public Redacted Version of Decision of the President on the Application for Pardon or 
Commutation of Sentence of Mitar Vasiljević, 12 March 2010. [GRANTED] 
D. Jokić, Public Redacted Version of Decision of the President on the Application for Pardon or 
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2011. [GRANTED] 
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H. Bala, Public Redacted Decision of the President on the Early Release of Haradin Bala, 28 June 
2012, 9 January 2013. [GRANTED] 
D. Zelenović, Early Release Decision, 24 June 2008, 30 November 2012 [DENIED]  
M. Naletilić, Public Redacted Version of the 29 November 2012 Decision the President on the Early 
Release of Mladen Naletilić, 26 March 2013. [GRANTED] 
 
2013 
M. Radić, Public Redacted Version of the 13 February 2013 of Decision the President on the Early 
Release of Mlađo Radić, 9 January 2013. [GRANTED] 
J. Tarčulovski, Decision the President on the Early Release of Johan Tarčulovski, 8 April 2013. 
[GRANTED] 
M. Krajišnik, Decision the President on the Early Release of Momčilo Krajišnik, 2 July 2013. 
[GRANTED] 
R. Kovač, Public Redacted Version of the 27 March 2013 of Decision the President on the Early 
Release of Radomir Kovač, 3 July 2013. [GRANTED] 
D. Ojdanić, Public Redacted Version of the 10 July 2013 of Decision the President on the Early 





D. Mrđa, Decision the President on the Early Release of Darko Mrđa, 18 December 2013. [GRANTED] 
 
2014 
Dragan Nikolić, Decision the President on the Early Release of Dragan Nikolić, 16 January 2014. 
[GRANTED] 
R. Češić, Public Redacted Version of the 30 April 2014 Decision of the President on the Early Release 
of on the Early Release of Ranko Češić, 28 May 2014. [GRANTED] 
 
2015 
V. Pandurević, Public Redacted Version of the 9 April 2015 Decision of the President on the Early 
Release of Vinko Pandurević, 10 April 2015. [GRANTED] 
N. Šainović, Public Redacted Version of the 10 July 2015 Decision of the President on the Early 
Release of Nikola Šainović, 27 August 2015. [GRANTED] 
Drago Nikolić, 20 July 2015 Decision of the President on the Application for Early Release or other 
Relief of Drago Nikolić’, made public 13 October 2015. [GRANTED] 
V. Lazarević, Public Redacted Version of the 7 September 2015 Decision of the President on the Early 
Release of Vladimir Lazarević, 3 December 2015. [GRANTED] 
D. Zelenović, Public Redacted Version of the 28 August 2015 Decision of the President on the Early 
Release of Dragan Zelenović, 15 September 2015. [GRANTED] 
 
2016 
L. Borovčanin, Public Redacted Version of 14 July 2016 Decision of the President on the Early Release 
of Ljubomir Borovčanin, 2 August 2016. [GRANTED] 
 
2017 
D. Kunarac, Decision of the President on the Early Release of Dragoljub Kunarac, 2 February 2017 
[DENIED]  
L. Beara, Public Redacted Version of the 7 February 2017 Decision of the President on the Early 
Release of Ljubiša Beara, 16 June 2017. [GRANTED] 
 
2018  
B. Pušić, Public Redacted Version of the 20 April 2018 Decision of the President on the Early Release 
of Berislav Pušić, made public 24 April 2018. [GRANTED] 








V. Ćorić, Further Redacted Version of the Decision of the President on the Early Release of Valentin 
Early Release Decision of Ćorić and Related Motions, 16 January 2019 [GRANTED CONDITIONAL 
RELEASE]  









Annex II: Schedule of Interviews 
 
ICTY and UNMICT: Including ICTY President Judge Agius, Judge Flügge, Judge Moloto and Judge 
Orie.1 
 
Interview Interviewee Location  Date  
1 Judge  
 
The Hague 23/01/2017 
2 Staff Member, The Registry  
 
The Hague 23/01/2017 
3 Senior Staff Member, The Registry  The Hague 
 
24/01/2017 
4 Staff Member, The Registry  
 
The Hague 24/01/2017 
5 Defence Counsel, Mr. Peter Robinson  
 
The Hague 25/01/2017  
6 Judge, Former President of the ICTY 
 
The Hague 25/01/2017 
7 Judge  
 
The Hague 26/01/2017  
8 Staff Member, The Registry  
 
The Hague 27/01/2017  
9 Staff Member, The Registry  
 
The Hague 31/01/2017 
10 Judge  
 
The Hague Morning 30/01/2017  
11 Judge  The Hague Afternoon 30/01/2017  
12 Judge The Hague 01/02/2017 
 
 
1 As two judges did not wish to be named their anonymity has been maintained by not identifying any 
interviewee by name. 
 
 
Interview Interviewee Location  Date  
13 Senior Staff Member, Office of the Prosecutor  The Hague 02/02/2017  
 
14 Senior Staff Member, President’s Office  The Hague 02/02/2017 
 
15 Judge  
 
The Hague 03/02/2017 
16 Staff Member, President’s Office  
 
The Hague 03/02/2017  
 
17 Staff Member, The Registry  The Hague 26/01/2017 
 






BiH – 51 interviews2  
- Including the following CSOs and NGOs: Association for Transitional Justice, Accountability and 
Remembrance, Sarajevo; Austra Nula, Banja Luka; Centre for Democracy and Transitional Justice, 
Sarajevo; Balkans Investigating Reporting Network, Sarajevo; Center for Investigative Reporting, 
Sarajevo; Republic Organization of Families of Captured and Killed Soldiers and Missing Civilians, 
Banja Luka; Research and Documentation Center, Sarajevo; Snaga Žene, Sarajevo; Society for 
Threatened People, Sarajevo; Sehera, Goražde; Suza, Brčko Vasa Prava, Sarajevo; Victims and 
Witnesses of Genocide, Sarajevo; Vive Žene, Tuzla; TRIAL International; and Youth Initiative for 
Human Rights, Sarajevo. 
- Including the following IGOs: the Council of Europe, the European Union and the United Nations 
Development Programme.  





2 As not all interviewees wished to be named their anonymity has been maintained by not identifying any 




Interview  Interviewee(s)  
 
Location, BiH Date  
1 NGO Representative  Sarajevo  16/10/2017 
 
2 Judges, War Crimes Chamber, Bosnian 
State Court  
(Two judges)  
 
Sarajevo  18/10/2017 
 
3 NGO, Staff Member  Sarajevo  27/10/2017  
 
4 NGO, Staff Member  Sarajevo  02/11/2017  
 
5 Ministry of Justice  
 
Sarajevo  03/11/2017 
6 Judge, formerly served at War Crimes 
Chamber  
 
Sarajevo  03/11/2017 
7 Defence Lawyer  Sarajevo  03/11/2017 
 
8 Victims’ Association, Director and Staff 
Member  
 
Sarajevo  Morning, 06/11/2017 
9 NGO, Director  
 
Sarajevo  Midday, 06/11/2017 
10 NGO, Director  
 
Sarajevo  Afternoon, 
06/11/2017 
11 NGO, Director 
 
Sarajevo  07/11/2017 
 
12 ICTY, Staff Member  Sarajevo  08/11/20197 
 
13 Prosecutor  Zenica 09/11/2017 
 
 
Interview  Interviewee(s)  
 
Location, BiH Date  
 
14 Chief Prosecutor  Brčko 
 
13/11/2017 
15 Prosecutor  
 
Brčko 13/11/2017 
16 Judges (3)  
 
Brčko 13/11/2017 
17 Judge and Member of Parole Commission  Brčko 
 
13/11/2017 




19 Victims’ Association  
  
Brčko 14/11/2017 
20 State Representative  
 
Brčko 14/11/2017 
21 Independent expert with professional 
experience of working with Victims of SV 
of the conflict 
 
Sarajevo  16/11/2017  
 
22 Prosecutor  
 
Eastern 
Sarajevo, RS  
 
17/11/2017 
















Interview  Interviewee(s)  
 
Location, BiH Date  
26 Victims’ Association  Prijedor, RS  22/11/2017  
 
27 Victims’ Association RS 23/11/2017 
 
28 CSO, Director  
 
Banja Luka, RS  23/11/2017 
29 Victim who had testified before the ICTY  
 
Prijedor, RS  23/11/2017 
30 NGO, Director  
 
Banja Luka, RS  24/11/2017  
31 NGO Staff Member  Banja Luka, RS 24/11/2017 
 
32 NGO Staff Member  
  
Sarajevo  01/12/2017 
33 IGO Staff Member  
 
Sarajevo  01/12/2017 






35 NGO, Director  Sarajevo  07/12/2017 
 
36 Prosecutor  
 
Mostar  08/12/2017  
 
37 Judge  Trebinje 08/12/2017  
 
38 Judge Cantonal Court  Sarajevo  12/12/2017 
 





Interview  Interviewee(s)  
 
Location, BiH Date  
 
40 NGO Sarajevo 14/12/2017 
 
41 NGO, Staff Member  Tuzla  15/12/2017 
 
42 IGO, Staff Member, EU Sarajevo 19/12/2017 
 
43 Judges, War Crimes Chamber, Bosnian 
State Court  




44 Individual currently working in an 
independent state institution with 




45 IGO, Senior Staff Member  
  
Sarajevo 21/12/2017 
46 IGO, Senior Staff Member 
 
Sarajevo 21/12/2017 
47 Independent with professional experience 
engaging with victim-witnesses in 
Srebrenica 
Sarajevo 21/12/2017 
48 Defence Lawyers (2)  
 
Sarajevo 22/12/2017 
49 Investigative Journalist 
 
Sarajevo 22/12/2017 
50 Independent lawyer  
 
Sarajevo 22/12/2017 
51 NGO (via Skype)  Sarajevo 18/01/2018  
 





Annex III: Interview Template: The Hague 
 
• The Evolution and Practice of Early Release 
 
1. What were your first thoughts on UER at the Tribunal?  
 
2. What do you think are the most important factors to consider in determining the grant of early 
release? 
 
3. What would be the general attitude amongst judges/staff on the early release of prisoners? 
 
4. On occasions where the Judges consulted were against early release do you know what their 
propositions about what should happen to the prisoner were? 
 
5. Are you aware of any consideration given to establishing agreements with states where the 
convict returns to have a system in place for monitoring conditional release? 
 
6. Do you think there would have been a value in establishing a practice of conditional release and a 
mechanism to monitor a grant of conditional release? 
 
• Purpose of Punishment 
 
7. What do you think are the purposes of imprisonment, within the context of international crimes? 
 
8. In the sentencing determinations at the ICTY retribution is the most cited purpose of punishment, 
second is deterrence, followed by rehabilitation. Retribution is cited not as revenge or simply the 
rule of law but tied to the notion of the “moral condemnation of the wrongs committed’. To what 
extent can the stated purposes be reconciled with convicts been granted unconditional early 
release? 
 
9. (a) To what extent is the prisoners’ acknowledgement of the crimes and remorse considered as 
important to the demonstration of rehabilitation? 
 
9. (b) What you think about the current process of determining a demonstration of rehabilitation? 
 
• Victims / Justice 
 
10. Do you know if witnesses and victims’ communities are informed of early release decisions in 
advance? There is an option to do so in the PD but it is not mandatory. 
 
11. Do you think, in retrospect, there should have been a consultation process with victims? 
 
12. What impact, if any, do the views of the victims’ communities and the wider general public have 
on how the Tribunal / Mechanism informs its work? 
 




14. A number of decisions have substantial redactions. What impact do you feel, if any, these 





Annex IV: Interview Template: BiH 
   
1. The practice, process and perception of Early Release at the ICTY/MICT  
 
1.1. Can you remember how you first came to know about early release at the ICTY? 
 
1.2. What were your immediate thoughts about early release?  
 
1.3. How much do you know about the past process of early release at the ICTY and current process 
at its Residual Mechanism? 
 
1.4. What do you think about these processes? 
 
1.5. In deciding early release the President is required by the Statute and the RPE to take into 
account four factors: gravity of the crimes; cooperation with the prosecutor; treatment of similarly-
situated prisoners; and a demonstration of rehabilitation. 
 
1.5.1. How would you prioritise these statutory factors?  
- which ones do you consider the most important?  
 
1.5.2. If relevant - cooperation with prosecutor - only post-conviction or prior to conviction, which 
would have been considered at sentencing?  
 
1.6. Other factors have been considered by former and the current President;- such as the ill-health 
of the perpetrator and/or a family member, family ties, the perpetrator’s age, personal implications 
of early release for the perpetrator (for example their ability to get a job, re-integrate into society.  
 
1.6.1. How would you prioritise these additional factors? - which do you think are important?  
 
1.7. Are any of these factors that you think should not be considered for perpetrators of 
international crimes?  
 
1.8. Are there other factors that you would consider important? If so, what ones and why?  
 
1.9. How do you think rehabilitation should be demonstrated in order for a perpetrator to be 
granted early release?  
 
1.9.1. Should remorse be considered as an indication of rehabilitation?  
 
1.9.2. Should good behaviour in prison be considered as rehabilitation?  
 






2. Purpose of punishment  
 




2.2. In the sentencing determinations at the ICTY retribution is the most cited purpose of 
punishment, second is deterrence, followed by rehabilitation. Retribution is cited not as revenge but 
tied to the notion of the “moral condemnation of the wrongs committed”.  
 
2.2.1. How would you prioritise these purposes of punishment? 
 
2.3. To what extent can the stated purpose of retribution - moral condemnation of crimes - be 
squared/matched/reconciled with perpetrators been granted unconditional early release?  
 
3. Personal perspective  
 
3.1. How has the practice of granting unconditional early release to perpetrators, generally after 
having served two thirds of their sentence, affected how you perceive the ICTY and its Residual 
Mechanism?  
 
4. Victims’ and survivors’ perspectives 
 
4.1. How do victims and survivors in general, those who haven’t testified in The Hague, find out 
about the early release of perpetrators?  
 
4.2. What do victims and survivors, in general, know about the process of early release at the 
ICTY/MICT?  
 
4.3. How do you think victims and survivors in general feel about the process of early release?  
4. 3.1. What factors do you think shape their opinion? 
4.3.2. Are there multiple opinions? 
4.3.3. Do these opinions on early release divide victims and survivors?  
 
4.4. What do you think of the argument that regardless of early release victims’ and survivors’ 
communities would be unsatisfied with the ICTY’s sentencing practice? 
 
4.5. Do you think victims and survivors should have been considered while making the decision on 
early release? 
 
4.6. Do you think victims and survivors should have been consulted in the process of early release?  
 
5. National practice 
 
5.1 What do you know about the practice of parole in BiH? 
 
5.2. Do you know if the law on the execution of criminal sanctions was influenced by the ICTY’s 
practice of granting early release generally after a perpetrator has served two-thirds of his/her 
sentence?  
 
5.3. Do you know if the law on parole at the state and entity levels was shaped by other factors, such 
as International experts involved in drafting legislation?  
 
6. Redactions from the public decisions on the grant of early release  
 




6.2. What impact do you feel, if any, these redactions have on how the decision is perceived by the 
person reading it? 
 
6.3. Redactions about the perpetrators’ right to privacy - what do you think about this?  
 
7. Conditional early release 
 
7.1 Do you think it would have made a difference if conditions had been attached to their early 
release (restrictions placed on them for the duration of their sentence) - such as no talking to the 
media; a statement of remorse? 
 
 
 
